Was <strong>Churchill</strong>a Flasher?Andrew Roberts<strong>Churchill</strong>'s War,by David Irving,Volume 2:Triumph in Adversity,Lon<strong>do</strong>n:Focal PointPublications,1064 pages,£25 ($40),member price$32.Admirers <strong>of</strong> Sir <strong>Winston</strong> <strong>Churchill</strong>can breathe a huge sigh <strong>of</strong> relief.For 14 years since the publication <strong>of</strong>David Irving's first volume on<strong>Churchill</strong> <strong>they</strong> have been waiting to seewhat new conspiracies the right-winghistorian might have managed to digup in the hundreds <strong>of</strong> archives fromwhich he has worked, but in this thickhymn <strong>of</strong> hate it is clear he has notmanaged to land one single significantblow on the reputation <strong>of</strong> Britain'swartime leader.All the old accusations <strong>are</strong> trotte<strong>do</strong>ut: that <strong>Churchill</strong> was a rude, lying alcoholicwho concealed Japan's intentionto attack Pearl Harbour from theAmericans, was behind the murder <strong>of</strong>Britain's ally the Polish leader GeneralSikorski, wanted to flatten Rome, andso on. There <strong>are</strong> even a few new andMr. Roberts is the author <strong>of</strong> Eminent<strong>Churchill</strong>ians (revie<strong>we</strong>d FH85:38 and 95:4),and <strong>Churchill</strong>, Embattled Hero (FH 90:35), andis a member <strong>of</strong> ICS(UK). The above is excerptedfrom a review in The Daily Telegraphand published here by courtesy <strong>of</strong> the author.ifoOKS,& CURIOSITIESequally groundless ones: according tothis volume <strong>Churchill</strong> was also a flasherwho enjoyed exposing himself to foreignstatesmen, was responsible for tipping<strong>of</strong>f the Nazis to the fact thatBritain had broken their codes, andasked MI6 to assassinate Britain's otherally, General de Gaulle. I have counteda <strong>do</strong>zen new accusations in this volume,most <strong>of</strong> which would be laughableif <strong>they</strong> <strong>we</strong>re not so foamingly presented,complete with 160 pages <strong>of</strong>notes that <strong>are</strong> alleged to back them up.Yet when, for example, Irvingclaims that the then Queen Elizabeth(now the Queen Mother) supportedHitler's peace <strong>of</strong>fer in 1940, and thatthe pro<strong>of</strong> is to be found in Box Number23 <strong>of</strong> Lord Monckton's papers atthe Bodleian Library in Oxford, I recalledfrom my own work on Moncktonthat that particular box has neverbeen open to historians. The Bodleianconfirmed to me that Mr. Irving hasnot so much as seen the box, let aloneopened it. Many <strong>of</strong> Irving's assertions<strong>are</strong> contradictory. If <strong>Churchill</strong> "invariablyput the interests <strong>of</strong> the UnitedStates above those <strong>of</strong> his own countryand its empire," why did he not warnthe Americans <strong>of</strong> what was about tohappen in Pearl Harbour? If Mr. Irving'sviews on Auschwitz <strong>are</strong> correct—that Jews <strong>we</strong>re not being systematicallykilled there—why should <strong>Churchill</strong> beheld to account for not ordering theRAF to bomb Auschwitz?Mr. Irving consistently wants itboth ways, but winds up getting neither.Despite the book's (surely ironicallymeant) subtitle, Irving sees no redeemingfeatures in the man who hadthe temerity to defeat A<strong>do</strong>lf Hitler.<strong>Churchill</strong>'s funniest jokes <strong>are</strong> dismissedas "jibes." The imperative need to meetPresident Roosevelt in late 1941 to coordinatea post-Pearl Harbour globalmilitary strategy against Germany andJapan is explained in terms <strong>of</strong> thePrime Ministers "desire to hobnob atthe highest levels." He is accused <strong>of</strong>winning the war "in spite <strong>of</strong> himself."Yet whenever the evidence for Irving'sclaims is minutely examined by someonewho has also visited the samearchives and handled the same original<strong>do</strong>cuments, it fails to justify the claimshe makes.The selective quotation is legion.When Irving claims <strong>Churchill</strong> wishedto "eliminate" de Gaulle, what<strong>Churchill</strong> in fact recommended to hisCabinet colleagues was that <strong>they</strong>should consider whether <strong>they</strong> should"eliminate de Gaulle as a political forceand face Parliament and France uponthe issue." Irving's entire Pearl Harbourtheory rests upon an obvious misreading<strong>of</strong> the