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The Ukrainian Weekly 1994

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22<br />

Systemic crisis...<br />

(Continued from page 2)<br />

em regions of Ukraine. Donetske and<br />

Transcarpathia currently lead in the sepa–<br />

ratist movement from Kyyiv. Recently,<br />

an attempt to create a free-trade zone in<br />

the Transcarpathian region was blocked<br />

by Kyyiv, which viewed it as "sepa–<br />

ratist." This move of the Parliament does<br />

not mean, however, that the question has<br />

been taken off the agenda.<br />

Tensions between Kyyiv and Galicia<br />

have been aggravated recently. For the<br />

Kyyiv elite, Lviv has changed from the<br />

"island of freedom" into the "island of<br />

dissent." That has caused a reduction in<br />

the grain and oil supplies to the region.<br />

This tendency can push Galicia to a dras–<br />

tic orientation of its policy toward eco–<br />

nomic independence and possible politi–<br />

cal separation from Kyyiv. <strong>The</strong>re exist<br />

parallel tensions between southern and<br />

eastern Ukraine and Galicia. it is clear<br />

that this peculiarity of <strong>Ukrainian</strong> politics<br />

RECORDING DEPARTMENT<br />

TOTAL AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1993<br />

GAlNS lN JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />

New members<br />

Reinstated<br />

Transferee! in<br />

Change class in<br />

Transferee! from Juvenile Dept.<br />

LOSSES lN JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />

Transferee! out<br />

Change of class out<br />

Transferee! to adults<br />

Died<br />

Cach surrender<br />

Endowment matured<br />

Fully paid-up<br />

Extended insurance<br />

Certificate terminated<br />

MEMBERSHIP REPORT<br />

JUV.<br />

17,277<br />

33<br />

THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY<br />

and culture will determine the general<br />

development of the situation in Ukraine<br />

and that it possesses greater importance<br />

than the relations in the "center-regions."<br />

<strong>The</strong> absolute financial-economic and<br />

political crisis in Ukraine has reached<br />

such an intensity (despite shallow "stabil–<br />

ity" - the beloved concept of the Kyyivan<br />

elite) that for its resolution some extraor–<br />

dinary measures are needed, e.g. rapid<br />

privatization, sale of non-functional enterprises<br />

to anybody in the world who would<br />

desire them, broad concessions and car–<br />

tels with foreign companies, and the<br />

issuance of state-guaranteed bonds for<br />

loans. Kyyiv is incapable of such initia–<br />

tives now. Political insecurity in Ukraine<br />

also leaves little hope for any substantial<br />

foreign aid.<br />

Conclusion<br />

<strong>The</strong> practical and theoretical possibili–<br />

ties for the improvement of the political<br />

and economic crisis in Ukraine are very<br />

small. Objectively, Moscow should be<br />

interested in stimulating the <strong>Ukrainian</strong><br />

SUNDAY, JUNE 26, <strong>1994</strong><br />

search for ways out of the situation. At the<br />

same time, the subjective unacceptability<br />

of <strong>Ukrainian</strong> independence can push<br />

Moscow in the direction of preserving a<br />

situation characterized by permanent polit–<br />

ical tension and economic crisis in<br />

Ukraine. Such a course of action will pre–<br />

vent the emergence of an economically<br />

and politically strong Ukraine, even<br />

though it could save Russian territory from<br />

refugees and the depletion of its treasury.<br />

Another point of view also is possible,<br />

namely that Moscow's policy of "dis–<br />

tancing" itself from <strong>Ukrainian</strong> economic<br />

and political hardships will cause enor–<br />

mous financial and human expenses in<br />

the future. To prevent this, Moscow must<br />

take on a more active involvement in<br />

<strong>Ukrainian</strong> affairs.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are some possible scenarios of<br />

