Ethical issues in engineering design - 3TU.Centre for Ethics and ...
Ethical issues in engineering design - 3TU.Centre for Ethics and ...
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>design</strong><br />
Safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
Anke van Gorp<br />
Simon Stev<strong>in</strong> Series <strong>in</strong> the Philosophy of Technology
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>;<br />
Safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
Proefschrift<br />
ter verkrijg<strong>in</strong>g van de graad van doctor<br />
aan de Technische Universiteit Delft,<br />
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. ir. J.T. Fokkema<br />
voorzitter van het College voor Promoties,<br />
<strong>in</strong> het openbaar te verdedigen op ma<strong>and</strong>ag 14 november 2005 om 10:30 uur<br />
door Anke Christ<strong>in</strong>e van GORP<br />
materiaalkundig <strong>in</strong>genieur<br />
geboren te Tilburg
Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotoren:<br />
Prof. dr. ir. P.A. Kroes<br />
Prof. dr. M.J. van den Hoven<br />
Samenstell<strong>in</strong>g promotiecommissie<br />
Rector Magnificus, voorzitter<br />
Prof. dr. ir. P.A. Kroes, Technische Universiteit Delft, Promotor<br />
Prof. dr. M.J. van den Hoven, Technische Universiteit Delft, Promotor<br />
Prof. dr. A. Grunwald, Forzungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH<br />
Prof .dr. B.A.W. Musschenga, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam<br />
Prof. dr. ir. P. Kruit, Technische Universiteit Delft<br />
Prof. ir. A. Beukers, Technische Universiteit Delft<br />
Dr. H. Z<strong>and</strong>voort, Technische Universiteit Delft<br />
Dr. ir. I.R. van de Poel heeft als begeleider <strong>in</strong> belangrijke mate aan de totst<strong>and</strong>kom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
van het proefschrift bijgedragen.<br />
ISBN-10: 90-9019907-1<br />
ISBN-13: 9789090199078<br />
ISSN: 1574-941X
Simon Stev<strong>in</strong> Series <strong>in</strong> the Philosophy of Technology<br />
Delft University of Technology & E<strong>in</strong>dhoven University of Technology<br />
Editors: Peter Kroes <strong>and</strong> Anthonie Meijers<br />
Volume 2<br />
© Anke van Gorp, 2005<br />
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored <strong>in</strong> a retrieval<br />
system, or transmitted, <strong>in</strong> any <strong>for</strong>m or by any means, without prior permission <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of the publisher.<br />
e-mail: anke_van_gorp@yahoo.com<br />
ISBN-10: 90-9019907-1<br />
ISBN-13: 9789090199078<br />
ISSN: 1574-941X
Contents<br />
1 Introduction 9<br />
1.1 Research question <strong>and</strong> objective 13<br />
1.1.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> 14<br />
1.1.2 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> 15<br />
1.2 Research approach 17<br />
2 Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes 21<br />
2.1 Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics 21<br />
2.1.1 <strong>Ethics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes 23<br />
2.2 Design 25<br />
2.2.1 Design process 25<br />
2.2.2 Design problems 27<br />
2.2.3 The <strong>design</strong> process as a social process 29<br />
2.2.4 Organisation of the <strong>design</strong> process 30<br />
2.3 Characteristics of <strong>design</strong> processes <strong>in</strong> relation to ethical <strong>issues</strong> 32<br />
2.3.1 Design type <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy 32<br />
2.3.2 Normative frameworks 36<br />
2.3.3 Moral responsibility <strong>and</strong> the trust relationship between<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> society 37<br />
2.4 Summary 42<br />
3 Introduction to the case-studies 43<br />
3.1 Work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses 43<br />
3.2 Selection of the case-studies 44<br />
3.3 Acquisition of empirical data 46<br />
4 DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able? 49<br />
4.1 A light family car 50<br />
4.2 The <strong>design</strong> team 53<br />
4.2.1 ‘If you have thought it through then it is ok’ 56<br />
4.3 What does it mean <strong>for</strong> a car to be safe? 59<br />
4.3.1 Active safety 60<br />
4.3.2 Passive safety 61<br />
4.3.3 Partner protection 63<br />
4.3.4 Car security 64
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
4.3.5 Regulation 64<br />
4.4 Light throw away after use? 65<br />
4.5 Susta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>and</strong> / or safe 70<br />
4.6 Summary of the case <strong>and</strong> the regulative framework 70<br />
4.6.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> 71<br />
4.6.2 Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong> 73<br />
4.6.3 Regulative framework 74<br />
4.7 Acknowledgements 76<br />
5 Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Equipment 77<br />
5.1 The <strong>design</strong> of a (petro)chemical plant 77<br />
5.2 Regulation regard<strong>in</strong>g pressure vessels <strong>and</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g 79<br />
5.2.1 Regulations 80<br />
5.2.2 Codes regard<strong>in</strong>g pressure vessels <strong>and</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g 81<br />
5.2.3 St<strong>and</strong>ards regard<strong>in</strong>g pressure vessels <strong>and</strong> pipes 82<br />
5.3 Clear responsibilities <strong>and</strong> tasks 83<br />
5.4 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> 84<br />
5.5 Summary of the case <strong>and</strong> the regulative framework 90<br />
5.5.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> 91<br />
5.5.2 Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong> 92<br />
5.5.2 Regulative framework 92<br />
5.6 Acknowledgements 94<br />
6 Design<strong>in</strong>g a Bridge 95<br />
6.1 The <strong>design</strong> problem 95<br />
6.2 Try<strong>in</strong>g to reconcile all requirements <strong>and</strong> stakeholders 98<br />
6.3 Legislation <strong>and</strong> codes 102<br />
6.3.1 Safety dur<strong>in</strong>g construction 102<br />
6.3.2 Safety <strong>in</strong> use 104<br />
6.3.3 Susta<strong>in</strong>ability 110<br />
6.4 Responsibility <strong>and</strong> liability 112<br />
6.5 Summary of the case <strong>and</strong> the regulative framework 113<br />
6.5.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> 114<br />
6.5.2 Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong> 116<br />
6.5.3 Regulative frameworks 117<br />
6.6 Acknowledgements 121<br />
7 Design of a lightweight trailer 123<br />
7.1 A lightweight truck trailer 124<br />
7.2 “The customer is always right” 126
Contents<br />
7.3 Safe <strong>in</strong> what sense? 131<br />
7.3.1 Structural reliability 133<br />
7.3.2 Misuse <strong>and</strong> overload<strong>in</strong>g 141<br />
7.4 Ascrib<strong>in</strong>g responsibilities 143<br />
7.5 Summary of the case <strong>and</strong> the regulative framework 147<br />
7.5.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> 147<br />
7.5.2 Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong> 150<br />
7.5.3 Regulative framework 150<br />
7.6 Acknowledgements 151<br />
8 Conclusions of the empirical study 153<br />
8.1 Summary of the results 154<br />
8.2 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> hierarchy 159<br />
8.3 Approaches to resolve ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong><br />
hierarchy 160<br />
8.3.1 Decision makers <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> hierarchy 162<br />
8.4 Regulative frameworks 165<br />
8.5 Design problem <strong>for</strong>mulation 167<br />
8.6 Generalisation of the conclusions 169<br />
9 Towards warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers 175<br />
9.1 Normal <strong>design</strong> 175<br />
9.1.1 Required competence of eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> 176<br />
9.1.2 Grunwald’s requirements reconsidered 177<br />
9.2 Radical <strong>design</strong> 181<br />
9.2.1 Identify<strong>in</strong>g what affected actors value 182<br />
9.3 Further research 186<br />
9.4 Recommendations <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g education 187<br />
Literature 191<br />
Samenvatt<strong>in</strong>g 199<br />
Appendix 1 211<br />
Appendix 2 215<br />
Dankwoord 219<br />
Curriculum Vitae 221
1 Introduction<br />
