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<strong>industrial</strong> <strong>wireless</strong><br />

50<br />

Fig. 5. Personnel and tracking applications need a<br />

plantwide Wi-Fi coverage for tracking RFID tags, often<br />

accomplished by external aerial mounting of <strong>wireless</strong><br />

transmitters and receivers.<br />

Protecting networks – Each mesh AP’s digital<br />

certificate authenticates it to the <strong>wireless</strong><br />

controller and allows it to participate in the<br />

secure network, so rogue or perhaps unauthorised<br />

APs cannot mimic genuine APs.<br />

All lawful <strong>wireless</strong> network communications<br />

are encrypted to prevent eavesdropping or<br />

packet manipulation. Rogue APs cannot insert<br />

themselves in the middle of the <strong>wireless</strong> infrastructure<br />

or otherwise compromise the network.<br />

Ideally, <strong>wireless</strong> user access should be deployed<br />

with a <strong>wireless</strong> intrusion prevention system.<br />

Also, scan for rogue clients/APs.<br />

Control access – Every user/device must<br />

authenticate with a centralised network domain<br />

authority. One way is to use an Authentication,<br />

Authorisation, and Accounting (AAA) server<br />

with the RADIUS authentication protocol coordinating<br />

access to the <strong>wireless</strong> network<br />

resources with the existing IT security infrastructure.<br />

Ensure client integrity – Antivirus software<br />

must be installed to prevent any primary<br />

infection of the device. Good security practices<br />

should be in force. Ideally, control devices<br />

(wired or <strong>wireless</strong>) should have no email or<br />

Internet access.<br />

PHOTO: EMERSON PROCESS<br />

WirelessHART field network inherent security<br />

features include:<br />

● AES-128 encryption (NIST/IEEE compliant)<br />

for all communications within the device mesh<br />

network and the gateway;<br />

● Individual device session keys to ensure endto-end<br />

message authenticity, data integrity,<br />

receipt validation, and secrecy through data<br />

encryption;<br />

● Hop-by-hop CRC and MIC calculations to<br />

ensure message authentication and verification<br />

as to communications source/receiver;<br />

● Devices must have a pre-configured ‘join key’;<br />

● White listing (ACL). If individual join keys<br />

are used, devices are explicitly given permission<br />

to join the network through the gateway or<br />

network manager via an ACL entry (also<br />

includes their globally unique HART address).<br />

Internal firewall<br />

The connectivity from the w-HART gateway to<br />

the host system is secured by an easily<br />

configured internal firewall that allows only the<br />

protocols and ports required for the field<br />

solution to be enabled for communication.<br />

Ethernet-based protocols (Modbus, OPC, AMS,<br />

HART Port, https) all support SSL-protected<br />

communications, while the gateway’s internal<br />

bi-directional firewall should default to ‘reject<br />

all’. Note that the firewall needs no active<br />

management.<br />

The above security features provide an easy<br />

to manage yet very robust communications<br />

system. Figure 4 shows a table of field <strong>wireless</strong><br />

attacks against mitigating defences.<br />

Some <strong>wireless</strong> solutions use an 802.11-2007-<br />

based Wi-Fi Mesh technology. Note, however,<br />

that 802.11 can be a security risk because<br />

<strong>wireless</strong> signals can be received by any<br />

commercially available 802.11 compliant<br />

device. By authenticating users before allowing<br />

them to access the <strong>wireless</strong> network, most<br />

attackers can be deterred, but it is recommended<br />

that all <strong>wireless</strong> data transmitted<br />

Denial of service<br />

Spoofing<br />

Man-in-the-middle<br />

Replay<br />

HELLO floods<br />

Sinkholes<br />

Eavesdropping<br />

Anti-jamming<br />

Authentication<br />

Verification<br />

Encryption<br />

Key management<br />

Mitigating defences<br />

Attacks<br />

Fig. 4: Plant <strong>wireless</strong> attacks against mitigating<br />

defences. WirelessHART field network inherent security<br />

features include AES-128 encryption, individual device<br />

session keys, hop-by-hop CRC and MIC calculations, a<br />

pre-configured ‘join key’ for devices, and white listing<br />

(ACL).<br />

<strong>industrial</strong> ethernet <strong>book</strong><br />

within the Wi-Fi mesh network, and between<br />

it and all client devices, should be encrypted.<br />

Device diagnostics<br />

The diagnostics information available from a<br />

<strong>wireless</strong> sensor or instrument is similar to that<br />

from a hard-wired fieldbus device or a conventional<br />

HART-based instrument. It is known that<br />

many users installed HART-based instruments<br />

mainly because of the extensive diagnostic<br />

information available, but estimates are that<br />

only 10% of installations actually use this<br />

information to the full extent. Many companies<br />

instead limit their use to handheld devices<br />

employed to manually calibrate and check field<br />

instruments during commissioning and calibration.<br />

Part of the problem with wired HART devices<br />

is they have to communicate over a relatively<br />

slow 4-20mA connection, and <strong>special</strong> software<br />

is involved. However, with w-HART, the full<br />

range of HART diagnostics is available via the<br />

high speed <strong>wireless</strong> connection, and asset<br />

management software can extract the HART<br />

information. Yet w-HART is still familiar to<br />

users, who don’t need to buy new tools or<br />

undertake more training programs.<br />

Older, wired instruments can be added using<br />

a w-HART adapter, opening up a new area for<br />

maintenance and diagnostics. For example,<br />

many <strong>industrial</strong> and process plants have valves<br />

that have to be pulled from the line for an<br />

overhaul on a regular basis.<br />

By adding a <strong>wireless</strong> adapter to a HART-based<br />

valve actuator, users can gain access to all the<br />

details needed to make an informed and<br />

proactive maintenance decision, instead of<br />

running to failure or performing unneeded<br />

maintenance. The same applies to flowmeters<br />

and related instruments.<br />

On the horizon<br />

The HCF continues to develop new technologies<br />

for HART and w-HART. Coming in the near<br />

future is standardisation on HART IP, an abbreviation<br />

for Highway Addressable Remote<br />

Transducer over IP.<br />

HART IP can use both TCP and UDP as the<br />

transport protocol. Typically, most <strong>wireless</strong><br />

gateways are connected to automation and<br />

information systems using Modbus, but the<br />

available bandwidth is low. HCF envisages HART<br />

IP over an Ethernet physical layer, as a better<br />

way of getting data into automation and information<br />

systems.<br />

Being able to obtain information on the<br />

performance and operational state of the mesh<br />

network is also desirable. HCF is responding to<br />

feedback from NAMUR testing to see if this is<br />

possible.<br />

David Walker is Sales Director for Wireless Solutions,<br />

Middle East & Africa at Emerson Process Management.<br />

First published in the <strong>industrial</strong> ethernet <strong>book</strong> May 2012<br />

sponsored by Advantech

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