Space Superiority

Space Superiority
The Chinese Threat to
US Space Superiority
Maj Richard J. Adams and Col Martin E. France
Air Force Space Command
Take unexpected routes to attack where the enemy is not
prepared.
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Space is becoming as essential to the economic and military
vitality of 21st century nations as the sea was for
states in times past. Just as 18th century Great Britain drew a
major portion of its influence from sea power, the United States
relies tremendously on space power to secure its global position.
America’s leveraging of spaceborne assets creates both
asymmetric advantages and vulnerabilities of strategic significance.
The deep and pervasive embedding of satellite-enabled
capabilities into modern systems makes functioning without
them unimaginable throughout the developed world, especially
in the United States. Recognizing the benefits conferred by
space systems on the nations that rely on them most motivates
potential adversaries to develop means to exploit their current
fragility and susceptibility to attack (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: Potential adversaries recognize the tremendous asymmetric
advantage the US military derives from space-based communications,
precision navigation and timing, weather, missile warning, and ISR.
The perceived emergence of threats to US space systems has
led the Department of Defense to place a greater emphasis on
space superiority and its components: space situation awareness;
defensive counterspace; and offensive counterspace. 1 At
the same time, discussion of increased US counterspace activity
has drawn the ire of critics who contend such moves are
unmerited and counterproductive. Space sanctuary and space
arms control advocates discount the counterspace threat from
potential rivals, arguing no nation possesses both the capability
and intent to attack America’s on-orbit assets. Numerous opponents
of space superiority programs also claim US developments
in this arena will only motivate potential adversaries to
develop their own counterspace or anti-satellite (ASAT) systems.
In fact, military competitors already possess much more
compelling motivations for deploying such capabilities. One
would-be adversary, China, has both the intent and an expanding
capability to exploit the vulnerability of US space systems
in the event of a future conflict. China’s counterspace ambitions
are not a reaction to American space control activity, but
instead are driven by more Earthly concerns of conventional
and nuclear balance of power in Asia.
The Space Sanctuary Position
Space sanctuary and arms control proponents have downplayed
US defense establishment concerns over a counterspace
threat from emerging adversaries. They maintain that prospective
foes lack either the intent or the capability necessary to
pose a legitimate threat to American space assets. Space sanctuary
advocates argue space-faring nations would have as much
to lose as the US in a “space war,” while more hostile, less
developed nations and groups simply lack the technology necessary
to mount an effective counterspace attack. Meanwhile,
opponents of space weaponization have characterized space
control advocates’ goals as ill-considered and self-serving. As
for China’s role, they argue that Beijing seeks only peaceful cooperation
in space and will only turn to space weapons if forced
to respond to US counterspace initiatives.
Bruce M. DeBlois, Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations, has been an outspoken proponent of the
space sanctuary school of thought. In a 1998 Aerospace Power
Journal article, he portrayed predictions of adversary space
weapons as “paranoid justification for US space programs.” He
went on to discount any hostile Chinese intent, stating: “China
is interested in space but has done nothing except persistently
pursue collaboration with Europe and the United States.” 2
Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Center for Defense
Information, has also been at the forefront of the debate over
space weaponization. In a recent special issue of the Disarmament
Forum, she suggests the current administration’s view
of the evolving threat to our space systems might be “overly
pessimistic.” 3 On the viability of a foreign threat she argues
neither capability nor intent exist saying, “There is little evidence
to date that any other country or hostile non-state actor
possesses both the mature technology and the intention to seriously
threaten American military or commercial operations in
space ...” 4
High Frontier Winter 2005 17