On March the 6 th , 1987, the roll-on/roll-off (ro/ro) passenger <strong>and</strong> freight ferry the<br />
Herald of Free Enterprise capsized just outside the Zeebrugge harbour. 1 Water<br />
rapidly filled the ship, lead<strong>in</strong>g to the death of 150 passengers <strong>and</strong> 38<br />
crewmembers. The ma<strong>in</strong> cause of the disaster was that the <strong>in</strong>ner <strong>and</strong> outer bow<br />
doors were open when the ship left port.<br />
The assistant bosun should have closed the doors, but he had fallen asleep.<br />
The absence of warn<strong>in</strong>g lights made it impossible to see from the bridge whether<br />
the bow doors were closed. On at least two previous occasions, similar negligence<br />
with sister ships owned by the same company had led to the ships leav<strong>in</strong>g port<br />
with the bow doors open. These <strong>in</strong>cidents however passed without disastrous<br />
results [London Crown, 1987].<br />
Pressure to depart quickly <strong>and</strong> poor communication had contributed to<br />
leav<strong>in</strong>g port with the bow doors still open <strong>in</strong> the case of the Herald. As is often<br />
the case, it was human error that preceded the disaster, but it was the <strong>design</strong> of<br />
the ferry that made the occurrence of such a disaster possible <strong>in</strong> the first place. It<br />
was the <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong>stability that ro/ro ferries encounter when water enters a deck<br />
that played an important role <strong>in</strong> the disaster. This is an aspect of ship <strong>design</strong>. It<br />
might be expected that while <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g the Herald <strong>and</strong> her sister ships, the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers were aware that if water were to flood on the decks the ship might<br />
quickly become unstable. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the Herald disaster there was a similar<br />
disaster with another ro/ro ferry, the Estonia. Water filled one of the decks <strong>and</strong><br />
the ship capsized kill<strong>in</strong>g nearly 800 people. This happened despite the fact that<br />
Estonia’s owners had complied with the proposed new regulation concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
ro/ro ferries <strong>for</strong>mulated after the Herald disaster [Van Poortvliet, 1999].<br />
In the follow<strong>in</strong>g, more detailed description of the Herald disaster I will focus<br />
on decisions made <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process that made the ship very vulnerable to<br />
water flood<strong>in</strong>g the car decks. This example demonstrates the possible ethical<br />
impact of decisions made <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
One ethical question that arises <strong>in</strong> relation to the <strong>design</strong> of the Herald of Free<br />
Enterprise, <strong>and</strong> other ro/ro ferries, is whether it should have been <strong>design</strong>ed to be<br />
more safe given the fact that it was known that water enter<strong>in</strong>g the deck might<br />
result <strong>in</strong> rapid capsiz<strong>in</strong>g. This is a moral problem because passengers, crew <strong>and</strong><br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1 This description of the Herald of free enterprise disaster is based on “<strong>Ethical</strong> considerations <strong>in</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> processes” [Van Gorp <strong>and</strong> Van de Poel, 2001]<br />
9
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
their families are harmed when a ship capsizes. There were, <strong>and</strong> are, simple<br />
technical solutions if one wants to prevent rapid capsiz<strong>in</strong>g when water enters a<br />
deck. Bulkheads created on the decks can easily prevent water from flow<strong>in</strong>g freely<br />
over a deck <strong>and</strong> prevent rapid capsiz<strong>in</strong>g [www.safetyl<strong>in</strong>e.wa.gov, 2005].<br />
Bulkheads on decks, however, give rise to longer load<strong>in</strong>g / unload<strong>in</strong>g times <strong>and</strong><br />
take up space on the decks, hence this costs money.<br />
When we look at ethical problems <strong>in</strong> relation to the <strong>design</strong> of the Herald <strong>and</strong><br />
comparable ships, ethical <strong>issues</strong> become relevant at different stages of the <strong>design</strong><br />
process <strong>and</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the use of the product. <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> are relevant dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulation of criteria <strong>and</strong> requirements <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the acceptance of<br />
trade-offs between requirements. I will focus on the <strong>for</strong>mulation of safety<br />
requirements <strong>for</strong> a ro/ro passenger or freight ferry, <strong>and</strong> on the trade-offs that<br />
exist between safety <strong>and</strong> economic requirements. This description will expla<strong>in</strong><br />
why ro/ro ferries were not <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> a way that would prevent rapid capsiz<strong>in</strong>g if<br />
water floods a deck.<br />
When it comes to <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g legal safety requirements, the International<br />
Maritime Organisation (IMO) has an important part to play. This <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
organisation is responsible <strong>for</strong> adopt<strong>in</strong>g legislation <strong>for</strong> ships. IMO’s safety<br />
legislation deals with the ship <strong>and</strong> passengers. The SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea)<br />
convention is especially concerned with passenger safety <strong>and</strong> with lifesav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
equipment on passenger ships. IMO officials knew as early as 1981 that if water<br />
entered the car decks of a ro/ro ferry, the ship could be lost <strong>in</strong> a rapid capsize<br />
[Van Poortvliet, 1999, 52]. Water enter<strong>in</strong>g the car deck will flow to the lowest<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t lead<strong>in</strong>g to a greater <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation, result<strong>in</strong>g, if the <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation exceeds a certa<strong>in</strong><br />
angle, <strong>in</strong> a rapid capsize. This fact has been regarded as common knowledge <strong>in</strong><br />
the maritime world, at least s<strong>in</strong>ce 1981. The IMO did not adjust its regulations to<br />
solve this problem, even though simple technical solutions, e.g. bulkheads, were<br />
available.<br />
Legislation adopted by the IMO needs to be implemented by governments,<br />
<strong>and</strong> only governments accept<strong>in</strong>g the IMO convention will implement it. Thus<br />
when mak<strong>in</strong>g a convention, it is important to make it acceptable <strong>for</strong> as many<br />
governments as possible, otherwise only a small percentage of all fleets will be<br />
obliged to abide by the convention. A shipp<strong>in</strong>g company can decide to sail under<br />
the flag of another country which has not ratified an IMO convention, if, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
op<strong>in</strong>ion of company management, comply<strong>in</strong>g with the convention will cost a lot<br />
of money. So there is a certa<strong>in</strong> amount of pressure on the IMO not to issue safety<br />
requirements that are considered by some governments to be too tight or too<br />
costly to implement.<br />
10
Introduction<br />
Most IMO conventions affect new ships but do not apply retrospectively to<br />
ships already at sea. This is known as the gr<strong>and</strong>father clause. The gr<strong>and</strong>father<br />
clause protects the poorer states, because <strong>for</strong> them it would be too costly to adapt<br />
their older fleets to new legislation. IMO legislation may thus be said to be weak<br />
