Rejected takeoff after the takeoff decision speed 'V ', Boeing B737 ...

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APPENDIX G: AIRCRAFT WAKE TURBULENCE The lift of an aircraft is generated by a pressure differential over the wing surfaces. The lowest pressure occurs over the upper wing surface and the highest pressure under the wing. This pressure differential triggers an airflow rollup aft of the wing resulting in swirling air masses trailing downstream of the wing-tips (vortices). Figure 16: view from the rear of the aircraft showing the vortex coming from the left and right wing. The vortices are generated from the moment an aircraft leaves the ground, since trailing vortices are a by-product of wing lift. The strength of the vortex is governed by the weight, speed, and shape of the wing of the generating aircraft. The vortex characteristics of any given aircraft can also be changed by extension of flaps or other wing configuring devices. However, as the basic factor is weight, the vortex strength increases proportionately with increase in aircraft operating weight. The vortex will lose its strength over time, in general between two to three minutes is the rule of thumb between aircraft taking off. rotation Figure 17: view from the side showing an aircraft taking off with the vortex behind the aircraft. 35
APPENDIX H: NTSB RECOMMENDATIONS ON ENHANCING REJECTED TAKEOFF SAFETY 1990 The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) made recommendations in the special investigation runway overruns following high speed rejected takeoffs report. A total of nine recommendations were made to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Redefine V 1 in 14 CFR 1.2 and 14 CFT 25.107 (2) to clearly convey that it is the takeoff commitment speed and the maximum speed at which rejected takeoff action can be initiated to stop the airplane within the accelerate-stop distance. (Class II, Priority Action)(A-90-40) Require Principal Operations Inspectors to review the accuracy of information on V 1 and rejected takeoff that 14 CFR 121 operators provide to flight crews to assure that they provide correct information about pilot actions required to maximise the stopping performance of an airplane during a high speed rejected takeoff. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-41) Require 14 CFR 121 operators to present to flight crews the conditions upon which flight manual stopping performance is predicated and include information about those factors which adversely affect stopping performance. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-42) Require that simulator training for flight crews of 14 CFR 121 operators present, to the extent possible, the cues and cockpit warnings of occurrences other than engine failures that have frequently resulted in high speed rejected takeoffs. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-43) Require that simulator training of 14 CFR 121 operators present accurately the stopping distance margin available for a rejected takeoff initiated near or at V 1 on runway where the distance equals or just exceeds balanced field conditions. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-44) Require that simulator training for flight crews of 14 CFR 121 operators emphasise crew coordination during rejected takeoffs, particularly those rejected takeoffs that require transfer of control from the first officer to the captain (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-45) Require 14 CFR 121 operators to review their policies which permit first officers to perform takeoffs on contaminated runways and runways that provide minimal rejected takeoff stopping distance margins, and encourage the operators to revise those policies as necessary. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-46) Require that the takeoff procedures of 14 CFR 121 operators are standardised among their airplane types to the extent possible, and that the procedures include appropriate callouts to alert flight crew members clearly and unambiguously when the airplane is entering the high speed takeoff regime and when the rejected takeoff is being initiated. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-47) Require 14 CFR 121 operators to require pilots to adopt a policy to use the maximum brake capability of autobrake systems, when installed on the airplane, for all takeoffs in which runway conditions warrant and where minimum stopping distances are available following a rejected takeoff. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-48) The recommendations have been partially fulfilled according to available records. Recommendation A-90-40 has been adopted and the V 1 has been redefined in new rulemaking. Recommendations A-90-41 through A-90-48 were addressed by the FAA by creating the Takeoff Safety Training Aid. Although not required to be implemented the FAA has issued advisory circular and that surveyed operators were using this training aid [1996]. The NTSB has classified the recommendations A-90-41 through A-90-48 as closed. 36
Page 1 and 2: Rejected takeoff after the takeoff
Page 3 and 4: The purpose of the Dutch Safety Boa
Page 5 and 6: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS A.C. A.D.M. A
Page 7 and 8: 1.2.2 Investigation questions The p
Page 9 and 10: For the event flight the V-speeds w
Page 11 and 12: GOLF FOXTROT taxiway end of the run
Page 13 and 14: At 09.46:24 hours the aircraft reac
Page 15 and 16: 3 ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 3.1 GENERAL
Page 17 and 18: 4 INVOLVED PARTIES AND THEIR RESONS
Page 19 and 20: 5 ANALYSIS 5.1 INTRODUCTION This ch
Page 21 and 22: may have caused a negative speed tr
Page 23 and 24: under this circumstance could be mo
Page 25 and 26: engine 24,3% wheel/tire 22,9% other
Page 27 and 28: 6 CONCLUSIONS During the takeoff at
Page 29 and 30: Board response: One of the reasons
Page 31 and 32: APPENDIX C: FLIGHT DATA RECORDER PL
Page 33 and 34: APPENDIX D: DETERMINATION OF THE SP
Page 35: APPENDIX F: REJECTED TAKEOFF PROCED

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