diary <strong>of</strong> the permanentunder-secretary at the Foreign Office,Sir Alec Ca<strong>do</strong>gan.When Irving writes that<strong>Churchill</strong> was <strong>of</strong> "partly Jewish blood,although safely diluted," he is simplybeing repulsive. When he claims that<strong>Churchill</strong> "was ambivalent about whyhe was really fighting this ruinous war,"he is ignoring the evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>do</strong>zens <strong>of</strong>the finest speeches ever delivered in theEnglish tongue, which explained toBritain and the world bet<strong>we</strong>en 1939and 1945 in utterly uncompromisinglanguage precisely why Nazism had tobe extirpated for human civilisation tosurvive and prosper. When he writesthat the Duke <strong>of</strong> Windsor was forcedto leave Portugal in August 1940 atBritish "pistol point," Irving is simplywrong. Irving's pr<strong>of</strong>ession <strong>of</strong> "shock"that <strong>Churchill</strong> turned a blind eye to hisdaughter-in-law Pamela Harriman's affairsis based on a failure to appreciatethe mores <strong>of</strong> <strong>Churchill</strong>'s class and time.<strong>Churchill</strong>'s supposed desire "to seeRome in flames" is utterly disproved byhis message to Roosevelt that "<strong>we</strong>ought to instruct our pilots to observeall possible c<strong>are</strong> in order to avoid hittingany <strong>of</strong> the Pope's buildings in thecity <strong>of</strong> Rome."This is the way the history <strong>of</strong> theSecond World War would have beenwritten if the wrong side had won,about the man, ironically, who preservedthe right <strong>of</strong> free<strong>do</strong>m <strong>of</strong> speech.FINEST HOUR 112/46
CHURCHILL CENTER BOOKCLUB MEMBER DISCOUNTS:To order: list books and prices,add for shipping ($6 first book, $ 1each additional in USA; $10 minimumelsewhere, air more). Mail withcheque to <strong>Churchill</strong> Center , POBox 385, ContoocookNH 03229USA. Visa or Mastercard <strong>we</strong>lcome;state name, numbers and expirationdate and sign your order."By Skips Alone VCurt Zoll erLord Kitchener and <strong>Winston</strong> <strong>Churchill</strong>:The Dardanelles Commission, Volume I,1914-15, edited by Tim Coates. Lon<strong>do</strong>n:The Stationery Office "UncoveredEdition" series, 2000, 216 pp., £6.99.The CC Book Club will place one orderfor this work. Will readers desiring acopy please advise the editor but sendno money, <strong>we</strong> will bill you.In 1917 the British government issuedthe Dardanelles Commission First Reportand Supplement and later dieDardanelles Commission Final Report,Parts I and II. The same government hasnow released a two-volume abridged versionin its "Uncovered Editions" series, aterm for "historic <strong>of</strong>ficial papers whichhave not previously been available in apopular form."Volume I reviews the circumstancessurrounding the conception, executionand failure <strong>of</strong> the plan to sailthrough the Dardanelles to the Sea <strong>of</strong>Marmara, arrive <strong>of</strong>f Constantinople andforce Turkey to surrender "by shipsalone." The account is presented in narrativeform, interspersed with quotationsfrom some <strong>of</strong> the witnesses appearing beforethe Commission.The Dardanelles had previouslybeen forced in February 1807, whenGreat Britain sent a fleet under AdmiralDuckworth to open the straits in case <strong>of</strong>necessity to act <strong>of</strong>fensively against theTurks during the Napoleonic wars.Duckworth broke through and enteredMr. Zoller produces Fffs "<strong>Churchill</strong>trivia" columnand is completing a new bibliography <strong>of</strong>works about <strong>Churchill</strong>, to be published byM. E. Sharpe late this year or in early 2002.the Marmara with negligible losses. Aftereleven days the British warships returned<strong>do</strong>wn the straits, enduring heavy casualtiesfrom the now stronger Turkish batteries.Floating mines did not then exist.Additional discussions on this subject<strong>we</strong>re held during the Boer War, byLord Fisher in 1904, and by the Committee<strong>of</strong> Imperial Defence in 1906.During World War I, after Turkey joinedthe side <strong>of</strong> the Central Po<strong>we</strong>rs in November1914, <strong>Churchill</strong> reconsidered thepossibility as a way to defend Egypt bycompelling Turkey to surrender.