Brief of respondent for Florida v. Powell, 08-1175 - Oyez

39
[T]o advise a suspect that he has the right
“to talk to a lawyer before answering any of
our questions” constitutes a narrower and
less functional warning than that required
by Miranda. Both Miranda and article I,
section 9 of the Florida Constitution require
that a suspect be clearly informed of the
right to have a lawyer present during
questioning.
JA 174. So although Petitioner and the Solicitor
General characterize the issue here as whether
Miranda requires “a single script,” “a single standard
form,” and “mandat[es] that particular words be
used,” Br. 12; SG Br. 6, 15, what is really at stake is
whether a suspect would be misled by the substantive
content of warnings that suggest a limit on access to
counsel to before questioning has begun. 13 As shown,
federal courts of appeals repeatedly and consistently
have answered that question in the affirmative.
Next, building on their flawed foundation that
the decision below applied the wrong legal framework,
Petitioner and the Solicitor General assert that the
13
Thus, contrary to Petitioner and the Solicitor General’s
suggestion, the decision below would not require suppression of
confessions if officers in the field give a warning that “deviates”
from the precise language of the Miranda decision, so long as
the warnins given convey the required substance. Br. 15; SG Br.
13-14, 20. In any event, that is not the situation here. As
Petitioner and the Solicitor General acknowledge, the officers
here accurately read a printed form developed and used as a
matter of policy by the Tampa Police Department. Br. 21 n.5, 24;
SG Br. 14 n.5.