Managing Intractable Conflicts: Lessons from Moldova and Cyprus

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Nested Identities: From History Books to the Emergence of a Post-Conflict Generation in Cyprus 29 olum” [Either taksim or death] was the slogan expressing sentiment prevailing among Turkish Cypriots. The independence of the Republic of Cyprus has been also perceived differently. Although, when it became independent on 16 August 1960, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots celebrated the event separately, within their communities (Holland & Faustman, 2010, p. 57), Turkish Cypriots were the ones who demonstrated more enthusiasm. Greek Cypriots started commemorating the independence only in 1979, as a reaction to the 1974 events. They also started using the Cypriot national flag and created their own Olympic team, while before they were using the Greek national flag and were part of the Greek Olympic team (Papadakis, 2010, p. 65). Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, currently completely ignore the Independence Day. Since the collapse of the 1960 Republic in 1963, but mainly after the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkish national symbolism was introduced and Turkish national holidays, including its military parades, started being celebrated together with the Turkish Cypriot ones. Instead of the Republic of Cyprus’ Independence Day, the TRNC Independence Day is celebrated (Tiryaki, 2013). The beginning of the conflict is also viewed and perceived differently. What Greek Cypriots view as ‘invasion’ by Turkey in 1974, Turkish Cypriots call ‘baris harekati’, the peace operation. While for Greek Cypriots the conflict started in 1974, for Turkish Cypriots it started in 1963 when they were ousted by Greek Cypriots from the bi-communal government and comprised 3 per cent of the island’s territory (Brus et al., 2008, pp. 24-26). It is only logical that with such a big difference between the views of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots over the reasons and date of the conflict’s outburst, the visions for the solution also differ. According to the polls, the majority of Greek Cypriots favor a unitary state over other alternatives. Federation is a distant solution. 77 per cent of Greek Cypriots favor a unitary state with a ‘one person one vote’ principle, agreement agreed upon behind the scenes at the Congress of Berlin in summer 1878, Cyprus was transferred to Britain. Although the Convention contained a provision that “if Russia returns Kars and other territories in Armenia, which were taken in the last war [Russo-Turkish War 1877-78 that ended up with defeat of Turkey and Peace Treaty of San Stefano], to Turkey, Cyprus will be evacuated by Britain and the Convention will be annulled”, additional agreement in the Convention deprived the Sultan of every power in Cyprus and in 1914, when Ottomans entered the war against the Allies, the British annexed the island entirely (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, pp. 302-352).
30 Managing Intractable Conflicts: Lessons from Moldova and Cyprus as an alternative to federalism. 42 per cent of them deemed it totally essential. On the other hand, 46 per cent of Turkish Cypriots believe two separate and internationally recognized states are absolutely essential to the peace in the island (Sozen, Christou, Lordos, & Kaymak, 2011). However, since 1974, the leaders of the two communities have been negotiating a bizonal and bi-communal federation based on the power sharing and political equality as an ideal solution for the Cyprus problem. The preferences demonstrated in the polls also correspond with the fears and mistrust both communities maintain towards each other. Turkish Cypriots fear that the fact that Greek Cypriots prefer the unitary state solution prove their ‘real’ intention, which is to dominate the whole island. Nationalistic descriptions in the schoolbooks of the island being purely Greek strengthen the conviction of Turkish Cypriots that rather than compromise on the power sharing and political equality, Greek Cypriots desire to be the sole owners of the island. Greek Cypriots, citing the intervention by Turkey in 1974, which divided the island’s territory and the unilateral declaration of independence from TRNC in 1983 [UDI], believe that Turkish Cypriots desire a permanent division of the island instead of a joint federation. It seems that in the Cyprus case, while nationalisms were behind the inception of the conflict, the conflict itself has helped to shape conflicting narratives regarding the reasons and prospects of the conflict itself. National historical narratives built on the thesis of the incompatible ‘other’ fuel the conflict while the conflict itself gives a pretext for the continuity of the homogeneous nationalist accounts. Indeed, it can be observed that the vicious circle of interconnectedness is quite firm in the Cyprus conflict. It seems that Turkish Cypriot nationalism, emerged as a reaction to the Greek Cypriot goal of enosis. When that transpired to the taksim thesis and when the taksim thesis partially materialized after Turkish Cypriots effectively withdrew from the Republic in 1974, Greek Cypriots embraced for the first time the ‘Cypriotness’ of the Republic of Cyprus. The vicious circle seems perfect: while Turkish Cypriot nationalism emerged as a reaction to the ‘enosis thirsty’ Greek Cypriot ‘Greek’ nationalism, the Greek Cypriot ‘Cypriotic’ nationalism developed as a result of the ‘taksim hungry’ Turkish Cypriot ‘Turkish’ nationalism. Is there any way out of this seemingly self-fueling cycle of perceived and real hostilities Numerous peace proposals have been penned for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. The late Annan Plan was just one among many. However, none
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Challenges to Keeping the Negotiati
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Managing Intractable Conflicts: Lessons from Moldova and Cyprus

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