Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age

J U N E2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital AgeBy Richard Fontaine and Will Rogers

AcknowledgmentsWe express our gratitude to our colleagues at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) for their assistance with thisstudy. Jackie Koo provided exceptional research assistance throughout the writing process. Kristin Lord’s efforts in editingand shaping this report and the overall CNAS Internet freedom project were invaluable. Nora Bensahel devoted significanttime and effort to improving the writing. Liz Fontaine provided typically excellent design and layout help on a shorttimeline.We owe a great deal of thanks to Ambassador David Gross, who shared his unique insights throughout the entirety of thisproject. We also owe a large debt of gratitude to those who reviewed all or part of this paper in draft form, including KenBerman, Daniel Calingeart, Andrew Lewman, Sarah Labowitz, Marc Lynch, Rebecca MacKinnon, Jeff Pryce, Ben Scott andseveral anonymous reviewers. We thank the Harvard Law School National Security Research Group for its extraordinaryhelp in researching the international legal implications of Internet freedom. The group, which is directed by Ivana Deyrup,includes Gracye Cheng, Morgan Cohen, Josh Green, Carlos Oliveira and Mark Stadnyk. Finally, we would like thank the manyexperts who patiently spoke with us about Internet freedom issues over the last year, whether in government, the privatesector or academia, here in Washington, in Silicon Valley, or elsewhere.This publication was made possible through the support of grants from the John Templeton Foundation and the MarkleFoundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the viewsof the John Templeton Foundation or the Markle Foundation. Readers should note that some organizations that arementioned in the report or that otherwise have an interest in the issues discussed here support CNAS financially. CNASmaintains a broad and diverse group of more than 100 funders, including private foundations, government agencies, corporationsand private individuals, and retains sole editorial control over its ideas, projects and products. A complete list ofthe Center’s financial supporters can be found on our website at www.cnas.org/support/our-supporters.The authors of this report are solely responsible for the analysis and recommendations contained herein.Cover ImageA man takes pictures with his cell phone on Tahrir, or Liberation Square, in Cairoon January 31, 2011.(BEN CURTIS/Associated Press)

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital AgeAbout the AuthorsRichard Fontaine is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.Will Rogers is a Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security.2 |

Internet Freedom: A Foreign Policy Imperativein the Digital AgeBy Richard Fontaine and Will Rogers

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY America needs a comprehensive Internet freedomstrategy, one that tilts the balance in favor of thosewho would use the Internet to advance toleranceand free expression, and away from those whowould employ it for repression or violence.By Richard Fontaine and Will RogersThis requires incorporating Internet freedom asan integral element of American foreign policy.As recent events in the Middle East demonstrate,the Internet has emerged as a major force ininternational affairs, one that will have lastingimplications for the United States and the internationalcommunity. But new communicationstechnologies are a double-edged sword. Theyrepresent both a medium for individuals to communicate,form groups and freely broadcast theirideas around the world, and a tool that empowersauthoritarian governments. U.S. policymakersshould better appreciate the complex role newcommunications technologies play in politicalchange abroad, and how those technologiesintersect with the array of American foreign policyobjectives.Internet freedom typically includes two dimensions.Freedom of the Internet denotes thefreedoms of online expression, assembly andassociation – the extension to cyberspace of rightsthat have been widely recognized to exist outsideit. Promoting freedom of the Internet merelyexpands to cyberspace a tradition of U.S. diplomaticand financial support for human rightsabroad. Freedom via the Internet, the notion thatnew communications technologies aid the establishmentof democracy and liberal society offline,is at once more alluring and hotly contested.Internet freedom in this sense has captured theimagination of many policymakers and expertswho see in these technologies a tool for individualsto help move their societies away fromauthoritarianism and toward democracy. Thoughthe links between democracy and Internet freedomare indirect and complex, nascent evidencesuggests that new communications tools do| 5

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age6 |matter in political change, and that both dissidentsand dictators act on that basis.Most attention has focused on technologies thatallow dissidents to penetrate restrictive firewallsand communicate securely. But funding technologycomprises just one aspect of America’sInternet freedom agenda. The United States alsoadvocates international norms regarding freedomof speech and online assembly and opposesattempts by autocratic governments to restrictlegitimate online activity.The private sector has a critical role to play inpromoting Internet freedom, but, given corporateinterests in maximizing profits rather thanpromoting online freedom in repressive environments,efforts to expand its role are difficult.Ethical debates, ranging from whether Americancompanies should be permitted to sell repressiveregimes key technologies to the responsibilitiesof corporations in the face of an autocracies’demand for information, remain unresolved. Andthe other side of this coin – whether U.S. exportcontrols should prohibit selling technologies thatcould be used to promote online freedom – isoften overlooked.To date, the U.S. government has shied awayfrom articulating fully the motivations behind itsInternet freedom agenda. Administration officialsemphasize that their policy supports freedom ofthe Internet, not freedom via the Internet, andthat the Internet freedom agenda is not part of abroader strategy to support democratic evolution.It should be.Admittedly, promoting Internet freedom is complicated,and involves inherent tensions withother U.S. foreign policy, economic and nationalsecurity interests. This is particularly true in thearea of cyber security. Cyber security expertsseek to secure the United States against cyberattacks, for example, by pushing for greater onlinetransparency and attribution, while Internetfreedom proponents urge greater online anonymity.While tensions between Internet freedom andcyber security are real, and in some cases will forcedifficult choices, they should not prevent robustU.S. efforts to advance both.A robust Internet freedom agenda should reflectthe following eight principles:Principle 1: Embrace a ComprehensiveApproachU.S. policymakers should incorporate Internetfreedom into their decision-making (especiallyon cyber security and economic diplomacyissues); convene private sector professionals,export controls experts, diplomats and others toexplore new ways of promoting Internet freedom;and use traditional diplomacy to promoteInternet freedom.Principle 2: Build an International Coalitionto Promote Internet FreedomThe U.S. government should convene a core groupof democratic governments to advocate Internetfreedom in key international fora; urge governmentsto encourage foreign companies to join theGlobal Network Initiative (GNI); and ensure thatthe Secretary of State gives her next major addresson Internet freedom in a foreign country, possiblyin Europe alongside key European Union (EU)commissioners.Principle 3: Move Beyond CircumventionTechnologiesThe U.S. government should continue to fundtechnologies other than firewall-evasion tools,including those that help dissidents maintaindigital security, ensure mobile access and reconstitutewebsites after a cyber attack. The U.S.government should offer financial awards to fostertechnological innovation, require that any onlinetool receiving U.S. funding be subjected to anindependent security audit and expand the sources

of technology funding to include foreign governments,foundations and the private sector.Principle 4: Prioritize TrainingThe State Department, along with the U.S. Agencyfor International Development (USAID), shouldcontinue to foster Internet freedom through targetedtraining programs, including education ononline safety.Principle 5: Lead the Effort to BuildInternational NormsThe U.S. government should promote a liberalconcept of Internet freedom in all relevant fora,and reject attempts by authoritarian states to promotenorms that restrict freedoms of informationand expression online. It should also pursue aninternational transparency initiative to encouragegovernments to publicize their policies on restrictingonline information.Principle 8: Reform Export ControlsThe U.S. government should relax controls on technologiesthat would permit greater online freedomwhile protecting American national security, andeducate companies on the precise nature of exportcontrol restrictions so that companies do not overcomplyand deny legal technologies to dissidentsabroad.In addition, we offer several recommendationsfor technology companies, including providingdissidents basic technical assistance to better usebuilt-in security functions for software and hardware;better informing users and the public aboutwho may access the data they control and underwhat conditions; increasing corporate transparencyabout foreign government requests; and advocatingfor increased Internet freedom.Principle 6: Create Economic Incentivesto Support Internet FreedomU.S. officials should continue to articulate theeconomic case for Internet freedom, backed whereverpossible by solid quantitative evidence, andpush for Internet censorship to be recognized as atrade barrier.Principle 7: Strengthen the Private Sector’sRole in Supporting Internet FreedomCongress should adopt laws that prohibitAmerican corporations from giving autocraticgovernments the private data of dissidents whenthe request is clearly intended to quash legitimatefreedom of expression, and that requirecompanies to periodically disclose requests itreceives for such data to the U.S. government.U.S. officials should continue to urge companiesto join the GNI, but also encourage themto develop broad unilateral codes of conductconsistent with the GNI. They should also publiclyhighlight specific business practices, bothpositive and negative.| 7

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age8 |II. IntroductionThe world’s population is more connected, withmore access to new information and ideas thanever before. Today, 2 billion people have access tothe Internet. Five billion people use mobile phones,many of them smartphones with Internet access. 1The Internet has also become an extension of civilsociety. 2 Digital tools are increasingly used to communicateacross borders, organize protests, launchcyber attacks, build transnational coalitions,topple some dictators and possibly strengthenothers – actions that all affect U.S. foreign policy.But American policymakers have just begun toincorporate the Internet’s role into their broaderconceptions of U.S. foreign policy.Thus far, the discussion among advocates andforeign policy practitioners has revolved around“Internet freedom,” a broad rubric that encompassesonline freedoms, including the rights of expressionand online organization, and the potentially transformativeand hotly contested role of the Internetin promoting democratization. The U.S. governmentnow has an Internet freedom agenda, withtens of millions of dollars to implement it. Boththe Senate and the House of Representatives boastglobal Internet freedom caucuses. The Secretary ofState has given two major addresses articulatingprinciples and policies for Internet freedom, andnewspapers and periodicals have repeatedly pointedto the use of online tools both for popular protestand as a means of repression. In the midst of the2011 Arab Spring, President Obama went so far asto describe the ability to use social networking as a“core value” that Americans believe is “universal.” 3The debate over whether and how to promoteInternet freedom has been an emotional one, with“cyber utopians” praising the Internet as a singulartool for toppling dictators, and “cyber pessimists”noting all the ways that autocracies use new communicationstools to strengthen their own rule.This report seeks to move beyond these two polesby identifying the nuances and tradeoffs involvedin promoting online freedom.This study focuses on the Internet, includingWeb-based communication platforms such asblogs, social networking and other photo- andvideo-sharing websites, and proposes an integratedInternet freedom strategy that balancescompeting U.S. interests. 4 We begin by definingInternet freedom, distinguishing between freedomof the Internet and freedom via the Internet, andexamine why the United States has an interestin preserving an open Internet. We then exploreways in which the Internet can be used both fordemocratic political change and as a tool of repression.We argue that the United States shouldactively promote Internet freedom, given not onlyits potential to aid those seeking liberal politicalchange, but also because doing so accords withAmerica’s deepest values. We examine the U.S.government’s current efforts to promote Internetfreedom abroad and the tensions between theseefforts and enhancing cyber security. Finally, weprovide a set of interlocking principles that, takentogether, will incorporate Internet freedom intoAmerican foreign policy.The paper assumes that the United States has aninterest in supporting human rights and democracyabroad. There is a continued healthy debateabout this point and it is far from America’s onlyinterest. But successive administrations (includingthose of Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama) havemade promoting democracy an explicit objectiveof U.S. policy. While the United States should berealistic and modest about what it can achieve,to the extent that a freer online space facilitates afreer offline space, the United States should supportInternet freedom. At its heart, an AmericanInternet freedom agenda should actively aim to tiltthe balance in favor of those who would use theInternet to advance tolerance and free expression,and away from those who would use it for repressionor violence.

This paper also acknowledges the downsides ofthe Internet. An autocratic regime can use theInternet to strengthen its ability to monitor itscitizens and control their behavior. Terrorists canuse it to communicate and spread propaganda.Criminals can use new technologies to organizeillicit activities. Dissidents can use the Internetto spread their message, but so can extremistsadvocating violence. There is no certain outcometo this continual push and pull, and the localpolitical context matters enormously.At its heart, an AmericanInternet freedom agendashould actively aim to tiltthe balance in favor of thosewho would use the Internetto advance tolerance and freeexpression, and away fromthose who would use it forrepression or violence.This report examines Internet freedom throughthe lens of American foreign policy and explorestwo central questions: What does access to an openInternet mean for U.S. foreign policy, and whatshould the United States do about it? Our intendedaudience is not merely those individuals intimatelyfamiliar with Internet freedom issues, but also thoseforeign policy actors and thinkers who should be.As we discuss below, Internet freedom means manythings to many people, and to some it suggests afocus on domestic policy – net neutrality, antitrustlaw, the role of the Federal CommunicationsCommission, and so on. Except where such domesticconcerns impact Internet freedom promotionefforts abroad (as we argue they may), such issuesare beyond the ambit of this paper.The Center for a New American Security (CNAS)initiated this project in March 2010 when it hostedthe launch of the Senate Global Internet FreedomCaucus. Over the course of more than a year,CNAS then convened a number of working groupson the role of the private sector, the prospects forinternational normative agreements, the role of circumventiontechnology and the tensions betweencyber security and Internet freedom. In addition,we consulted with representatives in government,the corporate world, the nonprofit sector, technologyfirms and academia. The study was conductedalongside CNAS’ companion project on cybersecurity. 5What is Internet Freedom?Internet freedom, broadly defined, is the notionthat universal rights, including the freedoms ofexpression, assembly and association, extend tothe digital sphere. Yet policymakers and othersoften define Internet freedom differently. It isthus useful to differentiate, as a number of expertsincreasingly have, between two linked but distinctconcepts: freedom of the Internet and freedom viathe Internet.Freedom of the Internet refers to the ability toengage in unfettered expression in cyberspace.This vision of Internet freedom, as scholar EvgenyMorozov points out in his book The Net Delusion,represents freedom from something: censorship,government surveillance, distributed denial ofservice (DDoS) attacks, and so on. 6 The principlesundergirding freedom of the Internet arearticulated in documents such as the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights (UDHR), whichdescribes as inalienable the right to receive andimpart information without interference. 7 In thissense, Internet freedom is little different from the| 9

