Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age

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J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age16 |The Internet may affect individuals, by altering orreinforcing their political attitudes, making themmore attuned to political events, and enabling themto participate in politics to a greater degree thanthey could otherwise. This does not automaticallytranslate into a more activist population; as theUSIP study notes, it could actually make citizensmore passive by diverting their attention away fromoffline political activism and toward less significantonline activity. 37 Some have called this “slacktivism,”exemplified by the millions of individuals whosigned online petitions to end genocide in Darfurbut who took no further action. 38 At the same time,individuals freely expressing themselves on theInternet are exercising a basic democratic right. Asdemocracy scholar Larry Diamond points out, usedin this way, the Internet can help “widen the publicsphere, creating a more pluralistic and autonomousarena of news, commentary and information.” 39It can also serve as an instrument through whichindividuals can push for transparency and governmentaccountability, both of which are hallmarks ofmature democracies. 40New media might also affect intergroup relations,by generating new connections among individuals,spreading information and bringing togetherpeople and groups. (Some have worried about theopposite effect – the tendency of the Internet topolarize individuals and groups around particularideological tendencies.) 41 This may occur notonly within countries, but also among them; theprotests in Tunisia sparked a clear rise in politicalconsciousness and activism across the Arab world– much of it facilitated by Internet-based communicationsand satellite television. 42 It may also takeplace over a long period of time; Clay Shirky, anexpert at New York University, argues that a “densifyingof the public sphere” may need to occurbefore an uprising turns into a revolution. 43New communications technologies could alsoaffect collective action, by helping change opinionand making it easier for individuals and groupsto organize protests in repressive countries.Unconnected individuals dissatisfied with theprevailing politics may realize that others sharetheir views, which might form the basis for collectiveaction. 44 Relatively small groups, elites orother motivated dissidents might use the Internetto communicate or organize protests. Even if thenumber of committed online activists is small, theymight nevertheless disseminate information to thegeneral population or inspire more widespreadprotests. 45 Again, it is important to distinguishsuch action from group “slacktivism;” as thesuccessful protests in Egypt showed, the regimeonly began to teeter when thousands of citizensphysically occupied Tahrir Square. Though initialprotests may have been organized via Facebook,the Mubarak government would still be in power ifthe protests had been confined only to cyberspace.These new technologies clearly affect regimepolicies as well. Governments have employed ahuge array of techniques aimed at controlling theInternet and ensuring that their political opponentscannot use it freely. This goes well beyondcensorship, which garners the bulk of popularattention. Autocracies also regularly monitor dissidentcommunications; mobilize regime defenders;spread propaganda and false information designedto disrupt protests and outside groups; infiltratesocial movements; and disable dissident websites,communications tools and databases. These andother practices can also induce self-censorship andother forms of self-restraint by publishers, activists,online commentators and opposition politicians.Autocrats can also turn dissidents’ use of theInternet against them. In Iran, for example, usersof social media – which linked their accounts tothose of other protestors – inadvertently createda virtual catalogue of political opponents thatenabled the government to identify and persecuteindividuals. The regime established a website thatpublished photos of protestors and used crowdsourcing to identify the individuals’ names. 46
Similarly, the Revolutionary Guard reportedlysent intimidating messages to those who postedpro-opposition messages and forced some citizensentering the country to open their Facebookaccounts upon arrival. 47 In the midst of theArab protests, Syria allowed its citizens to accessFacebook and YouTube for the first time in threeyears. Some human rights activists suspected thatthe government made the change precisely in orderto monitor people and activities on these sites. 48Similarly, shortly after the Egyptian governmentlifted its Internet blackout in early 2011, pro-Mubaraksupporters disrupted planned demonstrationsby posting messages on Facebook and Twittersaying that the protests had been canceled. 49 Thegovernment reportedly sent Facebook messages tocitizens urging them not to attend protests becausedoing so would harm the Egyptian economy. 50 Inthe same vein, the Chinese government employsan estimated 250,000 “50 Cent Party” memberswho are paid a small sum each time they posta pro-government message online. 51 And afteran anonymous post on the U.S.-based Chineselanguage website Boxun.com called on activiststo stage China’s own “Jasmine Revolution,” nodemonstrators turned up at the rally point – but itwas flooded with security teams and plainclothesofficers. 52 Some speculated that Chinese officialsthemselves may have authored the anonymousposting in an effort to draw out political dissidents.53 While no evidence has emerged to supportthe claim, it is not hard to imagine such an attempttaking place in the future.Autocracies are engaged in “offline” attempts torepress Internet use, as well. Saudi Arabia, forexample, has not only blocked websites but alsoplaced hidden cameras in Internet cafes aimedat monitoring user behavior and required cafeowners to give their customer lists to governmentofficials. 54 China requires users to register theiridentification upon entry to a cybercafe. 55 AndLibyan officials simply demanded that refugeesfleeing the recent fighting turn over their cellphonesor SIM cards at border checkpoints. 56Beyond these effects, new media can affect externalattention, by transmitting images and informationto the outside world, beyond the control ofgovernment-run media and regime censorship andspin. Such attention can mobilize sympathy forprotestors or hostility toward repressive regimes, 57as occurred when the video of Neda Agha-Soltanmoved from YouTube to mainstream media.Digital videos and information may also have arebound effect; information transmitted out ofEgypt and Libya by social networking and videohostingsites during the protests in those countriesmade its way back in via widely watched satellitebroadcasts. This effect could be particularly pronouncedin countries like Yemen, where Internetpenetration is low but Al Jazeera is widely viewed.Similarly, print journalists have found sources andstories through social media and have used thesame media to push their articles out to the world.In addition to the five mechanisms laid out byUSIP and noted above, we observe two additionalfactors that affect them in various ways.The economic impact of the Internet might affectthe degree of democratization in a country. TheInternet has increased labor productivity and correspondingeconomic growth, which may help middleclasses emerge in developing countries. 58 Becausenew middle classes tend to agitate for democraticrights, new technologies could indirectly promotedemocratization. In 2011, Clinton referenced arelated dynamic, the “dictator’s dilemma,” statingthat autocrats “will have to choose between lettingthe walls fall or paying the price to keep themstanding … by resorting to greater oppression andenduring the escalating opportunity cost of missingout on the ideas that have been blocked and peoplewho have been disappeared.” 59 In other words, anautocrat can either repress the Internet or enjoy itsfull economic benefits, but not both.| 17
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Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age

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