ERRV Viking Islay - Marine Accident Investigation Branch

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1.101.10.1PersonnelThe masterThe master was a British national aged 64. Originally serving on board fishing vessels,he had achieved his Fishing “Skipper Full” certificate of competency (CoC) in 1974, andhad served as skipper/master on board both fishing and various offshore vessels formany years. He had served with Vroon since 2002.In 2000, he was required to convert his fishing vessel CoC, due to the changesintroduced by the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification andWatchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW) (as amended). As a part of this conversionprocess, he had completed an ERRV command and control course. At the time of theaccident, the master held STCW II/2 Master CoC which was limited to use on Standby,Seismic Survey and Oceanographic Research Vessels only.1.10.2 The chief mateThe chief mate was a British national aged 55. He originally went to sea on boardfishing vessels in 1975, and had served with Vroon since 1997. In 2001, he had beenrequired to convert his original fishing vessel “Second Hand Full and Special” CoCto an STCW II/2 Chief Mate; limited to Standby, Seismic Survey and OceanographicResearch Vessels only. He had completed an ERRV Command and Control course.1.10.3The day work seamen - the first two victims• Mr Robert EbertowskiMr Ebertowski, a Polish national aged 40, held a Seaman Grade 1 AB qualification.He had, through a Polish crewing agency, worked on board various foreign ships,including several trips as an engineer on LPG carriers before joining the ERRVindustry. He had worked for Vroon since March 2005 and had been on contractservice with Vroon since 2007.• Mr Robert O’BrienMr O’Brien, a British national aged 59, held a Seaman Grade 1 AB qualification. Hewas also the ship’s nominated Advanced Medical Aid responder (AMA). Seafaringwas his second career, having previously served many years in the UK armedforces as an army medic. He had worked for Vroon for 7 years.1.10.4 The 8/12 seaman - the third victimMr Finlay MacFadyen, a British national aged 46, held a Seaman Grade 1 ABqualification. He had previously served many years as a motorman/oiler in the BritishMerchant Navy. He had worked in the ERRV industry for several years and for Vroonfor almost 2 years.1.11 Viking Islay’s safety equipment1.11.1Atmosphere testing equipmentPrior to this accident, Viking Islay had been equipped with a Crowcon EIKON personalO 2 alarm. It was not possible to use this instrument to measure the oxygen levels in aspace before first entry. It was designed as a personal alarm unit to provide individual18
users with a warning should the oxygen level within an enclosed space reduce to ahazardous level. The Crowcon EIKON held on board Viking Islay had a limited shelf lifeand had become time expired. Accordingly, in February 2007, ship's staff had ordereda replacement as described below:EKON H 2 S gas monitor: make Crowcon [sic].As a consequence, Vroon supplied the ship with a disposable single gas monitor for theprotection of personnel against toxic H 2 S hazard 10 as a replacement.The crew of Viking Islay were unaware that the original O 2 “meter” was in fact apersonal gas alarm and not an atmosphere testing device, and that the replacementpersonal gas alarm supplied by Vroon detected H 2 S and not O levels.21.11.2Other equipmentViking Islay had no portable vent fans or portable lighting at the time of the accident.Viking Islay was provided with a dedicated air compressor in order to re-fill BA cylinderson board. This allowed more realistic drills to be undertaken, as the crew were able tobecome practised in the use of BA, yet retain the ship’s emergency response capabilityat all times.1.12 Emergency Escape Breathing Devices1.12.1 Requirement to provide Emergency Escape Breathing DevicesViking Islay carried five Sabre Emergency Life Support Apparatus (ELSA), inaccordance with statutory requirements 11 to carry EEBDs. These devices providepersonnel with breathing protection against a hazardous atmosphere, while escapingto a place of safety. IMO MSC Circular 849 specifically forbids the use of EEBDs forentering oxygen deficient voids or tanks. 121.12.2 EEBDs provided on board Viking Islay – Sabre ELSA typeThe Sabre ELSA is a self-contained, open circuit, compressed air, constant flow EEBD.It comprises a compressed air cylinder with a combined reducer/cylinder valve, attachedto a close fitting escape hood by a breathing hose. The whole unit is contained withina stowage bag ready for immediate use. The high-visibility bag is clearly markedESCAPE USE ONLY (Figures 10 and 11).10 Hydrogen Sulphide [H 2 S], an extremely hazardous, toxic gas. It is a colourless, flammable gas that canbe identified, in relatively low concentrations, by a characteristic rotten egg odour. The gas occurs naturallyas a product of decaying sulphur-containing organic matter, particularly under low oxygen conditions. Manypetroleum industry jobsites are potential locations of this gas.11 SOLAS 74 Chapter II-2, Part D, Reg 13, paragraph 3.4. Promulgated by IMO MSC/Circ.849 of June1998, this amended regulation required EEBD to be carried on board most vessels. This SOLAS amendmentwas given effect within UK regulations by SI 2003 No.2951, the Merchant Shipping (Fire Protection)Regulations (Amendment) Regulations 2003.12 Paragraph 2 of the Annex to MSC/Circ.849 of June 1998 states: An EEBD is a supplied-air device onlyused for escape from a compartment that has a hazardous atmosphere…EEBD’s are not to be used forfighting fires, entering oxygen deficient voids or tanks, or worn by fire fighters. This is repeated in Annex 1 ofMGN 215 (M+F), dated March 2002.19
Page 2 and 3: Extract fromThe United Kingdom Merc
Page 4 and 5: 1.13 The Vroon Offshore Safety Mana
Page 6 and 7: GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRON
Page 8 and 9: Viking Islay
Page 10 and 11: Section 1- FACTUAL INFORMATION1.1 P
Page 12 and 13: Figure 2Chain locker - showing rope
Page 14 and 15: Figure 4StoreCabin & mess roomVikin
Page 16 and 17: Figure 5Foc’sle store - showing a
Page 18 and 19: At 1140, the master manoeuvred Viki
Page 20 and 21: 1.4.3 Medium term O2 depletionIn or
Page 22 and 23: Figure 7Position ofsign (Figure 6)H
Page 24 and 25: 1.6Actions by the Maritime and Coas
Page 28 and 29: Figure 10Close fitting hoodBreathin
Page 30 and 31: on the EEBD as a means of supportin
Page 32 and 33: 1.141.14.1Entry into Dangerous Spac
Page 34 and 35: 1.16.2 Further guidance on dangerou
Page 36 and 37: y a crew member entering the space
Page 38 and 39: The EEBD training provided by Vroon
Page 40 and 41: would have continued to do so had i
Page 42 and 43: 3. Other spaces are not necessarily
Page 44 and 45: Section 44.1- action takenVroon Off
Page 46: Section 5- recommendationsVroon Off

ERRV Viking Islay - Marine Accident Investigation Branch

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