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age10 |notion of free expression, whose advocacy hasbeen an element of U.S. foreign policy for decades.After all, American ambassadors have long pressedforeign governments to allow a free press, releasejailed journalists and cease jamming unwantedbroadcasts.Freedom via the Internet is at once both a morealluring and complicated idea. Its advocates suggestthat more online freedom can lead to moreoffline freedom; that is, the free flow of ideas overthe Internet promotes democratization. Freedomvia the Internet has captured the imaginationof many in Congress, the media and elsewhere(including dissidents and dictators) who havewitnessed the Internet’s seemingly transformativeeffects on autocratic governments. Protesters,democratic activists and average citizens areincreasingly using Facebook, Twitter and otherapplications to communicate and organize – mostrecently in Tunisia and Egypt, but in other countriesas well.Internet Freedom and U.S. National InterestsThe United States has a long history of providingdiplomatic and financial support for the promotionof human rights abroad, including the right to freeexpression. While each presidential administrationemphasizes human rights to differing degrees,during recent decades they have all consistentlyheld that human rights are a key U.S. interest.Promoting freedom of the Internet expands humanrights support into cyberspace, an environmentin which an ever-greater proportion of humanactivity takes place. The United States advocatesfor freedom of the Internet because it accords notonly with American values, but also with rightsAmerica believes are intrinsic to all humanity.For years, the U.S. government has programmaticallyand rhetorically supported democracypromotion abroad. The State Department routinelydisburses millions of dollars in funding fordemocracy-building programs around the world,many of which are aimed explicitly at expandingfree expression. Presidential and other speechesregularly refer to the American belief in the universalityof this right; to cite but one example, aMarch 2011 White House statement on Syria notedthat, “The United States stands for a set of universalrights, including the freedom of expression andpeaceful assembly.” 8 The Obama administration’s2010 National Security Strategy specifically calledfor marshaling the Internet and other informationtechnologies to support freedom of expressionabroad, 9 and the Bush administration adopted apolicy of maximizing access to information andideas over the Internet. 10America’s interest in promoting freedom viathe Internet comes from the same fundamentalbelief in democratic values and human rights.Despite inevitable inconsistencies and difficulttradeoffs, the United States continues to supportdemocracy. The Bush administration’s 2006National Security Strategy committed to supportdemocratic institutions abroad through transformationaldiplomacy. 11 President Obama, afterentering office with an evident desire to move awayfrom the sweeping tone of his predecessor’s “freedomagenda,” nevertheless told the U.N. GeneralAssembly in 2009 that “there are basic principlesthat are universal; there are certain truths whichare self-evident – and the United States of Americawill never waver in our efforts to stand up for theright of people everywhere to determine their owndestiny.” 12To the extent that supporting Internet freedomadvances America’s democracy-promotion agenda,the rationale for promoting online freedom is clear.However, cause and effect are not perfectly clear andthe United States must choose its policies under conditionsof uncertainty. Both the Bush and Obamaadministrations have wagered that by promotingglobal Internet freedom the United States will notonly operate according to universal values but willpromote tools that may, on balance, benefit societies

over the autocrats that oppress them. Secretary ofState Hillary Rodham Clinton urged countries to“join us in the bet we have made, a bet that an openInternet will lead to stronger, more prosperouscountries.” 13 Given the evidence we discuss throughoutthis report, this bet is one worth making.Yet promoting Internet freedom inevitablyrequires the U.S. government to make tradeoffswith other national security and economic interests– a perennial challenge for a governmentpursuing competing priorities. After all, it iseasier to support Internet freedom in countriesin which the United States discerns few overarchingstrategic and economic interests than incountries where the United States has a robustand complex agenda.Consider China, for example. China engages inwidespread Internet repression and hosts theworld’s largest population of online users. Butpromoting Internet freedom there complicatesAmerican efforts to win Beijing’s support on anarray of other issues, ranging from North Koreato Iran. And strengthening controls over the saleof American technologies to China could meanshutting U.S. companies out of the world’s largestInternet market at a time when the Americaneconomy is still recovering from the recentfinancial crisis.The United States should promote Internet freedomabroad, but this policy does incur costs.Funding for Internet freedom programs usesscarce dollars. The Internet can empower violentradicals as well as peaceful reformers. There is noguarantee that supporting Internet freedom willenhance freedom or lead to greater democracy. Yetit is virtually certain that if the United States ceasesits Internet freedom-related activities, the balanceof online power would shift toward autocraciesseeking to restrict their populations’ freedom. Thisalone should compel American officials to takeInternet freedom seriously.A Brief History of the U.S. Government’sInternet Freedom EffortsThe U.S. government started pursuing an Internetfreedom agenda during the second term of theGeorge W. Bush administration. Congress beganscrutinizing Internet freedom issues in 2005,focusing particularly on the private sector. Reportsthat a local Yahoo affiliate gave the email recordsof a journalist to Chinese authorities, which ledto his 10-year prison sentence, prompted congressionalhearings that also included Microsoft andGoogle. 14 The same year, Congressman ChrisSmith, R-N.J., introduced the first version of hisGlobal Internet Freedom Act, which would prohibitexporting certain hardware and software torepressive regimes. 15 In 2008, representatives fromCisco Systems, Inc. were asked to appear beforethe Senate Judiciary Committee to determine ifthe company knowingly sold routers to China forthe purpose of controlling political dissent andstrengthening the state’s Great Firewall. 16 TheYahoo incident, together with Cisco’s sales andGoogle’s agreement to censor its search results inChina, generated a larger discussion on CapitolHill about whether the government should prohibitAmerican technology companies from respondingto politically motivated information requestsor selling technology that could help governmentscommit human rights violations. After the socalledTwitter revolution in Iran in 2009, Congresspassed the Victims of Iranian Censorship (VOICE)Act, which authorized (but did not appropriate) 55million dollars for State Department programs thatwould help the Iranian people overcome electroniccensorship and digital oppression. 17The executive branch has also been increasinglyactive. In February 2006, then-Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice established the Global InternetFreedom Task Force (GIFT) as a way to coordinateState Department efforts to promote Internetfreedom and respond to Internet censorship. 18Soon thereafter, then-Under Secretary of State for| 11

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age12 |Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobrianskyannounced that the State Department would henceforthinclude a country-level assessment of Internetfreedom in its annual human rights reports.Like its predecessor, the Obama administration’sInternet freedom agenda goes well beyond fundingfirewall-evading technology. The State Departmenthas bolstered its capacity to use its diplomatic,economic and technological resources to promotea free Internet. Clinton has established a team ofexperts, including a senior advisor for innovation,to develop creative ways to blend technology withtraditional diplomatic and development efforts.In addition, the State Department re-launched itsInternet freedom task force in 2010, rebrandingit the “NetFreedom” Taskforce, and established aCoordinator for Cyber Issues in early 2011. TheWhite House established a deputy chief technologyofficer for Internet policy within the Office ofScience and Technology Policy (OSTP) to coordinategovernment-wide Internet and technologypolicy, including issues related to cyber securityand Internet freedom.Clinton has led efforts to promote Internet freedomin the Obama administration. Evoking PresidentFranklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1941 Four Freedomsspeech, in 2010 Clinton added a fifth, the “freedomto connect – the idea that governments should notprevent people from connecting to the Internet, towebsites or to each other.” 19 In a second speech ayear later, she pledged America’s “global commitmentto Internet freedom, to protect human rightsonline as we do offline,” including the freedoms ofexpression, assembly and association. 20These speeches represent the clearest and mostcomplete articulation of the U.S. government’sInternet freedom strategy, but questions remain.For example, does the government aim to promotethe online freedoms of expression, assemblyand association as intrinsic goods, regardlessof whether their exercise engenders democraticchange offline? Or does the U.S. governmentbelieve that, on balance, a freer Internet willpromote democratic political change? The administrationstill lacks a clear message for precisely whyit is undertaking efforts to promote online freedomin the first place, which has produced confusionabout its overall approach to Internet freedom.Crafting the MessageIn her 2011 speech, Clinton said, “There is a debatecurrently under way in some circles about whetherthe Internet is a force for liberation or repression.But I think that debate is largely beside the point.” 21In fact, that is the key point – if the Internet is aforce for repression, why should the United Statessupport its freer use?Administration officials emphasize that theirpolicies support freedom of the Internet, notfreedom via the Internet; these policies are notpart of a broader democracy-promotion strategy.In her 45-minute speech, Clinton used theterm “democracy” just once, when defending theadministration’s position on WikiLeaks. Instead,she said that the United States supports a freeInternet because it helps build “strong” and “prosperous”states. She did not say that the Internethelps build freer or more democratic states. 22Yet that is a key reason why the administrationsupports Internet freedom. It is the central motivationbehind the State Department’s training andtechnology programs, which are aimed at onlineactivists, dissidents and democracy-related NGOs.The U.S. government should clearly state why itpromotes Internet freedom: Doing so accords withAmerica’s longstanding tradition of promotinghuman rights, including freedoms of expression,association and assembly, and the United Statesis betting that access to an open Internet canfoster elements of democracy in autocratic states.Officials can acknowledge the potential downsides,but they need not shy from publicly acknowledgingthe U.S. interest in democratization and the

hope that promoting Internet freedom can assistthose who are pressing for liberal change abroad.The government should not discredit dissidentsby suggesting that they are an arm of U.S. foreignpolicy, but refraining entirely from mentioningdemocracy in connection with Internet freedomrisks undermining domestic support for its policies– including on Capitol Hill. And the current rhetoricalambivalence belies the increasingly robust– indeed, increasingly impressive – U.S. efforts topromote Internet freedom.At the same time, the United States shouldcounter the view that Internet freedom is merelyan American project cooked up in Washington,rather than a notion rooted in universal humanrights. The United States promotes Internetfreedom more actively than any other country,and is one of the only countries that activelyfunds circumvention technologies. It leads inpromoting international norms and has made agreater effort than most to incorporate Internetfreedom into its broader foreign policy. This hasprovoked concerns that American advocacy willtaint the efforts of local activists. For example,Sami ben Gharbia, a prominent NetherlandsbasedTunisian blogger, has said, “Many peopleoutside of the U.S., not only in the Arab world,have a strong feeling that the Internet Freedommantra emitting from Washington D.C. is just acover for strategic geopolitical agendas” and thatthis could threaten activists who accept supportand funding. 23 Autocratic governments routinelydenounce Internet freedom-related activities asimposing American values, and some technologycompanies and foundations have shied awayfrom supporting circumvention and anonymitytechnologies because of their perceived tie to U.S.foreign policy.effort. Despite reservations from some, more than5,000 foreign activists and others have acceptedInternet-related training funded by the StateDepartment, and many more employ U.S. government-fundedtechnology. 24 Many governmentshave not yet formulated policies in this area, butsome are expressing growing interest in doing so,including several European countries and the EU.To the extent that foreign governments advocatefor Internet freedom and foreign corporations joinsuch efforts as the GNI and international organizationspromote new norms, the United States willbe able to make a stronger argument that Internetfreedom is truly a global effort.The response to such concerns should not be toavoid any suggestion that Internet freedom isrelated to American support of democracy andhuman rights, but rather to internationalize the| 13

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age14 |III. Internet Freedomand Political ChangeThe Internet’s potential as a tool for politicalchange captivated top foreign policy officialsin 2009 during what was quickly dubbed Iran’sTwitter Revolution. The new awareness grew asprotestors used the Internet and text messages tospread information and coordinate efforts, andwas crystallized by the viral movement of a videodepicting the brutal slaying of a young Iranianstudent, Neda Agha-Soltan. The video, whichwas captured on a mobile phone and uploadedto YouTube, traveled across the Web and ontolocal and satellite television, prompting Obamato express his outrage at the killing. When thepresident of the United States uses a White Housepress conference to address material uploaded toYouTube, something fundamental has changed inthe nature of modern communications.The focus on Internet freedom grew as the ArabSpring gathered momentum a year and a half later.The wave of revolts across the Arab world, beginningin Tunisia, then sweeping across Egypt andinto Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and elsewherewere fueled in part by activists using tools such asFacebook, Twitter, SMS (text messaging) and otherplatforms. Several regimes took draconian steps tostop online organizing and communication. Thesense grew that the Internet mattered, but just howit mattered was not totally clear.In a sense, the Internet represents just the latestpart of a story that has unfolded for centuries.Communication technologies have played significantroles in political movements since antiquity,from the printing press that empowered theReformation, cassette tapes distributed by Iranianrevolutionaries in 1979, to fax machines used byPoland’s Solidarity movement and satellite televisiontoday. But the global nature of the Internet,its very low barrier to entry, its speed and thedegree to which it empowers the individual allmake it qualitatively different from earlier technologies.The Internet itself has become the focusof attention by dictators, democracy activists andobservers around the world.Does Internet Freedom Lead to Democracy?The United States promotes Internet freedombecause Americans believe in the freedom ofexpression, in any medium. The country alsopromotes it because American leaders have betthat, on balance, the increased availability of new,unfettered communications technologies abets thespread of democracy. But does it?Here we use the term “democracy” to mean a politicalsystem that is transparent and accountable tothe public through free and fair elections; includesactive political participation by the citizenry;protects human rights; and maintains a rule oflaw that is fair to all citizens. 25 This is obviously anideal, and democratic systems exhibit many variations,but this definition offers a useful standardfor measuring potential progress.Experts remain deeply divided, as shown in thetext box on the following page, as to whetherunbridled access to the Internet can help transformauthoritarian regimes over time and bring greaterfreedom to once-closed societies. Most attemptsto assess its impact rely on case studies, anecdotesor theory. The novelty of the phenomenon and thefew and widely varying data points pose notableanalytical challenges, and assessments requirea certain amount of subjective interpretation.Facebook clearly played a major role in building anopposition to the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egyptand in organizing protests. But after the governmentshut off the Internet, protests became bigger,not smaller. So did this demonstrate the Internet’slimited role as a tool of agitation? Or did theshutoff of cherished online tools itself spur enragedcitizens to demonstrate instead of staying home(possibly in front of a computer)?

Does the Internet Promote Democracy?Optimists“The Internet is above all the most fantastic means ofbreaking down the walls that close us off from oneanother. For the oppressed peoples of the world,the Internet provides power beyond their wildesthopes.” 26Bernard KouchnerFormer French Foreign Minister“It does make a difference when people inside closedregimes get access to information – which is whydictatorships make such efforts to block comprehensiveInternet access … [promoting Internet freedom]would be a cheap and effective way of standing withIranians while chipping away at the 21st-century wallsof dictatorship.” 27Nicholas KristofThe New York Times columnist“The Internet is possibly one of the greatest tools fordemocratization and individual freedom that we’veever seen.” 28Condoleezza RiceFormer Secretary of State“Without Twitter, the people of Iran would not havefelt empowered and confident to stand up for freedomand democracy.” 29Mark PfeifleFormer Deputy National Security Advisor“If you want to liberate a society, just give them theInternet.” 30Wael GhonimEgyptian Google Executiveand democracy activistSkeptics“The idea that the Internet favors the oppressedrather than the oppressor is marred by what I callcyber-utopianism: a naïve belief in the emancipatorynature of online communication that rests on a stubbornrefusal to admit its downside.” 31Evgeny MorozovAuthor of The Net Delusion“The platforms of social media are built around weakties … weak ties seldom lead to high-risk activism.” 32Malcolm GladwellThe New Yorker staff writer“Democracy isn’t just a tweet away.” 33Jeffrey GedminFormer President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty“It is time to get Twitter’s role in the events in Iranright. Simply put: There was no Twitter Revolutioninside Iran.” 34Golnaz EsfandiariSenior Correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty“Techno-optimists appear to ignore the fact thatthese tools are value neutral; there is nothing inherentlypro-democratic about them. To use them is toexercise a form of freedom, but it is not necessarily afreedom that promotes the freedom of others.” 35Ian BremmerPresident of the Eurasia GroupIt has become axiomatic to say that the Internet doesnot itself create democracies or overthrow regimes;people do. This is obviously true, but if new communicationstools do matter – and there appears to be atleast nascent evidence that they do – then they can playa role in several distinct ways. An important reportissued by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)presented a useful framework for examining how newcommunications technologies might affect politicalaction. The paper identifies five distinct mechanismsthrough which the Internet might promote (or be usedby regimes to block) democratic progress. 36 Here wedeepen the analysis of these mechanisms and add twoadditional factors that affect them.| 15