development.<br />

A. Civil war. <strong>The</strong> unexpected rise to<br />

power of extreme political forces (if, for<br />

instance, the president were to be<br />

impeached, as was recently attempted in<br />

December by 240 MPs) could turn a polit–<br />

<strong>Ukrainian</strong> National Association<br />

Monthly reports for January<br />

ADULTS<br />

41,237<br />

51<br />

ADD<br />

5,339<br />

8<br />

TOTALS<br />

63,853<br />

92<br />

TOTAL LOSSES 77 254 19 350<br />

INACTIVE MEMBERSHIP<br />

GAlNS 1N JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />

Paid-up<br />

Extended insurance<br />

TOTAL GAlNS<br />

LOSSES lN JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />

Died<br />

Cach surrender<br />

Reinstated<br />

Lapsed<br />

TOTAL LOSSES<br />

TOTAL UNA MEMBERSHlP<br />

AS OF JANUARY 31, <strong>1994</strong><br />

14<br />

2<br />

16<br />

9<br />

2<br />

12<br />

17,259<br />

52<br />

12<br />

64<br />

48<br />

7<br />

4<br />

3<br />

62<br />

41,150 5,335<br />

F1NANC1AL DEPARTMENT<br />

Dues and Annuity Premiums From Members<br />

income From "Svoboda" Operation<br />

investment income:<br />

Banks<br />

Bonds<br />

Certificate Loans<br />

Mortgage Loans<br />

Real Estate<br />

Short Term investments<br />

Stocks ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^<br />

Total<br />

Refunds:<br />

Total<br />

lNCOME FOR JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />

Employee Hospitalization Plan Premiums<br />

General Office Maintenance<br />

investment Expense<br />

Operating Expenses Washington Office<br />

Rent<br />

Reward To Special Organizer<br />

Taxes Federal, State fcCity On Employee Wages<br />

Taxes Held in Escrow<br />

Miscellaneous:<br />

Donations To Fraternal Fund<br />

Exchange Account-UNURC<br />

Profit On Bonds Sold or Matured<br />

Transfer Account<br />

Total<br />

investments:<br />

Bonds Matured Or Sold<br />

Mortgages Repaid<br />

Short Term investments Sold<br />

Total<br />

income For January, <strong>1994</strong>,„^„„„^„„„„„„„.^„,<br />

DlSBURSEMENTS FOR JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />

Paid To Or For Members:<br />

Annuity Benefits And Partial Withdrawals<br />

Cash Surrenders<br />

Death Benefits<br />

66<br />

14<br />

80<br />

49<br />

16<br />

5<br />

74<br />

63,744<br />

WALTER SOCHAN<br />

Supreme Secretary<br />

S<br />

s<br />

s<br />

$<br />

964.82<br />

201,188.43<br />

2,123.43<br />

27,025.37<br />

16,149.34<br />

7,801.48<br />

7,044.48<br />

26,756.38<br />

3,743.37<br />

850.40<br />

2,613.08<br />

186.30<br />

229.20<br />

21,546.98<br />

217.33<br />

2,500.00<br />

158,674.76<br />

7,448.76<br />

326,169.14<br />

494,792.66<br />

344,909.88<br />

107,118.30<br />

397,666.73<br />

849,694.91<br />

2,109,464.56<br />

3,994.56<br />

25,069.15<br />

43,500.00<br />

Total<br />

Dividend Accumulations<br />

Endowments Matured<br />

indigent Benefits Disbursed<br />

interest On Death Benefits<br />

Reinsurance Premiums Paid<br />

Operating Expenses:<br />

Real Estate<br />

Svoboda Operation<br />

Washington Office<br />

Official Publication-Svoboda<br />

Organizing Expenses:<br />

Advertising<br />

Commissions And Overrides On Universal Life<br />

Field Conferences<br />

Medical inspections<br />

Refund of Branch Secretaries Expenses<br />

Reward To Organizers<br />

Reward To Special Organizers<br />

Supreme Medical Examiner's Fee<br />

Traveling Expenses-Special Organizers<br />

Total<br />

Payroll, insurance And Taxes:<br />

Employee Benefit Plan<br />

insurance-General<br />

Salaries Of Executive Officers<br />