<strong>and</strong> ro/ro vessels comply<strong>in</strong>g with IMO legislation are still prone to rapid capsize.<br />
Apart from the IMO, <strong>in</strong>surance <strong>and</strong> classification companies also have a part<br />
to play <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mulation of safety requirements. To obta<strong>in</strong> hull <strong>in</strong>surance from<br />
<strong>in</strong>surance companies such as Lloyd’s of London, a ship needs to be classified.<br />
Classification organisations are private organisations that monitor compliance<br />
with legislation dur<strong>in</strong>g construction <strong>and</strong> certify sea worth<strong>in</strong>ess dur<strong>in</strong>g a ship’s<br />
lifetime. Only the ship’s equipment <strong>and</strong> construction are taken <strong>in</strong>to account by<br />
the classification organisations, they do not deal with passenger safety [Van<br />
Poortvliet, 1999].<br />
There is little <strong>in</strong>centive <strong>for</strong> shipp<strong>in</strong>g companies to ask <strong>for</strong>, or <strong>for</strong> shipyards to<br />
<strong>design</strong>, ships that are safer than required by IMO conventions <strong>and</strong> hull <strong>in</strong>surance<br />
regulations. When disasters occur the <strong>in</strong>vestigation that follows usually concludes<br />
that it was a human error that led to the disaster. Little attention is given to the<br />
<strong>design</strong> of the ship as long as, on completion, the ship complied with the current<br />
regulations of the time.<br />
Six actors are important <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mulation of the safety requirements laid down<br />
<strong>for</strong> ro/ro ferries. These actors are: the IMO, governments, <strong>in</strong>surance companies,<br />
classification companies, shipyards <strong>and</strong> shipp<strong>in</strong>g companies. To underst<strong>and</strong> why<br />
these six actors have not <strong>for</strong>mulated tighter safety requirements, it is important to<br />
realize that when safety requirements are <strong>for</strong>mulated a trade-off is made with<br />
economic requirements.<br />
Economic considerations are important <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>surance <strong>and</strong> classification<br />
companies because they depend on shipyards <strong>and</strong> shipp<strong>in</strong>g companies. When<br />
the safety requirements they impose are more costly than those of competitors<br />
they will lose customers. Insurance companies will want the requirements to be<br />
tight enough to prevent them from hav<strong>in</strong>g to pay out too frequently <strong>for</strong> hull loss<br />
<strong>and</strong> damages. However, they usually do not want to impose more or tighter<br />
requirements than their competitors as they are afraid of loos<strong>in</strong>g their customers.<br />
Shipyards do not have loyal customers. To be competitive the price needs to<br />
be kept as low as possible or at least lower than that of the competitors. Safety<br />
measures are usually only built <strong>in</strong> when there is a legal obligation to do so.<br />
Shipyards may not be held liable if, at the time they were built, their ships<br />
complied with the relevant legislation.<br />
Shipp<strong>in</strong>g companies <strong>in</strong> Northwest Europe are <strong>in</strong> strong competition with<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> planes, there<strong>for</strong>e they do not want to face <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g costs or longer<br />
11
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
load<strong>in</strong>g times. In the case of ro/ro ferries, shipp<strong>in</strong>g companies do not want to<br />
have bulkheads on the decks because it takes time to put them <strong>in</strong> place while<br />
load<strong>in</strong>g the ferry. Moreover, fewer cars can be transported because the bulkheads<br />
have to be <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> such a way that larger <strong>and</strong> smaller cars can fit between<br />
them; this requires spac<strong>in</strong>g between the bulkheads that is less efficient if large<br />
cars <strong>and</strong> freight-trucks are considered. So shipp<strong>in</strong>g companies also trade off<br />
safety aga<strong>in</strong>st economic considerations.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, the IMO <strong>and</strong> governments of <strong>in</strong>dividual countries also trade off safety<br />
considerations aga<strong>in</strong>st economic ones. As we saw earlier <strong>for</strong> IMO conventions to<br />
be effective as many countries as possible have to support them. For many<br />
countries, economic considerations will play an important part when it comes to<br />
decid<strong>in</strong>g which safety requirements they consider acceptable. This is re<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>ced<br />
by the fact that shipp<strong>in</strong>g companies can choose which flag they sail under.<br />
Governments could <strong>for</strong>bid ships that do not meet their stricter national<br />
regulations from enter<strong>in</strong>g their harbours. There are economic reasons not to do<br />
this. A government’s national harbours, where stricter regulations are en<strong>for</strong>ced,<br />
will have a competitive disadvantage compared to harbours <strong>in</strong> countries that do<br />
not impose stricter regulation than the IMO regulation. This, <strong>in</strong> turn, re<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>ces<br />
competition between countries when it comes to devis<strong>in</strong>g attractive rules <strong>for</strong><br />
shipp<strong>in</strong>g companies. Such competition may well water down safety<br />
requirements.<br />
To summarise, some of the important ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> the case of the Herald of<br />
Free Enterprise are the follow<strong>in</strong>g: the ship’s <strong>design</strong> was <strong>in</strong>herently unstable once<br />
water entered the car deck. Is it ethically justifiable to <strong>design</strong>, produce <strong>and</strong> use<br />
ships that are <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> circumstances <strong>in</strong>herently unstable? What is the<br />
responsibility of eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> this complex situation? There were no warn<strong>in</strong>g<br />
lights on the bridge, there<strong>for</strong>e it was not possible to establish from the bridge<br />
whether the bow doors were closed or not. Should eng<strong>in</strong>eers attempt to anticipate<br />
human errors dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process? Is it the responsibility of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
to <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong> a way that prevents human errors as much as possible or even to<br />
<strong>design</strong> idiot proof ships? It is, <strong>for</strong> example, desirable to <strong>design</strong> ferries that cannot<br />
leave port unless the bow doors are fully closed <strong>and</strong> secured. As we have seen <strong>in</strong><br />
sett<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> requirements, trade-offs are made between safety <strong>and</strong><br />
economics. There is economic pressure to water down safety requirements. Are<br />
trade-offs between economics <strong>and</strong> safety acceptable? Which of the choices<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g this trade-off can be justified? Does follow<strong>in</strong>g the regulations lead to<br />
morally acceptable <strong>design</strong>s? <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> that come up <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes like<br />
the ones mentioned above will be central <strong>in</strong> this thesis.<br />
12
1.1 Research question <strong>and</strong> objective<br />
Introduction<br />
Technology has a profound <strong>in</strong>fluence on society. New possibilities <strong>and</strong> new risks<br />
arise as a consequence of the employment of new technologies <strong>and</strong> products.<br />
Decisions made dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> processes shape the possibilities <strong>and</strong> risks of<br />