<strong>What</strong> finally triggered the issuewas a request by the Russian military authorities,in January 1915, for relief <strong>of</strong>the pressure on Russian troops in theCaucasus. Lord Kitchener, the Secretary<strong>of</strong> State for War, prompdy gave an affirmativeans<strong>we</strong>r on his own initiative,promised to make a demonstration, andinformed <strong>Churchill</strong>, then First Lord <strong>of</strong>the Admiralty, that while the Army couldnot sp<strong>are</strong> any men, the Navy shouldmake the effort. On 16 February, Kitcheneragreed to send a large body <strong>of</strong>troops, including the 29th Division, as aback-up if needed to support the navalattack; four days later he delayed theirdeparture, and the troops did not departuntil March 1 Oth.Based on the final report <strong>of</strong> theCommission to the Parliament, there was! considerable lack <strong>of</strong> communications bet<strong>we</strong>enthe decision makers and the militaryexperts. There existed no joint militaryand naval staff to investigate, plan,and support the operation. Kitchener| never discussed the plan with his GeneralStaff, acted as his own Chief <strong>of</strong> ImperialGeneral Staff, and essentially operated asa one-man war department. <strong>Churchill</strong>held extensive discussions with Lordi Fisher, his First Sea Lord, and believed hehad Fishers full support until May 1915,when he became aw<strong>are</strong> <strong>of</strong> Fisher's strongobjections. Sir Arthur Wilson and SirHenry Jackson, naval experts in the Admiralty,disagreed with the plan, but didnot voice their opinion to <strong>Churchill</strong> because"it was not their concern."Finally, the War Council, consisting<strong>of</strong> Prime Minister Asquith, ForeignMinister Sir Edward Grey, Chancellor <strong>of</strong>the Exchequer Lloyd Gorge, Secretary <strong>of</strong>; State for India the Marquess <strong>of</strong> Cre<strong>we</strong>,the Lord Chancellor Lord Haldane,<strong>Churchill</strong> and Kitchener seemed to haveacted on several decisions without inquiringabout critical issues. There <strong>we</strong>re nodiscussions about staff work on suchquestions as the availability <strong>of</strong> troops,and the ability <strong>of</strong> naval vessels satisfactorilyto destroy the Dardanelles forts.The War Council assumed that ifthe Navy was unsuccessful in the attemptto force the Dardanelles, the ships couldwithdraw without military or politicalimpact. Lord Fisher and Admiral <strong>of</strong> theFleet Sir Arthur Wilson, who regularlyattended the War Council, said <strong>they</strong> didn'tvoice their concern about the plan because"<strong>they</strong> <strong>we</strong>re not specifically askedabout their opinions." Sir James WolfeMurray, Chief <strong>of</strong> the Imperial GeneralStaff, who also regularly attended theWar Council, was not kept informed byLord Kitchener. When the War Councildecided, on 13 January 1915, that "theAdmiralty should prep<strong>are</strong> for a naval expeditionin February to bombard andtake the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinopleas the objective," the decisionwas made without adequate examination,planning and understanding <strong>of</strong> themilitary situation.Kitchener delayed the dispatch <strong>of</strong>the troops for three <strong>we</strong>eks without informing<strong>Churchill</strong> or the War Council—an action which continued to show thelack <strong>of</strong> coordination and communicationbet<strong>we</strong>en the participants and decisionmakers and contributed to the ultimatefailure. In fact the War Council did notmeet at all during the <strong>we</strong>ek leading up tothe naval attack on 18 March 1915, analmost incredible lapse <strong>of</strong> leadership.The Commission report criticized<strong>Churchill</strong> as "having advocated the attackby ships alone before the War Council ona certain amount <strong>of</strong> half-hearted and hesitatingexpert opinion, which favoured atentative or progressive scheme, beginningwith an attack on the outer forts"and found that he should have assured"that the views <strong>of</strong> the naval advisers <strong>we</strong>reclearly put before the Council."The Commission had three dissenters.Andrew Fisher, an Australian MP,dissented from the majority report's conclusionthat "naval advisers should haveexpressed their views to the Council,whether asked or not, if <strong>they</strong> consideredthat the project...impractical from thenaval point <strong>of</strong> view." Fisher said naval »FINEST HOUR 112/47