The Ukrainian Weekly 1994
The Ukrainian Weekly 1994
The Ukrainian Weekly 1994
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22<br />
Systemic crisis...<br />
(Continued from page 2)<br />
em regions of Ukraine. Donetske and<br />
Transcarpathia currently lead in the sepa–<br />
ratist movement from Kyyiv. Recently,<br />
an attempt to create a free-trade zone in<br />
the Transcarpathian region was blocked<br />
by Kyyiv, which viewed it as "sepa–<br />
ratist." This move of the Parliament does<br />
not mean, however, that the question has<br />
been taken off the agenda.<br />
Tensions between Kyyiv and Galicia<br />
have been aggravated recently. For the<br />
Kyyiv elite, Lviv has changed from the<br />
"island of freedom" into the "island of<br />
dissent." That has caused a reduction in<br />
the grain and oil supplies to the region.<br />
This tendency can push Galicia to a dras–<br />
tic orientation of its policy toward eco–<br />
nomic independence and possible politi–<br />
cal separation from Kyyiv. <strong>The</strong>re exist<br />
parallel tensions between southern and<br />
eastern Ukraine and Galicia. it is clear<br />
that this peculiarity of <strong>Ukrainian</strong> politics<br />
RECORDING DEPARTMENT<br />
TOTAL AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1993<br />
GAlNS lN JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />
New members<br />
Reinstated<br />
Transferee! in<br />
Change class in<br />
Transferee! from Juvenile Dept.<br />
LOSSES lN JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />
Transferee! out<br />
Change of class out<br />
Transferee! to adults<br />
Died<br />
Cach surrender<br />
Endowment matured<br />
Fully paid-up<br />
Extended insurance<br />
Certificate terminated<br />
MEMBERSHIP REPORT<br />
JUV.<br />
17,277<br />
33<br />
THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY<br />
and culture will determine the general<br />
development of the situation in Ukraine<br />
and that it possesses greater importance<br />
than the relations in the "center-regions."<br />
<strong>The</strong> absolute financial-economic and<br />
political crisis in Ukraine has reached<br />
such an intensity (despite shallow "stabil–<br />
ity" - the beloved concept of the Kyyivan<br />
elite) that for its resolution some extraor–<br />
dinary measures are needed, e.g. rapid<br />
privatization, sale of non-functional enterprises<br />
to anybody in the world who would<br />
desire them, broad concessions and car–<br />
tels with foreign companies, and the<br />
issuance of state-guaranteed bonds for<br />
loans. Kyyiv is incapable of such initia–<br />
tives now. Political insecurity in Ukraine<br />
also leaves little hope for any substantial<br />
foreign aid.<br />
Conclusion<br />
<strong>The</strong> practical and theoretical possibili–<br />
ties for the improvement of the political<br />
and economic crisis in Ukraine are very<br />
small. Objectively, Moscow should be<br />
interested in stimulating the <strong>Ukrainian</strong><br />
SUNDAY, JUNE 26, <strong>1994</strong><br />
search for ways out of the situation. At the<br />
same time, the subjective unacceptability<br />
of <strong>Ukrainian</strong> independence can push<br />
Moscow in the direction of preserving a<br />
situation characterized by permanent polit–<br />
ical tension and economic crisis in<br />
Ukraine. Such a course of action will pre–<br />
vent the emergence of an economically<br />
and politically strong Ukraine, even<br />
though it could save Russian territory from<br />
refugees and the depletion of its treasury.<br />
Another point of view also is possible,<br />
namely that Moscow's policy of "dis–<br />
