On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities - Belfer Center for ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

notoriously wary of privacy infringement and distrustful of governmentmonitoring. Despite the growing push by lawmakers for increased Internetmonitoring by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 57 , the need torespect individual privacy has remained of paramount concern. Defensive cyberoperations, like the Department of Justice and FBI’s takedown of the Corefloodbotnet, which contained over 2 million infected systems, required extensive legaljustification. 58 This reflects the domestic political sensitivity of governmentinfluence (or some may say intrusion) on private citizens’ lives.Additionally, there are interagency political issues that complicateuniform cyber policy. DHS has the responsibility to protect U.S. citizens withinthe borders, but the vast majority of cyber resources reside at NSA and DoD. A2009 National Research Council (NRC) report suggests that military externalcyber operations would have implications for other agencies’ missions (includingDoS and Treasury). 59 A consideration for policy makers, therefore, will be thefacility in aligning these various interests.Lastly, the authorization for the use of force constitutionally rests withCongress. Should an agency decide to engage in external cyber operations thatcould be considered a use of force, it may require Congressional approval.Achieving this politically (and expeditiously) may prove problematic. Thissuggests that the need exists for establishing pre-approved authority levels, andhaving a robust debate to establish norms for acceptable cyber action.57 Though terrorist organizations have leveraged the power of social media, DHS has made itabundantly clear that they wish to protect individual privacy. They claim that current monitoringis in accordance with “defined parameters articulated in published department privacyguidelines.” (Hosenball, 2012)58 (James, 2011)59 (National Research Council, 2009)37
InternationalMultilateral action is often more effective in achieving U.S. nationalinterests, making international politics a critical consideration. Currently,external cyber operations remain classified, but should such operations rise tothe level of cyber attack, it would be critical for the U.S. to seek multilateralism.This act of legitimacy-seeking may require not only coordination with alliesbilaterally, but also the United Nations and potentially NATO.Assuming that there are diplomatic agreements, external cyber operationswill require coordinating with allied forces. More than 30 nations have cyberunits in their armed forces 60 , many of which are our allies. These nations withcapable units are inevitably conducting external cyber operations of their own. AU.S. decision to take significant action in cyberspace may interfere with ourpartner nations’ efforts. 61 To avoid potential conflict, the U.S. must consider theOperational coordination required to ensure proper deconfliction. Depending onTemporal considerations, this may adversely affect the decision to use cybertechnology.Finally, as an emerging domain, setting international norms for behaviorand conduct in cyberspace is a key policy consideration. In making externalcyber policy decisions the U.S. must consider the principle of reciprocity and seepolicies as an opportunity to establish norms and customary international law incyberspace. The U.S. should prefer policies that are also acceptable to the U.S. asan international norm.60 (Wolf, 2011)61 (See, National Research Council, supra note 20)38
Page 1 and 2: On the Use of OffensiveCyber Capabi
Page 3 and 4: Table of ContentsAcknowledgements .
Page 5 and 6: Executive SummaryThe defining chara
Page 7 and 8: FrameworkAssessing the implications
Page 9 and 10: I. IntroductionThough conflict inev
Page 11 and 12: Unfortunately, we believe that ther
Page 13 and 14: To the maximum extent possible we u
Page 15 and 16: these cyberspace operations “comp
Page 17 and 18: Principles Driving the Ontological
Page 19 and 20: Cyber activity can have both logica
Page 21 and 22: cyberspace and complicates sound na
Page 23 and 24: cyber action, but we do find them t
Page 25 and 26: Cyber Pre-emption: External cyber o
Page 27 and 28: threatening external action or enta
Page 29 and 30: Figure 5: Framework for Cyber Polic
Page 31 and 32: effects of external cyber operation
Page 33 and 34: International LawInternational cons
Page 35 and 36: There is also an interaction betwee
Page 37: TemporalCommanders desire the abili
Page 41 and 42: Potential changes to the “laws of
Page 43 and 44: Scanning:IV. Cyber Actions with Min
Page 45 and 46: The 4 th Amendment protects against
Page 47 and 48: operational intelligence collection
Page 49 and 50: security vulnerabilities are identi
Page 51 and 52: 1) Establish an interagency underst
Page 53 and 54: individual’s agency must be justi
Page 55 and 56: Finally section (f) exempts only la
Page 57 and 58: argue it is not intended to limits
Page 59 and 60: intrusion methods are required to e
Page 61 and 62: SystemicDespite the first order eff
Page 63 and 64: is possible. The capabilities used
Page 65 and 66: d. Section (f) should be expanded t
Page 67 and 68: indicates a will to keep the inform
Page 69 and 70: protections for privacy. However, t
Page 71 and 72: information on U.S. persons collect
Page 73 and 74: Example ScenarioThe following scena
Page 75 and 76: the awkward position: if it is unkn
Page 77 and 78: less severe than attack are largely
Page 79 and 80: treaties. This second set of duties
Page 81 and 82: persons. Beyond the limitations pla
Page 83 and 84: instead of force, when cyber attack
Page 85 and 86: collection effort to generate all t
Page 87 and 88: and incentivize technology companie
Page 89 and 90:
operational capabilities for employ
Page 91 and 92:
2) To ensure the operational capabi
Page 93 and 94:
and are entirely permissible ethica
Page 95 and 96:
equires an external component. The
Page 97 and 98:
any one branch’s overreach. (We h
Page 99 and 100:
particularly from limiting espionag
Page 101 and 102:
more destructive/disruptive. Though
Page 103 and 104:
to reach an interagency understandi
Page 105 and 106:
counterattacks to serve as a deterr
Page 107 and 108:
however, may require a significant
Page 109 and 110:
There is a possibility of a backlas
Page 111 and 112:
2) The foreign external cyber opera
Page 113 and 114:
For the purpose of this work, a pre
Page 115 and 116:
Although the ethical considerations
Page 117 and 118:
ight to “life, liberty and securi
Page 119 and 120:
would be hard to overstate. 131 Thi
Page 121 and 122:
ConsequentialDomesticAs mentioned i
Page 123 and 124:
extent to which the executive branc
Page 125 and 126:
public as new U.S. military technol
Page 127 and 128:
IC believes that the HVT is using 3
Page 129 and 130:
Policy Recommendations1) Use of cyb
Page 131 and 132:
identified by our ontology, spannin
Page 133 and 134:
Appendix 1: Summary of Recommendati
Page 135 and 136:
c. Amended (a)(2) (a), (b), and (c)
Page 137 and 138:
gained) and necessity (only the min
Page 139 and 140:
2) If overt, cyber force should be
Page 141 and 142:
Cyber Intrusion: Unauthorized acces
Page 143 and 144:
BibliographyAllison, G. T., & Black
Page 145 and 146:
Etzioni, A. (2011). Cybersecurity i
Page 147 and 148:
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 11 (United Stat
Page 149 and 150:
Nye, Jr., J. S. (2004). Soft Power.
Page 151 and 152:
United Nations. (1948, December 10)
Page 153:
152
show all

On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities - Belfer Center for ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?