I Developments in Washington's Law of Law-Making - Gonzaga ...

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 44:3
Second, Division I's Batey ruling calls into question the weight assigned to
legislative "value judgments" in bill titles. Bill titles are not merely sterile recitations
of the law; as with all legislation, they reflect the politics and policies of their
legislative sponsors. 219 Whether a bill achieves its declared goal, e.g., "enhanc[ing]
benefit and tax equity," may be in the eye of the beholder. 220 In its amicus brief to the
state supreme court in Batey, the legislature argued that separated from the concept of
value-whether the change is "beneficial"--such words in the title merely indicate
"change" and do not operate as a substantive restriction where the title is sufficient to
provide inquiry notice. 221 However, since the state supreme court resolved the case
on statutory grounds, Division I's constitutional reasoning on the subject-in-title
analysis leaves open the question of legislative value judgments in bill titles.
C. Rewinding the Rope: Curing Article II, Section 19 Problems through
Subsequent "Reenactment"
The legislature can cure statutory problems through subsequent reenactment.
Yet, in several recent decisions, the court has employed simplistic analyses of title
defect cures through legislative reenactment. Such title-reenactment analyses
potentially conflict with the technical and traditional use of reenactment by legislative
drafters.
Morin v. Harre 22 and Pierce County v State ("Pierce County 1")2 are recent
examples of cases where the state supreme court has permitted the legislature to cure
an alleged article H, section 19 defect through subsequent amendmene 24 or
reenactment. 225 In Batey v Employment Security Department, 226 the plaintiffs
conceded that the legislature could legitimately have cured a subject-in-title defect
219. In this regard, bill titles should be distinguished from titles written for ballot measures,
which are prepared through a statutory process, see Original Acts, supra note 146, at 41 n. 27, and
must be "true and impartial." WASH. REv. CODE § 29A.72.050. E.g., In re Ballot Title for Initiative
333, 558 P.2d 248, 250-51 (Wash. 1977) (holding that initiative sponsors and opponents both have
interest in impartiality of ballot title).
220. Brief ofAmicus Curiae Wash. State Leg., supra note 158, at 4-6.
221. Id at 5-6. Cf Pierce County v. State, 78 P.3d 640, 648 (Wash. 2003) ("Pierce County
I") (stating that "policy fluff" in text of bill is not a subject for purposes of single-subject analysis).
222. 164 P.3d 495,498-99 (Wash. 2007).
223. 148 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Wash. 2006) ("Pierce County 11").
224. Cf In re Matteson, 12 P.3d 585, 589 (Wash. 2000) (holding that section amended in
budget allegedly in violation of art. H, sec. 19 was subsequently clarified in a new section enacted
under proper title, rendering moot the challenge to the budget section).
225. Cf State v. Stannard, 142 P.3d 641, 644 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (Division II rejected as
without support in Washington law the state's argument that subsequent amendment and reenactment
of an initiative's section cured alleged title/subject violations).
226. Batey v. Employment Sec. Dep't 154 P.3d 266 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007), aff'don other
grounds sub nom Spain v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 185 P.3d 1188 (Wash. 2008).