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Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

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Before the crash: the EU as a partial<br />

economic success story?<br />

<strong>The</strong>se issues cannot be satisfactorily addressed without an overview of<br />

what EU economic and social policies had achieved in the period before<br />

the crisis broke. <strong>The</strong> decade prior to the millennium was one of much<br />

soul searching about the EU’s economic record. In the aftermath of<br />

German unification, the Bundesbank’s anti-inflationary squeeze led to<br />

recession across much of the Continent as other members of the Exchange<br />

Rate Mechanism (ERM) struggled to stabilise their parities against the<br />

Deutschmark. Fiscal consolidation progressed as member states sought<br />

to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria for Euro membership.<br />

Unemployment rose sharply particularly among older workers and young<br />

people (and employment participation rates fell) as companies sought<br />

to maintain their core labour force in the face of weak demand. Trade<br />

unions, in cooperation with employers, sought to alleviate the employment<br />

problem through strategies of work-sharing that involved limitations on<br />

working time and extensive early retirement. Whereas until the 1980s the<br />

EU had steadily closed the gap in output per head with the United States,<br />

there then ensued a decade of stagnation. In the mid-1990s a productivity<br />

surge in the United States (often attributed to the information technology<br />

revolution) began to generate fresh fears that Europe was being left<br />

behind.<br />

Policy experts argued that Europe needed to prioritise “economic reform”,<br />

by which bodies such as the OECD meant labour market reforms 1 , to create<br />

more flexibility and weaken trade union resistance to change; further<br />

opening up of product markets, especially in services and the “network”<br />

industries, traditionally dominated by publicly owned monopolies; and<br />

financial liberalisation to create a Single Market in financial services. <strong>The</strong><br />

EU bought into an agenda of “economic reform”. However, its conception<br />

of employment policy, embodied in the European Employment Strategy<br />

(EES) that grew out of the Luxembourg Jobs Summit in November 1997,<br />

was more Nordic in conception than the OECD’s and focused on active<br />

labour market policy and raising employment participation. To this mix of<br />

flexibility and active labour markets, in 2000 the Lisbon strategy added a<br />

more social democratic emphasis on both new forms of public investment<br />

in growth through research, innovation and skills, and the idea that<br />

welfare states and social inclusion policies could be re-designed to have a<br />

positive impact on economic performance.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is considerable academic debate as to whether or not policymakers’<br />

continued emphasis on the “Lisbon” agenda of economic reform<br />

12<br />

After the crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU

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