products. These decisions are ethically relevant. Some decisions, <strong>for</strong> example, can<br />
have a large <strong>in</strong>fluence on the safety of people us<strong>in</strong>g the product. Although there<br />
is extensive literature on <strong>design</strong> processes <strong>and</strong> on eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics, specific<br />
attention <strong>for</strong> ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes is relatively new. A lot of the<br />
literature on eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics has been developed from the study of disasters<br />
such as the Herald of Free Enterprise or cases of whistle-blow<strong>in</strong>g but <strong>in</strong> these<br />
studies only little attention is given to the <strong>design</strong> process. In this research I will<br />
focus on daily practice <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>. It might seem strange to start this<br />
chapter with the description of a disaster given that I will look at daily<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g practice, the description of the Herald disaster is only <strong>in</strong>tended to<br />
make it clear that eng<strong>in</strong>eers make choices regard<strong>in</strong>g ethical <strong>issues</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
processes. These decisions can, but need not, have detrimental consequences.<br />
With or without the actual occurrence of the Herald disaster, the <strong>design</strong> of this<br />
ro/ro ferry may be seen as an example of daily eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g practice. My research<br />
question is as follows:<br />
What k<strong>in</strong>d of ethical <strong>issues</strong> come up <strong>and</strong> how do eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with these ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> processes?<br />
This analysis of <strong>design</strong> practice will contribute to eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics. 2 It will<br />
provide detailed <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on which ethical <strong>issues</strong> play a part <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> how eng<strong>in</strong>eers decide about these <strong>issues</strong>. This <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation should<br />
enrich discussions on the moral responsibility of eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes.<br />
The objective of this research can be summarised as follows:<br />
To provide a contribution to discussions on the moral responsibilities of<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> processes.<br />
The contribution will consist of detailed descriptions of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
practices <strong>and</strong> a normative analysis of these <strong>design</strong> practices. As can be seen <strong>in</strong><br />
the Herald case there can be regulation perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> of the product.<br />
This research should provide <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>for</strong> answer<strong>in</strong>g, amongst others, the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g question: do eng<strong>in</strong>eers behave <strong>in</strong> a morally responsible manner if they<br />
follow the exist<strong>in</strong>g regulations or should responsible eng<strong>in</strong>eers do more than<br />
just follow the regulations?<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
2 People <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> research <strong>and</strong> not eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics might be <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> the<br />
case descriptions because actual <strong>design</strong> processes are described.<br />
13
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
1.1.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong><br />
Until now I have assumed that the reader knows <strong>in</strong>tuitively what ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
are. I will now expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> more detail the mean<strong>in</strong>g of the term “ethical” as used<br />
here. 3 I will call a problem an ethical or moral problem if moral values are at<br />
stake. In characteris<strong>in</strong>g moral values I will follow Thomas Nagel. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Nagel, there are different sources of value, special allegiances, general rights,<br />
utility, perfectionist ends of self-development <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual projects, that cannot<br />
be reduced to each other or to more fundamental values. Values based on special<br />
allegiances are, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Nagel a result of a subject’s relationships to others<br />
<strong>and</strong> consist of special obligations to other people or <strong>in</strong>stitutions. General rights<br />
are rights that everyone has as a human be<strong>in</strong>g. These rights constra<strong>in</strong> action;<br />
actions that violate these rights are morally not permitted. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Nagel,<br />
‘utility <strong>in</strong>cludes all aspects of benefit <strong>and</strong> harm to all people (or sentient be<strong>in</strong>gs)’<br />
[Nagel, 1979, 129]. Perfectionist ends of self-development refer to the <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic<br />
value of certa<strong>in</strong> achievements. Nagel provides examples of the <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic value of<br />
scientific discovery or artistic creation. The fifth type of value derives from<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual projects. Nagel says that ‘this is value <strong>in</strong> addition to whatever reasons<br />
may have led to them <strong>in</strong> the first place’ [Nagel, 1979, 130]. An example Nagel<br />
gives is that if you have set out <strong>and</strong> started to climb to the top of Mount Everest<br />
then this project ga<strong>in</strong>s importance. <strong>Ethical</strong> theories usually focus on one of the<br />
sources of value. Kantianism focuses on universal rights. Utilitarianism only<br />
accounts <strong>for</strong> utility. Virtue ethics concentrates on perfectionist end of selfdevelopment.<br />
I do not want to limit myself to one source of value by choos<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ition of ethical <strong>issues</strong> that refers only to utility or virtues or universal rights.<br />
In this thesis, <strong>issues</strong> that are related to one of the sources of moral values<br />
identified by Nagel are called ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> decisions concern<strong>in</strong>g ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> are called “ethically relevant” decisions. For example, <strong>issues</strong> concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
safety are related to utility but also to universal rights, there<strong>for</strong>e safety is an<br />
ethical issue. The term “ethical issue” only <strong>in</strong>dicates that the way eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal<br />
with an issue can be evaluated from an ethical po<strong>in</strong>t of view.<br />
This conception of ethical <strong>issues</strong> is used <strong>in</strong>dependently of what eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
themselves th<strong>in</strong>k are ethical <strong>issues</strong>. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers may or may not share this<br />
conception of ethical <strong>issues</strong>. Even <strong>in</strong> cases that eng<strong>in</strong>eers do not consider an<br />
issue to be ethical, if it is an ethical issue accord<strong>in</strong>g to the above conception I will<br />
treat it as such <strong>in</strong> this research. There might also be <strong>issues</strong> that eng<strong>in</strong>eers call<br />
ethical but that are not ethical <strong>issues</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to the above conception; these<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
