Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age

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J U N E 2 0 1 1Internet FreedomA Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age18 |Whether the “dictator’s dilemma” actually existsremains unknown. There are certainly clearindividual instances where Internet repressionhas damaged a nation’s economy; Experts fromthe Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) have estimated that Egypt’sfive-day Internet shutdown cost the country at least90 million dollars, a figure that does not includee-commerce, tourism or other businesses that relyon Internet connectivity. 60 But China seems to providea powerful counterexample since it severelyrepresses the Internet while enjoying extraordinarilyhigh rates of sustained economic growth.Indeed, China appears to have used its restrictiveInternet practices to squeeze out internationalcompetition and generate conditions where onlydomestic companies – ones that adhere to thegovernment’s stringent censorship and monitoringpractices – can thrive. China’s largest domesticsearch engine, Baidu, exercises strict controls oncontent but has thrived since Google pulled outof China in January 2010. China may be an outlier;the massive financial and human resourcesit devotes to online control may not be replicableelsewhere. Other countries may be left with blunterforms of repression that degrade both the Internet’seconomic and political effects.In addition to the political and economic effectsdescribed above, new technologies can accelerateeach of them. Google’s Eric Schmidt and JaredCohen have argued that faster computer powercombined with the “many to many” geometry ofsocial media empowers individuals and groupsat the expense of governments and that this, inturn, increases the rate of change. 61 Dissidents canidentify one another, share information, organizeand connect with leaders and with external actors,all easier and faster than ever before. 62 Indeed, onehallmark of the 2011 Arab Spring was the astonishingrate of change as popular protests threatenedor toppled governments that had been in power fordecades in a matter of weeks. 63Again, the local political context is critical. Themedium may be global, but whether and how itenables individuals to foster democratic changelargely depends on a wide array of local variables,including opposition leadership, the existence ofcivil society institutions, the willingness of theregime to crack down on dissident activity, and soforth. In Tunisia and Egypt for example, tens ofthousands of protestors responded to protest eventpages on Facebook by taking to the streets. Yet inother Arab states, a call on Facebook for a “dayof rage” did not have the same pronounced influence.The degree of openness in the local politicalsystem, the discontent among the population,the willingness of the government to use coercivemeans to stop democratic activism, the role ofminorities and other local factors all matter greatly.Experts from the Organisationfor Economic Co-operationand Development haveestimated that Egypt’s fivedayInternet shutdown costthe country at least 90 milliondollars, a figure that does notinclude e-commerce, tourismor other businesses that rely onInternet connectivity.The Internet does not automatically promotedemocratization; Iran’s Twitter revolution ledto no reforms while Egypt’s Facebook revolutiontoppled the Mubarak regime. Furthermore,the technology itself is agnostic; the same online
tools that empower dissidents can aid dictators intheir oppression. In the short run, at least, a freerInternet does not automatically translate into moreliberal political systems.Yet some case studies do demonstrate the Internet’sprofound potential: that access to an open Internetcan help countries slide away from authoritarianismand toward democracy. Events in Iran, Tunisia,Egypt and elsewhere suggest that the Internet andrelated technologies (such as SMS) have indeedserved as critical tools for organizing protests,spreading information among dissident partiesand transmitting images and information to theoutside world – some of which moved onto satellitetelevision channels, further boosting their influence.64 And while experts continue to argue aboutthe precise effect, they tend to agree that socialmedia tools have made revolutions in the MiddleEast easier and speedier than they would haveotherwise been. 65Perhaps the most compelling link between a freeInternet and democratization is also the simplest:Both dissidents and dictatorships abroad seem tobelieve that the Internet can have a transformativerole, and they act on that basis. Dictatorshipsexpend enormous time and resources to clampdown on online activity, and more than 40 countriesactively censor the Internet or engage inother forms of significant Internet repression. 66Meanwhile, millions of individuals use proxy serversand other circumvention and anonymity toolsto evade censorship and monitoring. During the2009 presidential campaign in Iran, for example,both President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and hisopponent, Mir-Hussein Mousavi, cited the Internetas a tool through which the liberal oppositioncould mobilize support. 67 It is unlikely they wereboth wrong. While the effect of the Internet willdepend on local conditions, there are indeed reasonablegrounds for believing that a free Internetcan help empower individuals to press for moreliberal political systems.IV. How the U.S. GovernmentPromotes Internet FreedomThe U.S. government promotes Internet freedomin five main ways: providing Internet technologies,shaping international norms, encouraging theprivate sector to expand its role, using economicdiplomacy and reforming export controls.Providing Internet TechnologiesAs autocracies attempt to censor, identify,intimidate and monitor online users, the U.S.government provides technologies that allow individualsliving in repressive environments to freelyaccess online information. The U.S. governmentfunds these technologies because, at present, themarketplace is highly unlikely to supply them onits own. The private sector has few financial incentivesto do so – it is difficult to charge anonymoussubscribers or sell ads in closed societies – and veryfew foreign governments, NGOs or foundationshave funded them to date.A variety of circumvention technologies enabledissidents to penetrate firewalls and access blockedwebsites and censored information. Each toolemploys the same basic method: It routes a user’srequest through an unblocked webpage in orderto access banned content. For instance, a user inChina who cannot access The New York Timeswebsite could instead reach a proxy site that couldthen obtain information from the Times website.Freegate and Ultrasurf, for example, were designedto circumvent China’s Great Firewall by takingadvantage of open proxies – proxy servers availableto anyone on the Internet – which serve as aforwarding service to bypass restrictive firewalls.Though Freegate and Ultrasurf, both of which havereceived U.S. government funding, were designedfor use in China, some users are located in othercountries, including Iran. 68Psiphon is another circumvention tool that relieson a worldwide network of servers to enable| 19
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Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age

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