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third Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands - NCSC

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car park will not open. It is annoying that staff and visitors have<br />

to park somewhere else or that employees feel cold or hot, but it<br />

generally does not mean anything worse than that.<br />

Year # Reports # Investigations<br />

2010 39 57<br />

Local/Regional<br />

2011 204 70<br />

(for example traffic installations, sewer pump and<br />

2012 138 89<br />

bridge operation, individual windmills)<br />

Digital incidents at this level can have a major impact, but the<br />

Table 11. Developments in number of reports in the US<br />

damage remains limited to a local or regional level and is primarily<br />

practical and financial in nature. An example is a bridge that stays<br />

opens so that traffic comes to a halt or a company that suffers major<br />

financial harm because one of its factory’s systems fails bringing<br />

production to a stop for a few days.<br />

National<br />

(vital infrastructure, for example the energy and<br />

drinking water supply)<br />

Digital incidents in the vital sectors may lead to social instability<br />

and therefore affect national security. There could be many victims<br />

and/or severe economic damage and recover may be lengthy, while<br />

these products and services are essential. IT, telecommunications<br />

(fixed and mobile) and electricity are crucial for society’s vital<br />

sectors to function. Failure of these can lead to harmful effects in<br />

other sectors and the impact of an incident may intensify even<br />

further. These incidents are the most relevant to the CSAN because<br />

they can have a direct impact on large groups of citizens, companies<br />

The number of investigations continues to rise, which indicates<br />

an increasing number of incidents. Based on the limited detailed<br />

information about ICS-related incidents, these are ranked in the<br />

three categories below.<br />

Incidents caused by internet connectivity<br />

Since 2011, various researchers have been focusing attention on<br />

systems which, by using Shodan [219] and other search engines, can<br />

be reached through the internet [220] . Smaller companies, local<br />

authorities and private individuals in particular are not sufficiently<br />

aware that their systems (generally SOHO and private applications)<br />

are directly accessible on the internet. The combination of<br />

vulnerabilities in the software and the use of weak passwords, etc.<br />

means that in many cases unauthorised access can be obtained<br />

to these systems. These vulnerabilities often arise because of<br />

insufficient agreements regarding security with <strong>third</strong> parties taking<br />

care of the installation and/or management.<br />

and governments.<br />

9.3 Incidents involving ICSs<br />

Particularly at the beginning of 2012 there was increased focus on<br />

the risks of connecting ICSs to the internet that resulted in many<br />

It is impossible to provide proper statistics about ICS-related<br />

incidents in the <strong>Netherlands</strong>. Organisations involved are still<br />

reticent about sharing information on this subject. In the period<br />

from June 2011 to November 2012, <strong>NCSC</strong>.nl received just 11 reports.<br />

Because of this low number, the American ICS-CERT has been<br />

reviewed as one of the few available public sources. Furthermore, a<br />

public incident reports. All the reports concerned systems that<br />

could be found through the internet using the Shodan search<br />

engine. [221] Although this category of vulnerabilities attracts by far<br />

the most attention and publicity, this is not where the biggest risks<br />

to national security currently lies because the vast majority of these<br />

fall in the SOHO category.<br />

broad reporting period was assessed to give insight into the gradual<br />

developments. The ICS-CERT annual overview with reports of<br />

218 There is no report as to whether these are truly ICS incidents. Following investigation, it may<br />

emerge that there was no security incident (simply a disruption) or that no ICS/SCADA was<br />

involved. There may also have been multiple reports of the same incident.<br />

219 SHODAN is an internet search engine that facilitates targeted searching of computers that are<br />

connected to the internet.<br />

220 Examples include: Eirann Leverett: http://www.blackhat.com/usa/speakers/Eireann-Leverett.<br />

html, Project SHINE: http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/pdf/ICS-CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Oct-<br />

Dec2012.pdf and HD Moore: https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/<br />

blog/2013/04/23/serial-offenders-widespread-flaws-in-serial-port-servers<br />

221 The (few) cases reported to the <strong>Netherlands</strong> because of these cases proved not to be related<br />

to vital infrastructures.<br />

96<br />

Incidents caused by vulnerabilities in generic IT tools<br />

(collateral damage category)<br />

General IT tools, known as Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)<br />

products, are increasingly being used in IT environments. This<br />

applies not just to hardware, but primarily also to software such as<br />

operating systems, web technologies and databases. Use of these<br />

COTS products undoubtedly has many advantages (such as lower<br />

costs), but it also gives vulnerabilities in these products a stepping<br />

stone to ultimately manipulate process controls. It also makes ICS<br />

environments more susceptible to malware that is actually (only)<br />

intended for standard IT facilities. For example outbreaks of the<br />

computer worms Slammer and Conficker in factory networks meant<br />

that production had to be halted. Key loggers, banking trojans and<br />

other generic malware that unintentionally infect ICS environments<br />

can also lead to failures.<br />

Incidents caused by the ‘human factor’<br />

Around half of the investigations cited by ICS-CERT relate to cases of<br />

spear phishing, possibly with the intention of penetrating the ICS

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