3 Some philosophers <strong>in</strong>dicate that morality describes a code of conduct of a society or another<br />
group [Gert, 2002]. <strong>Ethics</strong> or moral philosophy is then construed to be a critical reflection on<br />
morality. I will use the terms “ethical” <strong>and</strong> “moral” <strong>in</strong>terchangeably.<br />
14
Introduction<br />
<strong>issues</strong> will not be considered ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> this thesis. An example of this is<br />
that some <strong>in</strong>dustrial <strong>design</strong>ers conflate aesthetic <strong>and</strong> moral values.<br />
Some of the ethical <strong>issues</strong> are also legal <strong>issues</strong>, <strong>for</strong> example safety <strong>issues</strong>.<br />
There is a lot of legislation, st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> codes perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to safety <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong>.<br />
This makes decisions regard<strong>in</strong>g safety no less ethically relevant, it only provides<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers with rules they should follow from a legal po<strong>in</strong>t of view when mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
decisions. In these cases the way eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with these <strong>issues</strong> can be<br />
evaluated both from an ethical <strong>and</strong> a legal po<strong>in</strong>t of view. Decisions about the<br />
safety of a product might then be morally right or wrong <strong>and</strong> legal or illegal. A<br />
question that can be raised <strong>in</strong> such <strong>in</strong>stances is whether a <strong>design</strong> that is safe<br />
enough accord<strong>in</strong>g to legislation is also ethically acceptable <strong>and</strong> vice versa.<br />
Legislation, codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards regard<strong>in</strong>g safety can also be evaluated ethically.<br />
1.1.2 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
To take <strong>in</strong>to account all ethical <strong>issues</strong> connected <strong>in</strong> one way or another to a <strong>design</strong><br />
process would be impossible. It is not that difficult to po<strong>in</strong>t out the ethical<br />
relevance of what seems to be a very trivial choice, like which tea to dr<strong>in</strong>k dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs of a <strong>design</strong> team. Tea can be produced organically or with the use of<br />
herbicides <strong>and</strong> under good or bad work<strong>in</strong>g conditions. The choice of what tea to<br />
dr<strong>in</strong>k is there<strong>for</strong>e related to utility <strong>and</strong> universal rights. Lots of ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
might play a role <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> context, <strong>for</strong> example some parts might be<br />
produced <strong>in</strong> countries where child labour is usual <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e it might be<br />
assumed that these parts are made by children. Although all these <strong>issues</strong> like<br />
child labour, exploitation of underdeveloped countries, use of herbicides <strong>and</strong><br />
pesticides are <strong>in</strong>deed ethical <strong>issues</strong>, these <strong>issues</strong> will not <strong>for</strong>m the ma<strong>in</strong> focus of<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> this research. I will concentrate on ethical <strong>issues</strong> that have a direct<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence on the <strong>design</strong> of a product <strong>and</strong> the way it is used. In particular, I will<br />
focus on ethical <strong>issues</strong> concern<strong>in</strong>g safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability. The reason <strong>for</strong> the<br />
focus on safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability is that these play a dom<strong>in</strong>ant role <strong>in</strong> many<br />
<strong>design</strong> processes. Given the conception of ethical <strong>issues</strong> it is clear that safety <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability may give rise to ethical <strong>issues</strong>. Decisions made about these <strong>issues</strong><br />
are related to utility <strong>and</strong> general rights. Decisions regard<strong>in</strong>g safety <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability are made <strong>in</strong> almost every <strong>design</strong> process, although the importance<br />
of these subjects may differ. In some cases, susta<strong>in</strong>ability or safety will not be<br />
regarded or discussed by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers, but this does not mean that there are no<br />
choices made regard<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>ability or safety.<br />
In the follow<strong>in</strong>g two examples I will show that the impact of decisions made<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> processes concern<strong>in</strong>g safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability may be far reach<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
In everyday life choices about safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability with regard to the use of<br />
technological devices are often made, but the consequences of the choices made<br />
15
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
by an <strong>in</strong>dividual user about safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability are usually of a much<br />
smaller magnitude than those <strong>for</strong> decisions made dur<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
When <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a pr<strong>in</strong>ter/copier, a choice needs to be made as to whether the<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ter/copier will be able to pr<strong>in</strong>t two sided or not. Once a choice is made <strong>for</strong><br />
two sided pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> copy<strong>in</strong>g, an additional choice needs to be made about the<br />
default properties. If two sided pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g is the default option, users have to make<br />
an explicit choice to pr<strong>in</strong>t one sided. Usually the pr<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>and</strong> copies com<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />
mach<strong>in</strong>e will be pr<strong>in</strong>ted two sided. Only <strong>in</strong> exceptional cases, where the two sided<br />
copies <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ts option is switched off by the user, will papers be pr<strong>in</strong>ted one<br />
sided. This default option will probably save a lot of paper compared with a<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ter/copier that can only pr<strong>in</strong>t one side. The environmental effects of sav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
paper are not that big if a s<strong>in</strong>gle pr<strong>in</strong>ter/copier is regarded but when the total<br />
number of pr<strong>in</strong>ters/copiers <strong>in</strong> use is considered the amount of paper saved by<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g two sided copies <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ts is enormous. As paper is produced from<br />
wood, a reduction <strong>in</strong> paper use will also reduce the amount of wood used. The<br />
production of paper, the transportation of wood <strong>and</strong> the transportation of paper<br />
all require energy. The amount of energy used will also be reduced <strong>and</strong> the total<br />
reduction <strong>in</strong> the resources used will be significant on a global scale. This example<br />
shows that decisions made dur<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> phase of a product, <strong>and</strong> that seem<br />
trivial dur<strong>in</strong>g that phase, can have large environmental effects.<br />
Another example of the ethical impact of <strong>design</strong> decisions is the follow<strong>in</strong>g. A<br />
