Space Superiority

What measures should be in place to make sure America is
able to use space capabilities at any time?
On 2 August 2004, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General
John P. Jumper, issued Air Force Doctrine Document 2-
2.1, Counterspace Operations. In this publication, General
Jumper outlines the role of Air Force space in the conduct of
counterspace operations. General Jumper states, “We must
be prepared to deprive an adversary of the benefits of space
capabilities when American interests and lives are at stake.” 5
This involves America’s use of space during combat operations,
but it also includes everyday uses of space. Protecting
those space capabilities is the hurdle that must be overcome to
ensure uninterrupted use. There are DCS measures that can
be taken to maximize usage of both military and commercial
space systems.
For the most part, protecting our space systems does not
require orbiting space sentinels or the pre-emptive destruction
of enemy capabilities. The effectiveness
of hostile attacks can be limited
with passive techniques. Many of these
techniques can be implemented long before
the systems are launched into space.
Designing satellite command and control
and uplink/downlink facilities to be highly
resistant to physical attack is one passive
technique. This is an easy task when
the ground station is on a military installation,
but becomes difficult for commercial
facilities, which often must be
collocated with customers and employee
populations. Protecting commercial sites
will take more planning, manpower, and
effort. However, the repercussions of an
attack on commercial space systems are
Capt Michael C. Todd (BS, USAFA) is
Chief, Weapons and Tactics in the 527th
Space Aggressor Squadron, Space Warfare
Center, Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado.
His responsibilities include preparing Air
Force, Joint and Allied forces for combat
through realistic and challenging threat replication,
training and feedback. Captain Todd
also operates adversary space systems, develops
new tactics, techniques and procedures
to counter threats and improve the United
States’ military space posture. Prior to his
current assignment, Captain Todd was an Air
Education and Training Command instructor
for the 381st Training Group’s Milstar Satellite
Vehicle Operator course at Vandenberg
Air Force Base. He previously served in various
Milstar satellite operator, instructor, and
staff positions in the 50th Space Wing. Captain
Todd is a graduate of Squadron Officer
School, Academic Instructor School, and the
Air Force Weapons School.
no less painful to the US than an attack
on military space systems.
Another passive defense technique is
the creation of a robust network employing
tactics such as frequency hopping
or spread spectrum signals comprised
of multiple redundant systems with the
ability to reroute information in the face
of attack. Physical dispersion of redundant
ground stations will prevent a single
point of failure. Using mobile ground
stations further complicates targeting by
an adversary. Dispersal also applies to
satellites in space. Deploying them in
various orbital planes and altitudes may
also be an option.
Passive techniques, however, are no
longer applicable when effective attacks
occur. It is important to detect and confirm
an attack has taken place, and then characterize the nature
and impact of the aggression. The location of the attacker is
important for suppression or neutralization. Once detection
and characterization occurs, it may be possible to employ an
active technique, which may involve a change in the satellite’s
configuration or location.
Maneuvering a space system is an example of an active
technique. This may allow the system to avoid electronic
jamming, or kinetic or directed-energy attacks against the satellite.
The downside of maneuvering is the use of a limited
supply fuel and possible interruption of the satellite’s mission
during the maneuver. If these limitations eliminate the maneuver
option, then changing the system configuration may be
a course of action. If a satellite is designed with redundant or
alternate systems not affected by the attacker, controllers may
be able to switch to these systems and continue the mission.
Regardless of the type of DCS technique used, sustaining
our ability to operate freely in space is
paramount to effective operations on
earth. This applies not only to combat
forces on the front lines, but also to the
civilian populace and commercial endeavors.
There are many examples of
America’s critical dependence on space
capabilities. An attack on our space systems
affects our ability to project military
power and impacts our diplomatic,
information, and economic sources of
influence. The United States cannot allow
its space resources to go unprotected.
US Northern Command was created
to guarantee homeland security, a mission
that must include a full spectrum
defense. By advocating sound DCS
techniques for the protection of critical
homeland space infrastructure, US
Northern Command can prepare the Nation
to defend itself against attack from
our “space approaches.”
Notes:
1
“Remarks by Admiral Keating during the
Change of Command,” US Northern Command, online,
Internet, available from http://www.northcom.
mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.showstory&storyid
=3CA87963-E5FD-8DE5-4299F61610AEF985.
2
“Who We Are: Homefront,” US Northern
Command, on-line, Internet, available from http://
www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_
homefront.
3
Military Space Forces Fact File, US Strategic
Command, on-line, Internet, 31 January 2005, available
from http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/
militaryspaceforces.htm.
4
Net Monthly Satellite Subscriber Additions,
Satbiznews, 1999, on-line, Internet, 31 January
2005, available from http://www.satbiznews.com/
monthly.html.
5
AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations (2 August
2004).
30 High Frontier Winter 2005