On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities - Belfer Center for ...

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somewhat with globalization, it is far from obsolete as governments continueto apply physical coercion to have some measure of control. 23 Still, there is noanalogue in the physical world for the ease of movement in cyberspace andthe ability to induce effects across national borders. Moreover, when theactors are beyond the reach of government coercion, either because of size oranonymity, cyberspace is witnessed in its most borderless manifestation.Ontology for Cyber Policy MakingThe following definitions begin at the macro level and narrow in focus.This project centers on cyber operations affecting systems not owned or operatedby the actor, and we developed this ontology accordingly. Specifically, weidentify, but do not establish in depth, a conceptual category for normal orroutine cyber activities. We have focused on fleshing out the nuances of externalcyber operations, the characteristics that separate them from other activities incyberspace, and the relevant attributes that should drive policy analysis. In doingso we introduce a number of terms, identify key attributes for analysis, andillustrate conceptual inter-relationships.Cyber activity is all activity conducted through cyberspace. We definecyberspace similarly to JP 1-2 as “a global domain consisting of theinterdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including theInternet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embeddedprocessors and controllers.” 24 What is possible in cyberspace is determined bythe “laws of code,” 25 as described by Lawrence Lessig, and is continuallyevolving and changing.23 (Goldsmith & Wu, 2007)24 (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012)25 (Lessig, 1999)17
Cyber activity can have both logical and physical effects. 26 Logical effectsare those effects contained within cyberspace with minimal (beyond changes tothe physical storage media) physically observable manifestations. All cyberactivity has logical effects. Physical effects are those effects that are physicallyobservable by people; only some cyber operations have physical effects, forexample manipulating industrial control systems to produce mechanical failures.Cyber activity is limited to that which is conducted through cyberspace.We are explicitly excluding from the definition of cyber activity those actions thataffect cyberspace but are conducted in the physical domain (free from the laws ofthe code), such as cutting communication cables or jamming radio frequencies.Actions in the physical domain affecting communications systems are a longstanding aspect of warfare with established policy understanding. For analyticalclarity this project focuses on just those actions conducted through cyberspace.Cyber action is the subset of cyber activity that includes interaction withcyber systems that produce effects beyond that which is generally found duringnormal operation. This set of cyber action explicitly excludes all ordinary orintended uses of cyberspace occurring in accordance with authorized permissionor access levels or those actions that do not produce a significant effect. Cyberaction is the relevant domain of analysis for this project, and we do not providefurther analysis of the broader set of cyber activity that produces no significanteffect or is benign in nature.There are two principal readily observable categories of cyber actions:external actions and internal actions. We define external cyber actions as thosecyber actions with effects on systems not owned or operated by the actor.26 (See Rattray and Healy, “Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber Capabilities andTheir Use”, National Research Council, supra note 21, 77-97)18
Page 1 and 2: On the Use of OffensiveCyber Capabi
Page 3 and 4: Table of ContentsAcknowledgements .
Page 5 and 6: Executive SummaryThe defining chara
Page 7 and 8: FrameworkAssessing the implications
Page 9 and 10: I. IntroductionThough conflict inev
Page 11 and 12: Unfortunately, we believe that ther
Page 13 and 14: To the maximum extent possible we u
Page 15 and 16: these cyberspace operations “comp
Page 17: Principles Driving the Ontological
Page 21 and 22: cyberspace and complicates sound na
Page 23 and 24: cyber action, but we do find them t
Page 25 and 26: Cyber Pre-emption: External cyber o
Page 27 and 28: threatening external action or enta
Page 29 and 30: Figure 5: Framework for Cyber Polic
Page 31 and 32: effects of external cyber operation
Page 33 and 34: International LawInternational cons
Page 35 and 36: There is also an interaction betwee
Page 37 and 38: TemporalCommanders desire the abili
Page 39 and 40: InternationalMultilateral action is
Page 41 and 42: Potential changes to the “laws of
Page 43 and 44: Scanning:IV. Cyber Actions with Min
Page 45 and 46: The 4 th Amendment protects against
Page 47 and 48: operational intelligence collection
Page 49 and 50: security vulnerabilities are identi
Page 51 and 52: 1) Establish an interagency underst
Page 53 and 54: individual’s agency must be justi
Page 55 and 56: Finally section (f) exempts only la
Page 57 and 58: argue it is not intended to limits
Page 59 and 60: intrusion methods are required to e
Page 61 and 62: SystemicDespite the first order eff
Page 63 and 64: is possible. The capabilities used
Page 65 and 66: d. Section (f) should be expanded t
Page 67 and 68: indicates a will to keep the inform
Page 69 and 70:
protections for privacy. However, t
Page 71 and 72:
information on U.S. persons collect
Page 73 and 74:
Example ScenarioThe following scena
Page 75 and 76:
the awkward position: if it is unkn
Page 77 and 78:
less severe than attack are largely
Page 79 and 80:
treaties. This second set of duties
Page 81 and 82:
persons. Beyond the limitations pla
Page 83 and 84:
instead of force, when cyber attack
Page 85 and 86:
collection effort to generate all t
Page 87 and 88:
and incentivize technology companie
Page 89 and 90:
operational capabilities for employ
Page 91 and 92:
2) To ensure the operational capabi
Page 93 and 94:
and are entirely permissible ethica
Page 95 and 96:
equires an external component. The
Page 97 and 98:
any one branch’s overreach. (We h
Page 99 and 100:
particularly from limiting espionag
Page 101 and 102:
more destructive/disruptive. Though
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to reach an interagency understandi
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counterattacks to serve as a deterr
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however, may require a significant
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There is a possibility of a backlas
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2) The foreign external cyber opera
Page 113 and 114:
For the purpose of this work, a pre
Page 115 and 116:
Although the ethical considerations
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ight to “life, liberty and securi
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would be hard to overstate. 131 Thi
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ConsequentialDomesticAs mentioned i
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extent to which the executive branc
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public as new U.S. military technol
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IC believes that the HVT is using 3
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Policy Recommendations1) Use of cyb
Page 131 and 132:
identified by our ontology, spannin
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Appendix 1: Summary of Recommendati
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c. Amended (a)(2) (a), (b), and (c)
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gained) and necessity (only the min
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2) If overt, cyber force should be
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Cyber Intrusion: Unauthorized acces
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BibliographyAllison, G. T., & Black
Page 145 and 146:
Etzioni, A. (2011). Cybersecurity i
Page 147 and 148:
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 11 (United Stat
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Nye, Jr., J. S. (2004). Soft Power.
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United Nations. (1948, December 10)
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