Credit special - Raiffeisen Bank International AG

Content
Introduction page 2
An increasing number of unrated
corporate bonds are conquering
the corporate bond market. page 2
Structure and pricing page 2
Issuers of unrated corporate
bonds page 2
Current pricing of unrated corporate
bonds page 4
Pricing of unrated corporate
bonds at issue page 5
Buyers of unrated corporate
bonds page 5
Conclusions page 6
Assessment page 7
Analysts
Christoph Klaper, CFA
christoph.klaper@raiffeisenresearch.at
Birgit Sigl
birgit.sigl@raiffeisenresearch.at
Credit special
Update: Unrated credits
28. January 2010
Unrated corporate bonds
More and more corporates are using the capital market
Top picks
XS0469316458 9.625 % ABENGOA SA 2015
AT0000A0G3Z9 4.5 % NOVOMATIC 2015
XS0457848272 5.375 % DAVIDE CAMPARI-
MILANO SP 2016
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
This publication is an update to our special issue dated
23 November 2009.
Summary
� Since our special publication dated 23 November 2009 there
have been five more new non-rated issues. According to our
shadow rating methodology, three of these issues are classified
in the investment grade universe and two in the high-yield
universe. These issues are only partially fairly priced, which
fits in with the pattern seen at the beginning of the major wave
of issuing.
� In 2010 there have already been three non-rated issues:
Novomatic, Solarworld and Mediaset.
� With regard to rated issues, lengthening of the tenor was observed,
whereas the maturity of non-rated issues has remained
roughly unchanged.
� An increasing number of unrated corporate bonds are being
placed on the capital market seemingly without problems. As
we see it, the buyers of these bonds are mainly hold-to-maturity
investors such as (retirement pension) insurance companies
and private investors.
� What is striking is that it is above all unrated quasi highyield
names that are not priced in a risk-appropriate manner,
whereas quasi investment-grade are priced more fairly.
� We expect the trend towards unrated corporate bond issues to
continue in 2010. In the long term, however, we think that this
subsegment of the corporate bond market will probably play
a minor role, as it did before 2009. By this we do not mean
that these issuers will disappear from the market, but rather,
that they will obtain a rating sooner or later in order to secure
long-term access to the corporate bond market.
� For hold-to-maturity investors we think that the unrated quasi
investment-grade segment, in particular, provides good opportunities.
Nevertheless, as long as these corporates do not
have an external rating, it is still up to the investor to carry out
a credit rating on an ongoing basis in order to fulfil the first
premise on the capital market: “Know your risk!”.
� The issues featuring the most attractive pricing are: 9.625%
Abengoa SA 2015, 4.5% Novomatic 2015 and 5.375%
Davide Campari 2016.
� The issues featuring the least attractive pricing are: 7% Evonik
Industries 2014, 5% Spar Warenhandels AG 2014 and
6.375% Otto GmbH&Co KG 2013.

Credit special
2
Introduction
An increasing number of unrated corporate
bonds are conquering the corporate bond
market.
After the strong rally in spreads in the last two months
and the sustained brisk activity on the primary market,
we wish to issue an update on the current situation
in non-rated bonds and explore the question of
whether and in what respect the factors seen in the
past have changed.
Over the past few months the positive sentiment on
the capital market has created a species that was
rarely encountered before the financial market crisis:
corporate bonds without a rating. These bonds
do not have an external credit rating by a rating
agency, which means that no external statement has
been made about their default probability. Nevertheless,
such paper has basically been placed without
any trouble. Is a new attractive investment category
establishing itself?
Since September 2009 alone, more than EUR 10 billion
in unrated corporate bonds have been issued. In
some cases, the issuing companies are not listed on
the stock market either, they have limited experience
of the capital market and are subject to strict and
regular reporting duties to a limited extent only.
The expected growth of this segment is considered to
be due to the fact that many corporates are turning
away from banks as their most essential source of
finance.
