Gitlin Law Firm 2010 Illinois Divorce and Paternity Case and ...

So the real issue is that of a remedy for non-compliance.
The Supreme Court stated it was not commenting upon potential other remedies:
[W]e note that other causes of action may be available to preserve the privacy and
confidentiality of the communications at issue particularly when a protective order is
involved. See, e.g., Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154 (2007) (patient
filed a complaint against hospital and its employee, who revealed patient’s pregnancy
results to patient’s sister at a public tavern, alleging, inter alia, invasion of privacy
and negligent infliction of emotional distress); Cordts v. Chicago Tribune Co., 369
Ill. App. 3d 601 (2006) (employee brought invasion of privacy and defamation claims
against his employer and a company hired by the employer to evaluate his disability
claim, alleging that the company wrongfully disclosed to plaintiff’s ex-wife that he
was receiving treatment for depression after learning of the fact while evaluating his
disability claim). However, we have no cause to consider whether alternative
remedies may be available to plaintiffs under the narrow question presented in this
case pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308. See Brookbank v. Olson, 389 Ill. App. 3d
683, 685 (2009) (this court’s review is generally limited to the question certified by
the trial court).
Custody Modification
Smithson – Burden of Proof Regarding Custody Modification: Admission that JPA was Not
Working Did not Amount to Stipulation to Terminate Joint Custody
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IRMO Smithson, (4 Dist., January 31, 2011)
Recall that Illinois case law holds that when there are dueling petitions to modify joint custody, the
trial court proceeds to a best interest determination rather than address whether there has been a
substantial change of circumstances, etc. [IRMO Lasky, 176 Ill. 2d 75, 81 (1997). Following Lasky,
this court found in IRMO Ricketts, 329 Ill. App. 3d 173 (2002), where both parents file petitions to
modify a joint-custody agreement, each seeking sole custody, both parents are, in essence, agreeing
joint custody should be terminated and there was no need to show serious endangerment to the
child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health in order to modify the custody agreement.
Ricketts, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 178.] The ex-husband contended that, while his ex-wife had not filed a
petition to modify joint custody, her testimony that joint custody was not working constituted a
stipulation that she no longer desired to have joint custody and urged that the trial court should have
gone straight to a best interest determination. The appellate court correctly noted that the
circumstances of this case were different from those found in Lasky and Ricketts. The appellate court
stated:
Although Christina did testify as an adverse witness she found joint parenting not
working, during her attorney's opportunity to elicit testimony to clarify her testimony,
Christina testified the reason she did not believe joint custody was working was she
believed she was parenting with Julia, James' new wife, and not James. She based
her belief on the fact the communication between the two families was conducted
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