L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...

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Force. At the request of the UN Secretary-General, we are also escorting UN chartered vessels in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia.” 27 The review of NATO’s positions about the alliance’s role on the continent was a natural continuation of individual policies of the leading members of the alliance, especially of the United States and those countries, which during the 19 th and 20 th centuries were colonial masters in Africa. Up till the break-up of the Soviet Union, direct involvement of African states into military cooperation with the superpowers was always bilateral. NATO and its twin alliance in the East – The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) – neither included African member countries, nor had their bases or formal missions on the continent. Despite continued confrontation, neither NATO, nor WTO ever had special head-quarters or military commands exclusively in charge of the African theatre of war. The situation changed after the disappearance of the bi-polar construction of the military balance in the world. The United Stated took the path of aggressive implantation of Washington-designed democracies in the global periphery, which might be used as handy front-screens for perpetuating American exploitation of countries’ resources. On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced the creation of a new unified combatant command – U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM – to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM’s establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided among three commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The command’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM was officially launched as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and became a stand-alone command on October 1, 2008. As envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM aims to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen 35
egional stability and security through improved security capability and military professionalization. If directed by national command authorities, its military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises. 28 DOD signaled its intention to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent early in the planning process, but such a move is unlikely to take place for several years, if at all. Currently, the command operates from Stuttgart, Germany. Though DOD has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent, a creeping infiltration of American military is, in reality, taking place. The U.S. have already established enduring infrastructure in Africa. At present, DOD’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF – HOA) has a semipermanent troop presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti with more than 1,500 U.S. military and civilian personnel in residence. The U.S. military has signed a five year lease with the Djiboutian government for Lemonier, with the option to extend the lease for two more five– year terms. The command authority for CJTF – HOA, formerly under CENTCOM, has been transferred to AFRICOM, and it will continue to be used as a Forward Operating Site. The U.S. military has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa and has established “barebones” facilities maintained by local troops in several locations. The U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia and continues to use them today to support counterterrorism activities. DOD refers to these facilities as “lily pads,” or Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), and currently has access to locations in Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. In the case of Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, a key military outpost and strategically important piece of real-estate in the Horn of Africa, precisely where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden, the United States government entered into an agreement 29 with the government of Djibouti that has several striking features: – U.S. military personnel have diplomatic immunity. 36
Page 1 and 2: ABOUT THE AUTHORS: Dr. IRINA ABRAMO
Page 3 and 4: 330.324.22 330.123.72 351.823.003 3
Page 6 and 7: INTRODUCTION IN THE GLOBALIZED WORL
Page 8 and 9: At certain stages of their history,
Page 10 and 11: tives. The authors are not describi
Page 12 and 13: cations, including monographs 1 and
Page 14 and 15: arena by the loftiest goals and ide
Page 16 and 17: quence, their role in the world eco
Page 18 and 19: thus the last seller of the commodi
Page 20 and 21: Table 1.1.2. World chromium product
Page 22 and 23: Table 1.1.3. World cobalt productio
Page 24 and 25: shore in many parts of the world. L
Page 26 and 27: Though US totally depends on import
Page 28 and 29: isk of supply shortage in the next
Page 30 and 31: long been obsolete, do exist and te