tancing" itself from <strong>Ukrainian</strong> economic<br />
and political hardships will cause enor–<br />
mous financial and human expenses in<br />
the future. To prevent this, Moscow must<br />
take on a more active involvement in<br />
<strong>Ukrainian</strong> affairs.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are some possible scenarios of<br />
development.<br />
A. Civil war. <strong>The</strong> unexpected rise to<br />
power of extreme political forces (if, for<br />
instance, the president were to be<br />
impeached, as was recently attempted in<br />
December by 240 MPs) could turn a polit–<br />
<strong>Ukrainian</strong> National Association<br />
Monthly reports for January<br />
ADULTS<br />
41,237<br />
51<br />
ADD<br />
5,339<br />
8<br />
TOTALS<br />
63,853<br />
92<br />
TOTAL LOSSES 77 254 19 350<br />
INACTIVE MEMBERSHIP<br />
GAlNS 1N JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />
Paid-up<br />
Extended insurance<br />
TOTAL GAlNS<br />
LOSSES lN JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />
Died<br />
Cach surrender<br />
Reinstated<br />
Lapsed<br />
TOTAL LOSSES<br />
TOTAL UNA MEMBERSHlP<br />
AS OF JANUARY 31, <strong>1994</strong><br />
14<br />
2<br />
16<br />
9<br />
2<br />
12<br />
17,259<br />
52<br />
12<br />
64<br />
48<br />
7<br />
4<br />
3<br />
62<br />
41,150 5,335<br />
F1NANC1AL DEPARTMENT<br />
Dues and Annuity Premiums From Members<br />
income From "Svoboda" Operation<br />
investment income:<br />
Banks<br />
Bonds<br />
Certificate Loans<br />
Mortgage Loans<br />
Real Estate<br />
Short Term investments<br />
Stocks ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^<br />
Total<br />
Refunds:<br />
Total<br />
lNCOME FOR JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />
Employee Hospitalization Plan Premiums<br />
General Office Maintenance<br />
investment Expense<br />
Operating Expenses Washington Office<br />
Rent<br />
Reward To Special Organizer<br />
Taxes Federal, State fcCity On Employee Wages<br />
Taxes Held in Escrow<br />
Miscellaneous:<br />
Donations To Fraternal Fund<br />
Exchange Account-UNURC<br />
Profit On Bonds Sold or Matured<br />
Transfer Account<br />
Total<br />
investments:<br />
Bonds Matured Or Sold<br />
Mortgages Repaid<br />
Short Term investments Sold<br />
Total<br />
income For January, <strong>1994</strong>,„^„„„^„„„„„„„.^„,<br />
DlSBURSEMENTS FOR JANUARY <strong>1994</strong><br />
Paid To Or For Members:<br />
Annuity Benefits And Partial Withdrawals<br />
Cash Surrenders<br />
Death Benefits<br />
66<br />
14<br />
80<br />
49<br />
16<br />
5<br />
74<br />
63,744<br />
WALTER SOCHAN<br />
Supreme Secretary<br />
S<br />
s<br />
s<br />
$<br />
964.82<br />
201,188.43<br />
2,123.43<br />
27,025.37<br />
16,149.34<br />
7,801.48<br />
7,044.48<br />
26,756.38<br />
3,743.37<br />
850.40<br />
2,613.08<br />
186.30<br />
229.20<br />
21,546.98<br />
217.33<br />
2,500.00<br />
158,674.76<br />
7,448.76<br />
326,169.14<br />
494,792.66<br />
344,909.88<br />
107,118.30<br />
397,666.73<br />
849,694.91<br />
2,109,464.56<br />
3,994.56<br />
25,069.15<br />
43,500.00<br />
Total<br />
Dividend Accumulations<br />
Endowments Matured<br />
indigent Benefits Disbursed<br />
interest On Death Benefits<br />
Reinsurance Premiums Paid<br />
Operating Expenses:<br />
Real Estate<br />
Svoboda Operation<br />
Washington Office<br />
Official Publication-Svoboda<br />
Organizing Expenses:<br />
Advertising<br />
Commissions And Overrides On Universal Life<br />
Field Conferences<br />
Medical inspections<br />
Refund of Branch Secretaries Expenses<br />
Reward To Organizers<br />
Reward To Special Organizers<br />
