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Evaluation of Department of State Information Security Program ...

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UNCLASSIFIED<br />

completeness and timeliness discussed previously, the <strong>Department</strong> concludes that<br />

deficiencies in the traditional POA&M system are not a material risk to the security <strong>of</strong><br />

the <strong>Department</strong>, given iPost as a compensating control.<br />

OIG Analysis: OIG considers this recommendation unresolved. The <strong>Department</strong> did<br />

not provide evidence during the evaluation that the POA&M process was all inclusive.<br />

The <strong>Department</strong> POA&M process on ClassNet does not include identified security<br />

vulnerabilities during security testing, OIG audits, or other assessments. Therefore, this<br />

process fails to track <strong>Department</strong> actions to remediate identified weaknesses.<br />

Additionally weaknesses that are identified in the scanning results are not added to the<br />

POA&M tracking. Although the <strong>Department</strong> stated that it had started distributing the<br />

quarterly memorandums, it did not take this action within the time period <strong>of</strong> the FISMA<br />

evaluation. The <strong>Department</strong> stated that iPost has replaced the traditional POA&M<br />

process. The independent public accountant determined, based on the issues noted with<br />

iPost (detailed in section G), that the system is not mature enough to compensate for the<br />

POA&M process. This recommendation can be resolved when the <strong>Department</strong> can<br />

document that the POA&M process includes the required elements for tracking, that the<br />

POA&M process accounts for weaknesses identified by all sources (scans, assessments,<br />

and OIG findings), and corrective actions are taken in the accordance with NIST and<br />

OMB requirements.<br />

E. Account Management Processes in Active Directory Need To Be Improved<br />

The <strong>Department</strong> needs to improve account management processes in Active Directory<br />

(AD) for OpenNet and ClassNet. In FY 2010, OIG reported deficiencies in account<br />

management, and we found that account management deficiencies still existed within AD for<br />

OpenNet and ClassNet.<br />

From a population <strong>of</strong> approximately128,000 OpenNet AD users’ accounts, we identified<br />

the following deficiencies:<br />

� Approximately 400 guest, test, and temporary accounts were in the AD<br />

accounts. The FAM 19 states, “The data center manager and the system<br />

manager may not maintain permanent user IDs and passwords on AISs for<br />

visitors, vendor service personnel, training, demonstrations, or other<br />

purposes.”<br />

� Approximately 9,000 accounts have not been used (never logged on). The<br />

FAM 20 requires user privileges to be reviewed annually to verify that<br />

privileges are still appropriate.<br />

� Approximately 400 accounts with passwords set not to expire. The FAM 21<br />

requires passwords to be changed at least every 60 days.<br />

19 12 FAM 622.1-3(b), “Password Controls.”<br />

20 12 FAM 622.1-3(i).<br />

21 12 FAM 622.1-3(j).<br />

17<br />

UNCLASSIFIED

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