Rejected takeoff after the takeoff decision speed 'V ', Boeing B737 ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Pilot flying (PF) • flight path and airspeed control • airplane configuration • navigation. Pilot monitoring (PM) • checklist reading • communications • tasks requested by PF • start levers and fire switches (with PF concurrence.) Table 2: Responsibility of the Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Montoring (PM). The first officer, when flying the aircraft, performs the duties listed under PF, and the captain performs those duties listed under PM [Table 2]. Both the PF and the PM have a responsibility to monitor air traffic control transmissions and to query any transmission that is not received fully and/or understood. In critical phases of the flight the pilot monitoring must inform the pilot flying of any deviations. 4.3 IRISH AVIATION AUTHORITY The Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) is a commercial state-sponsored company which was established on 1 January 1994 to provide air navigation services in Irish-controlled airspace, and to regulate safety standards within the Irish civil aviation industry through: • Certifying and registering aircraft airworthiness • Licensing personnel and organisations involved in aircraft maintenance • Licensing pilots, air traffic controllers and aerodromes • Approving and monitoring air carrier operating standards through Air Operator Certificates. Internationally set safety standards emanating from the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO); European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA); EUROCONTROL; the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Union (EU) guide the IAA in ensuring that Irish civil aviation operates to international safety standards. As Ryanair is an Irish operator the IAA is responsible for the oversight, approve and monitoring of the air carrier operation. 17
5 ANALYSIS 5.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter uses the collected information to analyse the event flight and the subsequent rejected takeoff decision. The event flight is analysed in the first paragraph. Next the available procedures to the flight crew on rejected takeoff are analysed. The third paragraph analyses the rejected takeoff from an historical perspective whereby previous studies and developments are considered. Finally, the decision dilemma to reject a takeoff is discussed. 5.2 THE EVENT FLIGHT This paragraph is divided into four subparagraphs. The first subparagraph deals with the takeoff roll where it was difficult to keep the aircraft on the centreline. The second subparagraph details the timeframe where irregular speed trend vector indications were observed. The third subparagraph deals with a perceived controllability problem at the time of rotation of the aircraft. The fourth subparagraph will describe the time frame of the rejected takeoff. start of the runway start of takeoff roll Irregular indications speed trend vector aircraft rotation rejected takeoff roll end of the runway V 1 airspeed [knots] 0 90 60 80 150 160 140 147 152 0 Figure 5: Timeline of takeoff with the four events which will be analyzed in this paragraph in more detail. start of the runway end of the runway 5.2.1 Start of takeoff roll After the event start of the first officer stated he had trouble in keeping the aircraft on the centreline at low speed. takeoff According roll to the first officer the heading deviation was interpreted as an engine power asymmetry. start of the The runway captain, who was the pilot monitoring the instruments, also noted end the of the deviations runway Irregular in aircraft start heading. of The captain indications also speed interpreted aircraft the feeling as engine asymmetry. Therefore the captain performed takeoff roll an additional trend engine vectorcross check rotation during rejected the takeoff roll roll. However, no difference airspeed in engine 0 indications 90 was observed. Nor was the cross-check communicated to the first officer who [knots] 60 80 was flying, this was however not mandated either. V 1 The airspeed flight 0 data shows 90 a deviation in aircraft heading 150 160 at low airspeed. 0The analysis of engine [knots] 60 80 140 147 152 parameters start of the flight runway data during this timeframe does not show engine asymmetry or end large of the differences runway in engine performance which could Irregular explain the observed heading changes. indications speed trend vector start of the runway end of the runway airspeed [knots] start of takeoff roll 90 V 1 150 140 147 airspeed 0 90 [knots] start of the runway 60 80 end of the runway Figure 6: Timeframe start of takeoff roll, from standstill aircraft to 90 knots computer airspeed. rotation start of the runway Irregular end of the runway indications speed trend vector 18 airspeed [knots] V 1 150 160 152
Page 1 and 2: Rejected takeoff after the takeoff
Page 3 and 4: The purpose of the Dutch Safety Boa
Page 5 and 6: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS A.C. A.D.M. A
Page 7 and 8: 1.2.2 Investigation questions The p
Page 9 and 10: For the event flight the V-speeds w
Page 11 and 12: GOLF FOXTROT taxiway end of the run
Page 13 and 14: At 09.46:24 hours the aircraft reac
Page 15 and 16: 3 ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 3.1 GENERAL
Page 17: 4 INVOLVED PARTIES AND THEIR RESONS
Page 21 and 22: may have caused a negative speed tr
Page 23 and 24: under this circumstance could be mo
Page 25 and 26: engine 24,3% wheel/tire 22,9% other
Page 27 and 28: 6 CONCLUSIONS During the takeoff at
Page 29 and 30: Board response: One of the reasons
Page 31 and 32: APPENDIX C: FLIGHT DATA RECORDER PL
Page 33 and 34: APPENDIX D: DETERMINATION OF THE SP
Page 35 and 36: APPENDIX F: REJECTED TAKEOFF PROCED
Page 37 and 38: APPENDIX H: NTSB RECOMMENDATIONS ON

Rejected takeoff after the takeoff decision speed 'V ', Boeing B737 ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?