Since our special publication two months ago, another
five non-rated bonds with a total volume of
more than EUR 2 bn have been issued, underlining
the good conditions for placing such bonds on the
market. If one assumes that retail and other hold-tomaturity
investors only subscribe issues with smaller
denominations, since September 55% of the issues
under review were directed at these investor groups.
The distribution between the investment grade category
and the high-yield category is roughly balanced;
whereby differences can be seen in the pricing
and the risk premia (see below for more details).
Unrated EUR issues vs total issues
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Jan-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jul-09 Sep-09 Nov-09 Jan-10
Cumulative rated issues 2009 (in EUR bn)
Cumulative not rated EUR issues 2009 (in EUR bn, r.h.s.)
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
Structure and pricing
Issuers of unrated corporate bonds
Of the issuing volume of unrated corporate bonds
totalling around EUR 15 billion (since March 2009),
it is above all cyclical companies that are showing
themselves to be the largest issuers in this segment
(see next chart). By contrast, energy companies and
utilities together with those in the capital goods industry
are substantially underrepresented.
Mostly cyclicals not rated!
Services Cyclical
Media
Consumer Cyclical
Consumer Non-Cyclical
Basic Industry
Technology & Electronics
Real Estate
Energy
Capital Goods
Utility
Share of not rated issuance minus share of rated issuance (%)
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
Furthermore, most issuers of unrated corporate bonds
had only one or no bond outstanding before the issue,
and many are using the corporate bond market
for the first time to refinance themselves. In comparison,
an average issuer on the corporate bond market
in 2009 already had six or seven bonds outstanding.
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Number of outstanding bonds per issuer
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
< 1 1 - 2 3 - 4 5 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 50 51 -
100
Average number of outstanding bonds per issuer (total 2009)
101 -
500
Average number of outstanding bonds per issuer (only not rated
2009)
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
If we take into account the banks’ restrained lending,
it is not surprising that more and more unrated corporates
issue bonds, as in some cases no alternative
loan finance is available to them. At the same time,
banks benefit from assisting unrated issuers during
their placement, thereby generating the currently preferred
commission income (without putting pressure
on the credit limit). The interests of banks and those
of many companies are thus at present identical and
are pushing the issuing volume of unrated corporate
bonds to historical highs. This suggests that further
issues of unrated issuers can be expected in the
months to come.
Before 2009, a maximum 1% to 2% of all non-financial
corporate bond issuers were not rated. Cast
your mind back to “pre-crisis times”, when companies
found it very difficult to place corporate bonds
at very low risk premiums. In 2009, the percentage
of unrated corporate bonds totalled roughly 5% of
all new issues; particularly in the second half of the
year we have seen a substantial increase in the issuing
momentum.
Proportion of not rated issues*
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Credit special
2006 2007 2008 2009 Jan 2010
* in % of total issues
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
For these companies to remain long-term on the corporate
bond market, however, we think that they will
have to undergo a rating process sooner or later.
The reason for this is obvious: generally speaking,
a company without a rating incurs higher financing
costs than one with a rating.
The long-term independence of corporates from
banks as their source of financing only makes sense
in economic terms if the companies undergo a rating
process and are thus able to finance themselves more
cheaply (in comparison with a non-rated status). By
contrast, if the corporate bond market is only going
to be used as a short-term default source of financing
and if the companies plan to return to their main
bank after the “crisis” or if the main bank holds out
the prospect of bank financing in the future, then the
current high issuing volume of unrated companies fits
into the picture better.
We think that, yes, corporates are seeking greater
independence from their banks; however, this is convincing
only in the case of corporates that have obtained
a rating before the issue or plan to do so. Accordingly,
the segment of rated issues should rise, but
not that of unrated ones. The proof is supplied by the
corporates themselves. Those who use the corporate
bond market as a source of financing frequently, are
in fact rated. Only those who do not use it frequently,
like to dispense with a rating.
3

Credit special
4
Current pricing of unrated corporate bonds
If unrated corporate bonds were to be rated, the
bonds issued since September 2009 would be found
in almost all rating segments. Taking pricing as a
basis, in our view these are bonds covering a rating
spectrum from A+ to BB-.
