Managing the Miombo Woodlands of Southern Africa - PROFOR
Managing the Miombo Woodlands of Southern Africa - PROFOR
Managing the Miombo Woodlands of Southern Africa - PROFOR
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4<br />
SOLUTIONS: HOW CAN THE MANAGEMENT OF MIOMBO<br />
BE IMPROVED<br />
4.1 TACKLING POVERTY TRAPS AND ENHANCING SAFETY NETS<br />
Before moving to solutions, we examine a fundamental problem in <strong>the</strong> miombo region: widespread<br />
and persistent poverty. In Section 1 <strong>of</strong> this paper, we considered Collier’s (2007) formulation <strong>of</strong><br />
how various poverty traps can sometimes make it really diffi cult for poor people to improve <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
condition, particularly in areas affected by armed confl ict, weak governance, and mismanaged<br />
dependencies on natural resources, and when facts <strong>of</strong> geography (in particular being landlocked,<br />
and surrounded by poor neighbors) limit access to external markets. Most miombo countries are<br />
caught in at least one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se traps: (a) armed confl ict, at least in <strong>the</strong> recent past, in Angola, DRC,<br />
and Mozambique; 19 (b) mismanaged dependencies on natural resources in Angola and DRC, with<br />
Zimbabwe also participating in resource extraction in <strong>the</strong> DRC; (c) weak governance throughout<br />
<strong>the</strong> region, with particular problems in, Angola, DRC, and Zimbabwe; and (d) Malawi, Zambia, and<br />
Zimbabwe all landlocked, as is much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DRC.<br />
Two trends are likely to intensify <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> poverty in <strong>the</strong> region: HIV/AIDS and climate change.<br />
The former is already affl icting millions <strong>of</strong> households, while <strong>the</strong> latter is likely to signifi cantly affect<br />
agricultural production and water availability.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> micro-level, poverty traps like <strong>the</strong>se have particular relevance for people living in and around<br />
miombo woodlands: local confl ict can make it diffi cult to resolve rights <strong>of</strong> use and ownership<br />
over woodland resources; elite capture and local corruption limit <strong>the</strong> extent to which households<br />
and communities can benefi t from improved management; a bias toward timber production can<br />
undermine local and more important local management strategies; and miombo-dependent<br />
communities <strong>of</strong>ten live far from markets and have limited access to transport and communication<br />
infrastructure (Mutamba, technical annex 1). Under <strong>the</strong>se circumstances, it is tough to add value to<br />
miombo products locally and to increase incomes.<br />
One thing that has come out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> household studies described in technical annexes 2, 4, and 5<br />
has been not that poor rural households are becoming rich by tapping into markets for miombo<br />
products (or have much potential for doing so), but that poor rural households are vitally dependent<br />
on miombo woodlands because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir role as a safety net. Among <strong>the</strong>se households, miombo<br />
is providing a substantial proportion <strong>of</strong> total household consumption. This proportion increases<br />
signifi cantly among households that encounter serious income shocks because <strong>of</strong> illness or<br />
environmental stress. These studies show, perhaps for <strong>the</strong> fi rst time in a rigorous and statistically<br />
19 Collier’s (2007) discussion explores <strong>the</strong> long-term problem <strong>of</strong> growth in post-confl ict economies. The confl ict may be<br />
over, but <strong>the</strong> trap created as a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> confl ict tends to persist. Civil war reduces growth by around 2.3 percent<br />
per year, so a seven-year war leaves a country about 15 percent poorer than it would have been. DRC will need 50<br />
years <strong>of</strong> peace, at its current growth rate, to achieve 1960s income levels. The chances that a poor country that has<br />
had a confl ict will have ano<strong>the</strong>r confl ict are much greater among <strong>the</strong> “bottom billion” countries than among o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
POLICIES, INCENTIVES, AND OPTIONS FOR THE RURAL POOR<br />
51