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RELIGIOPOLITICAL ACTIVISM 169a beleaguered minority, and framed as such, it had broad resonance inthe Muslim community. A stringently defined legal tradition had takenprecedence over the interests ofwomen earlier, as we saw in the case ofwhat had preceded the Dissolution ofMarriages Act of1939; and thedefense of the shari‘a was again seen, by the ‘ulama and those supportingthem, as a greater good—indeed, a necessity—that had to override anyother considerations in the Shah Bano controversy. The fact that the governmentalready recognized the ‘ulama as legitimate, indeed authoritative,representatives ofMuslim popular opinion enabled them to play a leadingrole in this controversy, and this recognition, in turn, strengthened theirleadership.Yet Nadwi’s leadership role in the Shah Bano controversy also pointsto a remarkable paradox. His position in the community and among the‘ulama ofIndia owed not a little, as I have argued, to the perception ofhis distinguished position in the Muslim world. His ability to representthe Muslim case to the government likewise owed something to that sameperception. And as Nadwi acknowledges in his autobiography, he did notdesist from reminding the prime minister of his stature abroad. Fearingthat Rajiv Gandhi would be persuaded by the argument that ifmany Muslimcountries had modified their laws ofpersonal status, India could followthem in doing so, Nadwi emphasized to him that Islam in India wasnot subservient to any other Muslim country and that Muslims elsewhererecognized the authority ofthe leading Indian ‘ulama. 113 The paradox,however, is this: Ifthis recognition in the greater Muslim world enabledhim to make his case authoritatively to the government and the public,his appeals to his authority abroad and his very career as an ardent advocateofIndian Islam’s ties with the greater Muslim world could not but fuelHindu nationalist denunciations ofthe “foreignness” ofIslam in India.I do not intend to suggest any direct correlation between the rise ofHindu nationalism since the 1980s and discourses such as Nadwi’s, eventhough the latter do seem to lend some credence to the former’s rhetoric.Representatives ofMuslim “secular modernists” have argued that underthe ‘ulama’s leadership, the community’s refusal to accept the terms of lifein a modern secular nation-state, for instance, by accommodating itself toa uniform civil code, has fueled the rise of Hindu nationalism. The destructionin December 1992 ofthe Baburi Masjid, a mosque in Ayodhya in UttarPradesh dating to the Mughal era and located at the site believed by someto be the birthplace ofthe Hindu god Rama, is seen, on this interpretation,as the price ofthe “victory” in the controversy over Muslim personal law. 114It has also been argued that the open support ofRajiv Gandhi’s governmentfor the demands of the Muslim Personal Law Board and, later, its tacitsupport ofthe Hindu nationalists laying claim to the site ofthe BaburiMasjid were two parts ofthe same cynical strategy to keep a fragile Con-