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age16 |The Internet may affect individuals, by altering orreinforcing their political attitudes, making themmore attuned to political events, and enabling themto participate in politics to a greater degree thanthey could otherwise. This does not automaticallytranslate into a more activist population; as theUSIP study notes, it could actually make citizensmore passive by diverting their attention away fromoffline political activism and toward less significantonline activity. 37 Some have called this “slacktivism,”exemplified by the millions of individuals whosigned online petitions to end genocide in Darfurbut who took no further action. 38 At the same time,individuals freely expressing themselves on theInternet are exercising a basic democratic right. Asdemocracy scholar Larry Diamond points out, usedin this way, the Internet can help “widen the publicsphere, creating a more pluralistic and autonomousarena of news, commentary and information.” 39It can also serve as an instrument through whichindividuals can push for transparency and governmentaccountability, both of which are hallmarks ofmature democracies. 40New media might also affect intergroup relations,by generating new connections among individuals,spreading information and bringing togetherpeople and groups. (Some have worried about theopposite effect – the tendency of the Internet topolarize individuals and groups around particularideological tendencies.) 41 This may occur notonly within countries, but also among them; theprotests in Tunisia sparked a clear rise in politicalconsciousness and activism across the Arab world– much of it facilitated by Internet-based communicationsand satellite television. 42 It may also takeplace over a long period of time; Clay Shirky, anexpert at New York University, argues that a “densifyingof the public sphere” may need to occurbefore an uprising turns into a revolution. 43New communications technologies could alsoaffect collective action, by helping change opinionand making it easier for individuals and groupsto organize protests in repressive countries.Unconnected individuals dissatisfied with theprevailing politics may realize that others sharetheir views, which might form the basis for collectiveaction. 44 Relatively small groups, elites orother motivated dissidents might use the Internetto communicate or organize protests. Even if thenumber of committed online activists is small, theymight nevertheless disseminate information to thegeneral population or inspire more widespreadprotests. 45 Again, it is important to distinguishsuch action from group “slacktivism;” as thesuccessful protests in Egypt showed, the regimeonly began to teeter when thousands of citizensphysically occupied Tahrir Square. Though initialprotests may have been organized via Facebook,the Mubarak government would still be in power ifthe protests had been confined only to cyberspace.These new technologies clearly affect regimepolicies as well. Governments have employed ahuge array of techniques aimed at controlling theInternet and ensuring that their political opponentscannot use it freely. This goes well beyondcensorship, which garners the bulk of popularattention. Autocracies also regularly monitor dissidentcommunications; mobilize regime defenders;spread propaganda and false information designedto disrupt protests and outside groups; infiltratesocial movements; and disable dissident websites,communications tools and databases. These andother practices can also induce self-censorship andother forms of self-restraint by publishers, activists,online commentators and opposition politicians.Autocrats can also turn dissidents’ use of theInternet against them. In Iran, for example, usersof social media – which linked their accounts tothose of other protestors – inadvertently createda virtual catalogue of political opponents thatenabled the government to identify and persecuteindividuals. The regime established a website thatpublished photos of protestors and used crowdsourcing to identify the individuals’ names. 46

Similarly, the Revolutionary Guard reportedlysent intimidating messages to those who postedpro-opposition messages and forced some citizensentering the country to open their Facebookaccounts upon arrival. 47 In the midst of theArab protests, Syria allowed its citizens to accessFacebook and YouTube for the first time in threeyears. Some human rights activists suspected thatthe government made the change precisely in orderto monitor people and activities on these sites. 48Similarly, shortly after the Egyptian governmentlifted its Internet blackout in early 2011, pro-Mubaraksupporters disrupted planned demonstrationsby posting messages on Facebook and Twittersaying that the protests had been canceled. 49 Thegovernment reportedly sent Facebook messages tocitizens urging them not to attend protests becausedoing so would harm the Egyptian economy. 50 Inthe same vein, the Chinese government employsan estimated 250,000 “50 Cent Party” memberswho are paid a small sum each time they posta pro-government message online. 51 And afteran anonymous post on the U.S.-based Chineselanguage website Boxun.com called on activiststo stage China’s own “Jasmine Revolution,” nodemonstrators turned up at the rally point – but itwas flooded with security teams and plainclothesofficers. 52 Some speculated that Chinese officialsthemselves may have authored the anonymousposting in an effort to draw out political dissidents.53 While no evidence has emerged to supportthe claim, it is not hard to imagine such an attempttaking place in the future.Autocracies are engaged in “offline” attempts torepress Internet use, as well. Saudi Arabia, forexample, has not only blocked websites but alsoplaced hidden cameras in Internet cafes aimedat monitoring user behavior and required cafeowners to give their customer lists to governmentofficials. 54 China requires users to register theiridentification upon entry to a cybercafe. 55 AndLibyan officials simply demanded that refugeesfleeing the recent fighting turn over their cellphonesor SIM cards at border checkpoints. 56Beyond these effects, new media can affect externalattention, by transmitting images and informationto the outside world, beyond the control ofgovernment-run media and regime censorship andspin. Such attention can mobilize sympathy forprotestors or hostility toward repressive regimes, 57as occurred when the video of Neda Agha-Soltanmoved from YouTube to mainstream media.Digital videos and information may also have arebound effect; information transmitted out ofEgypt and Libya by social networking and videohostingsites during the protests in those countriesmade its way back in via widely watched satellitebroadcasts. This effect could be particularly pronouncedin countries like Yemen, where Internetpenetration is low but Al Jazeera is widely viewed.Similarly, print journalists have found sources andstories through social media and have used thesame media to push their articles out to the world.In addition to the five mechanisms laid out byUSIP and noted above, we observe two additionalfactors that affect them in various ways.The economic impact of the Internet might affectthe degree of democratization in a country. TheInternet has increased labor productivity and correspondingeconomic growth, which may help middleclasses emerge in developing countries. 58 Becausenew middle classes tend to agitate for democraticrights, new technologies could indirectly promotedemocratization. In 2011, Clinton referenced arelated dynamic, the “dictator’s dilemma,” statingthat autocrats “will have to choose between lettingthe walls fall or paying the price to keep themstanding … by resorting to greater oppression andenduring the escalating opportunity cost of missingout on the ideas that have been blocked and peoplewho have been disappeared.” 59 In other words, anautocrat can either repress the Internet or enjoy itsfull economic benefits, but not both.| 17

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age18 |Whether the “dictator’s dilemma” actually existsremains unknown. There are certainly clearindividual instances where Internet repressionhas damaged a nation’s economy; Experts fromthe Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) have estimated that Egypt’sfive-day Internet shutdown cost the country at least90 million dollars, a figure that does not includee-commerce, tourism or other businesses that relyon Internet connectivity. 60 But China seems to providea powerful counterexample since it severelyrepresses the Internet while enjoying extraordinarilyhigh rates of sustained economic growth.Indeed, China appears to have used its restrictiveInternet practices to squeeze out internationalcompetition and generate conditions where onlydomestic companies – ones that adhere to thegovernment’s stringent censorship and monitoringpractices – can thrive. China’s largest domesticsearch engine, Baidu, exercises strict controls oncontent but has thrived since Google pulled outof China in January 2010. China may be an outlier;the massive financial and human resourcesit devotes to online control may not be replicableelsewhere. Other countries may be left with blunterforms of repression that degrade both the Internet’seconomic and political effects.In addition to the political and economic effectsdescribed above, new technologies can accelerateeach of them. Google’s Eric Schmidt and JaredCohen have argued that faster computer powercombined with the “many to many” geometry ofsocial media empowers individuals and groupsat the expense of governments and that this, inturn, increases the rate of change. 61 Dissidents canidentify one another, share information, organizeand connect with leaders and with external actors,all easier and faster than ever before. 62 Indeed, onehallmark of the 2011 Arab Spring was the astonishingrate of change as popular protests threatenedor toppled governments that had been in power fordecades in a matter of weeks. 63Again, the local political context is critical. Themedium may be global, but whether and how itenables individuals to foster democratic changelargely depends on a wide array of local variables,including opposition leadership, the existence ofcivil society institutions, the willingness of theregime to crack down on dissident activity, and soforth. In Tunisia and Egypt for example, tens ofthousands of protestors responded to protest eventpages on Facebook by taking to the streets. Yet inother Arab states, a call on Facebook for a “dayof rage” did not have the same pronounced influence.The degree of openness in the local politicalsystem, the discontent among the population,the willingness of the government to use coercivemeans to stop democratic activism, the role ofminorities and other local factors all matter greatly.Experts from the Organisationfor Economic Co-operationand Development haveestimated that Egypt’s fivedayInternet shutdown costthe country at least 90 milliondollars, a figure that does notinclude e-commerce, tourismor other businesses that rely onInternet connectivity.The Internet does not automatically promotedemocratization; Iran’s Twitter revolution ledto no reforms while Egypt’s Facebook revolutiontoppled the Mubarak regime. Furthermore,the technology itself is agnostic; the same online

tools that empower dissidents can aid dictators intheir oppression. In the short run, at least, a freerInternet does not automatically translate into moreliberal political systems.Yet some case studies do demonstrate the Internet’sprofound potential: that access to an open Internetcan help countries slide away from authoritarianismand toward democracy. Events in Iran, Tunisia,Egypt and elsewhere suggest that the Internet andrelated technologies (such as SMS) have indeedserved as critical tools for organizing protests,spreading information among dissident partiesand transmitting images and information to theoutside world – some of which moved onto satellitetelevision channels, further boosting their influence.64 And while experts continue to argue aboutthe precise effect, they tend to agree that socialmedia tools have made revolutions in the MiddleEast easier and speedier than they would haveotherwise been. 65Perhaps the most compelling link between a freeInternet and democratization is also the simplest:Both dissidents and dictatorships abroad seem tobelieve that the Internet can have a transformativerole, and they act on that basis. Dictatorshipsexpend enormous time and resources to clampdown on online activity, and more than 40 countriesactively censor the Internet or engage inother forms of significant Internet repression. 66Meanwhile, millions of individuals use proxy serversand other circumvention and anonymity toolsto evade censorship and monitoring. During the2009 presidential campaign in Iran, for example,both President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and hisopponent, Mir-Hussein Mousavi, cited the Internetas a tool through which the liberal oppositioncould mobilize support. 67 It is unlikely they wereboth wrong. While the effect of the Internet willdepend on local conditions, there are indeed reasonablegrounds for believing that a free Internetcan help empower individuals to press for moreliberal political systems.IV. How the U.S. GovernmentPromotes Internet FreedomThe U.S. government promotes Internet freedomin five main ways: providing Internet technologies,shaping international norms, encouraging theprivate sector to expand its role, using economicdiplomacy and reforming export controls.Providing Internet TechnologiesAs autocracies attempt to censor, identify,intimidate and monitor online users, the U.S.government provides technologies that allow individualsliving in repressive environments to freelyaccess online information. The U.S. governmentfunds these technologies because, at present, themarketplace is highly unlikely to supply them onits own. The private sector has few financial incentivesto do so – it is difficult to charge anonymoussubscribers or sell ads in closed societies – and veryfew foreign governments, NGOs or foundationshave funded them to date.A variety of circumvention technologies enabledissidents to penetrate firewalls and access blockedwebsites and censored information. Each toolemploys the same basic method: It routes a user’srequest through an unblocked webpage in orderto access banned content. For instance, a user inChina who cannot access The New York Timeswebsite could instead reach a proxy site that couldthen obtain information from the Times website.Freegate and Ultrasurf, for example, were designedto circumvent China’s Great Firewall by takingadvantage of open proxies – proxy servers availableto anyone on the Internet – which serve as aforwarding service to bypass restrictive firewalls.Though Freegate and Ultrasurf, both of which havereceived U.S. government funding, were designedfor use in China, some users are located in othercountries, including Iran. 68Psiphon is another circumvention tool that relieson a worldwide network of servers to enable| 19

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital AgeThe Role of the Internet in Political Movements: A Brief History20 |By Jacqueline Koo,Joseph S. Nye, Jr. InternThe 2009 Green Revolution in Iranand the 2011 Arab Spring representedwatershed events for manyforeign policy makers who are onlybeginning to grapple with issuessurrounding Internet freedom.Yet using new communicationstechnologies as a tool for politicaltransformation began over adecade ago. Numerous examplesdemonstrate how Internet andmobile phone technology can beused to facilitate protests and evenrevolution in countries around theworld. Some succeeded in bringingabout change, while others did not.In January 2001, while PhilippinePresident Joseph Estrada was ontrial for impeachment, thousandsof Filipinos protested the unwillingnessof loyalist senators to presentthe evidence against him. Theprotests were partly organizedby text messaging – some sevenmillion messages were sent duringthe week of the trial – whichhelped assemble over one millionprotesters at a major crossroad inManila. Startled by the protests, thesenators reversed the decision andreleased the evidence, resulting inEstrada’s impeachment. 69In fall 2004, a series of popularuprisings that became knownas the Orange Revolution inUkraine were largely shaped bypro-democracy activists using theInternet to protest a fraudulentpresidential election. Social activistsused the Internet and textmessaging on mobile phones asplatforms for uncensored politicaldialogue and as a way to organizeprotests. The activists also setup election-monitoring trainingthrough pro-democracy websites,which was pivotal in helping collectevidence of the fraudulent election.70 The street protests forced anew election that brought ViktorYushchenko, a democratic reformer,to power. 71In February 2005, the assassinationof former Lebanese Prime MinisterRafik Hariri sparked a series ofanti-Syrian demonstrations, knowncollectively as the Cedar Revolution,that were reportedly organizedvia text messages and emails. Thedemonstrators used cellphonesequipped with digital cameras totake on-the-ground pictures, whichwere then sent to news organizationsand friends who uploadedthem to websites in order to showwhat was happening to the rest ofthe world. 72 The demonstrationsultimately led to the withdrawal ofall Syrian troops from Lebanon.In February 2008, an unemployedengineer began a campaign viaFacebook, “One Million VoicesAgainst FARC,” to marshal millionsof protestors opposed to theviolent tactics of the ColombianRevolutionary Armed Forces’(FARC) and its holding of some 700hostages. The organizers utilizedemail, Google Docs, instant messagingsystems and Skype tocommunicate with other organizersin other cities and with members ofthe Colombian diaspora abroad, 73resulting in simultaneous demonstrationsin 27 Columbian cities and104 cities around the world. 74 TheFARC has been weakened, largelythrough Colombian governmentoperations, but remains the hemisphere’slargest insurgent group.In April 2008, young Egyptianactivists protested to support alabor strike in an industrial town.The campaign was organized viaFacebook and was called the “April 6Youth Movement,” after the day thatthe labor strike was held. In spring2008, the Facebook group boastedover 100,000 members. The protestitself was quickly contained bysecurity forces, which dampened theoverall enthusiasm of the movementamong its members. 75 Nevertheless,the online forum retained a membershipof over 70,000 youth byJanuary 2009, most of whom werenot politically involved before joiningthe movement, and facilitatedheated political dialogue among itsmembers.In April 2009, anti-communist activistsin Moldova protested allegedlyfraudulent parliamentary electionsin which the Party of Communistswon a majority of seats. The activistsorganized protests through avariety of social media platforms,including Twitter, LiveJournal (apopular eastern European socialnetworking site) and Facebook.Demonstrators reportedly organizedflash mobs – large, briefdemonstrations assembled suddenlyin a public space – by textmessage. 76 In response to the weeklongprotests, President Vladimir

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital AgeThe Promise and Perils of the InternetMoldovaMoldovan activists organized protestsand flash mobs in part through socialmedia platforms to denounce April2009 parliamentary election results,alleging fraud against the Party ofCommunists.CubaInternet activity in Cuba – whereless than 13 percent of the populationhad access in 2009 – has beenseverely stifled due to governmentmonitoring and steep penalties foronline dissent, resulting in a culture ofself-censorship among users.ColombiaIn February 2008, an unemployed engineer’sFacebook campaign, “One MillionVoices Against FARC,” marshaled millionsof demonstrators in 27 Colombiancities and 104 cities around the world inopposition to kidnappings and violencecarried out by the Colombian RevolutionaryArmed Forces (FARC).Tunisia and EgyptThe December 2010 “Jasmine Revolution”in Tunisia and the January 2011revolution in Egypt witnessed activistsemploying Facebook and other socialmedia platforms to organize demonstrationsagainst authoritarian rule.21 |