Pricing spectrum
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
not rated
issues 2009/10
BB+
BBB+
BBB-
BBB
0 5 10 15
A-
A
A+
AA-
We have given the newly issued, unrated corporate
bonds a “shadow rating” or a rating assessment,
i.e. an indication of a possible external rating. This
assessment is based on a Merton model analysis
(= quantitative calculation of a default probability on
the basis of balance sheet and stock market data)
and an analysis of the most important financials and
rating drivers of these companies. We do not claim
that our shadow rating represents an exact calculation
of a possible external rating, but would like to
show by how much the market-implied rating of unrated
corporate bonds may differ from a quantitative/
fundamental assessment of a possible rating.
BB-
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
BB
AA
Shadow rating vs. priced rating
B-14
B13
B+ 12
BB- 11
BB10
BB+ 9
BBB- 8
BBB7
BBB+ 6
A- 5
A 4
A+ 3
AA- 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324
Rating shadow Priced rating
1) ...3.75 % CHRISTIAN DIOR 2014, 2) ...4.625 % HEINEKEN NV
2016, 3) ...4.75 % BEWAG - BURGENLAEND ELEK 2014, 4) ...5.375 %
DAVIDE CAMPARI-MILANO SP 2016, 5) ...4.5 % NOVOMATIC 2015,
6) ...4.75 % ADIDAS INTL FINANCE BV 2014, 7) ...5.25 % FRAPORT
AG 2019, 8) ...4 % SAFRAN SA 2014, 9) ...5.5 % HAVAS SA 2014,
10) ...4.875 % AP MOLLER-MAERSK A/S 2014, 11) ...5.75 % UCB SA
2014, 12) ...5.75 % UCB SA 2016, 13) ...9.625 % ABENGOA SA 2015,
14) ...4.875 % LAGARDERE SCA 2014, 15) ...6.125 % CA IMMOBILIEN
ANLAGEN AG 2014, 16) ...8.375 % RALLYE SA 2015, 17) ...7.625 %
RALLYE SA 2016, 18) ...6.75 % AIR FRANCE-KLM 2016, 19) ...5.375 %
SIXT AG 2012, 20) ...6.125 % SOLARWORLD 2017, 21) ...5 % SPAR
OESTER. WARENHANDEL 2014, 22) ...6.375 % OTTO GMBH & CO KG
2013, 23) ...7 % EVONIK INDUSTRIES AG 2014
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
It is conspicuous that above all quasi high-yield
names are not adequately priced in terms of risk
whereas the pricing of quasi investment-grade securities
are much more closely in line with the shadow
ratings, i.e. are adequately priced in terms of risk.
In other words, unrated quasi high-yield corporate
bonds tend to be expensive. This is illustrated by the
above chart. While the shadow rating (grey) reflects
the fundamental assessment of a possible rating
(and is the basis for assignment to the high-yield or
investment-grade segment), the priced rating (blue)
in some cases shows considerable differences compared
to the shadow rating, to the disadvantage of
buyers of these bonds. The converse picture can be
seen in the case of unrated, but quasi investmentgrade
corporate bonds. In our view, here the market
compensates for the existing default risk well to very
well.
For hold-to-maturity investors we believe that above
all the unrated quasi investment-grade segment still
offers good opportunities. Nevertheless: as long as
these companies do not have any external rating, the
investor’s task is to constantly ascertain a credit rating
in order to fulfill the first principle on the capital
market: “Know your risk!”

Pricing of unrated corporate bonds at issue
In our opinion unrated corporate bonds should
pay higher risk premiums compared to their rated
counterparts. This is also quite clearly the case for
investment-grade issues (see chart below). Unrated
corporate bonds with an average shadow rating of A
showed higher risk premiums at issue than comparable
corporate bonds with an external A rating issued
at around the same time.
