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ARTICLE-19-policy-on-prohibition-to-incitement

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However, Article 20(2) of the ICCPR goes<br />

<strong>on</strong> <strong>to</strong> list three protected characteristics<br />

– nati<strong>on</strong>ality, race, and religi<strong>on</strong> – as<br />

grounds for prohibiting <strong>incitement</strong>. The<br />

HR Committee has not yet addressed the<br />

questi<strong>on</strong> of whether it should be interpreted<br />

expansively <strong>to</strong> include other recognised<br />

characteristics. 43<br />

The selectivity of the grounds listed in<br />

Article 20(2) of the ICCPR may be a<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the political c<strong>on</strong>text of<br />

the negotiati<strong>on</strong>s for the ICCPR and the<br />

his<strong>to</strong>rical events that it was resp<strong>on</strong>ding<br />

<strong>to</strong>. The ICCPR entered in<strong>to</strong> force in <str<strong>on</strong>g>19</str<strong>on</strong>g>77,<br />

having been adopted before equality<br />

movements around the world made<br />

significant progress in promoting and<br />

securing human rights for all. Since then,<br />

the ICCPR has come <strong>to</strong> be interpreted and<br />

unders<strong>to</strong>od as supporting the principle<br />

of equality <strong>on</strong> a larger scale, applying <strong>to</strong><br />

other unlisted grounds, in particular sexual<br />

orientati<strong>on</strong>, gender identity, and disability.<br />

The object and purpose of internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

human rights law is often unders<strong>to</strong>od as<br />

the protecti<strong>on</strong> of individual and collective<br />

human rights and the maintenance and<br />

promoti<strong>on</strong> of the ideals and values of<br />

a democratic society. This focus has<br />

encouraged an evolving interpretati<strong>on</strong><br />

of the provisi<strong>on</strong>s of internati<strong>on</strong>al human<br />

rights instruments so as <strong>to</strong> reflect the<br />

developments in society over time. In this<br />

respect, the ICCPR and other internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

and regi<strong>on</strong>al human rights treaties have<br />

been described as “living instruments” that<br />

must be interpreted “in the light of presentday<br />

c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s”, rather than being viewed<br />

as c<strong>on</strong>tracts with c<strong>on</strong>crete terms defined<br />

by the norms that were prevailing at the<br />

moment of their drafting or ratificati<strong>on</strong>. 44<br />

As society’s understanding of equality<br />

<strong>on</strong> grounds such as disability or sexual<br />

orientati<strong>on</strong> and gender identity has evolved,<br />

so has the understanding of the “object and<br />

purpose” of internati<strong>on</strong>al human rights law.<br />

Furthermore, there is a general principle<br />

that legal instruments that give effect <strong>to</strong><br />

fundamental rights and freedoms should<br />

be interpreted “generously,” in order <strong>to</strong><br />

enable their full realisati<strong>on</strong>. The realisati<strong>on</strong><br />

of rights should not be c<strong>on</strong>strained by<br />

an overly formalistic commitment <strong>to</strong> the<br />

original wording of the instrument, or<br />

even <strong>to</strong> the intent of the drafters, if that<br />

interpretati<strong>on</strong> would unnecessarily narrow<br />

the enjoyment of rights and freedoms.<br />

Internati<strong>on</strong>al human rights law further<br />

supports these interpretative principles by<br />

recognising that existing rights must be<br />

20<br />

43<br />

Moreover, Article 4 of the ICERD refers <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>to</strong> “race, colour and ethnic origin” am<strong>on</strong>g the prohibited grounds, which is<br />

narrower than the grounds covered by the ICERD in general, namely “race, colour, descent, or nati<strong>on</strong>al or ethnic origin.” In the<br />

interpretati<strong>on</strong> of the ICERD, the ICERD Committee did not uphold this narrow list of grounds. For example, in 2004 General<br />

Recommendati<strong>on</strong> XXX <strong>on</strong> “Discriminati<strong>on</strong> Against N<strong>on</strong>-Citizens”, the Committee recommended that the State parties should<br />

“take steps <strong>to</strong> address xenophobic attitudes and behaviour <strong>to</strong>wards n<strong>on</strong>-citizens, in particular hate speech and racial violence<br />

and .... take resolute any tendency <strong>to</strong> target, stigmatize, stereotype or profile, <strong>on</strong> the basis of race, colour, descent and nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

or ethnic origin, members of “n<strong>on</strong>-citizen” populati<strong>on</strong> groups...” General Recommendati<strong>on</strong> No.30: Discriminati<strong>on</strong> Against N<strong>on</strong><br />

Citizens, Gen. Rec. No. 30. (General Comments), adopted <strong>on</strong> 1 Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2004, General Recommendati<strong>on</strong> XXX; available at:<br />

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/e3980a673769e229c1256f8d0057cd3dOpendocument.<br />

44<br />

See, for example, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, A 26 (<str<strong>on</strong>g>19</str<strong>on</strong>g>78).

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