271. Memorandum of Conversation1 Moscow, May 24, 1972, 7:50 ...

May 13–May 31, 1972 1051
a problem of war. More especially it is a problem of a war which is
poisoning the general international situation as a whole and because
it is having an effect on relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
I wish to emphasize it is particularly important to note this at this precise
moment when cruel bombing has been resumed and where once
again very cruel military actions have been taken against North Vietnam.
I had occasion to talk about this with Dr. Kissinger, but we want
to take this opportunity now to emphasize that not only we but most
of the nations of the world are calling this a shameful war and quite
rightly calling it aggression. 7
There is perhaps indeed no need for us to go into all the details of
the past, but there is one point that we should like to emphasize and
that is the new escalation of the war, particularly the bombing of North
Vietnam started by you at the very time when the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, our Prime Minister, was in Hanoi [1965]. At that
time, North Vietnam wasn’t doing anything.
You have just given your own assessment of this war and your
own explanation for the war. We must most resolutely and forthrightly
tell you, Mr. President, that our assessment is of a fundamentally different
nature. You have heard on more than one occasion our assessment
of this war in the statement of all the leaders of the Soviet Union.
Perhaps we do not wish at this time to engage in polemics here on this
subject, but we must say that we shall not depart from our assessment
because we are profoundly convinced that it is right.
I agree, as I have said before, that we should not delve deep into
the past; but certainly the fact is that the Geneva Accords 8 which established
the basis for peace in Indochina were grossly violated. And
it would be appropriate to mention where these agreements were violated.
It is a fact that the elections in South Vietnam envisaged by the
Geneva Accords were not held, and it is no secret why this was not
done. It was quite clear at that time who would win the election and
on which side lay the support of the Vietnamese people.
7 In his memoirs Nixon wrote that everyone had been in a good humor when they
got back to the dacha and Brezhnev had suggested they have a meeting before dinner,
which had been scheduled for 8. “For the next three hours the Soviet leaders pounded
me bitterly and emotionally about Vietnam.” He recalled that he “momentarily thought
of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde when Brezhnev, who had just been laughing and slapping
me on the back, started shouting angrily that instead of honestly working to end the
war, I was trying to use the Chinese as a means of bringing pressure on the Soviets to
intervene with the North Vietnamese.” (RN: Memoirs, p. 613)
8 The July 1954 Geneva accords which ended the hostilities in Indochina and provided
for a temporary partition of Vietnam pending a nationwide election in the summer
of 1956.