This makes sense as an external rating generally has
a certain value for the investor, which is expressed
in the form of lower risk premiums. In other words,
the investor implicitly pays for the rating by providing
the company with cheaper funding than if the corporate
had not been rated. If the company is not rated,
the investor incurs opportunity costs (e.g. independent
calculation of a rating, continuous monitoring of
same), for which he would like to be compensated.
This means that if the investor is able to calculate
and evaluate these opportunity costs, he should be
rewarded in the form of higher risk premiums.
The market seems to apply the reverse logic in the
case of high-yield bonds. Unrated corporate bonds
with an average shadow rating of BB showed lower
risk premiums at issue than comparable corporate
bonds with an external BB rating issued at around
the same time.
New issues since September 2009
Launch spread in bp
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Not rated IG issues with higher
launch spreads than rated IG
issues
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maturity in years
HY new issues (not rated) HY new issues (rated BB)
IG new issues (not rated) IG new issues (rated A)
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
?
not rated HY issues with
lower launch spreads than
rated
Additionally, since our publication in November it
has been seen that the maturity of the bonds issued
has lengthened: for rated issues in the high-yield segment
the average maturity has lengthened by two
years, rising from five years to seven years.
Although we suspect that above all retail investors
have bought unrated quasi high-yield corporate
�
bonds in the past, basically these corporate bonds
do not represent a suitable investment precisely for
this investor base.
Interpretation: Whereas the pricing of investmentgrade
new issues is realistic, we believe that some
high-yield risks are not identified (because they cannot
be recognized ad hoc as such). This raises the
question: Who buys these bonds and why are especially
high-yield bonds with a low credit rating apparently
mispriced?
Many investors evaluate the bonds according to
the actual pricing upon issue, whereby they take
into account other comparable bonds to reach an
assessment of whether a bond belongs more in the
investment grade segment or more in the high-yield
segment. But this approach has the following problem:
for non-rated issues, the launch spread often
points to investment grade level risk, which would
actually be classified more appropriately in the highyield
segment upon a closer fundamental examination.
Some reasons that we see for this “misassessment”
are mainly investors’ rising risk appetite and
an increasing lack of risk differentiation.
Buyers of unrated corporate bonds
Credit special
1) Most of the non-rated bonds which were issued exhibit
a low, “retail-friendly”, denomination structure,
as a result of which we presume that retail and not institutional
investors tend to buy these kinds of bonds.
2) The investor base for high-yield corporate bonds
is much smaller than that for investment-grade bonds.
Above all institutional investors can calculate shadow
ratings and identify risk-adequate pricings themselves.
We therefore suspect that this investor base
has participated principally in investment-grade issues
that are adequately priced in terms of risk within
the framework of unrated issues.
3) Above all institutional investors have to comply
with certain rules of the game for investment. For instance,
its is very often stipulated that they may only
invest in bonds with an investment-grade rating or
that there must be at least one rating by an external
rating agency in order to be permitted to invest
at all. Assuming that a company wishes to place its
corporate bonds in a free float in the long term too,
increase the probability of a successful placement
and reduce the refinancing risk, there is an automatic
incentive to go through an external rating process.
Without these prerequisites there is no incentive to
subject themselves to a possibly lengthy and expensive
rating process.
5

Credit special
6
4) The spread performance of unrated corporate
bonds was much poorer shortly after issue (one
week) than corporate bonds with similar credit standing,
but which had been rated (see chart below). This
leads to the conclusion that these bonds were not
heavily traded, but find their way into hold-to- maturity
portfolios more rapidly. Classical hold-to-maturity
investors are (retirement pension) insurance companies
and private investors.
Spread tightening in %*
12%
8%
4%
0%
HY new
issues (not
rated)
IG new
issues (not
rated)
* one week after issues
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
HY new
issues (rated
BB)
IG new
issues (rated
A)
5) The unrated bond issues are generally rare names
on the corporate bond market (often with one bond
outstanding or none at all), which is why these bonds
Unrated corporate bonds
offer the possibility of wider diversification for institutional
investors. For us this characteristic represents
the main reason for buying unrated corporate bonds
by fund companies. Nevertheless, we assume that
these have mainly participated in the “fairly” priced
quasi investment-grade corporate bonds.
