JAN-MAR 2010 VOL 72 No1 - Navy League of Australia

FROM THE CROW’S NEST
THE ‘BRONCO FACTOR’ FOR THE LHDS
Sometime ago in Vol 70 No 3 of THE NAVY, this editorial suggested that
Defence could exploit the synergies provided by the RAAF’s F-35 JSF
purchase (AIR-6000) and the RAN’s LHD project (JP-2048 Ph 4A/B)
(see, ‘Let’s not Relearn Gallipoli’).
The editorial outlined a plan that said part of the AIR 6000 purchase of
JSF could include some STOVL (Short Take Off and Vertical Landing)
versions in the second buy under Phase 2B of the project. Phase 2A
is set to buy 72 standard USAF variants of the JSF. The STOVL version
could then operate from the flight deck of the LHDs.
The new Canberra class LHDs will provide the ADF with the ability to
take land forces offshore away from RAAF land based fighter cover.
Presently, there are no plans for those land forces to have LHD based air
support, other than a limited number of Tiger reconnaissance helicopters
(whose primary armament is geared towards reconnaissance/self
defence rather than close air support).
Experience has shown that land forces deployed without organic air
support are extremely vulnerable. Presently, the best way to support
the force with the current JSF model chosen by the RAAF is to find a
nation close to the operation that would be willing to host an Australian
fighter base. While RAAF JSFs would then be able to provide cover
for amphibious operations getting that near nation’s basing assistance
would be difficult to say the least. To add to the complexity of an
overseas amphibious operation a significant land force would then be
required to protect that base. Potentially making it unviable in any event
and a logistics liability to the supported amphibious operation itself.
Having a capability such as the LHDs means that one day it could be
used, and when used will mean the situation is a serious one requiring
serious and decisive firepower to act as a force multiplier to the land
force deployed. The realities and implications of this are probably still
not fully understood by the ADF, and won’t be until the LHDs arrive.
The editorial’s suggestion for exploiting JSF synergies with LHD
Themistocles
capabilities was received positively by the main-stream national media
and the public at large. Unfortunately, a response either way has not
seen from Defence or Government.
The argument for a close air support capability for troops ashore from
the LHDs was not intended to provide an air supremacy force for the
LHDs but merely close air support at priority call for troops ashore
encountering enemy resistance. Anti-air warfare would be provided
by the new Hobart class AWDs (Air Warfare Destroyers) either through
SM-2 or SM-6 missiles. The AWDs employment of Tomahawk cruise
missiles, as announced in the last White Paper, could also have an air
defence effect by attacking air bases and destroying aircraft on the
ground, or runways and infrastructure required to operate the enemy’s
air combat capability. The idea for STOVL JSFs for the Canberra class
LHDs was exactly along the same lines as the USMC’s employment
of Harriers from their LHDs, which are usually referred to as ‘airborne
artillery’ for the Marines ashore.
Given the positive reception and the obvious need for such a capability
for the ADF it was disappointing that the White Paper, published after the
editorial, did not use the wave of media and public support to examine
the troop support role for JSFs off the LHDs. However, since then the
world’s economy has suffered a number of serve ‘corrections’. This has
also impacted on Australia’s Defence in the form of budget restrictions.
So in the environment of tight fiscal pressures, Defence’s need to save
an unattainable $2 billion p.a., and limited experience of the implications
of offshore amphibious operations the need for close air support for
Australian troops ashore seems to be being ignored. However, a recent
USAF issued requirement for a new close air support fixed wing aircraft
may be a solution to the ADF’s requirement.
The US Light Attack and Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) programme is
expected to be part of the USAF’s FY 2010 budget. The programme
calls for a small and relatively cheap fixed wing aircraft to essentially
support troops in Afghanistan. One of the lead contenders for this
A Bronco manoeuvring on the deck of a USN LHD after landing. This example is the
OV-10D Bronco, noticeable by its longer nose to house a large FLIR system. The OV-10
was completely carrier/LHD capable. It could land and takeoff without arrestor or catapult
assistance and manoeuvre itself around deck. (USN)
02 THE NAVY VOL. 72 NO. 1