- Page 1 and 2: On the Use of OffensiveCyber Capabi
- Page 3 and 4: Table of ContentsAcknowledgements .
- Page 5: Executive SummaryThe defining chara
- Page 9 and 10: I. IntroductionThough conflict inev
- Page 11 and 12: Unfortunately, we believe that ther
- Page 13 and 14: To the maximum extent possible we u
- Page 15 and 16: these cyberspace operations “comp
- Page 17 and 18: Principles Driving the Ontological
- Page 19 and 20: Cyber activity can have both logica
- Page 21 and 22: cyberspace and complicates sound na
- Page 23 and 24: cyber action, but we do find them t
- Page 25 and 26: Cyber Pre-emption: External cyber o
- Page 27 and 28: threatening external action or enta
- Page 29 and 30: Figure 5: Framework for Cyber Polic
- Page 31 and 32: effects of external cyber operation
- Page 33 and 34: International LawInternational cons
- Page 35 and 36: There is also an interaction betwee
- Page 37 and 38: TemporalCommanders desire the abili
- Page 39 and 40: InternationalMultilateral action is
- Page 41 and 42: Potential changes to the “laws of
- Page 43 and 44: Scanning:IV. Cyber Actions with Min
- Page 45 and 46: The 4 th Amendment protects against
- Page 47 and 48: operational intelligence collection
- Page 49 and 50: security vulnerabilities are identi
- Page 51 and 52: 1) Establish an interagency underst
- Page 53 and 54: individual’s agency must be justi
- Page 55 and 56: Finally section (f) exempts only la
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argue it is not intended to limits
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intrusion methods are required to e
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SystemicDespite the first order eff
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is possible. The capabilities used
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d. Section (f) should be expanded t
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indicates a will to keep the inform
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protections for privacy. However, t
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information on U.S. persons collect
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Example ScenarioThe following scena
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the awkward position: if it is unkn
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less severe than attack are largely
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treaties. This second set of duties
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persons. Beyond the limitations pla
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instead of force, when cyber attack
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collection effort to generate all t
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and incentivize technology companie
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operational capabilities for employ
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2) To ensure the operational capabi
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and are entirely permissible ethica
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equires an external component. The
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any one branch’s overreach. (We h
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particularly from limiting espionag
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more destructive/disruptive. Though
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to reach an interagency understandi
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counterattacks to serve as a deterr
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however, may require a significant
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There is a possibility of a backlas
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2) The foreign external cyber opera
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For the purpose of this work, a pre
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Although the ethical considerations
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ight to “life, liberty and securi
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would be hard to overstate. 131 Thi
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ConsequentialDomesticAs mentioned i
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extent to which the executive branc
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public as new U.S. military technol
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IC believes that the HVT is using 3
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Policy Recommendations1) Use of cyb
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identified by our ontology, spannin
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Appendix 1: Summary of Recommendati
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c. Amended (a)(2) (a), (b), and (c)
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gained) and necessity (only the min
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2) If overt, cyber force should be
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Cyber Intrusion: Unauthorized acces
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BibliographyAllison, G. T., & Black
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Etzioni, A. (2011). Cybersecurity i
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Jacobellis v. Ohio, 11 (United Stat
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Nye, Jr., J. S. (2004). Soft Power.
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United Nations. (1948, December 10)
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