Censoring the Censors in the WTO - Southwestern Law School

34 J. Int’l Media & Entertainment Law Vol. 3, No. 1
event after arriving in China for the concert—“I’m pleased that the
Ministry of Culture is protecting the morals of the expat bankers and
their girlfriends that are going to be coming” 83 —raises the question
of just what “public” the Chinese Government’s “prohibited content
laws” are intended to protect. That is, Jagger essentially was questioning
whether the Government’s claim that the lyrics contained in the five
above-mentioned songs offend the Chinese people’s morals is credible,
given that illegal copies of these songs have circulated in China for
years, the under-18 set in China today doesn’t even consider the Stones’
music “hip enough” to warrant their patronizing the Stones’ concert,
and the great majority of the people expected to attend the Stones’ concern
were elderly, wealthy foreigners. 84
If the U.S. were to directly challenge one of China’s prohibited content
laws in the WTO and China, then predictably were to raise a public
morals defense to that challenge, the U.S. might argue that the prohibited
content law in question doesn’t implicate any moral concern. It is much
more likely, however, that the U.S. would concede that it is possible
that the Chinese people find the prohibited content in question to be
morally objectionable and argue that the Chinese Government cannot
prove that a majority of the Chinese people object to the prohibited content
on moral grounds. A number of China’s very broadly-stated prohibited
content laws are particularly vulnerable to attack by another WTO
member on this ground. Examples of such laws include prohibitions on
the publication or dissemination of any information “that is prejudicial
to public order,” 85 “that violates the Constitution or laws or the implementation
of administrative regulations,” 86 “that incites the overthrow
of the government or the socialist system,” 87 that incites division of the
country,” 88 “that is harmful to national unity,” 89 “that destroys the order
of society,” 90 “that injures the reputation of state organs,” 91 “that opposes
83. Kopp, supra note 80.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., PRC Interim Regulations Governing the Management of International
Computer Networks, Legal Daily, February 12, 1996, issued by State Council Order
No. 195, signed by Premier Li Peng on February 1, 1996, Art. 13.
86. See, e.g., Management Measures of the PRC Regulations for the Safety Protection
of Computer Information Systems, in Jisuanji Ji Wangluo—Falu Fagui, Computer &
Internet—Laws And Regulations 99, Art. 5 (Balu Chubanshje Beijing 1999),
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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