Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age

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J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age32 |Reforming Export ControlsThe U.S. government can also reform its exportcontrols on information technologies to furtherits Internet freedom objectives. Discussionsabout the link between the public and privatesectors in promoting Internet freedom havefocused on whether the U.S. government shouldprohibit the supply of technology and equipmentto repressive governments. But the governmentmust also ensure that it does not prohibit theexport of technology that could be used to promoteonline freedom.For years the United States has relied on controlsenforced by the Departments of Commerce andTreasury to regulate overseas sales of merchandiseand materials to states that pose a threat to U.S.national and economic security. These controlsrestrict exports of sensitive computer hardwareand software, such as cryptographic programsand other technologies that scramble messagesand data, in part to prevent unfriendly states fromacquiring cyber capabilities that could be usedagainst the United States or its allies. Until recently,basic Internet services (such as email and instantmessage services) could not be exported to statessuch as Cuba, Iran, Syria and Sudan.In March 2010, the Treasury Department issueda general license for Internet service technologiesthat would allow companies to export photosharing and other social networking and communicationsservices to users in Cuba, Iran andSudan – a move administration officials citedexplicitly as being part of their Internet freedomagenda. 129 In June 2010, the CommerceDepartment eliminated export restrictions onmost mass-market electronic products withencryption functions, including cellphones,laptops and computer drives, which can now beexported without a license. 130Yet export controls remain burdensome forInternet freedom. Administration officials haveprivately stated that complex and overlappingexport control regulations chill commercialactivity, especially with technology developers.U.S. export controls currently restrict, forinstance, the transferring, transmitting anddownloading of open source code that is alreadywidely available for free online. 131 This opensource code includes encryption code for securecommunications and a suite of other tools thatcould potentially give cyber-dissidents and otheronline activists a wider range of options forcommunicating securely and accessing bannedcontent. But a strict interpretation of currentexport controls requires websites that host opensource code, such as Google and Mozilla, toblock access to Internet Protocol (IP) addressesoriginating in sanctioned countries.In March 2010, the TreasuryDepartment issued a generallicense for Internet servicetechnologies that wouldallow companies to exportphoto sharing and othersocial networking andcommunications servicesto users in Cuba, Iran andSudan.Currently, when the State Department funds aparticular technology, the developer receives aspecific license that waives export controls onthat technology – so that it can, for example,provide circumvention technology to Iranians
and Syrians. Yet the license does not apply tothe same technology if it is created and exportedby an organization that does not receive StateDepartment funds. The U.S. government shouldquickly fix this glaring inconsistency.V. Navigating the TensionsBetween Internet Freedomand Cyber SecurityBalancing the principle of freedom of expressionon the Internet, in which users can act anonymously,with the need for a secure environment inwhich malicious users seeking to do harm can beidentified and stopped by responsible governments,is a difficult challenge. Indeed, policymakers todayare engaged in two simultaneous and potentiallycontradictory efforts. Promoting Internet freedomimplies advocating privacy and providing toolsthrough which individuals can act anonymouslyonline. Cyber security, by contrast, implies onlinetransparency and attribution. These two effortscreate tensions that are not well understood andfrequently remain unaddressed. Part of the problemstems from the fact that conversations aboutAmerica’s cyber security and Internet freedompolicies have, by and large, taken place in isolationfrom each other. Cyber security policy has involvedthe national security community, while Internetfreedom policies have involved the technologycommunity and a handful of human rights activists– and now the foreign policy community.These tensions are real and will sometimes forcedifficult choices, but they should not preventthe United States from securing cyberspace andpromoting Internet freedom at the same time. U.S.policies will have to address two key tensions: anonymityversus attribution, and defending againstattacks versus emboldening autocracies.Anonymity versus AttributionCyber security proponents often advocate greatertransparency in online behavior and seek toimprove the ability of security monitors to reliablyidentify malicious users and track their activities.“Anonymity is the fundamental problem we face incyberspace,” Stewart Baker, former chief counselfor the National Security Agency (NSA), said atan April 2010 Internet conference in Germany. 132| 33
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