Space Superiority

true that it is essential for space capabilities to provide support
for terrestrial operations, to focus solely on that result ignores the
more immediate importance of gaining and maintaining control
of the medium. What is needed is a Doolittle-like refocus: “The
primary space mission is to ensure space superiority,” from
which all the numerous advantages of space capabilities can flow
for ultimate success on the terrestrial battlefield. The proposed
recommendations: (1) gain and maintain space superiority to
equal footing with superiority within the other mediums as the
sine qua non for the advantages of space capabilities, and (2)
establishment of a clear authority and process for the development
and execution of a space superiority strategy, together comprise a
positive start towards achieving this necessary refocus.
Notes:
1
An important distinction made here – the space weaponization issue
is most frequently looked at from the question “Should the US deploy
weapons in space?” The underpinning belief in this analysis is that the US
has no monopoly on that decision, and, indeed, adversaries have far more
to gain by initiating attacks on space assets.
2
Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1978), 46.
3
Henri Troyat, Alexander of Russia: Napoleon’s Conqueror, trans.
Joan Pinkham (New York: Fromm International Publishing Corporation,
1986), 140.
4
Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia (1843, Repub,
USA: Da Capo Press, 1995), 179.
5
Ibid., 163.
6
Troyat, 162, 166.
7
Rothenberg, 55.
8
Andrew Williams, The Battle of the Atlantic: Hitler’s Gray Wolves
of the Sea and the Allies’ Desperate Struggle to Defeat Them (New York:
Basic Books, 2003), 144.
9
Steven Trent Smith, Wolfpack: The American Submarine Strategy
That Helped Defeat Japan (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2003), 16.
10
Ibid., 17.
11
Williams, 127.
12
Craig C. Hannah, Striving for Air Superiority: The Tactical Air Command
in Vietnam (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press,
2002), 14.
13
Ibid., 73.
14
Ibid., 83.
15
Williams, 91.
16
Hannah, 54.
17
Herman L. Gilster, The Air War in Southeast Asia (Maxwell AFB,
Ala.: Air University Press, 1993), 91.
18
David R. Tanks, “Future Challenges to US Space Systems.” The
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (Washington, D.C., 1998), 7.
19
John P. Geis, II, Directed Energy Weapons on the Battlefield, Center
for Strategy and Technology Occasional Paper No. 32 (Maxwell AFB,
Ala., 2003), 28.
20
Tanks, 4-13
21
Lambeth, 18.
22
Ibid., 31.
23
Tanks, 12.
24
“Bejing Alleges Falun Gong Hijacked Chinese TV Sat During World
Cup,” Space Daily, 8 July 2002, on-line, Internet, available from http://
www.spacedaily.com/cyberwar-02f.html
25
Hannah, 86.
26
Mark Clodfelter, “Of Demons, Storms, and Thunder: A Preliminary
Look at Vietnam’s Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Campaign,” Airpower
Journal, Winter 1991, 19.
27
Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American
Space Power (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 1.
28
Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, devotes a paragraph
to the importance of achieving superiority in the space, electromagnetic,
and information domains. Similarly, Joint Publication 3-14, Joint
Doctrine for Space Operations, includes several references to the need for
space superiority. But these appear more isolated instances rather than
consistent themes, and no Joint Publication devotes significant attention
to the development and execution of a strategy for maintaining space superiority.
29
Michael V. Smith, Ten Propositions Regarding Space Power (Maxwell
AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2002). Smith makes the case in his
second proposition that space has inherently global properties.
30
Command and control of space capabilities remains a central issue in
joint warfighting today. This analysis acknowledges the ongoing efforts
to define it, but notes a distinction between C2 of space forces during
operations, and the planning of a strategy as part of an overall theater campaign.
The latter, in the near-term, will need to be done chiefly in theater,
with the JFACC as its champion.
31
Stephen L. McFarland and Wesley Phillips Newton, “American Strategic
Air Offensive,” 183-252, Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment,
ed., R. Cargill Hall (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office,
1998), 211.
Maj John E. Shaw (BS, USAFA; MS, University
of Washington; Massachusetts, The George
Washington University) is the Operations Officer
for the 25th Space Control Tactics Squadron,
Space Warfare Center, Schriever AFB,
Colorado. He is responsible for the direction
of all squadron efforts to develop, document
and assess space tactics, techniques and procedures;
to establish and operate the Space Test
and Training Range; and to propagate approved
tactics and space control employment concepts
to warfighters. In previous assignments, Major
Shaw has served on operations tours in the
50th Space Wing, the National Reconnaissance
Office, and the 32nd Air Operations Group
(USAFE). He has also served on the Air Staff
as Deputy Chief of Space Strategy and Integration
and as a Speechwriter. Major Shaw is a distinguished
graduate of Squadron Officer School
and Air Command and Staff College.
28 High Frontier Winter 2005