I Developments in Washington's Law of Law-Making - Gonzaga ...

2008/09]
WASHINGTON'S LAW OF LAW-MAKING
Notwithstanding these defects, the court refused to bar the initiative from the
November 2008 ballot. 451 The petitioners in Community Care made two arguments
based on the flawed text of the petition: first, the Secretary of State could not treat the
initiative as one to the voters and was thus barred from placing it on the ballot; and
second, the Secretary was obligated to follow the format of the petition by placing it
before the Sixty-First Legislature the following January. 452 Yet because the
governing statutes permit review only for rejections, not acceptances, the petitioners
were forced to seek a writ of mandamus or certiorari.
The court concluded that the case was "fundamentally about the secretary of
state's discretion in processing initiative petitions. ' '453 As noted in Schrempp, the
Secretary of State's discretion to accept the petitions is confirmed by the statutes' use
of "may ' '4 54 and "substantially. ' 455 Mandamus will not lie to compel acts vested in
the discretion of a state officer 4 56 absent an abuse of discretion that amounts to a
failure to exercise discretion at all, 457 and the court may use its power to issue a writ
of certiorari only to address quasi-judicial action for which no remedy exists. 458
Because of the ambiguities the court found in the initiative petition and text, the court
concluded that the Secretary of State had a reasoned basis for exercising his discretion
to accept the petitions. 459 The three-justice dissent argued that the Secretary's
discretion was limited to accepting petitions that substantially complied with the
statute and that the majority's ruling essentially made compliance with the statutory
forms optional, "leaving the way open for those who intentionally create ambiguities
for political advantage. ' A 6 °
Courts are unwilling to interpret statutes in a manner that impairs the
constitutional right to enact ballot measures: these rights may not be "hampered either
by technical statutory provisions or technical construction thereof, further than is
necessary to fairly guard against fraud and mistake in the exercise by the people of
this constitutional right. ''461 The Community Care court only impliedly relied on this
principle, but it specifically noted the court's restricted role in the case: "the authority
451. Community Care, 200 P.3d at 704.
452. Id. at 704-05.
453. Id at 707.
454. WASH. REv. CODE § 29A.72.160 (2005); see Community Care, 200 P.3d at 705.
455. WASH. REv. CODE § 29A.72.110 (2005); see Community Care, 200 P.3d at 705.
456. Vangor v. Munro, 798 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Wash. 1990); Walker v. Munro, 879 P.2d 920,
925 (Wash. 1994).
457. Vangor 798 P.2dat 1155.
458. Community Care, 200 P.3d at 706-07); N. Bend Stage Line, Inc. v. Dept. of Pub. Works,
16 P.2d 206, 210-11 (Wash. 1932) (administrative decision for which no other judicial review was
available); Kriedler v. Eikenberry, 766 P.2d 438, 444 (Wash. 1989).
459. Community Care, 200 P.3d at 707-08.
460. Id. at 708-09, 711 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
461. Sudduth v. Chapman, 558 P.2d 806,808-09 (Wash. 1977).