person may decide not to drive too fast as this is usually dangerous <strong>and</strong> not<br />
environment friendly. The government of a country might decide to regulate the<br />
speed of cars by impos<strong>in</strong>g speed limits. If there are speed limits imposed drivers<br />
can still drive as fast as they wish, <strong>and</strong> is possible <strong>in</strong> their car, but they will run<br />
the risk of be<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ed when exceed<strong>in</strong>g the speed limits. Car eng<strong>in</strong>eers might<br />
decide to <strong>design</strong> a car <strong>in</strong> which it is impossible to exceed the speed limits. Trucks<br />
<strong>for</strong> example <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s are equipped with a speed regulator that makes it<br />
impossible <strong>for</strong> the driver to drive faster than 90 km/h. This example illustrates<br />
the <strong>in</strong>fluence eng<strong>in</strong>eers may have; they can promote or prevent speed<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Independently of what regulation requires or what speed limits are legally<br />
en<strong>for</strong>ced, eng<strong>in</strong>eers can <strong>design</strong> cars with lower top speeds. 4 Cars with top speeds<br />
of 300 km/h make speed<strong>in</strong>g possible <strong>and</strong> might perhaps <strong>in</strong>vite drivers to test the<br />
top speed while <strong>in</strong>stall<strong>in</strong>g a speed regulator or <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a car with a less<br />
powerful eng<strong>in</strong>e would make such speed<strong>in</strong>g impossible. Design<strong>in</strong>g cars with<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
4 In the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s only trucks are legally required to be equipped with speed regulators.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers might, however, decide to equip cars with speed regulators even if this is not legally<br />
required. There is a gentlemen’s agreement between German car producers to limit the speed of<br />
a car to 250 km/h, examples are the Mercedes Benz CLK 55 AMG cabriolet, the BMW M5 (with<br />
speed limiter 250 km/h without 338 km/h), Audi A3 sportback 3.2 Quatro. Although MG is not a<br />
German car producer, the MG ZT/ZT-T260 is also limited to 250 km/h [Carros, 2004].<br />
16
Introduction<br />
lower top speeds would also save a lot of fuel as the fuel consumption is higher at<br />
higher speeds. Lower fuel consumption also decreases CO2 production. Smaller<br />
speed differences, <strong>for</strong> example between trucks <strong>and</strong> cars may possibly decrease the<br />
number of accidents occurr<strong>in</strong>g on roads <strong>and</strong> thereby the number of people<br />
<strong>in</strong>jured <strong>and</strong> killed on roads. So by choos<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>design</strong> a car with lower top speeds,<br />
be it by actively limit<strong>in</strong>g the top speed of the car or <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a less powerful<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>e, eng<strong>in</strong>eers can reduce fuel consumption, CO2 production <strong>and</strong> the amount<br />
<strong>and</strong> severity of accidents on highways.<br />
1.2 Research approach<br />
Descriptions of <strong>design</strong> practices have to be obta<strong>in</strong>ed to answer the research<br />
question. This will be done through case-studies [Y<strong>in</strong>, 1984/1989]. In casestudies,<br />
different ways of obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g data can be used. In my case-studies, I have<br />
<strong>in</strong>terviewed eng<strong>in</strong>eers, observed <strong>design</strong> teams at work <strong>and</strong> read official <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal <strong>design</strong> documents.<br />
Observ<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs allowed me to collect <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about the<br />
way the decisions are made by eng<strong>in</strong>eers. Observ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs is also a<br />
way to get <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about what eng<strong>in</strong>eers perceived to be the difficulties <strong>and</strong><br />
challenges of <strong>design</strong> processes. The meet<strong>in</strong>gs used <strong>for</strong> the case-studies were<br />
taped <strong>and</strong> the tapes transcribed. See appendix 1 <strong>for</strong> a list of the meet<strong>in</strong>gs that<br />
were observed.<br />
Design documents, especially the official ones meant <strong>for</strong> customers, give a<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d of reconstruction of the decisions made <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs. The <strong>design</strong><br />
documents can sometimes provide additional <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, <strong>for</strong> example, <strong>in</strong> some<br />
<strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs arguments <strong>for</strong> or aga<strong>in</strong>st certa<strong>in</strong> choices were given but the<br />
actual decision was not taken dur<strong>in</strong>g the meet<strong>in</strong>g although the decision was<br />
documented <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> documents. The more <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal <strong>design</strong> documents<br />
often gave <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on specific aspects of the <strong>design</strong> process. This<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation can be used <strong>for</strong> later official <strong>design</strong> documents <strong>for</strong> customers.<br />
Sometimes the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal documents were more detailed than the official <strong>design</strong><br />
documents.<br />
Interviews were used to get further <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on what role specific<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers had <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>and</strong> whether they encountered ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong>. In the <strong>in</strong>terviews eng<strong>in</strong>eers were asked what they considered to be the<br />
ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> their <strong>design</strong> process. Most <strong>in</strong>terviews were held at or near the<br />
end of the observation period, so it was possible to ask eng<strong>in</strong>eers about anyth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that was not yet clear to me after hav<strong>in</strong>g read the <strong>design</strong> documents <strong>and</strong><br />
observed the <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs. All the <strong>in</strong>terviews were transcribed <strong>and</strong> the<br />
transcriptions were approved by the <strong>in</strong>terviewees, see appendix 1.<br />
17
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
After the <strong>in</strong>terview <strong>and</strong> observation periods I gave a presentation of my<br />
results to each of the <strong>design</strong> teams. This presentation was followed by a<br />
discussion. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers could <strong>in</strong>dicate whether I had made some <strong>in</strong>correct factual<br />
statements about the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>and</strong> whether or not they recognised the<br />
results. The presentation was also a last opportunity <strong>for</strong> me to ask about some<br />
details that were not yet clear to me. The reason <strong>for</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g a presentation at the<br />
end of the observation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview<strong>in</strong>g period was that the eng<strong>in</strong>eers were<br />
curious about, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong>, my research <strong>and</strong> results. If eng<strong>in</strong>eers asked me<br />
about the results, I told them that I would present my results, <strong>and</strong> give them the<br />
