12 The Responsible Inves<strong>to</strong>r’s Guide <strong>to</strong> Commodities4INVESTMENTSIN COMMODITYDERIVATIVES4.1 The issues at stakeInvesting in commodity derivatives is the main way in which institutionalinves<strong>to</strong>rs seek exposure <strong>to</strong> <strong>commodities</strong>. Investments are implemented bymeans of futures, OTC contracts, index tracking funds, swaps on indices, hedgefunds and other active strategies.Financial inves<strong>to</strong>rs usually sell back (“settle”) their derivative contractsbefore expiry <strong>to</strong> other counterparties and therefore avoid holding the physicalcommodity. Over the long-term, they therefore have no effect on absoluteproduction levels and related ESG issues. Over shorter timeframes, though,they can create price signals in the futures market that impact producer decisionsand influence prices in the spot market. Increased volatility in commodityprices can make it difficult for society <strong>to</strong> adapt and, in the case of food<strong>commodities</strong>, can lead <strong>to</strong> food crises and social unrest. Excessive speculationon futures markets can also potentially disrupt futures markets role as a pricediscovery and risk hedging <strong>to</strong>ol for farmers and producers. When looking atcommodity derivative investments we are therefore dealing with systemic risksof a more indirect nature, compared <strong>to</strong> other types of investments with moredirect ESG impacts.The G20 has put commodity price volatility at the <strong>to</strong>p of its agenda andmany international bodies and national regula<strong>to</strong>rs are dealing with the issue.A heated debate about the potential influence of financial inves<strong>to</strong>rs on commodityprices is under way with highly divergent opinions being expressed.Academic research on the issue is often inconclusive, in part because it relieson past data that cannot capture the rapidly changing situation with regard <strong>to</strong>the nature and scale of investments. In Appendix 2 we summarise findings ofrecent “meta” publications on this issue <strong>to</strong> complement the literature alreadyreviewed in our interim report.“… what little dis<strong>to</strong>rtion specula<strong>to</strong>rs maycause is soundly trumped by the servicethey provide. In particular, they supplyliquidity and price information that makesfutures markets more efficient”—The Economist, 13 November 2010
13Based on our discussions and interviewswith inves<strong>to</strong>rs and on the literature reviewed,we have identified the following mechanismsthat can lead <strong>to</strong> inves<strong>to</strong>rs impacting pricelevels and volatility:• In many futures markets, financial inves<strong>to</strong>rshave become the leading players (compared<strong>to</strong> commercial inves<strong>to</strong>rs)• Financial inves<strong>to</strong>rs increasingly decide <strong>to</strong>invest based on fac<strong>to</strong>rs that are unrelated<strong>to</strong> fundamentals, such as herding arounda price trend (which might initially bejustified by changes in fundamentals butthen becomes self-reinforcing) or wantinga certain exposure for portfolio diversificationreasons (which, if manifested in anindex strategy, leads <strong>to</strong> obliga<strong>to</strong>ry “rolling”of futures contracts <strong>to</strong> maintain exposure,without regard <strong>to</strong> fundamentals)• By piling in<strong>to</strong> <strong>commodities</strong> markets at suchscale, and in a manner that is largely insensitive<strong>to</strong> fundamental drivers, financialinves<strong>to</strong>rs have in fact eroded their original<strong>commodities</strong> investment case of uncorrelatedreturns. Partly as a result of this,more sophisticated inves<strong>to</strong>rs have begun <strong>to</strong>seek commodity exposure through investmentsin real assets such as farms, minesor forests.• The advent of highly liquid exchangetradedfunds makes it relatively easy formomentum-driven inves<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> move largeamounts of money in or out of commoditymarkets• All of this can lead <strong>to</strong> increased volatility infutures markets, and as a consequence alsoin spot markets 7• Some observers also point <strong>to</strong> the fact that astructurally higher volatility will also lead<strong>to</strong> higher physical commodity price levels.This is explained by the following relationship:increased volatility in futures marketsleads <strong>to</strong> increased margin requirements,making it more expensive for farmers <strong>to</strong>hedge their production risks. This cost iseventually passed on <strong>to</strong> the end consumers.4.2 Recommendations forinstitutional inves<strong>to</strong>rsThe main responsibility for dealing withthese issues clearly rests with regula<strong>to</strong>rs.US and European regula<strong>to</strong>rs have alreadyintroduced a range of measures aimed atincreasing transparency and limiting excessivespeculation (these include measures<strong>to</strong> increase transparency of both regulatedand “over-the-counter” markets, centralclearing requirements, regulation of significantparticipants, position limits, etc.).Inves<strong>to</strong>rs nevertheless have an importantrole <strong>to</strong> play. Based on our discussionsand engagement with inves<strong>to</strong>rs, a seriesof voluntary measures that inves<strong>to</strong>rs canimplement with the goal of avoiding negativeimpacts and actively contributing <strong>to</strong>well-functioning markets were identified.These include:■■Defining reasonable performance targetsfor active managers <strong>to</strong> avoid themhaving <strong>to</strong> chase momentum and takeexcessive risk■■Using multiple investment channels,avoiding that single investment managersor funds attain a dominating positionin the market with a higher risk ofcontributing <strong>to</strong> volatility■■When investing passively, implementingprocedures aimed at rebalancing portfolioallocations for different <strong>commodities</strong>(e.g. when prices exceed levels justifiedby fundamentals). This has the effectthat the inves<strong>to</strong>r is a seller of futureswhen prices go up excessively (and viceversa)which tends <strong>to</strong> stabilise prices.■■Insisting on hedge fund managers beingtransparent about their positions andstrategies■■Not allowing managers <strong>to</strong> hold positionsin<strong>to</strong> delivery period or taking deliveryso as not <strong>to</strong> affect the price-buildingmechanism■■Setting limits on investment in smaller,more illiquid commodity markets wherelack of market sophistication / liquiditycoverage could lead <strong>to</strong> inves<strong>to</strong>rs havinga big influence on prices■■Engaging with commodity futuresexchanges, investment managers, indexproviders, etc. with the goal of improvinggovernance and transparency ofcommodity and OTC markets■■Contributing <strong>to</strong> the policy debate moreproactively and transparently, in view ofbalancing short-term interests with theneed for ensuring the long-term sustainabilityof derivatives markets and inves<strong>to</strong>rs’access <strong>to</strong> them.7. Given <strong>to</strong>day’s size of futures markets and the observed contangoeffect, price discovery is usually happening in the futures market“Inves<strong>to</strong>rsthat believemarkets arebroken shouldlobby for betterregulation,in particularbettertransparency”—Head of Commodities of apension fund interviewed inthe course of the project