Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) - Report of ...

what had happened. As Ward continued driving outby, Harper called Lobato and told him to
contact Erickson and let him know that they were headed his way. Lobato sent a message to the
PED light Erickson had been given, instructing him to call the AMS operator. As Ward reached
crosscut 88, he passed Maxwell, who had stopped at a phone to call Lobato. Lobato told
Maxwell that he thought an earthquake had occurred. Maxwell told Lobato to start calling the
section. Lobato continued attempting to contact miners in the working section, without success.
Maxwell drove inby crosscut 93, where he saw damaged stoppings and turned around and started
driving outby.
Pritt and Curtis were unaware of the collapse when they exited the mine at 2:53 a.m. Pritt
dropped Curtis off to start examining the No. 1 conveyor belt. Pritt drove his pick-up truck back
into the mine to begin his preshift examination of the No. 2 conveyor belt. When he reached the
Main West entries, at 3:01 a.m., Pritt received a PED message instructing him to call the AMS
operator. He went to a nearby phone at Main West crosscut 4 and called Lobato, who briefed
him on the situation. Pritt told Lobato to send a PED message to Erickson and let them know
that he was on his way to the section. Pritt asked Lobato to contact Curtis and have him continue
walking the belts inby until Pritt found out what was going on. Pritt also spoke to Harper, just
before Ward arrived at crosscut 35. Ward picked up Harper and they sped toward the section, as
Pritt started driving inby from crosscut 4. Lobato sent PED messages to Curtis, Hardee, and
Erickson.
Ward and Harper encountered thick dust inby crosscut 96, where they saw destroyed stoppings.
At approximately 3:12 a.m., they stopped just inby crosscut 113 where a large piece of coal
blocked the roadway. Harper walked to a phone near crosscut 112 and called Lobato. Harper
instructed him to call Gary Peacock (mine superintendent) and tell him that there was a cave-in,
that all the stoppings were blown out inby crosscut 96, and that they were going to try to advance
into the section. Meanwhile, Pritt met Maxwell near crosscut 88. Maxwell parked his supply
tractor and got into Pritt's truck. They called Lobato and instructed him to notify Peacock that
something had happened. Lobato telephoned Peacock at his home. Pritt and Maxwell continued
driving toward the section as Ward and Harper explored inby crosscut 113.
Pritt and Maxwell arrived near crosscut 112, called Lobato, and confirmed that the phone
worked. Pritt tried to contact the section and received no response. Maxwell returned to his
supply tractor to gather materials for reestablishing ventilation.
While exploring inby crosscut 113, Ward and Harper heard loud, deep rumbling from continued
movement of the surrounding strata and observed sloughing of the ribs and mine roof. Debris in
the travelway and poor visibility hindered their travel. They returned to the phone where they
met Pritt. Pritt convinced Ward that they needed to wait for mine rescue apparatuses before
attempting to advance inby. Pritt called Toomer and asked him to bring in as many mine rescue
breathing apparatuses as he could find. During this call, the AMS operators relayed Pritt’s
information to Peacock by telephone. Pritt also told Peacock that they lost communications with
the section and that stoppings were down.
Hardee finished his preshift examination of the South Crandall Canyon Mine and drove to the
foremen’s room, located inside the Crandall Canyon Mine, at 3:22 a.m. As he prepared to record
his examination results, Hardee overheard Pritt requesting breathing apparatuses. Hardee joined
the conversation and volunteered to get the apparatuses. At 3:25 a.m., Hardee drove his pick-up
truck to the mine office building and ran upstairs to the AMS office, where Lobato was on the
phone with Peacock. Hardee briefly spoke with Peacock to tell him he was going into the mine.
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