Conclusions
ISIN Name Maturity Volume
in EUR bn
The strong demand for new issues, the search for a
high yield, the possibility of additional opportunities
for diversifying and the fact that many rated companies
are already fully funded has meant than even unrated
companies in dubious sectors can be placed.
This trend will further be observable in the upcoming
months. However, this can be done without the need
for going through an occasionally lengthy and expensive
rating process.
If the financial markets continue to return to normal,
this means that the number of unrated new issues will
decrease significantly. By this we do not mean that
these issuers will disappear from the market, but that
sooner or later they will obtain a rating in order to secure
long-term access to the corporate bond market.
The next issue by a currently unrated issuer may thus
already be rated. As a result the segment of unrated
corporate bonds will slowly disappear. However, this
actually contributes to the growth of the overall corporate
bond universe.
Shadow
rating
Priced
rating
XS0421464719 7.125 % HEINEKEN NV 2014 07.04.2014 1000 A BBB 3.36 109
AT0000A0DJX7 4.75 % BEWAG - BURGENLAEND ELEK 2014 03.07.2014 200 A- BBB 3.36 100
XS0439260398 4.75 % ADIDAS INTL FINANCE BV 2014 14.07.2014 500 A- BBB+ 3.47 107
XS0447977801 5.25 % FRAPORT AG 2019 10.09.2019 800 A- BBB+ 4.71 136
AT0000A0EN38 5 % SPAR OESTER. WARENHANDEL 2014 18.09.2014 200 BB BBB 3.66 128
FR0010805309 3.75 % CHRISTIAN DIOR 2014 23.09.2014 350 A BBB+ 3.35 89
FR0010806745 8.375 % RALLYE SA 2015 20.01.2015 500 BB BB 6.33 395
FR0010808071 4.875 % LAGARDERE SCA 2014 06.10.2014 1000 BB+ BB+ 3.88 253
AT0000A0EXE6 6.125 % CA IMMOBILIEN ANLAGEN AG 2014 16.10.2014 150 BB+ BB+ 5.19 275
XS0456567055 4.625 % HEINEKEN NV 2016 10.10.2016 400 A BBB+ 3.88 95
XS0456708212 7 % EVONIK INDUSTRIES AG 2014 14.10.2014 750 B+ BB+ 4.92 251
XS0457848272 5.375 % DAVIDE CAMPARI-MILANO SP 2016 14.10.2016 350 A- BBB- 4.70 179
FR0010814459 6.75 % AIR FRANCE-KLM 2016 27.10.2016 700 BB BB+ 5.72 282
FR0010815472 7.625 % RALLYE SA 2016 04.11.2016 500 BB BB 6.60 372
BE6000431112 5.75 % UCB SA 2014 27.11.2014 750 BBB- BBB- 4.34 188
XS0462887349 4.875 % AP MOLLER-MAERSK A/S 2014 30.10.2014 750 BBB BBB- 4.16 165
FR0010820217 5.5 % HAVAS SA 2014 04.11.2014 350 BBB BB+ 4.86 237
DE000A1A6UM3 5.375 % SIXT AG 2012 06.11.2012 300 BB BB+ 4.21 236
