Asian-Arab philosophical dialogues on globalization, democracy ...

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Asia-<strong>Arab</strong> Philosophical Dialogues on Globalization, Democracy and Human Rights
government—was meant to be minimal: seen chiefly as protectors of private property, political regimes
were said to govern best when governing least. The dismal experiences of the twentieth century with
populist and totalitarian governments have reinforced the liberal preference for political or public
minimalism—despite occasional concessions to “welfare” programs during times of economic hardship.
As a result of these experiences and developments, the notion of individual freedom has come to be
equated preponderantly with “negative liberty” (to use Isaiah Berlin’s phrase) or the freedom to be left
alone—with only limited allowance made for active or “positive freedom” (mainly on the level of voting
rights and lobbying). In his study of John Dewey (who opposed this entire trend), Raymond Boisvert has
sketched the stereotype of the minimalist liberal: “an individual with no roots and little connectedness
to community; . . . a highly competitive individual fixated on narrow purposes whose practice is marked
by expedience rather than conventional ethics”. 1
On a sophisticated level, aspects of democratic minimalism can be found even in the writings of
theorists or intellectuals otherwise strongly committed to democratic politics. As stated above, an
example is Robert Dahl’s celebrated text A Preface to Democratic Theory (first published in 1956). In the
very Introduction to his study, Dahl delineates two basic approaches in this field: a “maximizing” theory
(relying either on ethical principles or formal axioms) and a purely “descriptive-empirical” and to that
extent minimalizing approach. Traditional political theory, he notes, has tended to be “maximizing”
by emphasizing “internal checks”—such as conscience and ethical dispositions—to restrain possible
excesses of governmental power. This approach, however, has gone out of fashion since the
revolutionary period and, in America, since the writings of James Madison. From Madison’s perspective,
the traditional ethical approach was simply no longer viable given the increasingly competitive and
interest-based character of modern politics. 2 Another example of a democratic theorist leaning in the
minimalist direction is Giovanni Sartori, well known for his text The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Like
Dahl’s study, Sartori’s text distinguishes at the outset between a “prescriptive” or normative conception
and a “descriptive” or empirical conception—with the latter version involving greatly reduced demands
on democratic politics. In his view, to introduce normative expectations is likely to overburden the
democratic regime such as to render it unviable. In view of the alleged danger associated with public
ethics, Sartori prefers to employ “minimalist” language and to leave phrases like “political morality, social
morality, professional ethics” aside. Democracy or “democratic machinery” coincides for him—and many
other empirical theorists—with voting behavior, pursuit of individual interests through pressure groups
and political parties, and public policy-making on the basis of these interests. 3
An even more resolutely minimalist approach is propagated by a perspective which, in recent times,
has increasingly gained prominence in the social sciences: rational choice theory. This outlook basically
transfers neo-classical economic assumptions to social and political life. As can readily be seen, what
is jeopardized or called into question by this model is not only public ethics, but politics, particularly
democratic polities, as such. For, even when seen as a minimally shared regime, democracy is bound to
be a burden or hindrance for the ambitions of an unrestrained economic agenda. No one has articulated
this burden more forcefully than William Riker, a founder of this model, in his book Liberalism Against
Populism (of 1982). As Riker states at the outset: “The theory of social [or rational] choice is a theory about
the way the tastes, preferences, or values of individual persons are amalgamated and summarized into
the choice of a collective group or society”. Since these preferences are not ethically ranked, the primary
focus is on something measurable or quantifiable: in economics monetary profit, in politics “the theory
of voting” which is the core of liberal (or libertarian) democracy, barring any interference with voting
preferences. Like Dahl, Riker distinguishes between a normative-ethical and an empirical or “analytical”
conception of politics—placing rational choice clearly in the second category. 4
1 Boisvert, Raymond D. and Dewey, John. 1998. Rethinking Our Time. Albany, NY, State University of New York Press,
p. 51-52. Compare also Berlin, Isaiah. 1977 Four Essays on Liberty. London, Oxford University Press; and for a critique
Taylor, Charles. 1979. What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty? Alan Ryan (ed), The Idea of Freedom, Essays in Honor of
Isaiah Berlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. .
2 See Dahl, Robert A. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 2, 18-19. To Dahl’s
credit, one has to acknowledge that he stressed not only formal procedural limits but also “inherent social checks
and balances”. He also refers (p. 22, 82-83) to an “underlying consensus on policy” existing “prior to politics”. But the
origin of this consensus is not disclosed.
3 Sartori, Giovanni. 1987. The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Vol. 1. Chatham, NJ, Chatham House Publ., p. 12-13, 17-18,
241-242; vol. 2, p. 476-477.
4 Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory
of Social Choice. Prospective Heights, IL, Waveland Press, p. 1-3.