Supreme Medical Examiner's Fee<br />
Traveling Expenses-Special Organizers<br />
Total<br />
Payroll, insurance And Taxes:<br />
Employee Benefit Plan<br />
insurance-General<br />
Salaries Of Executive Officers<br />
Salaries Of Office Employees<br />
Taxes-Federal, State And City On Employee tt<br />
Total<br />
General Expenses:<br />
Actuarial And Statistical Expenses<br />
Total<br />
Bank Charges<br />
Bank Charges For Custodian Account<br />
Books And Periodicals<br />
Dues To Fraternal Congresses<br />
General Office Maintenance<br />
insurance Department Fees<br />
Operating Expense of Canadian Office<br />
Printing and Stationery<br />
Rental Of Equipment And Services<br />
Telephone, Telegraph<br />
Traveling Expenses-General.^^^<br />
Miscellaneous:<br />
Accrued interest On Bonds<br />
Auditing Committee Expenses<br />
Donation From Fund For <strong>The</strong> Rebirth Of Ukraine<br />
Donations<br />
Exchange Account– Payroll<br />
Fraternal Activities<br />
investment Expense-Mortgages<br />
Loss On Bonds<br />
Professional Fees<br />
Rent<br />
Transfer Account<br />
<strong>Ukrainian</strong> Publications<br />
Total<br />
investments:<br />
Bonds<br />
Certificate Loans<br />
E.D.P. Equipment<br />
Total<br />
^lSEurSSml snts For Jam uary, <strong>1994</strong><br />
ASSETS<br />
Cash<br />
Short Term<br />
investments<br />
Bonds<br />
'<br />
Mortgage Loans 'm<br />
Certificate Loan "<br />
Real Estate "<br />
Printing Plant A E.D.P. "<br />
Equipment<br />
Stocks<br />
Loan to D.H.-U.N.A<br />
Housing Corp.<br />
Loan To U.N.U.R.C.<br />
BALANCE<br />
LIABILITIES<br />
775,539.31 Life insurance<br />
50,170,008.08<br />
636,660.73 Accidental D.D.<br />
685,827.82 Fraternal<br />
1,712,115.71 Orphans<br />
104,551.04 Old Age Home<br />
8,834,553.19 Emergency<br />
S<br />
5"<br />
772.54<br />
72,625.95<br />
500.00<br />
13.50<br />
586.08<br />
85,948.32<br />
79,096.55<br />
17,506.36<br />
83,078.10<br />
23,097.37<br />
2,249.57<br />
444.00<br />
369.16<br />
66,042.02<br />
4,206.24<br />
9,452.79<br />
1,500.00<br />
2,869.92<br />
43,239.61<br />
9,000.00<br />
19,091.99<br />
64,427.73<br />
22,870.07<br />
6,359.00<br />
519.82<br />
2,431.35<br />
321.32<br />
200.00<br />
1,211.47<br />
515.25<br />
520.00<br />
706.27<br />
2,219.70<br />
35,728.76<br />
3,205.48<br />
850.68<br />
54,789.10<br />
68.06<br />
33.23<br />
69,141.72<br />
50.00<br />
158,674.76<br />
657.16<br />
775.00<br />
44.81<br />
4,170.00<br />
1,885.63<br />
325,000.00<br />
1,031.00<br />
497,270.00<br />
3,103.43<br />
10,110.00<br />
4,552.07<br />
335,701.81<br />
3,926.75<br />
854,664.06<br />
2,152,536.11<br />
$ 75,252,610.11<br />
ToTaT І 73,553,263.- З 73,553,263.34"<br />
ALEXANDER BLAH1TKA<br />
Supreme Treasurer<br />
N0.26<br />
ical conflict into a military one. <strong>The</strong> pre–<br />
text for this could be terrorist activities of<br />
paramilitary forces such as UNSO<br />
(<strong>Ukrainian</strong> National Self-Defense) in<br />
Sevastopil or in the Donbas. Provocations<br />
could also be organized by the SBU (for–<br />
mer KGB). Armed conflict could spread<br />
through a significant part of <strong>Ukrainian</strong><br />
territory, thus causing a stampede of<br />
refugees to Russia.<br />
<strong>The</strong> intervention of Russia would<br />
become inevitable in such a case.<br />
Moscow's delay in entering into a conflict<br />
would entail for Moscow a sharp increase<br />
in both political and economic expenses<br />
(something like U.S. and NATO military<br />
involvement in Bosnia).<br />
B. <strong>The</strong> "Latin-Americanization" of<br />
Ukraine. <strong>The</strong>re exists the possibility that<br />