opportunity to react to these results, later on. This gave me the opportunity to<br />
postpone discussions on safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability until the presentation <strong>in</strong> order<br />
to <strong>in</strong>fluence the <strong>design</strong> process as little as possible.<br />
I have chosen to change the names of the participat<strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> the<br />
descriptions of the <strong>design</strong> processes The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not ask me to do this but<br />
I have chosen to protect their privacy <strong>in</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong> text, see appendix 1 <strong>for</strong> more<br />
concrete <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation. The exact identity of the persons <strong>in</strong>volved does not matter<br />
<strong>for</strong> the case descriptions, his or her arguments, decisions <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong>mal position <strong>in</strong><br />
the <strong>design</strong> team are relevant <strong>for</strong> this thesis.<br />
In do<strong>in</strong>g the case-studies, I made the choice to present myself as an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<br />
among eng<strong>in</strong>eers. A large advantage of this choice was that the <strong>design</strong> team<br />
members knew that I could underst<strong>and</strong> the “language” of eng<strong>in</strong>eers; <strong>and</strong><br />
although my participation was kept to a m<strong>in</strong>imum dur<strong>in</strong>g the observation <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>terview period, the members of the <strong>design</strong> teams knew that I was a qualified<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer; this made communication easier. The <strong>design</strong> team members did not<br />
feel compelled to expla<strong>in</strong> everyth<strong>in</strong>g they were do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a simplified way.<br />
In l<strong>in</strong>e with keep<strong>in</strong>g my participation at a m<strong>in</strong>imum, I did not contribute to<br />
the solution of the <strong>design</strong> problem. This choice was also made because<br />
participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong> process would require a lot from me as I had no<br />
previous <strong>design</strong> experience. The <strong>design</strong> task would probably completely absorb<br />
my attention <strong>and</strong> time, mak<strong>in</strong>g it difficult also to observe what was go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong><br />
the team. There<strong>for</strong>e, I was <strong>in</strong>volved but not as a member of the <strong>design</strong> team. I<br />
had some <strong>in</strong>put <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process at the end of the data gather<strong>in</strong>g period<br />
when I presented my results.<br />
With regard to the validity of my results, I tried to m<strong>in</strong>imise the <strong>in</strong>fluence of<br />
my presence. I did this by <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g that I was <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> processes without a thorough explanation of what I meant by the term<br />
“ethical <strong>issues</strong>”. Roughly, eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> the cases <strong>in</strong>terpreted the term “ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong>” <strong>in</strong> four different ways. First, some eng<strong>in</strong>eers thought that I wanted to look<br />
at human rights <strong>and</strong> wondered what I was do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> their company because they<br />
18
Introduction<br />
could not imag<strong>in</strong>e human rights <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> their company. Second, others thought<br />
that ethics was only concerned with what k<strong>in</strong>d of life a person should live <strong>and</strong><br />
wondered what <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g had to do with that. Third, some people, Bachelor<br />
students especially, thought that I would study the etiquettes <strong>in</strong> their <strong>design</strong><br />
team. Fourth, some eng<strong>in</strong>eers shared the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of ethical <strong>issues</strong> used <strong>in</strong><br />
this study <strong>and</strong> expected me to look at decisions concern<strong>in</strong>g the safety of the<br />
<strong>design</strong> or the prevention of disasters. I deliberately did not correct the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
who thought that I was <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> etiquette, the good life or human rights. My<br />
presence might have <strong>in</strong>fluenced the <strong>design</strong> team but as most of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers did<br />
not know exactly what I was look<strong>in</strong>g at it is not likely that they placed more<br />
emphasis on decisions concern<strong>in</strong>g safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability. I taped whole <strong>design</strong><br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> made notes throughout <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terviews, not only<br />
when safety or susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>issues</strong> were under discussion. If eng<strong>in</strong>eers asked<br />
questions about my research results I usually referred to the presentation that I<br />
would give later on.<br />
As little is known about the way eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> daily<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>, this was an exploratory research project. Based on ideas<br />
taken from the literature on <strong>design</strong> processes, <strong>and</strong> to be presented <strong>in</strong> chapter 2,<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses were <strong>for</strong>mulated. These work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses <strong>and</strong> the<br />
selected cases are <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> chapter 3. The cases are described <strong>in</strong> chapters 4<br />
to 7. Conclusions are drawn from the cases <strong>and</strong> an ef<strong>for</strong>t is made to generalise<br />
the results of the case-studies <strong>in</strong> chapter 8. The results from this research are<br />
used to make a start with def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g conditions <strong>for</strong> warranted trust <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers, <strong>in</strong> chapter 9. These conditions lead to a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary del<strong>in</strong>eation of the<br />
moral responsibilities that eng<strong>in</strong>eers have dur<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
19
2 Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
The research question <strong>and</strong> objective <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> chapter 1 <strong>in</strong>dicate that this<br />
thesis contributes to eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics. This research should lead to<br />
descriptions of the ethical <strong>issues</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers encounter <strong>and</strong> how they deal with<br />
these <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes. The focus on ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>design</strong> processes is relatively new. As yet <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics there has not<br />
been a lot of systematic attention <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes, as will be <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong><br />
section 2.1. An overview of the literature on the nature of <strong>design</strong> processes is<br />
presented <strong>in</strong> section 2.2. This overview is relevant because the ideas about the<br />
nature of <strong>design</strong> processes are used to guide the gather<strong>in</strong>g of data <strong>in</strong> the casestudies.<br />