XS0467329016 6.375 % OTTO GMBH & CO KG 2013 20.11.2013 500 BB- BB+ 5.06 292
XS0469316458 9.625 % ABENGOA SA 2015 25/02/2015 300 BB+ BB- 7.73 529
FR0010827048 4 % SAFRAN SA 2014 26/11/2014 750 BBB+ BBB+ 3.61 107
BE6000480606 5.75 % UCB SA 2016 10/12/2016 500 BBB- BBB- 4.97 204
XS0478864225 6.125 % SOLARWORLD 2017 21/01/2017 400 BB BB+ 6.46 338
AT0000A0G3Z9 4.5 % NOVOMATIC 2015 22/01/2015 200 A- BBB- 4.54 200
Indicative values, ASW . . . Asset Swap Spread
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
Yield
in %
ASW
in bp

Assessment
Attractive pricing
ISIN Name Shadow rating Priced rating Curr. ASW
in bp
Credit special
Fair ASW
in bp
XS0421464719 7.125 % HEINEKEN NV 2014 A BBB 110 50
FR0010805309 3.75 % CHRISTIAN DIOR 2014 A BBB+ 90 52
XS0456567055 4.625 % HEINEKEN NV 2016 A BBB+ 96 61
AT0000A0DJX7 4.75 % BEWAG - BURGENLAEND ELEK 2014 A- BBB 100 64
XS0439260398 4.75 % ADIDAS INTL FINANCE BV 2014 A- BBB+ 107 64
XS0447977801 5.25 % FRAPORT AG 2019 A- BBB+ 136 88
XS0457848272 5.375 % DAVIDE CAMPARI-MILANO SP 2016 A- BBB- 179 77
AT0000A0G3Z9 4.5 % NOVOMATIC 2015 A- BBB- 200 68
XS0469316458 9.625 % ABENGOA SA 2015 BB+ BB- 529 258
XS0462887349 4.875 % AP MOLLER-MAERSK A/S 2014 BBB BBB- 165 129
FR0010820217 5.5 % HAVAS SA 2014 BBB BB+ 237 129
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
Fair pricing
ISIN Name Shadow rating Priced rating Curr. ASW
in bp
Fair ASW
in bp
FR0010806745 8.375 % RALLYE SA 2015 BB BB 395 346
FR0010815472 7.625 % RALLYE SA 2016 BB BB 372 371
FR0010808071 4.875 % LAGARDERE SCA 2014 BB+ BB+ 253 254
AT0000A0EXE6 6.125 % CA IMMOBILIEN ANLAGEN AG 2014 BB+ BB+ 275 254
BE6000431112 5.75 % UCB SA 2014 BBB- BBB- 188 147
BE6000480606 5.75 % UCB SA 2016 BBB- BBB- 204 167
FR0010827048 4 % SAFRAN SA 2014 BBB+ BBB+ 108 80
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
Unattractive pricing
ISIN Name Shadow rating Priced rating Curr. ASW
in bp
Fair ASW
in bp
XS0456708212 7 % EVONIK INDUSTRIES AG 2014 B+ BB+ 252 507
AT0000A0EN38 5 % SPAR OESTER. WARENHANDEL 2014 BB BBB 129 341
FR0010814459 6.75 % AIR FRANCE-KLM 2016 BB BB+ 282 371
DE000A1A6UM3 5.375 % SIXT AG 2012 BB BB+ 235 299
XS0478864225 6.125 % SOLARWORLD 2017 BB BB+ 340 374
XS0467329016 6.375 % OTTO GMBH & CO KG 2013 BB- BB+ 294 476
Source: Raiffeisen RESEARCH, Bloomberg
7

8
Credit special
Acknowledgement
This report was completed on 28 January 2010.