Page 32 and 33: a European-African energy forum; th
Page 34 and 35: upon the same ideology: the new roa
Page 38 and 39: - The United States has sole jurisd
Page 40 and 41: uses to track terrorists. Algerian
Page 42 and 43: sum, in exchange for terminating th
Page 44 and 45: UK, Greece, Italy and Spain during
Page 46 and 47: ing Angola’s large oil resources
Page 48 and 49: China concluded two major M&A deals
Page 50 and 51: the continent. To help African coun
Page 52 and 53: egy with regard to Sudan and Zimbab
Page 54 and 55: some price-related difficulties for
Page 56 and 57: 100,000 students from almost every
Page 58 and 59: 15 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral
Page 60 and 61: CHAPTER 2 Natural Resource Potentia
Page 62 and 63: tion in the global division of labo
Page 64 and 65: of other nations (manifest in an ex
Page 66 and 67: The mineral resource base (MRB) of
Page 68 and 69: In Nigeria, the smelter at Ikot Aba
Page 70 and 71: ite production at Komi to reach 6.5
Page 72 and 73: depletion. In South Africa, output
Page 74 and 75: 25-26 thousand tons of copper conce
Page 76 and 77: Country 75 Cost Ranges Namibia 0 20
Page 78 and 79: The Elkon district, Southern Yakuti
Page 80 and 81: ites and Miocene sediments extendin
Page 82 and 83: South, Etango and Valencia alaskite
Page 84 and 85: of competitiveness by similar produ
Page 86 and 87:
tive scenario, the above goals will
Page 88 and 89:
The concept of resource efficiency
Page 90 and 91:
vately owned. The leading enterpris
Page 92 and 93:
In this respect African and Russian
Page 94 and 95:
Table 2.2.2. Distribution of capita
Page 96 and 97:
will allow the project to overcome
Page 98 and 99:
World prices on all types of minera
Page 100 and 101:
2.3. Competitors or Partners? Russi
Page 102 and 103:
Soviet organizations supplied Alger
Page 104 and 105:
that the gas crisis between Russia
Page 106 and 107:
The second LUKOIL project in Egypt
Page 108 and 109:
The agreement was finally signed du
Page 110 and 111:
pany “Slavneft” would join a co
Page 112 and 113:
DRC to extract copper and cobalt in
Page 114 and 115:
for 22 years in 2002 Friguia refine
Page 116 and 117:
licenses. They are the only Russian
Page 118 and 119:
that the main aims were inter-alia
Page 120 and 121:
Agency to develop plans for up to 4
Page 122 and 123:
pit nickel mine and the Selkirk und
Page 124 and 125:
deposit also contains a Peridotite-
Page 126 and 127:
and Eastern parts of the EPL 3850 p
Page 128 and 129:
Russian economy and the specifics o
Page 130 and 131:
34 . 2009. C. 366- 368. 35 John St
Page 132 and 133:
CHAPTER 3 Project RUSSAFRICA: Towar
Page 134 and 135:
copra, spices, other products of tr
Page 136 and 137:
This theoretic and scientific aura
Page 138 and 139:
and technical cooperation with Afri
Page 140 and 141:
higher and specialized secondary ed
Page 142 and 143:
used and repaid part of the credit.
Page 144 and 145:
exploitation of projects. Soviet ex
Page 146 and 147:
At the same time we recognize that
Page 148 and 149:
For the Soviet Union, solidarity wi
Page 150 and 151:
disappeared together with their ass
Page 152 and 153:
cial Representative of the Presiden
Page 154 and 155:
countries and minimize the adverse
Page 156 and 157:
The principled line in support of A
Page 158 and 159:
Exports of Russian raw materials to
Page 160 and 161:
of Su-30MKA fighters. At the same t
Page 162 and 163:
etc. He also remarked that since th
Page 164 and 165:
However, there are harbingers of a
Page 166 and 167:
There was a good demand in Egypt fo
Page 168 and 169:
Another promising sphere for Russia
Page 170 and 171:
Lada users in Egypt. In 2010, a new
Page 172 and 173:
All these companies have permanent
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ment of the Russian Federation 105
Page 176 and 177:
As of mid 2010, other areas of econ
Page 178 and 179:
cooperation and hydrocarbon product
Page 180 and 181:
tion." The participants in the Raba
Page 182 and 183:
2009 consisted of such traditional
Page 184 and 185:
From October 21-23, 2010, the Fourt
Page 186 and 187:
(May 2009), and Ugandan President Y
Page 188 and 189:
Russia provided humanitarian aid to
Page 190 and 191:
Nigeria’s Share in Russia’s Imp
Page 192 and 193:
supplies only it is either a blatan
Page 194 and 195:
On the initiative of the Ethiopian
Page 196 and 197:
- Automotive and components - Capit
Page 198 and 199:
led by the two Chambers and attende
Page 200 and 201:
coal mixture of a new generation. T
Page 202 and 203:
cial architecture and food safety a
Page 204 and 205:
The talks in Luanda led the two cou
Page 206 and 207:
9 Annual Report of Alexander Saltan
Page 208 and 209:
CONCLUSIONS THE RESULTS OF THE UNDE
Page 210 and 211:
interpretations is the intensifying
Page 212:
Leonid FITUNI and Irina ABRAMOVA RE
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L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...

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