the <strong>Ukrainian</strong> military will attempt to play<br />
the same role that the army played in some<br />
countries of Latin America (Pinochet). But<br />
this variant would be tantamount to eco–<br />
nomic catastrophe, as the <strong>Ukrainian</strong> army<br />
is incapable of conducting economic<br />
reform due to the absence of necessary<br />
economic experience in the officers' corps<br />
and its refusal to collaborate with dictator–<br />
ial regime on the side of market-oriented<br />
economists. For Russia this scenario<br />
would signify, first of all, the existence in<br />
Ukraine of an authoritarian and nationalis–<br />
tic regime incapable of guaranteeing ele–<br />
mentary supplies to its citizens, subse–<br />
quently causing the mass flight of<br />
refugees, and the inevitable involvement<br />
of Russia in the restoration of the<br />
<strong>Ukrainian</strong> economy because of its role as a<br />
link with Europe. <strong>The</strong> financial costs for<br />
Russia in this case would be enormous.<br />
C. <strong>The</strong> disintegration of Ukraine.<br />
Economic and political crises could lead<br />
to the emergence of several states on the<br />
territory of Ukraine. <strong>The</strong> variant of civil<br />
war is highly probable in this case, if the<br />
disintegration does occur peacefully,<br />
then all the resulting smaller states will<br />
face the same economic, financial and<br />
political problems as Ukraine. Russia<br />
will be compelled to grant financial<br />
assistance to these countries in order to<br />
guarantee access to Europe and to pre–<br />
vent them from fighting with each other.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re also may exist in these new coun–<br />
tries the desire to unite with Russia.<br />
D. <strong>The</strong> further economic and political<br />
degradation of the existing regime in<br />
Ukraine. This is-pe^mie if the continua–<br />
tion of the current tenfielie^s does not<br />
result in a social explosion, civil war, or<br />
the disintegration of Ukraine. Taking<br />
into account the broad cultural ami eth–<br />
nic links between Russia and Ukrabe<br />
and the problem of refugees, Russia in<br />
this case would be dragged into<br />
<strong>Ukrainian</strong> problems. Russia may also be<br />
forced to deal with problems resulting<br />
from the degradation of Ukraine, such as<br />
illegal exports of drugs and arms from<br />
that country. <strong>The</strong> continuing existence of<br />
nuclear arms, nuclear plants, and the<br />
high possibility of ecologic catastrophe<br />
in Ukraine may also endanger the territo–<br />
ry of Russia.<br />
E. <strong>The</strong> most dangerous scenario is that<br />
both Russia and Ukraine will disinte–<br />
grate. This could result in an exhausting<br />
war. This scenario could be the cause of<br />
a third world war and would involve the<br />
efforts of both the United States and its<br />
Western allies. A resolution of such a<br />
conflict would require peacekeeping<br />
forces, substantial financial aid and a<br />
great deal of negotiations.<br />
F. <strong>The</strong> final scenario is the slow<br />
degradation of Ukraine. This could be<br />
coupled with the further "fascization" of<br />
Russia if Zhirinovsky or another nation–<br />
alist comes to power in 1996. in essence,<br />
this variant repeats some of the main fea–<br />
tures of the previous one. All scenarios<br />
are tantamount to the loss of <strong>Ukrainian</strong><br />
independence, its fragmentation and the<br />
marginalization of its existence in the<br />
European and global context.