271. Memorandum of Conversation1 Moscow, May 24, 1972, 7:50 ...

May 13–May 31, 1972 1049
circumstances I was left with no choice but to react as we did react. I
realized this posed a very difficult problem for the Soviet leadership.
We were faced with a situation where 60,000 U.S. troops would
have been endangered had not strong action been taken. We were also
faced with the continuing problem where as many as 1,000 or more are
missing in action and not accounted for, most or many of whom are
known to be prisoners of war. And despite the withdrawal of 500,000
United States soldiers since I took office and after offer after offer in
the negotiations, 149 public meetings in Paris and 13 private meetings
which Dr. Kissinger conducted produced absolutely nothing from the
North Vietnamese except for an ultimatum for us to get out under conditions
which we will not accept.
Our position now is very forthcoming. We believe it is fair. As a
matter of fact, the General Secretary in his conversations with Dr.
Kissinger in his visit a few weeks ago suggested the consideration of
a ceasefire. All we ask now is a return of and an accounting for our
prisoners of war and a ceasefire. Once that is agreed to, we will withdraw
all Americans within four months and cease military actions. We
cannot go any further than that. Nothing further is negotiable on that
point.
We could talk at great length about the wisdom of the American
position in Vietnam. I know the views of the Soviet leaders. You know
ours. No useful purpose would be served by going over past history.
We now confront the fact that we have taken every step to bring an
end to what is the only major international issue which clouds relations
between the United States and the USSR. It is our intention to
end the war by negotiations; but negotiations must be fair to both sides.
There cannot be an ultimatum to us to impose on the South Vietnamese
a government the North Vietnamese cannot impose by themselves. If
the North Vietnamese are unwilling to end the war that way [by negotiations],
6 then I will do whatever I must to bring the war to an end.
Anything we do we will have in mind our desire not to exacerbate the
relations between us. To this end we rejected the idea of a blockade
which would have involved Soviet ships. During this meeting, for example,
we stopped bombing the Hanoi area because of our desire to
avoid any incidents embarrassing these talks. We have now reached
the point where we see no way to deal with the North Vietnamese except
the course I have chosen. Now the choice is theirs. They can have
a peace which respects their independence and ends the conflict
throughout Southeast Asia. Or we will have to use the military means
available to us to bring the war to an end.
6 All brackets in the source text.