Salaries Of Office Employees<br />

Taxes-Federal, State And City On Employee tt<br />

Total<br />

General Expenses:<br />

Actuarial And Statistical Expenses<br />

Total<br />

Bank Charges<br />

Bank Charges For Custodian Account<br />

Books And Periodicals<br />

Dues To Fraternal Congresses<br />

General Office Maintenance<br />

insurance Department Fees<br />

Operating Expense of Canadian Office<br />

Printing and Stationery<br />

Rental Of Equipment And Services<br />

Telephone, Telegraph<br />

Traveling Expenses-General.^^^<br />

Miscellaneous:<br />

Accrued interest On Bonds<br />

Auditing Committee Expenses<br />

Donation From Fund For <strong>The</strong> Rebirth Of Ukraine<br />

Donations<br />

Exchange Account– Payroll<br />

Fraternal Activities<br />

investment Expense-Mortgages<br />

Loss On Bonds<br />

Professional Fees<br />

Rent<br />

Transfer Account<br />

<strong>Ukrainian</strong> Publications<br />

Total<br />

investments:<br />

Bonds<br />

Certificate Loans<br />

E.D.P. Equipment<br />

Total<br />

^lSEurSSml snts For Jam uary, <strong>1994</strong><br />

ASSETS<br />

Cash<br />

Short Term<br />

investments<br />

Bonds<br />

'<br />

Mortgage Loans 'm<br />

Certificate Loan "<br />

Real Estate "<br />

Printing Plant A E.D.P. "<br />

Equipment<br />

Stocks<br />

Loan to D.H.-U.N.A<br />

Housing Corp.<br />

Loan To U.N.U.R.C.<br />

BALANCE<br />

LIABILITIES<br />

775,539.31 Life insurance<br />

50,170,008.08<br />

636,660.73 Accidental D.D.<br />

685,827.82 Fraternal<br />

1,712,115.71 Orphans<br />

104,551.04 Old Age Home<br />

8,834,553.19 Emergency<br />

S<br />

5"<br />

772.54<br />

72,625.95<br />

500.00<br />

13.50<br />

586.08<br />

85,948.32<br />

79,096.55<br />

17,506.36<br />

83,078.10<br />

23,097.37<br />

2,249.57<br />

444.00<br />

369.16<br />

66,042.02<br />

4,206.24<br />

9,452.79<br />

1,500.00<br />

2,869.92<br />

43,239.61<br />

9,000.00<br />

19,091.99<br />

64,427.73<br />

22,870.07<br />

6,359.00<br />

519.82<br />

2,431.35<br />

321.32<br />

200.00<br />

1,211.47<br />

515.25<br />

520.00<br />

706.27<br />

2,219.70<br />

35,728.76<br />

3,205.48<br />

850.68<br />

54,789.10<br />

68.06<br />

33.23<br />

69,141.72<br />

50.00<br />

158,674.76<br />

657.16<br />

775.00<br />

44.81<br />

4,170.00<br />

1,885.63<br />

325,000.00<br />

1,031.00<br />

497,270.00<br />

3,103.43<br />

10,110.00<br />

4,552.07<br />

335,701.81<br />

3,926.75<br />

854,664.06<br />

2,152,536.11<br />

$ 75,252,610.11<br />

ToTaT І 73,553,263.- З 73,553,263.34"<br />

ALEXANDER BLAH1TKA<br />

Supreme Treasurer<br />

N0.26<br />

ical conflict into a military one. <strong>The</strong> pre–<br />

text for this could be terrorist activities of<br />

paramilitary forces such as UNSO<br />

(<strong>Ukrainian</strong> National Self-Defense) in<br />

Sevastopil or in the Donbas. Provocations<br />

could also be organized by the SBU (for–<br />

mer KGB). Armed conflict could spread<br />

through a significant part of <strong>Ukrainian</strong><br />

territory, thus causing a stampede of<br />

refugees to Russia.<br />

<strong>The</strong> intervention of Russia would<br />

become inevitable in such a case.<br />

Moscow's delay in entering into a conflict<br />

would entail for Moscow a sharp increase<br />

in both political and economic expenses<br />

(something like U.S. and NATO military<br />

involvement in Bosnia).<br />

B. <strong>The</strong> "Latin-Americanization" of<br />

Ukraine. <strong>The</strong>re exists the possibility that<br />

the <strong>Ukrainian</strong> military will attempt to play<br />