UkraineThe fall 2004 Orange Revolution, aseries of demonstrations allegingfraud in presidential elections, waslargely organized through the Internetand mobile phone text messages,and prompted a new election thatbrought to power Viktor Yushchenko,a democratic reformer.KyrgyzstanIn April 2010, Twitter and other socialmedia platforms helped bring attentionto protests against PresidentKurmanbek Bakiyev’s administration,contributing to pressure for PresidentBakiyev’s resignation.ChinaBeijing wields one the world’s largestand most sophisticated systems – the“Great Firewall” – for filtering andblocking Internet traffic, while employingabout 250,000 “Fifty Cent Party”members who post pro-Chinese CommunistParty propaganda online.IranThe June 2009 “Twitter Revolution”involved activists uploading mobilephone videos to YouTube that werereplayed on satellite television, aswell as activists using social media toorganize efforts and show the worldthe regime’s brutal repression.PhilippinesIn January 2001, text messageorganizedprotests brought togetherone million demonstrators urging thePhilippine Senate to release evidencethat would later be used to impeachPresident Joseph Estrada.LebanonIn February 2006, following the assassinationof former Lebanese PrimeMinister Rafik Hariri, anti-Syrian demonstrations,organized in part by textmessages and emails, ultimately ledto the withdrawal of all Syrian troopsfrom Lebanon.BurmaBurmese cyber dissidents have usedthe Internet to upload videos of antigovernmentdemonstrations and, asduring the 2007 Saffron Revolution,have been known to send digital filesacross the border to be uploadedfrom foreign computers.| 22

Voronin called for a recount, andthe electoral commission foundno evidence of fraud. The Party ofCommunists proceeded to take themajority of seats in Parliament but,weakened by the protests, failed toelect a prime minister. 77 The presidentdissolved Parliament threemonths later.In June 2009, supporters of theopposition candidate, Mir-HosseinMousavi, staged massive protestschallenging the results of theIranian presidential election thatnamed the incumbent PresidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad the winner.The protests known as the GreenRevolution were also nicknamed the“Twitter Revolution” for the role thatTwitter and other Internet-basedsocial networking sites reportedlyplayed in facilitating communicationwithin Iran and with the rest ofthe world. The demonstrations wereput down with brutal force and therevolution failed.In April 2010, a series of riots anddemonstrations took place inKyrgyzstan stemming from dissatisfactionand anger againstPresident Kurmanbek Bakiyev’sadministration. Observers haveoffered differing perspectives onthe role social media played duringthe Kyrgyz protests (with some, forinstance, arguing that platformssuch as Twitter were more effectivein broadcasting the demonstrationsthan in organizing them). 78 Ageneral consensus exists, however,that Twitter and other social mediaplatforms helped bring attentionto the revolt and contributed tomounting pressure for Bakiyev tostep down.In December 2010, Tunisianstook to the streets protestinghigh unemployment, high foodprices, corruption and the lack offreedom of speech, and called forPresident Zine el-Abidine Ben Alito step down. These protests weredubbed the “Jasmine Revolution,”but were also called the “FacebookRevolution.” 79 The protests werespearheaded by a number of youngbloggers that employed Facebook,Twitter, blogging sites and emailto organize protests nation-wide. 80On January 14, 2011, after 28 daysof protests, Ben Ali dissolved theParliament and then resigned, endinghis 23-year rule.In January 2011, Egyptians took partin peaceful mass demonstrationsand strikes calling for PresidentHosni Mubarak to step down,actions that escalated into violentclashes with the police. The protestswere organized through the “WeAre All Khaled Said” Facebook page,named after a young blogger whowas beaten to death by police inJune 2010, and whose death fueledthe outrage surrounding the initialrevolts. 81 Over 2 million people protestedin Cairo’s Tahrir Square andprotests were held in several othermajor Egyptian cities. 82 Observingthe protestors’ use of social media,the Mubarak regime shut downnearly all Internet and cellphoneservice within the country for fivedays. 83 The shutdown backfired –the protests grew enormously andthe move prompted both internationalcondemnation and domesticoutrage. 84 On February 11, Mubarakstepped down after 30 years ofpower and handed control to militaryleaders.As of this writing, mass protestscontinue in countries acrossthe Middle East. The role of theInternet in influencing and facilitatingthese demonstrations varies bycountry, and the extent to whichthe protests will ultimately causepolitical change remains unclear.However, these examples showthat the Internet gives activistsin closed societies tools throughwhich to express dissent and uniteindividuals at an unprecedentedpace and scale, and will undoubtedlyserve as a tool for politicalaction – among both protestorsand the regimes they oppose – forthe foreseeable future.| 23

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age24 |restricted users to reroute their requests aroundfirewalls. While these tools allow users to puncturefirewalls, they do not provide absolute anonymity.Users may still be exposed to state surveillancepractices, especially in countries where Internetservice providers are required to retain data onuser activity – a virtual paper trail of what websiteseach user has visited. 85 They have another drawbackas well: They cannot access content within acountry that censors.Other technologies help users maintain their anonymityin the face of a regime’s watchful eye. TheTor Project, which received nearly 750,000 dollarsfrom the U.S. government between 2006 and 2010,has developed one notable tool. 86 Tor uses a networkin which encrypted messages pass throughseveral network nodes known as “onion routers”that then peel away layers of encryption as informationis transmitted among proxy servers aroundthe world. The network allows users to hide theirlocation from websites they are visiting, enablingthem to evade governments and others attemptingto trace their location. For example, a Tor userin Iran might appear as on a website registry as auser in Germany if the last proxy server used werelocated in Germany. In addition, virtual privatenetworks (VPNs) encrypt and tunnel all Internettraffic through a proxy, enabling their users to circumventfirewalls and use webmail, chat and otheronline communication services. 87 Most VPNs areavailable for a nominal subscription fee. One popularVPN, Hotspot Shield, uses ads in lieu of a fee,allowing users to subscribe to the service for free.Other technological tools enhance the ability ofdissidents and activists to use the Internet freely.Software exists to help protect websites againstDDoS attacks, which can be launched by autocraticregimes or patriotic hackers (individuals orgroups who express nationalistic pride by attackingforeign government or dissident websites) bysending millions of page requests per second to asite, thereby overloading and crashing its servers.Other available tools help secure online databases(of human rights abuses, for example), providemirror sites to keep websites live during an attackand archive uploaded data so that it can be easilyreposted after a website returns to service. In addition,as mobile technology increasingly becomes amain platform for online activity, there is greaterinterest in secure cellphones and encrypted mobilecommunications. In a positive move, the StateDepartment is supporting the development ofan innovative application that would allow prodemocracyactivists to hit a “panic button” beforetheir mobile phones are confiscated, erasing theiraddress book and sending emergency alerts toother campaigners. 88Yet such tools cannot be used effectively by activistswho lack the skills to employ them, and theycan actually be dangerous. Used improperly, theymay give users a false sense of security or exposetheir users identities and online actions to authorities.As with other elements of American humanrights advocacy, only individuals on the groundcan calculate their personal risks and decide whichare worth taking. However, the United States has aresponsibility to ensure that users of technologiesit funds make decisions that are as fully informedas possible. It also has a responsibility to ensurethat the tools it supports work as advertised. Thisrequires, in part, subjecting any U.S. governmentfundedcircumvention technologies to rigorousanalysis before they are deployed to ensure they donot contain vulnerabilities that could be exploitedby authoritarian regimes. To do otherwise potentiallysubjects dissidents to grave threat. (See “TheDilemmas of Digital Technology” text box.)Properly using new technologies must alsocontinue to be part of the substantial trainingprograms funded by the U.S. government. Someof this training focuses on building the onlineresilience of activist organizations, to help themrespond when they are victims of an attack andto reboot their systems in a timely fashion. Other

The Dilemmas of Digital Technology: The Cases of Haystack and FreegateA key element of the U.S. government’sInternet freedom agendainvolves providing circumventionand anonymity technologies tocyber dissidents in closed societies.However, each of these technologiesposes an array of technical andpolitical dilemmas. While such toolscan be highly effective in helpingindividuals living under dictatorshipaccess the uncensored Internet,determining just how to do so canbe very difficult indeed. Two technologies– Haystack and Freegate– demonstrate these dilemmas. Theformer shows the vital importance ofensuring that a digital tool works asadvertised; the latter illustrates thediplomatic tensions that result fromsupporting these technologies.HaystackIn June 2009, in the midst of widespreadprotests in Iran, Austin Heap,a 25-year old software engineer inSan Francisco, announced that hehad developed a circumvention toolcalled Haystack that would help Iraniandissidents evade their government’sdraconian Internet censorshipfilters. “It’s completely secure for theuser so the government can’t snoopon them,” Heap said. “We use manyanonymizing steps so that identitiesare masked and it is as safe as possibleso people have a safe way tocommunicate with the world.” 89Haystack quickly became a sensationin the mainstream media and Heapeven received the Guardian’s “Innovatorof the Year Award.” 90 Haystackcaught the eye of the State Department,and in March 2010 the TreasuryDepartment issued a license todistribute the software in Iran. 91 Yetwhile Heap touted the software’sstrong security features, the technologydid not undergo rigorous technicaltesting or peer review and, as aresult, it went live in summer 2010with serious design flaws. 92An independent team crackedHaystack’s code within six hours of itspublic release and determined that thegovernment of Iran would have beenable to discern users’ location andidentities. 93 As a result, the Haystackprogram was disbanded in September2010. As the U.S. governmentincreases its funding for circumventionand anonymity technologies, it mustsubject them to rigorous technicalreview and independent evaluation– including by outside experts whennecessary – before they are deployed.To do otherwise risks not only wastingtaxpayer dollars, but also putting dissidentsand activists at risk.FreegateFreegate shows the challenges ofbalancing Internet freedom effortswith broader foreign policy priorities.Freegate is a censorship circumventiontool developed by theU.S.-based Global Internet FreedomConsortium (GIFC), an organizationrun by the Falun Gong, a Chinesespiritual group that Beijing labels aterrorist organization. The softwareis aimed at enabling users in Chinato puncture the regime’s Great Firewall,but it has also been accessedby users in other countries; morethan a million Iranian users reportedlyemployed it in June 2009. 94Freegate and its sister software, Ultrasurf,also developed by the GIFC,report that they have, combined,500,000 to 1 million monthly users. 95In 2010, the State Department transferred1.5 million dollars to the BroadcastingBoard of Governors (BBG) tosupport Freegate and another GIFCtool, Ultrareach, drawing a predictablyangry response from Beijing.A Chinese government spokespersonsaid the GIFC and Falun Gongare “bent on vilifying the Chinesegovernment with fabricated lies,undermining Chinese social stabilityand sabotaging China-U.S. relations”and that the Chinese government is“strongly opposed to the U.S. governmentproviding whatever assistanceto such an anti-China organization.” 96GIFC supporters have lobbied CapitolHill for financial support to expandits existing infrastructure, notingthat GIFC had to restrict use of thesoftware by Iranians not long after the2009 protests subsided because oflimited server capacity.Funding groups associated with theFalun Gong poses obvious complicationsfor U.S. relations with China. GivenBeijing’s deeply negative view ofthe spiritual group, supporting FalunGong volunteers as they circumventthe Chinese firewall stresses the countries’complex bilateral ties. Indeed,some see the State Department’sdecision to fund Freegate throughthe BBG as an attempt to distance itsdiplomatic efforts from its support forGIFC-related efforts. 97 Given the highperformance of these technologiesand their popularity, stress on therelationship may be worth the costto the United States, but as fundingfor new programming continues toincrease, the government shouldmake a concerted effort to diversifythe technologies it supports.| 25

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age26 |basic technical training teaches users how toidentify and verify certificate authorities andSecure Socket Layer (SSL) certificates – the popupboxes that verify the authenticity and securityof a website – to help minimize the number ofstate surveillance intrusions that users inadvertentlyauthorize. Still other programs teach basic“cyber hygiene” practices to activists who maynot be technologically proficient, which includeconstructing strong passwords, avoiding keystrokelogging in Internet cafes, preventing theinadvertent download of malicious code and usingHypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS),which encrypts online sessions.The State Department has spent approximately 20million dollars since 2008 on programs to developcircumvention technologies and promote digitalactivism, and planned to award more than 25 milliondollars in additional funding in 2011. 98 TheState Department has been criticized for delays indisbursing funding for Internet-freedom relatedtechnologies. According to a congressional report,the State Department received 50 million dollars inappropriations for Internet freedom programmingsince Fiscal Year 2008, but had disbursed less thanhalf by February 2011. 99 Partly as a result, in April2011 Congress reallocated 10 million dollars fromthe State Department to the Broadcasting Board ofGovernors (BBG) – which reduced State’s Internetfreedom budget by a third and more than quintupledthe BBG’s budget in this area. Separately,the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency(DARPA), which is part of the Department ofDefense, funds the development of circumventiontechnologies that would allow the U.S. military toaccess the Internet safely and anonymously. 100There are good reasons for the BBG to take thelead on providing most circumvention and anonymitytechnologies. It is an operational entitythat currently provides an array of circumventiontechnologies, and develops some of themin-house. Should State and the BBG both fundcircumvention technologies, they will likely endup funding the same outside groups. State will,however, need to continue supporting circumventiontechnologies whose use falls outside the BBG’smission of promoting U.S. government-sponsoredinternational broadcasting. State has proposedfunding projects such as mobile security applicationsand ad-hoc mesh networking (decentralizednetworks that rely on individual nodes to transmitdata) for use when the Internet is shut down, whichinclude both circumvention and anonymizingcomponents. State should also retain the lead onsupporting other technologies that fall outside theBBG’s mission and current technical competence,including tools to establish secure human rightsdatabases, online hubs for censored comment, andso on. 101Shaping International NormsThe Bush and Obama administrations have bothsought to promote Internet freedom by shapinginternational norms. Developing internationalnorms is a long-term, global objective. Somecountries that currently repress that Internetaccess – like China, Iran and Burma – areunlikely to be moved by normative trends in thenear term; statements at the United Nations andpolicy declarations supporting Internet freedomare highly unlikely to change their current policies.But promoting Internet freedom is not onlya near-term effort, and current efforts may pay offin the long run. Many countries have not yet fullydeveloped their own Internet policies or thoughtthrough all of the implications of Internetfreedom and repression even in the short run –including states in Central Asia, the Middle Eastand Africa. Shaping the behavior of those statesshould be an important goal of the United Statesand likeminded partners.Rather than advocating a new international treatyor new regimes, the U.S. government has arguedthat the principles of Internet freedom already existin the UDHR and the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights. Article 19 of the UDHRstates that the right to free expression exists in anymedium and on any frontier, and Article 20 protectsthe right of everyone to peacefully assembleand associate, a right that Clinton has argued isguaranteed in cyberspace as well. 102At the same time, the U.S. government has triedto codify norms that would reinforce free expressionand block efforts to restrict it. The 2005 WorldSummit on the Information Society (WSIS), aU.N.-sponsored gathering of 174 countries, produceda consensus statement recognizing that“freedom of expression and the free flow of information,ideas and knowledge, are essential forthe Information Society and beneficial to development.”103 In 2008, the member states of theInternational Telecommunication Union (ITU)adopted a resolution pledging to “refrain from takingany unilateral and/or discriminatory actionsthat could impede another Member State to accesspublic Internet sites.” According to AmbassadorDavid Gross, then the top State Department officialmanaging communications and informationpolicy, the deliberations made clear that “memberstates” meant not only governments, but also thecivilians of those countries. 104Continued U.S. leadership is critical to fill whatremains a normative vacuum. Part of the difficulty,however, lies not only with authoritarianregimes, but also with some of America’s closestdemocratic partners. While the U.S. governmentrecognizes some limits on free expression – childpornography, slander, perjury, “fighting words”and certain other forms of expression are illegal,online or off – its commitment to free speech isnevertheless the strongest of any major country.Germany, for instance, prohibits Holocaustdenial online; France does not allow the sale ofNazi paraphernalia over the Internet; and Turkeybanned YouTube for two years because it refusedto remove videos the courts deemed insulting toMustafa Kemal Ataturk. Governments in Britain,Italy and Germany have also established lists ofblocked websites – particularly those containingchild pornography, online gambling or hate speech– but these lists are often neither transparent noraccountable to the public. 105Authoritarian countries inevitably attempt toshield themselves from criticism and pressure bypointing to democracies that ban online speech.Denying them the opportunity to do so successfullyrequires the United States and others toarticulate, publicly and consistently, the distinctionbetween restrictions on free speech put intoplace by democratic political systems through dueprocess and those enacted by dictatorships. WhileAmericans may disagree with the limits on onlineexpression enforced by democratic partners, thesedecisions are nevertheless made through participatorypolitical systems while restrictions imposed byautocratic regimes are not.Defining “cyber security,” and determining thelegitimate steps a government may take to ensureit, also poses a significant challenge to America’sInternet freedom efforts. 106 Most democratic governmentsuse the term to mean protecting againstassaults on and intrusion of cyber systems andcritical infrastructure, such as electric utilities,government servers, financial systems and telecommunicationsnetworks. In contrast, some othergovernments argue that the term should includethe notion of “information security” – regulatingcontent. Russian officials, for example, haveemphasized that information security requiresbalancing individual, social and state interests. 107Such notions have real world consequences:Russia’s federal security service recently proposedbanning Skype, Gmail and other platforms becausethey are “uncontrolled” platforms that use encryptiontechnology for secure communication. 108 TheUnited Arab Emirates made similar claims in 2010when it banned the use of BlackBerry services,complaining that it could not access encryptedcommunications. 109| 27

