issue in the most brutal way, and if they are not preparedto urge us to stay and to co-operate in every manner Iwould actually clear out. That at any rate would be asolution. Whether we should clear out of the countryaltogether or hold on to a portion of the Basra vilayet isa minor issue requiring a special study.It is quite possible, however, that face to face withthis ultimatum the King, and still more the ConstituentAssembly, will implore us to remain. If they do, shall wenot be obliged to remain? If we remain, shall we not beanswerable for defending their frontier? How are we todo this if the Turk comes in? We have no force whateverthat can resist any serious inroad. The War Office, ofcourse, have played for safety throughout and are readyto say “I told you so” at the first misfortune.Surveying all the above, I think I must ask you fordefinite guidance at this stage as to what you wish andwhat you are prepared to do. The victories of the Turkswill increase our difficulties throughout theMohammedan world. At present we are paying eightmillions a year for the privilege of living on an ungratefulvolcano out of which we are in no circumstances toget anything worth having.DLG to WSC (<strong>Churchill</strong> papers: 17/27)10 Downing Street, 5 September 1922My dear Colonial Secretary,I agree that the situation in Iraq requires mostcareful consideration, and think you should put yourviews before the Cabinet on Thursday.The whole problem has arisen out of the decisionto attack the Turks in Mesopotamia. Strategically, I thinkthat decision was faulty. To be effective we had to leaveour base on the sea for hundreds of miles in a torridcountry utterly unfit for white fighting. We ought tohave concentrated on Gallipoli and Palestine orAlexandretta. The Taurus was then unpierced. The decisionwas taken when I was hardly on the fringe of theWar Cabinet. You were in it. Having provoked war withthe Turk we had to fight him somewhere, but theswamps of the Tigris were a badly chosen battle-ground.Whatever, however, the merits or demerits of theoriginal decision to fight in Mesopotamia, it certainly isresponsible for our difficulties now; and tracing the storyback to that decision, I do not see how any of our subsequenttroubles could have been avoided.It was quite clear to me when I became PrimeMinister that we could not afford to relax our campaignagainst the Turks in that region. Such a decision, afterthe withdrawal from Gallipoli, and the surrender of aBritish army at Kut, would have weakened our positionthroughout the Mahomedan world.Having beaten the Turk both in Iraq and inPalestine, we could not at the Armistice have repudiatedall our undertakings towards the Arabs. We were responsiblefor liberating them from Turkish sovereignty, andwe were absolutely bound to assist them in setting upArab governments, if we were not prepared to governthem ourselves.As to the present position, it is very disappointingthat Feisal has responded so badly to your excellentefforts to make him self-supporting with a minimum ofBritish protection; but I do not think that an effectivecase can be made against us on that score, if we standtogether and meet criticism courageously.If we have failed in Iraq, it is because we havetaken no effective steps during our years of occupationto prospect the possibilities of the country. As you know,I was anxious that the Anglo-Persian [Oil Company]should bore to ascertain the value of the oil deposits. Wehave, however, done practically nothing in that respect.If we leave, we may find a year or two after we havedeparted that we have handed over to the French andthe Americans some of the richest oil fields in theworld—just to purchase a derisive shout from our enemies.On general principles, I am against a policy ofscuttle, in Iraq as elsewhere, and should like you to putall the alternatives, as you see them, before the Cabineton Thursday.Retrospect<strong>Churchill</strong>’s warnings about Iraq are todayquoted frequently, but the situation in1920-22 had its own characteristics. Britainwas quarreling with Turkey (Lloyd Georgewas anti-Turk) and oil was not a major factor,except as a way Britain’s Iraq Mandate might “pay itsown way.” America was then the main oil producer, thevast Arabian oil fields were still undiscovered, andBritain’s oil supply was assured via the Anglo-Persian OilCompany in Iran. Oil was suspected to be plentiful inIraq, and Lloyd George regretted that no effort had beenmade to confirm this and exploit it.In his unsent 1920 letter to Lloyd George,<strong>Churchill</strong> declared that the Arabs had “laid aside theblood feuds they have nursed for centuries and that theSuni and Shiah [sic] tribes are working together.” Was heright? Perhaps not, but apparently today the opposite situationexists. The Iraqi leader who could get the Sunni,Kurds and Shia to work together would be heralded as awizard of Bismarckian proportions.The British decision to hold Iraq by air power,bucking up the Hashemite King Feisal while withdrawingtroops, was taken in Cabinet. Iraq obtained nominalindependence in 1932. The thirty-five-year Hashemitedynasty, after several coup attempts and revolts, finallyfell in the revolution of 1958, which led to the Ba’athistsand, ultimately, to Saddam Hussein. —Ed. ,FINEST HOUR 135 / 36
THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT (2)<strong>Churchill</strong> andLloyd GeorgePOLITICAL MYOPIA, 1936-1945:HOPING YOUR COUNTRY WILL LOSEBY JAMES LANCASTER“ALMOST ALL BEHIND YOU, WINSTON”: Low would havecaused a stir had he added a ghostly Lloyd George, ponderinghis options in May 1940. (LG image from a cartoon in the tatlerof 26 Apri 1911.) Can readers name all the complete faces depictedby Low? Photoshop® modifications by Barbara Langworth.There is one conspicuous absentee in the famousDavid Low cartoon of 14 May 1940, “Allbehind you <strong>Winston</strong>,” where <strong>Churchill</strong> and hiscabinet colleagues stride forward purposefully,their sleeves rolled up, four days after WSCbecame Prime Minister.The absentee is David Lloyd George, <strong>Churchill</strong>’sformer mentor and Prime Minister for much of WorldWar I. He is not in the cartoon because he was not inthe Government—of his own choice. Lloyd Georgerefused to join the War Cabinet three times, on 13 May,28 May and 6 June. He also refused <strong>Churchill</strong>’s offer, on10 December 1940, to go to Washington asAmbassador, following the death of Lord Lothian.During the first six months of <strong>Churchill</strong>’s premiership,friends and colleagues of all parties tried to persuadeLloyd George to support <strong>Churchill</strong> and join thegovernment. His secretary and mistress, FrancesStevenson, tried as hard as anyone, admitting, “I knewthat LG’s iron will was set against working with<strong>Churchill</strong>.” 1 Stevenson recorded this on 20 June 1940.By October she had come round to Lloyd George’s plan,writing to him: “Your time will surely come, and thegreat thing is to keep fit until that time arrives.” 2Why did <strong>Churchill</strong> want Lloyd George, someonehe had, early in his career, referred to as “a chatteringlittle cad,” 3 in his coalition government? The principalreason was his belief that in a wartime coalition “Thesense of duty dominates all else, and personal claimsrecede.” 4 Although <strong>Churchill</strong> had become increasinglydisillusioned with his old chief in the interwar years, hewanted his government to represent all parties, includingthat much diminished Liberal faction led by LloydGeorge. He also wanted to muzzle the “Welsh Wizard,”and with good reason. Lloyd George had proclaimed onmany occasions his admiration for Hitler, following theirtwo meetings in 1936. He had consistently attacked thegovernment for incompetence, and had spoken in favourof discussing peace terms with Hitler. With his prestigestill intact, his emergence as a British Pétain needed tobe guarded against one way or another. <strong>Churchill</strong> certainlythought LG could do more good on the teamthan opposing it from the outside.Why for his part did Lloyd George, who resentedbeing successively spurned by Premiers Macdonald,Baldwin and Chamberlain, refuse to “fall in” behind<strong>Churchill</strong>? Where was his “sense of duty”? Why did henot bury his “personal claims”? To decline four invitationsfrom your Prime Minister to serve your country inthe hour of her peril reveals, at the very least, extraordinarydisloyalty. It was also unpatriotic. Worse, it sent thewrong message to the enemy. Many of Lloyd George’sarticles were so defeatist that many people thought heshould be locked up. Duff Cooper replied to one of hisharangues in the House in September 1939 saying thatit “would be received with delight in Germany, where itwould be said that the man who claimed to have wonthe last war was already admitting defeat in this one.” 5One reason for Lloyd George’s refusals was his profoundpessimism, his feeling that the situation was militarilyhopeless. Only a few weeks after the outbreak ofwar, Harold Nicolson and Robert Boothby met him atThames House. In his diary entry for 20 September1939 Nicolson wrote: “He [Lloyd George] says that he isfrankly terrified and does not see how we can possiblywin the war.” 6 The Welshman even constructed at a costof £6000 an air-raid shelter sixty feet underground atChurt, his country estate. His secretary, Arthur Sylvester,said it was like Piccadilly underground station.Lloyd George’s only formal explanation for notjoining the Government was his 29 May letter to<strong>Churchill</strong>, saying he could not join a War Cabinet containingChamberlain. When he refused <strong>Churchill</strong>’s finaloffer, to become Ambassador in Washington inDecember 1940, he said that his doctor (Lord Dawson >>FINEST HOUR 135 / 37