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Brief of respondent for Florida v. Powell, 08-1175 - Oyez

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46<br />

This last sentence could not effectively<br />

convey a right the defendant was never told<br />

he had. In other words, how can a defendant<br />

exercise at any time during an interrogation<br />

a right he did not know existed? The catchall<br />

phrase did not supply the missing<br />

warning <strong>of</strong> the right to have counsel present<br />

during police questioning because a right<br />

that has never been expressed cannot be<br />

reiterated.<br />

JA 172. 15<br />

15<br />

A federal district court in <strong>Florida</strong> rejected a similar<br />

argument. In United States v. Taylor, federal agents reading<br />

from a standard <strong>for</strong>m then used by the Department <strong>of</strong> Homeland<br />

Security, advised the defendants that “[y]ou have the right to<br />

talk to a lawyer <strong>for</strong> advice be<strong>for</strong>e we ask you any questions.” No.<br />

05-60072, at 5 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2005) (magistrate judge’s<br />

report and recommendation). The magistrate judge found the<br />

warning invalid under Miranda, concluding that most criminal<br />

attorneys, to say nothing <strong>of</strong> “a suspect unschooled in the law,”<br />

would construe the <strong>for</strong>m as impermissibly limiting access to<br />

counsel to the period be<strong>for</strong>e interrogation. Id. at 12. Notably, the<br />

government in that case, like here, argued that other clauses in<br />

the <strong>for</strong>m – a provision providing that “[i]f you decide to answer<br />

questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to<br />

stop answering at any time” and a waiver provision providing<br />

“[a]t this time, I am willing to answer questions without a<br />

lawyer present” – were sufficient to support a “reasonable<br />

inference” <strong>of</strong> the right to have an attorney present during<br />

questioning. Id. at 6, 11. The magistrate judge rejected the<br />

government’s parsing <strong>of</strong> the <strong>for</strong>m, concluding that the “waiver<br />

portion <strong>of</strong> the <strong>for</strong>m incorporates the statement <strong>of</strong> rights portion,<br />

which sets <strong>for</strong>th the right to counsel be<strong>for</strong>e questioning<br />

only. Moreover, there is no indication in the <strong>for</strong>m that the right<br />

to terminate questioning implies a right to request counsel or<br />

(Continued on following page)

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