271. Memorandum of Conversation1 Moscow, May 24, 1972, 7:50 ...

May 13–May 31, 1972 1053
look into the process of negotiations to date we see that you have
emphasized one idea: that Vietnam must accept your conditions for
settlement. Why? Why should the Vietnamese accept American ideas
for a settlement? After all, they are not demanding part of American
territory as part of a settlement and they are not demanding any other
benefit as a price for a settlement. They suggest the war be ended and
a coalition government with the participation of all three forces be established
in the area and that be followed by the free expression of the
will of the South Vietnamese people. But all that has not been accepted.
Just recently, I saw a proposal on the Vietnamese side that the Paris
negotiations be continued, but the U.S. together with Saigon rejected
the idea of further negotiations on a settlement in Vietnam. Surely this
doesn’t reflect the desire of seriously trying to end the war. It is manifest
of the new aggressive aspirations on the part of the U.S. in Vietnam
and that is done in the way that all nations in the world reject the
positions taken by the U.S. But, of course, if the U.S. and the President
of the United States is willing to be branded everywhere in the world
as an aggressor, then of course there is practically no way the matter
can be discussed.
Then again on the other hand you are here and we conduct discussions
on many issues to try to reach agreements. You yourself admitted
how difficult it was for us to decide to hold these talks in such
conditions. It is certainly true we are allies of the DRV and we are meeting
our international duty and that is something we will continue to
do to the hilt. Here I want to emphasize that no bombing can ever resolve
the war in Vietnam.
It does seem to appear the U.S. is upholding some interests of its
own in Vietnam. Because I certainly don’t think if the U.S. earnestly
desired negotiations on the basis of realistic conditions, if the conditions
were right for negotiations, I don’t believe the Vietnamese would
not agree to return the prisoners of war. It is certainly a fact in the normal
course of things that prisoners of war are returned after the end
of a war. That’s the way we acted at the end of World War II. When
the war ended we returned the prisoners we had on our hands.
Surely Vietnam is a heavy burden on the hearts of all people, and
perhaps particularly so the Soviet people who went through a sad period
and lost 20 million in World War II. Of course, the U.S. had an
easier time in World War II. I believe if the U.S. had suffered the way
the Soviet people had, then perhaps you would look at matters about
Vietnam differently than at present, but of course God forbid that you
ever have to suffer what the Soviet people suffered in World War II.
You were quite right; it was certainly difficult for us to agree to
hold this meeting under present circumstances. And yet we did agree
to hold it. I want to explain why. We felt that preliminary work prior