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age28 |Similarly, competing definitions of aggressioncomplicate efforts to develop Internet freedomnorms. At an April 2008 U.N. conference, a seniorRussian official argued that “any time a governmentpromotes ideas on the Internet with the goalof subverting another country’s government – evenin the name of democratic reform – it shouldqualify as ‘aggression.’” 110 In 2009, the six-memberShanghai Cooperation Organisation – whichincludes Russia and China – adopted an accordthat reportedly defined “information war,” inpart, as an effort by a state to undermine another’s“political, economic and social systems.” 111The same tensions exist in working with Americanpartners to combat online crime. The AdditionalProtocol to the European Convention on Cybercrime,for example, provides a mechanism for states toharmonize their domestic laws relating to varioustypes of cybercrime. At first glance, this would seemprecisely the kind of effort that the United Statesshould support on security grounds. Yet the protocolrequires signatories to criminalize such activities asdistributing xenophobic or racist material through acomputer system; expressing denial, “gross minimization”or approval of a genocide or crimes againsthumanity through a computer; distributing insults topeople because of their race, color, religion, nationalor ethnic origin through a computer system; or aidingand abetting any of these acts. The AdditionalProtocol has been signed by Albania, Cyprus,Denmark, France, Slovenia and Switzerland. Whilethe United States ratified the underlying conventionin 2006, it has declined to join the AdditionalProtocol, believing it to be inconsistent with U.S.constitutional guarantees. 112Efforts to enlist Internet service providers andother technology companies to enforce regulationsprotecting copyrights and intellectual propertyalso complicate U.S. efforts to build stronger globalsupport for Internet freedom. Intermediaries– including Internet service providers, websitehosting companies, social networking and emailservice providers and search engines – are increasinglypressured by states to regulate content theyhost. In the United States, an individual postingillegal material is generally held liable rather thanthe intermediary. 113 In many foreign countriesintermediaries do face liability, and the process bywhich they are notified (by either the governmentor private actors) is often unclear.The role of the private sectoris the single most complicatedissue facing U.S. policymakersas they forge an Internetfreedom agenda.Holding them liable in this way risks chilling freeonline expression. In countries like France, whereInternet service providers and others are increasinglyenforcing copyright regulations, hosts mayself-police content and respond immediately totakedown notices, even those issued in bad faithor for unscrupulous purposes. 114 The United Statesand a number of other nations, including the EU,Japan and Mexico, are currently negotiating anAnti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement that willserve as an international framework for enforcingintellectual property rights. In developing suchframeworks, the United States must be very waryof moving beyond current American law. Holdingintermediaries responsible could undermine theU.S. Internet freedom agenda by compelling themto err on the side of caution and to proactivelycensor, ban or remove even legal – let alone questionable– content.The United States must help formulate acceptableinternational definitions of cyber security, aggression,cybercrime and copyright enforcement that

espect the principles of Internet freedom. It willalso need to continually articulate the distinctionbetween political speech permissible undersuch regimes as the UDHR and truly illicit onlineactivity. This will likely involve opposing effortsto develop restrictive international norms spearheadedby some of America’s closest friends.Enlisting Private Sector SupportThe role of the private sector is the single mostcomplicated issue facing U.S. policymakers as theyforge an Internet freedom agenda. Private firmshave a duty to maximize profits rather than promoteonline freedom in repressive environments.Yet with the prominent role their products playedin Iran, Egypt, China and elsewhere, companieshave been dragged into the center of the Internetfreedom debate, whether they want to be there ornot. Ethical debates about the proper role of theprivate sector – ranging from whether Americancompanies should be permitted to sell repressiveregimes key technologies to the responsibilities ofcorporations in the face of a regime’s demand forinformation – remain unresolved.The perception that American companies aidInternet repression abroad clearly makes promotingInternet freedom more difficult. This isparticularly true for the most egregious activities,such as turning over the personal data of a dissidentto state security services. As we discuss below,Congress should ban such activities and requiremore transparency into other corporate involvement,such as providing lists of banned websites.Yet nearly seven years after the initial hearings onInternet companies in China began, no legislationin this area has passed.Both corporations and policymakers are strugglingto define the appropriate role of companies in promotingInternet freedom. For example, Cisco hasbeen accused of marketing routers in China thatare used to support the Great Firewall. 115 For severalyears Google censored its own search results inChina. More recently, the computer security firmMcAfee Inc. provided content-filtering software toInternet service providers in Bahrain, Saudi Arabiaand Kuwait. 116 China’s Huawei is a significant supplierof filtering technology. Telecommunicationsgiant Nokia allegedly provided the Iranian governmentwith the capability to tap mobile phones,interrupt calls and intercept and scramble SMS textmessages to disrupt organized protests. 117 France’sAlcatel reportedly sold website filtering and surveillanceequipment to Burma, 118 and Canada’sNortel Networks has allegedly provided censorshiptechnology to the Chinese government. 119The problem is that companies must follow locallaws when they operate in foreign countries,including laws restricting online behavior inauthoritarian states. If they do not comply, thefirms risk losing their licenses and access to thosemarkets. Many observers have pointed to Google’sdecision to withdraw from China rather than continueto accept Chinese government restrictionsas an example of a principled corporate stand thatothers should emulate. But industry representativespaint a more complicated picture. Fledglingtelecommunications and technology companieswithout large revenue streams – or even largerfirms that do not boast tremendous financialassets – may find the need to stay engaged inChina, the world’s largest Internet market, a questionof life or death.The perception that American firms themselves arean arm of American foreign policy also jeopardizestheir ability to compete in key foreign markets.During the 2009 Iranian revolution, for instance,Jared Cohen, then a member of Clinton’s policyplanning staff, emailed Twitter founder Jack Dorseyurging the company to forgo a planned site outageso that Iranians could continue tweeting. Thisaction attracted disapproval even in the UnitedStates, but it is consistent with the U.S. policy ofpromoting Internet freedom. The U.S. governmentroutinely reaches out to private firms and this will| 29

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age30 |constitute an increasingly important element ofAmerica’s Internet freedom agenda. Yet, some ofthose who have criticized the State Department’soutreach to Twitter also call on the government tourge corporations to join the GNI.Permitting U.S. companies to operate in certainauthoritarian countries rather than cede the marketto the alternatives can serve America’s Internetfreedom agenda in the long term. For example,while Google censored its search results in mainlandChina, Baidu – China’s largest domesticsearch engine – has even more stringent censorshippolicies, and has taken over much of the marketshare Google abandoned. A policy change likeGoogle’s might lead to less information availableonline to the average Chinese citizen, not more.And a transaction between two foreign parties overwhich the United States has no visibility or controlcould quite conceivably faclitate Internet repressionmore than the activities of an American companythat are, at the end of the day, subject to U.S. lawand public opinion pressures.As technology companies increasingly expand intorepressive foreign countries, they will face heightenedpressure from Congress and the public tomake internal decisions with an eye toward theirbroader implications. Facebook, for example, hasrequired users to register their accounts undertheir real names – clearly a deterrent to dissidentswho wish to remain anonymous. This has been aparticular point of contention between Facebookand Internet freedom advocates, because it potentiallyallows for regime allies to have activists usingaliases suspended from the site.In 2008, a coalition of nonprofit organizations,universities and financial institutions, nearlyall American, joined with Google, Yahoo andMicrosoft to form the GNI, which attempts tocodify business codes of conduct. GNI memberscommit to “collaborate in the advancementof user rights to freedom of expression andprivacy.” 120 Participants agree to adhere to a setof shared principles about how companies shouldrespond to government requests for information,including making those requests transparentand protecting users’ rights to privacy. The GNIincludes a reporting and enforcement mechanismto ensure that its members meet its complianceand evaluation requirements. 121While many view the GNI as a great step forwardin the Internet freedom movement, its effects havebeen significantly limited by the lack of corporateparticipants. Not a single technology companyhas joined the three founders, each of which is anAmerican firm. The Secretary of State has publiclycalled on technology companies to join theinitiative, and members of Congress have donethe same; in August 2009, Sen. Richard Durbin,D-Ill., wrote to 26 companies urging them to jointhe GNI.122 All has been for naught. Corporaterepresentatives with whom we spoke observed thattheir companies agreed with the principles putforth by the GNI, but they simply do not see it intheir business interest to join because they do notwish to expend the resources necessary to fulfillthe GNI’s reporting requirements or submit theircorporate practices to external reviews. Othersexpressed concern that joining the GNI couldthreaten their access to particular markets becauseGNI is perceived as an organization for promotingAmerican values.In an encouraging trend, a few companies haveproactively sought to break through Internetrepression. When Egypt shut down the Internetalmost completely, a French company offeredEgyptians anonymous dial-up access via aFrench phone number. 123 At the same time,Google and Twitter jointly created a tool,Speak2Tweet, which allowed Egyptians to calla dedicated number that translated their voicemessages into tweets. Google officials noted thatthe initiative was a direct response to the eventsin the Middle East, saying, “We hope this will

go some way to helping people stay connectedat this very difficult time.” 124 During the revolutionin Libya, the Moammar Gadhafi regime cutInternet access and jammed cellular networksand satellite phone signals. A Libyan-Americantelecommunications executive led a team thatimported millions of dollars in equipment,hijacked the national network and reestablishedcommunications in the country. 125Increasing Economic IncentivesIncreasing the economic incentives to promoteInternet freedom must be central to any U.S.government strategy. There are three majorways to do this: persuasion, publicity and tradeagreements.U.S. officials are trying to persuade states thatInternet repression will chill their economicdevelopment, and to persuade companies thatInternet freedom issues affect their own financialinterests and bottom lines. Clinton has noted thata free Internet, by increasing transparency, canreduce corruption – making a given economy amore predictable and profitable marketplace forbusiness – and that by investing in countries withtough censorship and surveillance policies, companiescan see their websites shut down or their staffthreatened. 126 Indeed, corporations will increasinglyfind themselves navigating the complex webof Internet restrictions abroad, some of which willdirectly affect their balance sheets.Every time an American company complies with apolitically motivated order to block Internet contentor share user information, it risks negative publicityin the United States and elsewhere. As negativepublicity builds, Congress may pass laws that wouldprohibit American companies from aiding certainforms of Internet repression which could requirecompanies to withdraw from foreign markets wherenational laws conflict with U.S. laws. As a result,corporations have an interest in preempting suchsituations by pressing foreign governments for moreliberal Internet environments – or at least fewerconstraints – and U.S. government officials shouldencourage them to do so.The U.S. government can also promote Internetfreedom though trade agreements where Internetrepression serves as a trade barrier. When a countryblocks access to a U.S. website, for example, it alsoblocks the site’s advertising – and thereby interfereswith the trade in products and services advertised. 127Of the millions of dollars lost during the Internetshutoff in Egypt, it is hard to imagine that Americanbusinesses were not also affected.Employing trade agreements is a more promisingstrategy than demanding foreign governments toadhere to universal values, because they containeconomic incentives (thus giving the United Statesnegotiating leverage) and are at least potentiallyenforceable. Should Internet censorship becomeaccepted as a non-tariff trade barrier, a censoringgovernment could be vulnerable to dispute arbitrationat the World Trade Organization or bilateraltrade remedies. And such agreements could bebilateral, multilateral or even global.The United States should more actively try toinsert binding language in agreements that wouldprohibit Internet censorship or other efforts tolimit access to information online. The UnitedStates did include a relevant provision in theKorea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, approved byCongress in December 2010. That agreementstates in part: “Recognizing the importance ofthe free flow of information in facilitating trade,and acknowledging the importance of protectingpersonal information, the Parties shall endeavorto refrain from imposing or maintaining unnecessarybarriers to electronic information flows acrossborders.” 128 Such language is clearly nonbinding –“shall endeavor to refrain” is a loose commitmentat best – but nevertheless suggests how the UnitedStates can promote Internet freedom in futuretrade negotiations.| 31

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age32 |Reforming Export ControlsThe U.S. government can also reform its exportcontrols on information technologies to furtherits Internet freedom objectives. Discussionsabout the link between the public and privatesectors in promoting Internet freedom havefocused on whether the U.S. government shouldprohibit the supply of technology and equipmentto repressive governments. But the governmentmust also ensure that it does not prohibit theexport of technology that could be used to promoteonline freedom.For years the United States has relied on controlsenforced by the Departments of Commerce andTreasury to regulate overseas sales of merchandiseand materials to states that pose a threat to U.S.national and economic security. These controlsrestrict exports of sensitive computer hardwareand software, such as cryptographic programsand other technologies that scramble messagesand data, in part to prevent unfriendly states fromacquiring cyber capabilities that could be usedagainst the United States or its allies. Until recently,basic Internet services (such as email and instantmessage services) could not be exported to statessuch as Cuba, Iran, Syria and Sudan.In March 2010, the Treasury Department issueda general license for Internet service technologiesthat would allow companies to export photosharing and other social networking and communicationsservices to users in Cuba, Iran andSudan – a move administration officials citedexplicitly as being part of their Internet freedomagenda. 129 In June 2010, the CommerceDepartment eliminated export restrictions onmost mass-market electronic products withencryption functions, including cellphones,laptops and computer drives, which can now beexported without a license. 130Yet export controls remain burdensome forInternet freedom. Administration officials haveprivately stated that complex and overlappingexport control regulations chill commercialactivity, especially with technology developers.U.S. export controls currently restrict, forinstance, the transferring, transmitting anddownloading of open source code that is alreadywidely available for free online. 131 This opensource code includes encryption code for securecommunications and a suite of other tools thatcould potentially give cyber-dissidents and otheronline activists a wider range of options forcommunicating securely and accessing bannedcontent. But a strict interpretation of currentexport controls requires websites that host opensource code, such as Google and Mozilla, toblock access to Internet Protocol (IP) addressesoriginating in sanctioned countries.In March 2010, the TreasuryDepartment issued a generallicense for Internet servicetechnologies that wouldallow companies to exportphoto sharing and othersocial networking andcommunications servicesto users in Cuba, Iran andSudan.Currently, when the State Department funds aparticular technology, the developer receives aspecific license that waives export controls onthat technology – so that it can, for example,provide circumvention technology to Iranians

and Syrians. Yet the license does not apply tothe same technology if it is created and exportedby an organization that does not receive StateDepartment funds. The U.S. government shouldquickly fix this glaring inconsistency.V. Navigating the TensionsBetween Internet Freedomand Cyber SecurityBalancing the principle of freedom of expressionon the Internet, in which users can act anonymously,with the need for a secure environment inwhich malicious users seeking to do harm can beidentified and stopped by responsible governments,is a difficult challenge. Indeed, policymakers todayare engaged in two simultaneous and potentiallycontradictory efforts. Promoting Internet freedomimplies advocating privacy and providing toolsthrough which individuals can act anonymouslyonline. Cyber security, by contrast, implies onlinetransparency and attribution. These two effortscreate tensions that are not well understood andfrequently remain unaddressed. Part of the problemstems from the fact that conversations aboutAmerica’s cyber security and Internet freedompolicies have, by and large, taken place in isolationfrom each other. Cyber security policy has involvedthe national security community, while Internetfreedom policies have involved the technologycommunity and a handful of human rights activists– and now the foreign policy community.These tensions are real and will sometimes forcedifficult choices, but they should not preventthe United States from securing cyberspace andpromoting Internet freedom at the same time. U.S.policies will have to address two key tensions: anonymityversus attribution, and defending againstattacks versus emboldening autocracies.Anonymity versus AttributionCyber security proponents often advocate greatertransparency in online behavior and seek toimprove the ability of security monitors to reliablyidentify malicious users and track their activities.“Anonymity is the fundamental problem we face incyberspace,” Stewart Baker, former chief counselfor the National Security Agency (NSA), said atan April 2010 Internet conference in Germany. 132| 33

