Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age

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J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age30 |constitute an increasingly important element ofAmerica’s Internet freedom agenda. Yet, some ofthose who have criticized the State Department’soutreach to Twitter also call on the government tourge corporations to join the GNI.Permitting U.S. companies to operate in certainauthoritarian countries rather than cede the marketto the alternatives can serve America’s Internetfreedom agenda in the long term. For example,while Google censored its search results in mainlandChina, Baidu – China’s largest domesticsearch engine – has even more stringent censorshippolicies, and has taken over much of the marketshare Google abandoned. A policy change likeGoogle’s might lead to less information availableonline to the average Chinese citizen, not more.And a transaction between two foreign parties overwhich the United States has no visibility or controlcould quite conceivably faclitate Internet repressionmore than the activities of an American companythat are, at the end of the day, subject to U.S. lawand public opinion pressures.As technology companies increasingly expand intorepressive foreign countries, they will face heightenedpressure from Congress and the public tomake internal decisions with an eye toward theirbroader implications. Facebook, for example, hasrequired users to register their accounts undertheir real names – clearly a deterrent to dissidentswho wish to remain anonymous. This has been aparticular point of contention between Facebookand Internet freedom advocates, because it potentiallyallows for regime allies to have activists usingaliases suspended from the site.In 2008, a coalition of nonprofit organizations,universities and financial institutions, nearlyall American, joined with Google, Yahoo andMicrosoft to form the GNI, which attempts tocodify business codes of conduct. GNI memberscommit to “collaborate in the advancementof user rights to freedom of expression andprivacy.” 120 Participants agree to adhere to a setof shared principles about how companies shouldrespond to government requests for information,including making those requests transparentand protecting users’ rights to privacy. The GNIincludes a reporting and enforcement mechanismto ensure that its members meet its complianceand evaluation requirements. 121While many view the GNI as a great step forwardin the Internet freedom movement, its effects havebeen significantly limited by the lack of corporateparticipants. Not a single technology companyhas joined the three founders, each of which is anAmerican firm. The Secretary of State has publiclycalled on technology companies to join theinitiative, and members of Congress have donethe same; in August 2009, Sen. Richard Durbin,D-Ill., wrote to 26 companies urging them to jointhe GNI.122 All has been for naught. Corporaterepresentatives with whom we spoke observed thattheir companies agreed with the principles putforth by the GNI, but they simply do not see it intheir business interest to join because they do notwish to expend the resources necessary to fulfillthe GNI’s reporting requirements or submit theircorporate practices to external reviews. Othersexpressed concern that joining the GNI couldthreaten their access to particular markets becauseGNI is perceived as an organization for promotingAmerican values.In an encouraging trend, a few companies haveproactively sought to break through Internetrepression. When Egypt shut down the Internetalmost completely, a French company offeredEgyptians anonymous dial-up access via aFrench phone number. 123 At the same time,Google and Twitter jointly created a tool,Speak2Tweet, which allowed Egyptians to calla dedicated number that translated their voicemessages into tweets. Google officials noted thatthe initiative was a direct response to the eventsin the Middle East, saying, “We hope this will
go some way to helping people stay connectedat this very difficult time.” 124 During the revolutionin Libya, the Moammar Gadhafi regime cutInternet access and jammed cellular networksand satellite phone signals. A Libyan-Americantelecommunications executive led a team thatimported millions of dollars in equipment,hijacked the national network and reestablishedcommunications in the country. 125Increasing Economic IncentivesIncreasing the economic incentives to promoteInternet freedom must be central to any U.S.government strategy. There are three majorways to do this: persuasion, publicity and tradeagreements.U.S. officials are trying to persuade states thatInternet repression will chill their economicdevelopment, and to persuade companies thatInternet freedom issues affect their own financialinterests and bottom lines. Clinton has noted thata free Internet, by increasing transparency, canreduce corruption – making a given economy amore predictable and profitable marketplace forbusiness – and that by investing in countries withtough censorship and surveillance policies, companiescan see their websites shut down or their staffthreatened. 126 Indeed, corporations will increasinglyfind themselves navigating the complex webof Internet restrictions abroad, some of which willdirectly affect their balance sheets.Every time an American company complies with apolitically motivated order to block Internet contentor share user information, it risks negative publicityin the United States and elsewhere. As negativepublicity builds, Congress may pass laws that wouldprohibit American companies from aiding certainforms of Internet repression which could requirecompanies to withdraw from foreign markets wherenational laws conflict with U.S. laws. As a result,corporations have an interest in preempting suchsituations by pressing foreign governments for moreliberal Internet environments – or at least fewerconstraints – and U.S. government officials shouldencourage them to do so.The U.S. government can also promote Internetfreedom though trade agreements where Internetrepression serves as a trade barrier. When a countryblocks access to a U.S. website, for example, it alsoblocks the site’s advertising – and thereby interfereswith the trade in products and services advertised. 127Of the millions of dollars lost during the Internetshutoff in Egypt, it is hard to imagine that Americanbusinesses were not also affected.Employing trade agreements is a more promisingstrategy than demanding foreign governments toadhere to universal values, because they containeconomic incentives (thus giving the United Statesnegotiating leverage) and are at least potentiallyenforceable. Should Internet censorship becomeaccepted as a non-tariff trade barrier, a censoringgovernment could be vulnerable to dispute arbitrationat the World Trade Organization or bilateraltrade remedies. And such agreements could bebilateral, multilateral or even global.The United States should more actively try toinsert binding language in agreements that wouldprohibit Internet censorship or other efforts tolimit access to information online. The UnitedStates did include a relevant provision in theKorea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, approved byCongress in December 2010. That agreementstates in part: “Recognizing the importance ofthe free flow of information in facilitating trade,and acknowledging the importance of protectingpersonal information, the Parties shall endeavorto refrain from imposing or maintaining unnecessarybarriers to electronic information flows acrossborders.” 128 Such language is clearly nonbinding –“shall endeavor to refrain” is a loose commitmentat best – but nevertheless suggests how the UnitedStates can promote Internet freedom in futuretrade negotiations.| 31
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Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age

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