ERRV Viking Islay - Marine Accident Investigation Branch

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1.4.3 Medium term O2 depletionIn order to assess whether the O 2 depletion found in the chain locker could have beencaused by corrosion, and to provide an estimate of the O 2 levels possible at the time ofthe accident, an expert was consulted 7 .Expert analysis concluded that corrosion within the sealed chain locker (since thelocker had last been certified gas-free) could have led to a loss of O 2 resulting in anatmosphere that was unable to support human life; levels as low as 4.4 % (by volume)were estimated to have been possible.The full report is at Annex A.1.4.4The physiological effects of reduced oxygenIn a normal ambient atmosphere the expected O 2 level would be around 20.9%, byvolume.In general, O 2 deficiency leads to a loss of mental alertness and a distortion of judgmentand performance. This happens within a relatively short time, without the person’sknowledge and without prior warning.The following table 8 indicates the effects of O 2 deficient atmospheres on humans.These values are approximate and can vary. Note that exposure to an atmospherecontaining less than 18% by volume of O 2 poses a significant risk.O 2(volume %)Asphyxia – Effect of O 2 ConcentrationEffects and Symptoms18-21 No discernible symptoms can be detected by the individual.11-18 Reduction of physical and intellectual performance withoutthe sufferer being aware.8-11 Possibility of fainting within a few minutes without prior warning.Risk of death below 11 vol%.6-8 Fainting occurs after a short time. Resuscitation possible if carriedout immediately.0-6 Fainting almost immediate. Brain damage may occur,even if rescued.Table 17 Opinion provided by the Research Institute for Industry at the University of Southampton.8 Reference source - University of Oxford http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/safety/s403.shtml12
1.5<strong>Investigation</strong>s at ImminghamOnce the atmosphere samples had been taken, the foc’sle store was force ventilated(using portable fans obtained from ashore) and then certified by the attending analystas safe for entry.On entering the foc’sle store an empty EEBD was found, and a notice was seen postedup on the after bulkhead of the compartment, near to the manholes (Figure 6). Thenotice appeared to have been made onboard during the period 2002 – 2005. Theship’s crew did not know when the notice had been posted.Figure 6Sign attached to aft bulkhead of foc’sle storeA reminder of the correct size of spanner needed to open the manhole covers wasseen, handwritten in marker pen, near the openings (Figure 7).Being aware of the most probable cause of the accident, both chain locker manholecovers were removed, the foam broken out of both spurling pipes and the space wasforce ventilated. The analyst re-tested the space and certified it safe to enter; themanhole openings were noted to be particularly small (Figure 8).The inside of the chain locker was inspected, measured and photographed. Themain part of the chain was found piled in the middle of the space in a fairly solid lump,probably indicating that it had not moved for an extended period of time. No significantforeign objects were found, other than small amounts of textile material, probably ragsused to plug the spurling pipes prior to applying expanded foam. Some salt water waspresent in the bilges at the bottom of the chain locker, below the false floor (Figure 9).13
Page 2 and 3: Extract fromThe United Kingdom Merc
Page 4 and 5: 1.13 The Vroon Offshore Safety Mana
Page 6 and 7: GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRON
Page 8 and 9: Viking Islay
Page 10 and 11: Section 1- FACTUAL INFORMATION1.1 P
Page 12 and 13: Figure 2Chain locker - showing rope
Page 14 and 15: Figure 4StoreCabin & mess roomVikin
Page 16 and 17: Figure 5Foc’sle store - showing a
Page 18 and 19: At 1140, the master manoeuvred Viki
Page 22 and 23: Figure 7Position ofsign (Figure 6)H
Page 24 and 25: 1.6Actions by the Maritime and Coas
Page 26 and 27: 1.101.10.1PersonnelThe masterThe ma
Page 28 and 29: Figure 10Close fitting hoodBreathin
Page 30 and 31: on the EEBD as a means of supportin
Page 32 and 33: 1.141.14.1Entry into Dangerous Spac
Page 34 and 35: 1.16.2 Further guidance on dangerou
Page 36 and 37: y a crew member entering the space
Page 38 and 39: The EEBD training provided by Vroon
Page 40 and 41: would have continued to do so had i
Page 42 and 43: 3. Other spaces are not necessarily
Page 44 and 45: Section 44.1- action takenVroon Off
Page 46: Section 5- recommendationsVroon Off

ERRV Viking Islay - Marine Accident Investigation Branch

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