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Evaluation of Department of State Information Security Program ...

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UNCLASSIFIED<br />

� Approximately 300 Install Accounts were within AD accounts. The FAM 22<br />

requires the removal <strong>of</strong> non-permanent (that is, visitor and training) user<br />

accounts and passwords.<br />

From a population <strong>of</strong> approximately 36,000 ClassNet AD accounts, we identified the<br />

following discrepancies:<br />

� Approximately 200 guest, test, and temporary accounts were in the AD<br />

accounts. The FAM 23 states, “The data center manager and the system<br />

manager may not maintain permanent user IDs and passwords on AISs for<br />

visitors, vendor service personnel, training, demonstrations, or other<br />

purposes.”<br />

� Approximately 4,000 accounts have not been used (never logged on). The<br />

FAM 24 requires user privileges to be reviewed annually to verify that<br />

privileges are still appropriate.<br />

� Approximately 900 accounts with passwords set not to expire. The FAM 25<br />

requires passwords to be changed at least every 60 days.<br />

� Approximately 200 Install Accounts were within AD accounts. The FAM 26<br />

requires the removal <strong>of</strong> non-permanent (that is, visitor and training) user<br />

accounts and passwords.<br />

Each bureau and post is responsible for user account management, such as adding new<br />

users and removing or modifying existing users’ accounts. Additionally, the <strong>Department</strong> had not<br />

developed and implemented processes and procedures to ensure that bureaus and posts<br />

performed an annual review and recertification <strong>of</strong> users’ privileges. Inadequate account and<br />

identity management controls increase the risk that temporary and active accounts may be<br />

accessed and used by <strong>Department</strong> and contractor personnel to perform unauthorized activities,<br />

such as modifying or improperly releasing sensitive <strong>Department</strong> information or accessing and<br />

modifying operating system s<strong>of</strong>tware.<br />

Recommendation 8. We recommend that the Chief <strong>Information</strong> Officer (CIO) develop<br />

and implement <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>State</strong> processes and procedures to resolve weaknesses in<br />

user accounts to ensure that unnecessary network user accounts are promptly removed by<br />

the bureaus and posts. Further, the CIO should develop and implement procedures to<br />

ensure that bureaus and organizational unit administrators annually review and recertify<br />

access privileges <strong>of</strong> users so that the number <strong>of</strong> guest, test, and temporary accounts are<br />

managed effectively as required by the Foreign Affairs Manual 12 FAM 622 and 12<br />

FAM 629.<br />

22 12 FAM 629.2-2(c), “Administrative <strong>Security</strong> – Password Controls.”<br />

23 12 FAM 632.1-4(d), “Password Controls.”<br />

24 12 FAM 622.1-3(i).<br />

25 12 FAM 622.1-3(j).<br />

26 12 FAM 629.2-2(c), “Administrative <strong>Security</strong> – Password Controls.”<br />

18<br />

UNCLASSIFIED

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