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age34 |Security practitioners argue that online transparencyand attribution allows law enforcement topinpoint the origins of cyber attacks and intrusionsand respond to them, which could also deter futuremalicious activities. Former Director of NationalIntelligence Mike McConnell has argued for makingthe Internet more transparent, saying, “Weneed to re-engineer the Internet to make attribution,geo-location, intelligence analysis and impactassessment – who did it, from where, why and whatwas the result – more manageable.” 133Such efforts would conflict with the Internet freedomagenda, which emphasizes online anonymity.The Tor network described previously, for example,does not have a back door through which the U.S.government or other law enforcement agencies canaccess and monitor the secured communication orWeb traffic. Experts argue that because the softwareis open source, users would identify any backdoor in the source code, compromising the software’sintegrity and prompting users to find otherprograms without a back door. Criminal networksand others seeking to monitor law enforcementusers could also exploit any back door thatbypasses the controls and auditing functions andhijack information of those monitoring them.Anonymous Internet use not only causes cybersecurity concerns; it can also threaten other aspectsof American national security. Technologies suchas Tor, for instance, could be used not only bydissidents and democracy activists, but also bycriminals and terrorists. 134 The very anonymizingtools and point-to-point encrypted communicationtechnology funded by the State Department andBBG could, some experts caution, be used by internationalterrorist organizations to coordinate andcarry out attacks undetected by U.S. governmentsecurity agencies. 135 Although not reacting specificallyto government-funded anonymity tools, foryears the FBI has warned about the potential risksassociated with the spread of sophisticated encryptiontechnologies. 136 As early as 1993, the NSAdeveloped a “Clipper chip” designed for telecommunicationscompanies to use in secure voicetransmissions – but with a back door for the U.S.government. 137 (After a public outcry by privacyactivists, the program was abandoned.)Other technologies pose potential challengesas well. BBG programs are intended to provideforeigners access to its own online materials – so,for instance, a Chinese citizen can access newsstories on the Voice of America website that isblocked in China. However, while BBG-providedproxy servers and other technologies enable auser to access BBG websites, they do not requireusers to stay there. This facilitates peer-to-peercommunication among users, but it could alsoenable potential criminals or terrorists to accesspropaganda or websites that teach bomb makingand other illicit skills. Similarly, activists seekingto evade government surveillance can purchaseprepaid mobile phones that lack unique identifiers,and the U.S. government reportedly hopesto fund projects that enable mobile phone users toanonymously access the Internet. Because criminalsand terrorists also seek to use such phones,however, a number of governments have begunoutlawing them. 138U.S. government-supplied circumvention tools arenot the only option for individuals wishing to communicateanonymously or access banned websites.Criminals and terrorists are far more likely to usebotnets (collections of compromised computersrunning automated software, generally withoutthe knowledge of their users) and other illicit toolsinstead of using less effective tools offered by theU.S. government (which can be slower than others,have restricted bandwidth and contain otherfeatures that make illicit tools more attractive bycomparison). “Mujahideen Secrets 2,” for example,is a jihadi-developed encryption tool designedto allow al Qaeda supporters to communicateonline. 139 While it is clearly impossible to eliminatethe possibility that government-sponsored

In drafting legislation intendedto protect the nation’s cybersystems and infrastructure,the U.S. government musttread carefully and quashperceptions that it is acceptableto use a “national cyberemergency” to trample onfreedom of expression.technologies will be used by bad actors, it is likelythat the number of bad actors doing so will pale incomparison to the number of users simply wishingto access neutral media.Defending Against Attacks versusEmboldening AutocraciesSimple efforts to defend against cyber attacks alsoaffect America’s Internet freedom agenda.The U.S. military has outlined a cyber securitystrategy based on active defense, which includesblocking malicious software before it attempts toenter military networks. 140 Although hunting downdestructive content outside defense networks islikely to be rare, the head of the military’s newlyestablished U.S. Cyber Command has argued thatthe United States must have offensive cyber capabilitiesto shut down attacking systems. 141 Suchmoves, which may be entirely justified, could at thesame time embolden autocracies wishing to justifytheir own offensive operations.The perception that the U.S. government couldrestrict traffic over large portions of the Internetin the event of a cyber emergency could alsocomplicate its efforts to promote online freedom.Congress debated a bill last year that wouldauthorize greater government control over the U.S.digital infrastructure in the event of a nationwidecyber attack. 142 Though many media reports abouta so-called Internet “kill switch” are erroneous(and a newly introduced version explicitly prohibitsany government employee from shutting down theInternet), the bill nevertheless raised concerns thatsuch authority would undermine Internet freedom.While interpretations of the bill vary widely, anexpert with the Electronic Frontier Foundationwarned, “The president would have essentiallyunchecked power to determine what services canbe connected to the Internet or even what contentcan pass over the Internet in a cyber securityemergency.” 143 The bill’s sponsors dispute thisinterpretation and note that the president’s powerscould be exercised only in extreme emergenciesand pursuant to limitations.The U.S. government must establish precise,widely understood scenarios under which itcould declare an emergency and the powers itcould then exercise. Failing to clearly define whatconstitutes a national “cyber emergency” thatwould give national leaders emergency powers torestrict Internet activity could set a precedent bywhich authoritarian regimes justify shutting offthe Internet during their own “cyber emergency”– such as widespread anti-government protests.Again, there is a distinct difference between apresidential order to restrict some forms of Internettraffic in the face of a cyber attack on America’scritical infrastructure and President Mubarak’sdecision to shut down his nation’s Internet duringthe democratic revolt in Egypt. In drafting legislationintended to protect the nation’s cyber systemsand infrastructure, the U.S. government musttread carefully and quash perceptions that it isacceptable to use a “national cyber emergency” totrample on freedom of expression.| 35

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age36 |VI. Recommendations – EightPrinciples for Internet FreedomThe principles and policy recommendations belowreflect an integrated Internet freedom strategythat balances competing foreign policy, economicand national security priorities, and leverages thetremendous potential of the private sector.Principle 1: Embrace a ComprehensiveApproachCurrent efforts to promote Internet freedom arefragmented across the U.S. government, and theissue barely registers among some officials whocould make a significant contribution. As a result,policymakers should incorporate Internet freedominto their decision-making. PromotingInternet freedom should be linked to other goals,including America’s cyber security agenda and itseconomic diplomacy efforts. The White House’sinternational cyberspace strategy is a step in theright direction, but a comprehensive agenda shouldcombine top-level policy direction with providingtechnology and training for bloggers and activists,exercising diplomatic support for imprisoneddissidents and online authors, training for foreignservice officers and others in new media, integratingInternet freedom issues into country andregional strategies, articulating economic argumentsfor Internet freedom, treating censorshipas a trade barrier, working with the private sector,reforming export controls and actively shapinginternational norms.To harness external expertise across fields, the U.S.government should regularly convene private sectorprofessionals; diplomats; Internet engineersand technical experts; cyber defense officials;export control lawyers; human rights activists;and foreign policy experts to explore new waysof promoting Internet freedom. The aim shouldbe to share knowledge among these professionallydistinct groups and discern potential areas ofcooperation or policy change. This type of forumcould be modeled after the Obama administration’sMarch 2011 summit on bullying, in whichthe administration convened civil society activists,educators, policymakers and technology firms todevelop strategies to prevent bullying (includingcyber bullying). 144The U.S. government should use traditional diplomacyto promote America’s Internet freedomagenda, including lobbying foreign governments toliberalize restrictions on freedom of speech, advocatingfor American companies (when they seeksuch diplomatic assistance) under pressure fromforeign regimes to turn over private data, pressinggovernments to release political prisoners andurging foreign partners to join the United Statesin pursuing the agenda. As the U.S. governmentdoes so, it must continually consider the tradeoffsbetween promoting Internet freedom and the otheritems on its foreign policy and economic agenda.Principle 2: Build an International Coalitionto Promote Internet FreedomThe U.S. government should internationalizeits Internet freedom efforts. The push for onlinefreedom, which is rooted in universal values, istoo heavily identified with the United States alone.Promoting Internet freedom must not be merelyan element of American foreign policy, but rathershould be an international effort supported by awide range of actors• The U.S. government should convene a coregroup of democratic governments – open to anythat wish to join – that would together advocatefor Internet freedom. This should include seekingcommon statements and policy advocacyin international fora where rules and norms aremost likely to be set. It should also convene otherstakeholders, including international organizations,NGOs and the private sector, for the samepurpose.• The Secretary of State should give her nextmajor address on Internet freedom in a foreign

country, possibly in Europe alongside key EUcommissioners.• The U.S. government should help internationalizethe GNI by urging European and otherdemocratic governments to encourage foreigncompanies to join.The U.S. government should work to expand thesources of technology funding over the mediumto long term. The U.S. government should encourageother actors to fund Internet freedom-relatedtechnologies, so that it does not remain the majorfunder of such technologies indefinitely.• Officials should work with like-minded governmentsand NGOs to explain America’s Internetfreedom-related technology programs, sharelessons learned thus far, and encourage themto develop their own programs. They shouldalso urge the private sector to monetize circumventionand anonymity technologies (e.g. bycircumventing restrictions so users can accesswebsites with ads).Principle 3: Move Beyond CircumventionTechnologiesThe U.S. government should fund a range oftechnologies beyond those that circumventonline censorship. While breaking down China’sGreat Firewall has attracted the vast majorityof public attention and support on Capitol Hill,circumvention tools should comprise just one(albeit critical) element of a much larger agenda.The State Department has requested proposalsfor multiple programs that together comprise aquite well-rounded approach to technology, all ofwhich should receive funding. State also plans toestablish an emergency fund to help civil societyorganizations keep their online operations up andrunning if they are targeted by severe hacking orcyber attacks. 145• In addition to funding existing tools, the U.S.government should fund technologies that:»» Help dissident and human rights websites protectthemselves against DDoS attacks.»» Help groups create mirror sites and reconstitutetheir websites and archives after atakedown.»» Facilitate encrypted communications andother forms of digital security.»» Ensure mobile access. Mobile platforms areincreasingly the locus of online activity, andthe State Department should ensure that a disproportionateamount of funding focuses onsecuring open access to the Internet throughmobile devices.• In order to maximize users’ safety, the U.S. governmentshould require any online tool receivingU.S. funding to go through an independentsecurity audit before it is deployed.The U.S. government should adopt a financialaward, akin to the “X Prize” that invitestechnological competition, and other creativemethods to foster technological innovation. Thegovernment should offer a financial award toprivate sector organizations that can develop thelowest-cost, most user-friendly and most resilientcircumvention or anonymity technology (e.g., anInternet Freedom Innovation Award for developingbest-in-class technologies).Principle 4: Prioritize TrainingThe State Department, along with USAID, shouldcontinue to foster Internet freedom through targetedtraining programs. Current or forthcomingtraining programs include basic training in digitaltools for activists and civil society organizations,instruction on using virtual open Internet centersand training in digital security. 146• The U.S. government should help activistsunderstand the risks associated with using newcommunications technologies and develop plansto secure their networks; establish contingencyplans for emergencies; and establish processes for| 37

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age38 |putting websites and digital archives back onlineafter an attack. It should also train dissidents inpersonal security against both cyber and noncybermonitoring, such as surveillance camerasin Internet cafes.Principle 5: Lead the Effort to BuildInternational NormsThe U.S. government should press in all relevantfora for a liberal concept of Internet freedom,and counter attempts by authoritarian states toadopt norms that restrict freedom of informationand expression online. American officialshave wisely tied basic Internet freedom principlesto existing international agreements, but theyshould also seek to articulate these principles innew normative arrangements during meetings ofthe U.N., the ITU, the G8 and G20 meetings, andother international fora.• U.S. officials should publicly and clearly distinguishbetween practices in democracies, whichgive law enforcement access to otherwise privatedata pursuant to due process, and those in countrieswhose governments seize such informationwithout due process.• The U.S. government should clearly definewhat constitutes a national security threat incyberspace. It should emphasize that it willonly restrict Internet traffic during a national“cyber emergency” in accordance with clear andtransparent principles (e.g., not to target politicalspeech).• The United States should work with otherinnovative, economically powerful marketdemocracies to build common principles fordomestic Internet use including general principlesfor the kinds of data governments will blockand censor and how they will communicatethose decisions.• The United States should pursue an internationaltransparency initiative to encourage governmentsto publicly state the categories of onlineinformation to which they restrict access, the legalgrounds for these restrictions and how those lawscan be changed (if this is not self-evident).Principle 6: Create Economic Incentivesto Support Internet FreedomU.S. officials should continue to articulatethe economic case for Internet freedom. TheState Department’s description of a “dictator’sdilemma” should be supported by solid, quantitativeevidence of the economic benefits ofonline freedom and costs of Internet repression.U.S. officials should make the corporate case aswell, as the Secretary of State has done in thepast. Internet freedom can reduce corruption byincreasing transparency, reducing the risk thatThe State Department’sdescription of a “dictator’sdilemma” should be supportedby solid, quantitative evidenceof the economic benefits ofonline freedom and costs ofInternet repression.companies will face politically motivated requeststhat generate adverse international publicity andlimiting the chances that a firm’s websites will beshuttered or its staff threatened.The U.S. government should push for Internetcensorship to be recognized as a trade barrier.• The United States should press for a bindingclause in any Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement– currently under consideration – thatincorporates basic principles about the free flow

of digital information, and seek to include suchprovisions in other trade agreements.• The United States should examine the legal casefor treating extreme cases of Internet repression(e.g. Egypt’s shutdown in early 2011) as a violationof World Trade Organization rules, andinclude information in U.S. Trade Representative(USTR) and Commerce Department reportsabout the economic harm produced by censorshipand other forms of Internet repression.Principle 7: Strengthen the Private Sector’sRole in Supporting Internet FreedomU.S. government officials should continue tourge companies to join the GNI, while alsoencouraging companies to develop broad unilateralcodes of conduct consistent with the GNI’sunderlying principles.Congress should adopt a nuanced legal frameworkfor the proper role of American corporations that:• Prohibits activities such as giving autocraticgovernments the private data of dissidents, whenthe request is clearly intended to quash legitimatefreedom of expression.• Requires American companies to periodicallydisclose to the U.S. government:»» Foreign governments’ requests for informationand services that do not conform to internationally-recognizedstandards (including informationabout users, IP blocking, keyword censorship andonline surveillance), and whether the companiescomplied with these requests.»» Sales of technology and services to governmentagencies or state-controlled companies that arereasonably expected to aid significant Internetrepression.Congress should continue highlighting specificbusiness practices that both promote and restrictInternet freedom through hearings, resolutions,the bully pulpit and other means. In addition toRecommendations for TechnologyCompaniesTechnology firms should take several measures topromote online freedom, many of which can directlyor indirectly benefit their bottom lines. They should:• Provide basic technical assistance with built-insecurity functions, such as secure passwordprotection and assess ways in which foreigngovernments can use their tools or services forInternet repression and explore ways to mitigatethose uses.• Better inform users and the public about who mayaccess data they control and under what conditions,so that users can make informed decisionsabout whether using particular services in specificcontexts will put them in danger. 147• Move toward greater transparency when censoringcontent or sharing private information withgovernments. Google’s transparency reportpublicizes the number of government inquiriesit receives for information about users andrequests for the company to take down or censorcontent. This provides one useful model forincreasing transparency, and technology companiesshould seek to establish industry-widestandards on public disclosure.• Fund technology personnel at human rights anddemocracy organizations so that these groups candevelop a deeper understanding of the complexissues surrounding new communications technologyand political change abroad, and so thatcompanies can increase their understanding ofhuman rights advocacy and the ways in whichtechnology products and features are viewed.• Advocate for Internet freedom abroad.American companies have an incentive to avoidbeing caught between the requirements oflocal law in an autocratic environment and thebad publicity that might result from complyingwith them. They can work to preempt suchdilemmas by pressing foreign governments formore liberal Internet environments – or at thevery least resist efforts to aid repression.| 39

