I Developments in Washington's Law of Law-Making - Gonzaga ...

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 44:3
Amalgamated Transit, 119 both of which rejected attempts to supplement the
constitution in statute.
In representing the Lieutenant Governor, the state focused on the procedural
difficulties raised by Senator Brown's challenge. As declared in Walker v. Munro, the
Lieutenant Governor's approval of a bill is not a mere ministerial act, because the
presiding officer must determine the number of votes cast and whether those votes
have been cast properly.' Because the ruling involved a discretionary duty, the state
argued that the Senator did not state a claim in mandamus and therefore the court
lacked original jurisdiction over the action. 21 Further, the state argued that issuing
such a writ would breach separation of powers by judicially intruding in the
legislative process and for similar reasons that the dispute was a nonjusticiable
political controversy.1 22
On the merits, the state first argued that the plain language of article H1, section 22
did not prohibit the legislature or the people acting in their law-making powers from
raising the bar for certain types of legislation.' 23 Further, argued the state,
Gerberding 124 does not compel the invalidation of the voting threshold. 1 25 In
Gerberding, the court rejected term limits and viewed the constitutional criteria for
holding office as exclusive because: (1) the framers had expressly considered and
rejected term limits; and (2) there is a strong constitutional presumption in favor of
eligibility for office. 126
Ultimately-and unanimously-the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
over Senator Brown's claims. 127 Under article IV, section 4 of the state constitution,
the court has original jurisdiction in mandamus cases, but the Brown court concluded
that it had no mandamus jurisdiction over the decision of the Lieutenant Governor. 1 28
The court reiterated its Walker ruling that mandamus will not lie to compel a
discretionary act and that a presiding officer's decision to sign a bill involves the
119. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 11 P.3d 762, 793-94 (Wash. 2000)
(invalidating initiative that attempted to establish extra-constitutional referenda).
120. Walker v. Munro, 879 P.2d 920, 925 (Wash. 1994). Cf City of Wenatchee v. Owens,
185 P.3d 1218, 1223 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (under statute requiring city clerk to attest to municipal
ordinances, clerk's signature is ministerial).
121. Brief of Respondent at 15-18, Brown v. Owen, No. 81287-0 (Wash. June 9,2008).
122. Id. at 33; see Walker, 879 P.2d at 927 (in declaratory judgment action, legislators'
concerns about confusion and uncertainty in the legislative process did not constitute actual, concrete
harm where the "course of future events is, at this time, purely speculative and subject to challenge
when a specific dispute arises in regards to a particular bill. Until presented with an existing, factspecific
action, this court will not involve itself in what is essentially a political dispute.").
123. Brief of Respondent supra note 121, at 37-39.
124. Gerberding v. Munro, 949 P.2d 1366 (Wash. 1998).
125. Brief of Respondent, supra note 121, at 43-44.
126. Gerberding, 949 P.2d at 1372-75; see also Brief of Respondent, supra note 121, at 44.
127. Brown, 2009 WL 564432, at * 1, 4,9.
128. Id at *4-5.