MR. JUSTICE ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, HCJ MR. JUSTICE FAQIR ...

CONSTITUTION PETITION NO. 1 OF 2008
AND CMA NO. 994 TO 996 OF 2008 48
before the Court. But notwithstanding the disinclination of
the court to give an all inclusive definition of the
expression, some broad propositions as to its meaning
have been enunciated. One of these propositions is that
equal protection of the laws means that no person or class
of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges
conferred and in the liabilities imposed. In the application
of these principles, however, it has always been recognized
that classification of persons or things is in no way
repugnant to the equality doctrine provided the
classification is not arbitrary or capricious, is natural and
reasonable and bears a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation. It is not for the Courts in such
cases, it is said, to demand from the legislature a scientific
accuracy in the classification adopted. If the classification
is relevant to the object of the Act it must be upheld
unless the relevancy is too remote or fanciful. A
classification that proceeds on irrelevant consideration,
such as differences in race, colour or religion will certainly
be rejected by the Courts. Applying these tests to the
present case, it cannot but be held that if in consequence
of abolishing the system of private rent for agricultural
land, it also became necessary to make some provision for
the outgoing landlords, the classification of the landlords
on the basis of their net incomes at the time of their
expropriation was necessary and not an unreasonable
classification.
In Abul Aala Maudoodi v. State (PLD 1964 SC 673 at 707) this Court
expounded the law on reasonable restriction as under: -
“The view that the expre ssion “reasonable restrictions’ in a
case like the present should be considered exclusively in
relation to the factual grounds on which the law imposing
the restrictions declares that they may be imposed is one,
which in my view, cannot be accepted by a Court which is
required to enforce a citizen’s right of free association as
formulated in the Constitution. The citizen is entitled to
approach the Court for a declaration, firstly, that his
freedom has been restrained under law, and secondly,
that it has been unreasonably restrained, and for the
determination of the latter question, I find it impossible to
exclude from consideration, the circumstances of the
application of the restraint. A circumstance of overpowering
importance, where the Constitution guarantees
such a freedom, would be that the restraint has been
applied by a person in authority acting merely on his own
opinion. I may here cite in support a short passage from