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Agenaming and shaming, Congress and the executivebranch should publicly praise companies that areattempting to uphold universal values while doingbusiness in autocratic environments.Principle 8: Reform Export ControlsThe U.S. government should launch a full reviewof its export controls on new communicationstechnology, which should aim to:• Permit the export of otherwise widely availableopen source code that would be available to foreignusers at no cost.• Ensure that circumvention and other technologiesthat are identical or very similar to those supportedby the U.S. government (and thus exempted fromexport controls) are also exempted.• Determine ways (which in some cases willrequire new legislation) to relax restrictions onexporting relevant technologies to countries likeSyria, which was not included in Treasury’s 2010export control revisions. 148• Ensure that any export control reforms accountsfor the need to maintain safeguards on Americantechnology for national security reasons.The U.S. government should educate technologycompanies on the exact requirements ofexport controls – including any changes – so thatcompanies do not over-comply and deny legaltechnologies to activists abroad.VII. ConclusionThe U.S. government must develop a truly comprehensiveInternet freedom strategy. Over the pastseveral years, it has taken important, positive stepsin a number of areas, from providing technologiesto shaping norms to engaging the private sector. Itmust now build on these efforts to integrate otherelements, including trade policy, export controlreform and others. Underlying all these efforts isa bet – essentially the same bet that the UnitedStates placed during the Cold War – that supportingaccess to information and encouraging the freeexchange of ideas is good for America. As we havediscussed in this report, we believe this bet is wellworth making.A free Internet, however, is not a silver bullet forsocial change. Supporting Internet freedom is complicatedand poses tradeoffs with other items onthe American diplomatic, security and economicagenda. It should be seen as just one, potentiallyquite important, element in a broader approach topromoting democratic ideals in repressive societies.The net effect of this effort is uncertain, and itwill likely remain so for years.But we should not underestimate the potentialpower of the Internet. We live in a time whenan application like Facebook, designed in 2004for American university students to share informationhas, in 2011, helped topple a dictator inEgypt; a time when the best satellite televisioncoverage of demonstrations and conflict can comefrom online video postings; and a time when dissidentsrisk imprisonment or worse for bloggingtheir beliefs.40 |The U.S. government faces a constant challenge inkeeping up with new technology and the changingways that users employ it. Corporations arecontinually vexed by the many varying demandsput upon them by governments around the world.Individuals in autocratic societies face dilemmas

We live in a time when anapplication like Facebook,designed in 2004 forAmerican university studentsto share information has, in2011, helped topple a dictatorin Egypt.in determining how to proceed online. Thoughthe debate is complicated, the longstandingAmerican commitment to basic human rights andfreedoms should remain clear. And on that basis,the United States has a responsibility to promoteInternet freedom, which is key to ensuring agreater degree of human liberty in an ever-morecontestedspace.| 41

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Ageendnotes42 |1. “Over 5 Billion Mobile Phone Connections Worldwide,” BBC News (9 July2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10569081.2. The authors thank Rebecca MacKinnon for the insight that the cyberdomain constitutes an extension of civil society.3. President Barack Obama stated that, “There are certain core valuesthat we believe in as Americans that we believe are universal: freedom ofspeech, freedom of expression, people being able to use social networkingor any other mechanisms to communicate with each other and express theirconcerns.” David Jackson, “Obama: ‘Violence is Not the Answer’ in Egypt,” USAToday (28 January 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/01/obama-violence-is-not-the-answer-in-egypt/1?csp=34.4. For the purposes of this study, we use the term “Internet” and “newcommunications technologies” interchangeably, defining them to includea broad collection of new digital communication technologies that areconnected in some form to the Internet, including SMS text, Skype and othervoice-over-the-Internet protocols (VOIP), as well as web-based platforms(e.g., Facebook and Twitter).5. The authors paid particular attention to examining the potential tensionsbetween Internet freedom and cyber security; these tensions are exploredin greater depth in “America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in theInformation Age,” Center for a New American Security (June 2011).6. Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion (New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2011):230.7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19. The InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights also articulates basic freedoms ofexpression applicable to Internet-based activity, as described below.8. “Statement by the Press Secretary on Violence in Syria” (24 March 2011),http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/24/statement-presssecretary-violence-syria.9. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Section 3(May 2010): 39, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.10. U.S. Department of State, State Summary of Global Internet Freedom TaskForce: Group Seeks to Maximize Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Informationand Ideas (20 December 2006), http://www.america.gov/st/democracyhrenglish/2006/December/20061220173640xjsnommis0.7082331.html.11. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Section7.C.1 (March 2006),http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionVII.html.12. “Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly” (23September 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarksby-the-President-to-the-United-Nations-General-Assembly/.13. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices &Challenges in a Networked World,” The George Washington University,Washington (15 February 2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm.14. “Yahoo Chief Apologizes to Chinese Dissidents’ Relatives,” The New YorkTimes (7 November 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-yahoo.1.8226586.html.15. The bill has subsequently been introduced in different versions, but hasnot been passed as of this writing. Global Internet Freedom Act, Govtrack.us (10May 2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-2216.16. Glenn Kessler, “Cisco File Raises Censorship Concerns,” The WashingtonPost (20 May 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/19/AR2008051902661.html.17. In full disclosure, one of the authors of this report helped draft this actwhile serving in government.18. U.S. Department of State, State Summary of Global Internet FreedomTask Force (20 December 2006), http://www.america.gov/st/democracyhrenglish/2006/December/20061220173640xjsnommis0.7082331.html.19. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” theNewseum, Washington (21 January 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.20. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices &Challenges in a Networked World,” The George Washington University,Washington (15 February 2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm.21. Ibid.22 . Ibid.23. Sami ben Gharbia, “The Internet Freedom Fallacy and the Arab DigitalActivism,” Samibengharbia.com (17 September 2010), http://samibengharbia.com/2010/09/17/the-internet-freedom-fallacy-and-the-arab-digitalactivism/.24. Lachlan Carmichael, “U.S. Trains Activists to Evade Security Forces,” AgenceFrance Press (8 April 2011), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h-zfvaYJftSfafM8whfpxycifTaQ?docId=CNG.2bbf1732398d8832e67b0555c508f609.a01.25. We draw from the work of Larry Diamond, a leading democracy scholar. Inhis book, The Spirit of Democracy, he describes at length the “thick conception”of democracy and lists several attributes that distinguish democracies fromother political systems. Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy (New York:Times Books, 2008): 22.26. Bernard Kouchner, “The Battle for the Internet,” The New York Times (13May 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/opinion/14iht-edkouchner.html?_r=1.

27. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Tear Down This Cyberwall!” The New York Times(17 June 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/18/opinion/18kristof.html?_r=1.28. Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs PaulaDobriansky, “New Media vs. New Censorship: The Assault,” remarks toBroadcasting Board of Governors, Washington (10 September 2008).29. Mark Pfeifle, “A Nobel Peace Prize for Twitter?” The Christian ScienceMonitor (6 July 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0706/p09s02-coop.html.30. Alexei Oreskovic, “Egyptian Activist Creates Image Issue for Google,”Reuters (12 February 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/12/us-egypt-google-idUSTRE71B0KQ20110212.31. Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion (New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2011):xiii.32 . Malcom Gladwell, “Why the Revolution Won’t be Tweeted,”The New Yorker (4 October 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell?currentPage=1.33. Jeffrey Gedmin, “Democracy isn’t just a tweet away,” USA Today (22 April2010).34. Golnaz Esfandiari, “Misreading Tehran: The Twitter Devolution,” ForeignPolicy (7 June 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/07/the_twitter_revolution_that_wasnt.35 . Ian Bremmer, “Democracy in Cyberspace,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2010), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66803/ianbremmer/democracy-in-cyberspace.36. Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, John Kelly and EthanZuckerman, “Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics,” UnitedStates Institute of Peace (August 2010): 9. Much of the discussion of theories ofchange in this section draws upon this important work.37. Ibid.: 9.38. Evgeny Morozov, “From Slacktivism to Activism,” Foreign Policy NetEffect blog (5 September 2009), http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/05/from_slacktivism_to_activism.39. Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” Journal of Democracy (July 2010):70.40. Ibid.41. Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, John Kelly and EthanZuckerman, “Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics,” UnitedStates Institute of Peace (August 2010): 10.42. Steve Coll, “The Internet: For Better or for Worse,” The New York Review ofBooks (7 April 2011).43. Lauren Kirchner, “‘Information Wars’ on Al Jazeera English,” ColumbiaJournalism Review (14 February 2011).44. Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, John Kelly and EthanZuckerman, “Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics,” UnitedStates Institute of Peace (August 2010): 10-11. The authors point out thatsocial media in particular may reduce the transaction costs for organizingcollective action, for example by making communication easier across physicaland social distance, or by undermining top-down movements in favor offlatter social movements.45 . Ibid.: 18.46. This website has evidently garnered little interest. Evgeny Morozov,“Think Again: The Internet,” Foreign Policy (May/June 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/think_again_the_internet.47. “‘Haystack’ Gives Iranian Opposition Hope for Evading InternetCensorship,” The Christian Science Monitor (16 April 2010).48. Jennifer Preston, “Syria Restores Access to Facebook and YouTube,” TheNew York Times (9 February 2011).49. Spencer Ackerman, “Trolls Pounce on Facebook’s Tahrir Square,” Wired (4February 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/02/trolls-pounceon-facebooks-tahrir-square/.50. Tarek Amr, “The Middle East, the Revolution and the Internet,” Remarksat AccessNow web symposium (3 February 2011), https://www.accessnow.org/policy-activism/press-blog/The-Middle-East-The-Revolution-And-The-Internet.51. Daniel Calingaert, “Authoritarianism vs. the Internet,” Policy Review (1April 2010): 6.52 . Brianna Lee, “Chinese Government Issues Preemptive Crackdown of‘Jasmine Revolution’ Protests,” PBS.org (3 March 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the-daily-need/chinese-government-issuespreemptive-crackdown-of-jasmine-revolution-protests/7697/.53. Quincy Yu, “Aborted Chinese ‘Jasmine Revolution’ a Trap Say Analysts,” TheEpoch Times (22 February 2011), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china/aborted-chinese-jasmine-revolution-a-trap-say-analysts-51732.html.54. 2010 Reporters Without Borders report cited in “New Media: A Force forGood or Evil?” The Layalina Review (12-25 March 2010), http://www.layalina.tv/publications/review/PR_VI.6/article2.html.55 . Rebecca MacKinnon, “China, the Internet, and Google,” testimony beforethe Congressional-Executive Commission on China (1 March 2010): 7.56. Scott Peterson, “On Libya-Tunisia Border, Refugees Plead for Help to GoHome,” The Christian Science Monitor (3 March 2011).57. Ibid.: 12.58. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development publisheda 2007 study on the economic impact of broadband Internet access based on| 43

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Agethe work done by its Working Party on the Information Economy. The studynotes that Internet communication technologies (ICTs) enable measurableeconomic growth: “Broadband is also increasingly important as an enablingtechnology for structural changes in the economy, most notably via its impacton productivity growth, but also by raising product market competitionin many sectors, especially in services. ICTs and broadband are facilitatingthe globalisation of many services, with broadband making it feasiblefor producers and consumers of services to be in different geographicallocations.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,“Broadband and the Economy” (5 May 2007): 5, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/7/40781696.pdf.59. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices &Challenges in a Networked World” (15 February 2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm.60. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , “TheEconomic Impact of Shutting Down Internet and Mobile Phone Services inEgypt” (4 February 2011), http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_2649_34223_47056659_1_1_1_1,00.html.61 . Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, “The Digital Disruption: Connectivity andthe Diffusion of Power,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2010).62. Doyle McManus, “Did Tweeting Topple Tunisia?” Los Angeles Times (23January 2011).63. As is true when evaluating the effect of new technologies along otherdimensions of political change, here too it is important to temper exuberancewith caution. Historian Simon Sebag Montefiore, for instance, notes that whileFacebook “certainly accelerates the mobilization of crowds … technology’seffect is exaggerated: in 1848, the revolution that most resemblestoday’s, uprisings spread from Sicily to Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Budapest inmere weeks without telephones, let alone Twitter. They spread through theexuberance of momentum and the rigid isolation of repressive rulers.” SimonSebag Montefiore, “Every Revolution is Revolutionary in Its Own Way,” TheNew York Times (27 March 2011).64 . Stephen Williams, the BBC’s executive editor for the Asia Pacific Region,emphasized the reciprocal information flows between online media andtelevision during the 2009 Iranian protests. At the height of the protests,he notes, the BBC’s Persian television offices in London received betweensix and eight Internet photos, emails and text messages every minute. “Theinfluence of Internet social media was huge in disseminating pictures andmessages round the world,” Williams says, and it “has undoubtedly helped theopposition contact other like-minded voices inside Iran. But the most impactmaking pictures and reports could only be seen by a wider public in Iranthrough Persian-speaking TV, because Internet activity is limited.” StephenWilliams, “The Power of TV News: An Insider’s Perspective on the Launch ofBBC Persian TV in the Year of the Iranian Uprising,” Joan Shorenstein Centeron the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University, Discussion PaperSeries #D-54 (February 2010).65. See Lauren Kirchner, “‘Information Wars’ on Al Jazeera English,” ColumbiaJournalism Review (14 February 2011).66. Jillian York, “More Than Half a Billion Internet Users are Being FilteredWorldwide,” Open Net Initiative (19 January 2010), http://opennet.net/blog/2010/01/more-half-a-billion-internet-users-are-being-filteredworldwide.67. Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, John Kelly and EthanZuckerman, “Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics,” UnitedStates Institute of Peace (August 2010): 13.68. Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, Jillian York, Robert Faris and John Palfrey,“2010 Circumvention Tool Usage Report,” Berkman Center for Internet andSociety, Harvard University (October 2010): 6, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/2010_Circumvention_Tool_Usage_Report.pdf.69. Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the PublicSphere, and Political Change,” Foreign Affairs (January-February 2011).70. Joshua Goldstein, “The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in theUkrainian Orange Revolution,” Berkman Center for Internet and Society,Harvard University (December 2007).71. Myroslaw J. Kyj, “Internet Use in Ukraine‘s Orange Revolution,” BusinessHorizons, Issue 49 (2006): 71-80, http://web.reed.edu/alumni/images/AC_2010/pdfs/Internet%20Use%20in%20Orange%20Revolution.pdf.72. Marwan M. Kraidy, “Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Changing ArabInformation Order,” International Journal of Communication (2007), http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/18/22.73. Brannon Cullum, “Oscar Morales and One Million Voices Against FARC,”Movements.org (no date), http://www.movements.org/case-study/entry/oscar-morales-and-one-million-voices-against-farc/.74 . Maria Camila Pérez, “Facebook Brings Protest to Columbia,” The New YorkTimes (8 February 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-protest11.html?_r=3.75. “Carnegie Guide to Egypt’s Elections – The April 6 Youth Movement,”Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/22/the-april-6-youth-movement.76. Nathan Hodge, “Moldova Calm after Twitter Storm,” Wired Danger Roomblog (10 April 2009), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/04/moldovacalm-af/.77. “Moldova recount ‘confirms result,’” BBC (17 April 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8004603.stm.78. Evgeny Morozov, “Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Analog Revolution,’” Foreign Policy’sNet Effect blog (8 April 2010), http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/08/kyrgyzstans_analog_revolution.79. Lisa Bryant, “Internet Powers Tunisian Protests,” Voice of America (17January 2011), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Internet-Powers-Tunisian-Protests-113868589.html.44 |