Editor
Raiffeisen RESEARCH GmbH
A-1030 Vienna, Am Stadtpark 9
Telefon: +43 1 717 07-1521
Economics and Financial Markets Research
Head:
Peter Brezinschek (1517)
Credit special
Economics, Fixed Income, FX:
Valentin Hofstätter (Head, 1685), Jörg Angele (1687), Walter Demel (1526), Wolfgang Ernst (1500), Ingo
Jungwirth (2139), Marcin Kopaczynski (1423), Julia Neudorfer (5842), Andreas Schwabe (1389), Gintaras
Shlizhyus (1343), Gottfried Steindl (1523), Martin Stelzeneder (1614)
Credit/Corporate Bonds:
Christoph Klaper (Head, 1652), Martin Kutny (2013), Doris Oswald (1631), Manuel Schreiber (3533), Gleb
Shpilevoy (1461), Birgit Sigl (5892), Alexander Sklemin (1212), Beatrix Thaler (5924)
Stocks:
Helge Rechberger (Head, 1533), Aaron Alber (1513), Christian Hinterwallner (1633), Jörn Lange (2169),
Hannes Loacker (1885), Richard Malzer (5935), Johannes Mattner (1463), Christine Nowak (1625), Leopold
Salcher (2176), Andreas Schiller (1358), Connie Schümann (2178), Magdalena Wasowicz (2169)
Quant Research/Emerging Markets:
Veronika Lammer (Head, 3741), Lydia Kranner (1609), Nina Kukic (1635), Christian Link (1355), Andreas
Reschreiter (1683), Josef Wolfesberger (1529)
Technical analysis:
Klemens Hrovath (1421), Robert Schittler (1537)
This document does not constitute an offer or invitation to subscribe for or purchase any securities and neither this document nor anything contained herein shall form the basis of any
contract or commitment whatsoever. This document is being furnished to you solely for your information and may not be reproduced or redistributed to any other person. Any investment
decision with respect to any securities of the respective company must be made on the basis of an offering circular or prospectus approved by such company and not on the basis of
this document. RZB may have effected an own account transaction in any investment mentioned herein or related investments and or may have a position or holding in such investments
as a result. RZB may have been, or might be, acting as a manager or co-manager of a public offering of any securities mentioned in this report or in any related security. Information
contained herein is based on sources, including annual reports and other material which might have been made available by the entity which is the subject of this document. RZB believes
all the information to be reliable, but no representations are made as to their accuracy and completeness. Unless otherwise stated, all views (including statements and forecasts) are solely
those of RZB and are subject to change without notice. Investors in emerging markets need to be aware that settlement and custodial risk may be higher than in markets where there is a
long established infrastructure and that stock liquidity may be impacted by the numbers of market makers which may therefore impact upon the reliability of any investments made as a
result of acting upon information contained in this document. Special regulations for the Republic of Austria: This document does not constitute either a public offer in the meaning of the
Kapitalmarktgesetz („KMG“) nor a prospectus in the meaning of the KMG or of the Börsegesetz. Furthermore this document does not intend to recommend the purchase or the sale of
securities or investments in the meaning of the Wertpapieraufsichtsgesetz. This document shall not replace the necessary advice concerning the purchase or the sale of securities or investments.
For any advice concerning the purchase or the sale of securities or investments kindly contact your RAIFFEISENBANK. Special regulations for the United Kingdom of Great Britain,
Northern Ireland (UK) and Jersey (Channel Islands): Raiffeisen Zentralbank. This publication has been either approved or issued by Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG (RZB) in order
to promote its investment business. RZB London Branch is authorised by the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Services Authority
(FSA). Details on the extent of the London branch‘s regulation by the Financial Services Authority are available on request. This publication is not intended for investors who are Retail
Customers within the meaning of the FSA rules and should therefore not be distributed to them. Neither the information nor the opinions expressed herein constitute or are to be construed
as an offer or solicitation of an offer to buy (or sell) investments. RZB may have effected an Own Account Transaction within the meaning of FSA rules in any investment mentioned herein
or related investments and or may have a position or holding in such investments as a result. RZB may have been, or might be, acting as a manager or co-manager of a public offering of
any securities mentioned in this report or in any related security. The RZB Jersey marketing representative office is not regulated by the Jersey Financial Services Commission as it does not
perform any financial services activity in Jersey as defined by the Financial Services (Jersey) Law 1998 (FSJL).Special regulations for the United States of America (USA) and Canada: This
document or any copy hereof may not be taken or transmitted or distributed, in the USA or Canada or their respective territories or possessions nor may it be distributed to any USA-person
or person resident in Canada by any means other than via a US Broker Dealer. Any failure to comply with these restrictions may constitute a violation of USA or Canadian securities laws.
Detailed disclaimer and disclosure as per Sect. 48f of the Stock Exchange Act: http://www.raiffeisenresearch.at -> “Disclaimer”