271. Memorandum of Conversation1 Moscow, May 24, 1972, 7:50 ...
271. Memorandum of Conversation1 Moscow, May 24, 1972, 7:50 ...
271. Memorandum of Conversation1 Moscow, May 24, 1972, 7:50 ...
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<strong>May</strong> 13–<strong>May</strong> 31, <strong>1972</strong> 1057<br />
position <strong>of</strong> strength. There may come a critical moment for the Vietnamese<br />
when they will not refuse to let in forces <strong>of</strong> other countries to<br />
act on their own side.<br />
The President: That threat doesn’t frighten us a bit, but go ahead<br />
and make it.<br />
Chairman Kosygin: Don’t think you are right in thinking what we<br />
say is a threat and what you say is not a threat. This is a question <strong>of</strong> a<br />
major war, and we say this, we don’t say it as a threat. This is an analysis<br />
<strong>of</strong> what may happen and that is much more serious than a threat.<br />
Mr. President, when you came to <strong>of</strong>fice we were <strong>of</strong> the opinion<br />
you as a politician <strong>of</strong> long-standing would take advantage <strong>of</strong> the possibilities,<br />
and we think the possibility is still there since you were not<br />
a party to unleashing the war. We still think there is something you<br />
can do in order to end the war and to bring peace to that area. And if<br />
an attempt is made to resolve the matter as you explained, that is to<br />
say if they do not agree and you do use strength, in short you would<br />
simply destroy Vietnam; that is something quite frankly that would entail<br />
no glory either for the United States or yourself, Mr. President.<br />
Now wherein lies the basic issue? You say you are prepared to<br />
withdraw your troops and this the Vietnamese are now welcoming.<br />
Now you say you want to secure the return <strong>of</strong> American prisoners <strong>of</strong><br />
war. Quite recently, Premier Pham Van Dong made a statement that as<br />
soon as the war is over the Vietnamese are quite ready to release all<br />
prisoners. So there is a solution to that problem too.<br />
The third question is that <strong>of</strong> a government. They say they are willing<br />
to set up a government <strong>of</strong> three elements. Dr. Kissinger knows just<br />
several days ago Pham Van Dong’s statement was made public, and<br />
that is what he told me when I spoke to him. So one thing remains.<br />
You still need to retain the so-called President in South Vietnam, someone<br />
you call President, who has not been chosen by anyone.<br />
The President: Who chose the President <strong>of</strong> North Vietnam?<br />
Chairman Kosygin: The entire people.<br />
The President: Go ahead.<br />
Chairman Podgorny: As for the President in North Vietnam, the<br />
late President Ho Chi Minh <strong>of</strong> North Vietnam was even admired by<br />
the South Vietnamese and regarded as their President.<br />
Chairman Kosygin: For the sake <strong>of</strong> him [Thieu], you want to send<br />
under the axe hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> Vietnamese, maybe even a<br />
million, and your own soldiers, simply to save the skin <strong>of</strong> a mercenary<br />
President, so-called. We have known the Vietnamese leaders for many<br />
years very well—Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, Le Duan. They are<br />
all very serious-minded and dedicated and with great experience in<br />
the struggle and devotion to their people.