80. Lisa Bryant, “Internet Powers Tunisian Protests,” Voice of America (17January 2011), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Internet-Powers-Tunisian-Protests-113868589.html.81. Jennifer Preston, “Movement Began with Outrage and a Facebook PageThat Gave It an Outlet,” The New York Times (5 February 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/06face.html.82. “Estimated 2 Million People Protest In, Around Tahrir Square In CairoEgypt,” Cnewsworld.com, http://www.cnewsworld.com/world-news/middle-east-world-news/estimated-2-million-people-protest-in-_-aroundtahrir-square-in-cairo-egypt-mp4/.83. James Glanz, “How Mubarak Shut Down Egypt’s Internet,” The Age(Australia) (17 February 2011), http://www.theage.com.au/world/howmubarak-shut-down-egypts-internet-20110216-1awjj.html.84. Grant Gross, “Egyptian Activist: Internet Shutdown Backfired,” PC World(3 February 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/218630/egyptian_activist_internet_shutdown_backfired.html.85. See “Data Retention,” Electronic Privacy Information Center, http://epic.org/privacy/intl/data_retention.html.86. “Tor: Sponsors,” http://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en.87. Experts at the Berman Center for Internet and Society at HarvardUniversity examined virtual private networks (VPNs) in a thorough study oncircumvention technology in 2010. They explain how these networks operate:“VPN technology has traditionally been used to allow corporate and otherinstitutional users to access internal networks from the public network, butin the past few years there has been tremendous growth in the availabilityof personal VPN services. Among other uses, these personal VPN services actas circumvention tools as long as the VPN proxy is hosted outside a filteringcountry. VPN services might or might not require installation of client-sidesoftware (many rely on existing VPN support in Windows or Mac OSX and soneed no extra client software) and allow the user to access the web directlythrough the native browser interface. Because VPN services tunnel all Internettraffic, they can be used for email, chat, and any other Internet service inaddition to web browsing. Almost all of these tools support themselvesthrough fees charged directly to users (charges of $10 to $30 per month arecommon), though a few also offer free services with restricted bandwidth.”Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, Jillian York, Robert Faris and John Palfrey,“2010 Circumvention Tool Usage Report,” Harvard Berkman Center for Internetand Society (October 2010): 4, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/2010_Circumvention_Tool_Usage_Report.pdf.88 . Andrew Quinn, “U.S. Develops ‘Panic Button’ for Democracy Activists,”Reuters (25 March 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/25/us-rights-usa-technology-idUSTRE72O6DH20110325.89. Maggie Shiels, “On Iran’s Virtual Front Line,” BBC News (6 August 2009),http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8186761.stm.90. Aleks Krotoski, “MediaGuardian Innovation Awards: Austin Heap v Iran’scensors,” Guardian.co.uk (20 March 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/mar/29/austin-heap-megas-innovator-award.91. William J. Dobson, “Needles in a Haystack,” Newsweek (6 August 2010),http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/06/needles-in-a-haystack.html.92. Evgeny Morozov, “The Great Internet Freedom Fraud,” Slate (16 September2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2267262.93. United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Another U.S. Deficit– China and America – Public Diplomacy in the Age of the Internet (15 February2011): 42, http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/diplomacy/ChinaInternet.pdf.94. Desmond Ang, “Falun Gong helps crack Iran’s web filter,” ABCNews (Australia) (2 July 2009), http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/02/2614914.htm.95 . Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, Jillian York, Robert Faris and John Palfrey,“2010 Circumvention Tool Usage Report,” Berkman Center for Internet andSociety, Harvard University (October 2010): 6, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/2010_Circumvention_Tool_Usage_Report.pdf.96. John Pomfret, “U.S. Risks China’s Ire with Decision to Fund SoftwareMaker Tied to Falun Gong,” The Washington Post (12 May 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/11/AR2010051105154.html.97. Author conversation with U.S. government official (14 April 2011).98. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices &Challenges in a Networked World,” The George Washington University,Washington (15 February 2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm.99. United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Another U.S. Deficit– China and America – Public Diplomacy in the Age of the Internet (15 February2011): 4, http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/diplomacy/ChinaInternet.pdf.100. Kathleen Hickey, “DARPA Looks for Stealthier Internet Access,” DefenseSystems (24 May 2010), http://defensesystems.com/articles/2010/05/21/darpa-safer-solicitation.aspx?admgarea=DS.101. The State Department has expressed interest in funding some of thesetechnologies. See U.S. Department of State, Joint Request for Statements ofInterest: Internet Freedom Programs (3 January 2011).102. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices &Challenges in a Networked World,” The George Washington University,Washington (15 February 2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm.103. This Tunis Commitment reaffirmed the 2003 Geneva Declaration ofPrinciples, which held, “Communication is a fundamental social process, abasic human need and the foundation of all social organization. It is central tothe Information Society. Everyone, everywhere should have the opportunity toparticipate and no one should be excluded from the benefits the InformationSociety offers.” “Tunis Commitment,” World Summit on the InformationSociety (18 November 2005), http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.html.| 45

J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age46 |104. David A. Gross, “Securing the Future of a Safe and Free Internet,”Remarks at the High Level Segment of the 2008 InternationalTelecommunication Union Council (12 November 2008).105. Sangamitra Ramachander, “Europe,” Open Net Initiative, http://opennet.net/research/regions/europe.106. CNAS’ companion study on cyber security employs the term “cybersecurity” to mean “A blanket term that encompasses both 1) informationassurance (measures that protect and defend information and informationsystems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentialityand non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of informationsystems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities)and 2) and information security (protecting information and informationsystems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification,or destruction).” “America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in theInformation Age,” Center for a New American Security (June 2011).107. “The Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Embassyof the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Cambodia (2 September 2000),http://www.embrusscambodia.mid.ru/doc-information-e.html.108. Will Englund, “In Russia, Official Proposes Curtailing Internet Freedom,”The Washington Post (8 April 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-russia-official-proposes-curtailing-internet-freedom/2011/04/08/AFzUud2C_story.html.109. After the United Arab Emirates BlackBerry ban, U.S. State Departmentspokesman P.J. Crowley said, “We think it sets a dangerous precedent…You should be opening up societies to these new technologies that havethe opportunity to empower people, rather than looking to see how youcan restrict certain technologies.” “U.S. Says UAE BlackBerry Ban SetsDangerous Precedent,” Reuters (2 August 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/02/us-uae-blackberry-usa-idUSTRE67144P20100802.110. Tom Gjelten, “Seeing the Internet as an ‘Information Weapon,’” NationalPublic Radio (23 September 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701.111. Ibid.112. Details related to “Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime,Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic NatureCommitted Through Computer Systems” come from extraordinary researchassistance by the Harvard Law National Security Research Group, under thedirection of Ivana Deyrup. For U.S. concerns about the Additional Protocol,see U.S. Department of Justice, Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime:Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/COEFAQs.htm.113. More precisely, the intermediary is generally not liable unless itknowingly hosts illegal material (e.g., content posted in violation of copyrightprotections) and refuses to remove it when notified.114. “Intermediary Liability: Protecting Internet Platforms for Expressionand Innovation,” Center for Democracy and Technology (April 2010): 8, http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-Intermediary%20Liability_%282010%29.pdf.115. Sarah Lai Stirland, “Cisco Leak: ‘Great Firewall’ of China was a Chanceto Sell More Routers,” Wired (20 May 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/05/leaked-cisco-do/.116. Paul Sonne and Steve Stecklow, “U.S. Products Help Block Mideast Web,”The Wall Street Journal (28 March 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704438104576219190417124226.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.117. Golnaz Esfandiari, “Nokia Faces Wrath of Iran’s Protestors,” Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty (15 July 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/Nokia_Faces_Wrath_Of_Irans_Protesters/1777717.html.118. “Internet Enemies 2011: Burma,” Refworld (11 March 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,MMR,,4d82269028,0.html; and“France, Netherlands Seek to Halt Internet Censorship,” Agence FrancePresse (8 July 2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hobAcoL50p4irWBiWSSkmM5BQ7Gg.119. “Censorship in China,” Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/business-and-human-rights/technology/page.do?id=1101572.120. “Principles - Freedom of Expression,” Global Network Initiative (no date)http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php#18.121. According to the Global Network Initiative’s (GNI) Governance Charter,membership in the GNI can be terminated for “Failure to meet reportingor other participation requirements [and] Failure to meet compliance andevaluation requirements.” “Governance Charter,” Global Network Initiative,Section 4D, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/charter/index.php#83.122. Office of Senator Richard Durbin, “Durbin, Coburn Continue to Press TechCompanies on Human Rights Code of Conduct” (7 August 2009), http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseId=316922.123. Chloe Albanesius, “Egypt Turns to Sole Provider, Dial-Up for InternetAccess,” PC Magazine (31 January 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2378969,00.asp.124. Chris Lefkow, “Google, Facebook, Twitter sound off on Egypt,” AgenceFrance-Presse (2 February 2011).125. Margaret Coker and Charles Levinson, “Rebels Hijack Gadhafi’s PhoneNetwork,” The Wall Street Journal (13 April 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703841904576256512991215284.html.126. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” theNewseum, Washington (21 January 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.127. Ed Black, “Google, the Internet and China: A Nexus Between HumanRights and Trade?” Testimony before the Congressional Executive Committeeon China (24 March 2010).128. Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Article 15.8 “Cross Border InformationFlows” (1 June 2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file816_12714.pdf.

129. Mark Lander, “U.S. Hopes Exports Will Help Open Societies,” The New YorkTimes (7 March 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world/08export.html.130. “BIS Updates Encryption Export Rule; Revised Rule Streamlines ReviewProcess, Enhances National Security,” Department of Commerce Bureau ofIndustry and Security (25 June 2010), http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2010/bis_press06252010.htm.131. As an example of one way in which U.S. export controls can chill onlinefreedom, Evgeny Morozov cites the case of Yaraslau Kryvoi, a WashingtonbasedBelarusian whose web-hosting firm suspended its blog becauseBelarus was subject to U.S. trade sanctions. Evgeny Morozov, “Do-It-Yourself Censorship,” Newsweek (7 March 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/2009/03/06/do-it-yourself-censorship.html.132. John Markoff, “At Internet Conference, Signs of Agreement AppearBetween U.S. and Russia,” The New York Times (15 April 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/science/16cyber.html.133. Ryan Singel, “Cyberwar Hype Intended to Destroy the Open Internet,” Wired(1 March 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/cyber-war-hype/.134. David Talbot, “Dissent Made Safer,” Technology Review (May/June 2009),http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=22427.Also see question by Harvard Law School’s John Palfrey to Ron Deibert,Director of the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab: “What’s going to happenwhen someone does something terrible using Psiphon, plans a terroristattack, for instance? What’s Psiphon’s liability?” Ethan Zuckerman, “RonDeibert on the History and Future of Psiphon,” My Heart’s in Accra (31 January2007), http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2007/01/31/ron-deibert-onthe-history-and-future-of-psiphon/.135. For example, Robert Vamosi writes that “TOR is endorsed by theElectronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and is designed for individuals tocircumvent Web censorship in countries such as China, however, the networkcould be used by criminals or even terrorists.” Robert Vamois, “HackingAnonymity,” CNET Reviews (20 October 2006), http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-3513_7-6654986-1.html?tag=untagged.136. The FBI and other U.S. government agencies have been relativelyvocal about their concerns regarding anonymity provided by encryptiontechnologies for over a decade. In 1998, The Washington Post reported that“FBI Director Louis Freeh is the most outspoken advocate of encryptionrestrictions … now, Freeh complains, new technology is helping criminalsmore than the police. One Freeh proposal is that all users of powerfulencryption software be asked to turn over their keys to a third party, sothat law-enforcement officials can gain access to them with a court order.”More recently, Dr. Marco Gercke, director of the Cybercrime ResearchInstitute, wrote “Encryption is a classic example of a neutral technology,since as it is not only used to hinder investigations but also to preventunauthorized access to information … The latest operating systems offerthe possibility to encrypt computer data with the click of a mouse, makingit difficult for law enforcement agencies to break the encryption andaccess the data.”Dan Froomkin, “Deciphering Encryption,” The WashingtonPost (8 May 1998) and Dr. Marco Gercke, “From Encryption to Failure ofTraditional Investigation Instruments,” Freedom From Fear Magazine,http://www.freedomfromfearmagazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=311:from-encryption-to-failure-of-traditionalinvestigation-instruments&catid=50:issue-7&Itemid=187.137. “Clipper Trip,” Crypto Museum, http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/clipper.htm.138. Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion (New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2011):176.139. Jaikumar Vijayan, “U.S. Web Site Said to Offer StrengthenedEncryption Tool for Al Qaeda Backers,” Computerworld(23 January 2008), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9058619/U.S._Web_site_said_to_offer_strengthened_encryption_tool_for_al_Qaeda_backers?taxonomyId=16&intsrc=hm_topic.140. Ellen Nakashima, “Pentagon Considers Preemptive Strikes as Part ofCyber-Defense Strategy,” The Washington Post (28 August 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/28/AR2010082803849.html.141. “We have to have offensive capabilities, to, in real time, shut downsomebody trying to attack us,” said GEN Keith Alexander. “You needautonomous decision logic that’s based on the rule of law, the legalframework, to let network defenders know what they are allowed to do inthe network’s defense.” C. Todd Lopez, “LandWarNet opens with 4 keys toInternet security,” Army News Service (3 August 2010), http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/08/04/43256-landwarnet-opens-with-4-keys-to-internetsecurity/.142. See the Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, introducedby Senators Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., Susan Collins, R-Maine and Ted Carper,D-Del.; the senators in February 2011 introduced a reworked bill, theCybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act.143. Declan McCullagh, “Internet ‘Kill Switch’ Bill Gets a Makeover,” CNET News(18 February 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20033717-281.html.144. Shawna Shepherd, “White House conference tackles bullying,” CNN (10March 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/03/10/obama.bullying/index.html.145. Department of State, Joint Request for Statements of Interest: InternetFreedom Programs (3 January 2011).146. Ibid.147. As Rebecca MacKinnon has suggested, had Chinese dissident Shi Taounderstood that Yahoo could share his email with Chinese police forces, hemay have found more secure methods of transmitting articles to dissidentwebsites. Rebecca MacKinnon, “China, the Internet, and Google,” Testimonybefore the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (1 March 2010): 7.148. U.S. laws currently restrict exports to Syria. For more on the restrictionsand their effects on Syrian Internet users, see Jillian York, “U.S. Gives Iran MoreNet Freedom – But What About Syria?” Guardian.co.uk (16 June 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jun/16/internetiran-syria-export-controls.| 47

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