the same role that the army played in some<br />

countries of Latin America (Pinochet). But<br />

this variant would be tantamount to eco–<br />

nomic catastrophe, as the <strong>Ukrainian</strong> army<br />

is incapable of conducting economic<br />

reform due to the absence of necessary<br />

economic experience in the officers' corps<br />

and its refusal to collaborate with dictator–<br />

ial regime on the side of market-oriented<br />

economists. For Russia this scenario<br />

would signify, first of all, the existence in<br />

Ukraine of an authoritarian and nationalis–<br />

tic regime incapable of guaranteeing ele–<br />

mentary supplies to its citizens, subse–<br />

quently causing the mass flight of<br />

refugees, and the inevitable involvement<br />

of Russia in the restoration of the<br />

<strong>Ukrainian</strong> economy because of its role as a<br />

link with Europe. <strong>The</strong> financial costs for<br />

Russia in this case would be enormous.<br />

C. <strong>The</strong> disintegration of Ukraine.<br />

Economic and political crises could lead<br />

to the emergence of several states on the<br />

territory of Ukraine. <strong>The</strong> variant of civil<br />

war is highly probable in this case, if the<br />

disintegration does occur peacefully,<br />

then all the resulting smaller states will<br />

face the same economic, financial and<br />

political problems as Ukraine. Russia<br />

will be compelled to grant financial<br />

assistance to these countries in order to<br />

guarantee access to Europe and to pre–<br />

vent them from fighting with each other.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re also may exist in these new coun–<br />

tries the desire to unite with Russia.<br />

D. <strong>The</strong> further economic and political<br />

degradation of the existing regime in<br />

Ukraine. This is-pe^mie if the continua–<br />

tion of the current tenfielie^s does not<br />

result in a social explosion, civil war, or<br />

the disintegration of Ukraine. Taking<br />

into account the broad cultural ami eth–<br />

nic links between Russia and Ukrabe<br />

and the problem of refugees, Russia in<br />

this case would be dragged into<br />

<strong>Ukrainian</strong> problems. Russia may also be<br />

forced to deal with problems resulting<br />

from the degradation of Ukraine, such as<br />

illegal exports of drugs and arms from<br />

that country. <strong>The</strong> continuing existence of<br />

nuclear arms, nuclear plants, and the<br />

high possibility of ecologic catastrophe<br />

in Ukraine may also endanger the territo–<br />

ry of Russia.<br />

E. <strong>The</strong> most dangerous scenario is that<br />

both Russia and Ukraine will disinte–<br />

grate. This could result in an exhausting<br />

war. This scenario could be the cause of<br />

a third world war and would involve the<br />

efforts of both the United States and its<br />

Western allies. A resolution of such a<br />

conflict would require peacekeeping<br />

forces, substantial financial aid and a<br />

great deal of negotiations.<br />

F. <strong>The</strong> final scenario is the slow<br />

degradation of Ukraine. This could be<br />

coupled with the further "fascization" of<br />

Russia if Zhirinovsky or another nation–<br />

alist comes to power in 1996. in essence,<br />

this variant repeats some of the main fea–<br />

tures of the previous one. All scenarios<br />

are tantamount to the loss of <strong>Ukrainian</strong><br />

independence, its fragmentation and the<br />

marginalization of its existence in the<br />

European and global context.

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