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Fall 2011 - Institute of Medical Science - University of Toronto

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VIEWPOINT<br />

Darwin. Newton. Einstein. Popper?<br />

By Adam Santoro<br />

Should science students be formally educated in the philosophy <strong>of</strong> science?<br />

Empirical science is characterized<br />

by its ability to construct universal<br />

statements, or ‘theories,’ from singular<br />

observations 1 . The formulation <strong>of</strong> a theory<br />

from singular observations requires inductive<br />

logic; for example, with enough observed<br />

instances <strong>of</strong> objects falling to the ground<br />

when dropped, one inductively infers that all<br />

objects fall to the ground when dropped. Yet<br />

the philosophical justification for the use <strong>of</strong><br />

inductive logic in science is not entirely obvious.<br />

Consider the following: if an observer<br />

views 10 000 swans and notes that each swan<br />

is white, is he justified in concluding that all<br />

swans are white? Why or why not? The lack<br />

<strong>of</strong> justification for the use <strong>of</strong> inductive logic<br />

is aptly named the ‘problem <strong>of</strong> induction.’<br />

There is no universally-accepted solution to<br />

this problem, despite the efforts <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong><br />

the greatest thinkers to have lived.<br />

Karl Popper proposed that science should not<br />

be defined by its use <strong>of</strong> inductive methods to<br />

construct theories, since in his view there is<br />

no such thing as confirmation by evidence 1 .<br />

To Popper, the solution to the problem <strong>of</strong><br />

induction was simple: no justification exists<br />

for the use <strong>of</strong> inductive logic to formulate<br />

universal statements. Instead, empirical science<br />

is demarcated from pseudo-science by a<br />

principle <strong>of</strong> ‘falsifiability.’ Theories are never<br />

confirmed or made more probable. Rather,<br />

Popper’s principle proposes that scientists<br />

should try to falsify theories, and those<br />

theories that best withstand falsification are<br />

‘corroborated.’ Popper’s idea is ingenious, as<br />

it shifts the focus away from inductive logic<br />

and onto deductive logic. If a theory does not<br />

withstand such a test, then it is inarguably<br />

deduced that it is false. Nonetheless, Popper’s<br />

philosophy is not without its faults. Hypothetico-deductivists<br />

contend that – Wait a<br />

moment. Hypothetico-deductivist? Popper?<br />

Isn’t he the guy on the popcorn box?<br />

<strong>Science</strong> education at numerous ‘top’ universities<br />

does not include requisite training<br />

in the philosophical issues underpinning<br />

scientific practice. When does evidence sufficiently<br />

justify a theory? How do we know<br />

when inductive inference provides us with<br />

true knowledge? Students must partake in<br />

self-study to answer these questions – if they<br />

are inquisitive. But are science students failing<br />

to benefit from a formal education in the<br />

philosophy <strong>of</strong> science?<br />

A general understanding <strong>of</strong> the philosophy<br />

<strong>of</strong> science is clearly advantageous for science<br />

students. A philosophical foundation can allow<br />

students to tackle numerous contentious<br />

issues – such as the interpretation <strong>of</strong> negative<br />

results. Above all, it can teach students to<br />

think; it can teach them to consider science<br />

from a broader perspective, and to eliminate<br />

inherent biases in their thought processes.<br />

Students will no doubt formulate their own<br />

opinions on important philosophical issues;<br />

they may, like Hempel 1 , argue that diversity,<br />

variety, and precision <strong>of</strong> evidence are <strong>of</strong> upmost<br />

importance, or they may be predictionists<br />

and assert that scientific truth can only be<br />

validated by the confirmation <strong>of</strong> novel predictions.<br />

However, if these opinions do not<br />

arise via consideration from formal education,<br />

then they inevitably develop from personal<br />

contemplation, subconscious (or even<br />

conscious) bias from the literature, and opinions<br />

<strong>of</strong> their supervisor and colleagues. Thus,<br />

students may not be fully equipped with the<br />

knowledge and perspective necessary for insightful<br />

deliberation.<br />

Albert Einstein wrote to a colleague 2 : “When<br />

Image: The School <strong>of</strong> Athens, (1510-1511), Raphael.<br />

31 | IMS MAGAZINE FALL <strong>2011</strong> PROSTATE CANCER

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