Ideas about <strong>design</strong> processes that are particularly relevant <strong>for</strong> this thesis,<br />
because these ideas expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m the <strong>for</strong>mulations of work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses<br />
presented <strong>in</strong> the next chapter are <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> section 2.3.<br />
2.1 Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics<br />
Research <strong>in</strong>to ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> is part of the research field of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics.<br />
In this section I will not give a complete overview of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics literature.<br />
I will restrict myself to a description of the ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>issues</strong> that are focussed on <strong>in</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> how this research is positioned with regards to these<br />
<strong>issues</strong>.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics is the field of study that focuses on the ethical aspects of<br />
the actions <strong>and</strong> decisions of eng<strong>in</strong>eers, both <strong>in</strong>dividually <strong>and</strong> collectively. A rather<br />
broad range of (ethical) <strong>issues</strong> are discussed <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics: professional<br />
codes of conduct, whistle-blow<strong>in</strong>g, deal<strong>in</strong>g with safety <strong>and</strong> risks, liability <strong>issues</strong>,<br />
conflicts of <strong>in</strong>terests, mult<strong>in</strong>ational corporations, privacy etc (see <strong>for</strong> example<br />
[Harris et al., 1995] [Davis, 1998] <strong>and</strong> [Bird, 1998]). A substantial amount of<br />
literature on the teach<strong>in</strong>g of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics to eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g students has been<br />
developed s<strong>in</strong>ce the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the 1980’s, (cf.[Baum, 1980] [Unger, 1982]<br />
[Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Sch<strong>in</strong>z<strong>in</strong>ger, 1989] [Harris et al., 1995], [Birsch <strong>and</strong> Fielder, 1994]).<br />
A salient feature of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics literature is that a lot of it has been<br />
developed based on studies of disasters like the Challenger disaster ([Vaughan,<br />
1996] <strong>and</strong> [Davis, 1998]). Another feature of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics is that, especially<br />
<strong>in</strong> the United States, there are a lot of proponents who regard eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics<br />
as a k<strong>in</strong>d of professional ethics (cf [Schaub et al., 1983] [Davis, 2001] <strong>and</strong> [Harris,<br />
2004). The idea is that the eng<strong>in</strong>eer as a professional has obligations not only to<br />
his or her employer but also to the general public, as <strong>for</strong> example doctors or<br />
21
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
lawyers also have obligations. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers should adhere to professional codes of<br />
conduct that state, <strong>for</strong> example that eng<strong>in</strong>eers shall hold the safety <strong>and</strong> welfare of<br />
the public paramount. Based on descriptions of the Challenger disaster, Davis<br />
emphasizes that there is a difference between eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> managers.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers should adhere to their professional norms <strong>and</strong> hold safety paramount<br />
<strong>and</strong> managers do not do this [Davis, 1998]. This tendency to regard eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
ethics as a k<strong>in</strong>d of professional ethics has led to a focus on the <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>and</strong> his or her responsibilities <strong>in</strong> his or her job <strong>and</strong> profession <strong>in</strong> most<br />
(American) eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics textbooks. This can also expla<strong>in</strong> the focus on<br />
whistle blow<strong>in</strong>g that can be found <strong>in</strong> some of the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics literature.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eer should <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> cases take his or her moral <strong>and</strong><br />
professional responsibilities seriously <strong>and</strong> blow the whistle.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Z<strong>and</strong>voort et al. [Z<strong>and</strong>voort et al., 2000] <strong>and</strong> Devon et al.<br />
[Devon, et al., 2001] eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics should focus on more than the <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer. They argue that the ethical problems that eng<strong>in</strong>eers encounter are<br />
partly due to the context they work <strong>in</strong>. Some of the ethical problems cannot be<br />
solved by <strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eers or the profession.<br />
In contrast to most of the literature on eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics, I will not focus on<br />
disasters <strong>and</strong> isolated <strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eers. In this research the focus will be on<br />
daily practice <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>. Fortunately, not every eng<strong>in</strong>eer has to deal<br />
with disasters or with a decision as to whether to blow-the-whistle or not. There<br />
is not much literature on ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> daily practice, yet every eng<strong>in</strong>eer will<br />
be confronted with these ethical <strong>issues</strong>. Furthermore, no dist<strong>in</strong>ction will be<br />
made between eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> managers <strong>in</strong> this research as is sometimes done <strong>in</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics literature. I will regard every member of a <strong>design</strong> team as a<br />
<strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eer regardless of their job title or education. I have two reasons<br />
<strong>for</strong> this choice. One, <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s eng<strong>in</strong>eers are usually not regarded as<br />
professionals <strong>in</strong> a <strong>for</strong>mal sense. It would be difficult to <strong>in</strong>dicate who is a<br />
professional eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s as eng<strong>in</strong>eers are not licensed or<br />
certified. Hav<strong>in</strong>g taken a degree at a University of Technology <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s<br />
gives you the right to use the title “Ingenieur”. There are some professional<br />
organisations <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers but not all eng<strong>in</strong>eers are members <strong>and</strong> some are<br />
members of more than one professional organisation. Moreover, some<br />
professional organisations are open to everyone do<strong>in</strong>g a certa<strong>in</strong> type of work<br />
regardless of whether that person is entitled to use the title “Ingenieur”. 1 The<br />
second reason is that <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes eng<strong>in</strong>eers, managers <strong>and</strong> market<strong>in</strong>g<br />
specialists cooperate to <strong>design</strong> a product. It would be artificial to exclude some<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1<br />
An example of such a Dutch professional society open to everyone do<strong>in</strong>g a certa<strong>in</strong> type of work<br />
is “Bouwen met Staal” (Construction with Steel).<br />
22
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
persons who clearly cooperate <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process just because they have<br />
another job description or another educational background.<br />
2.1.1 <strong>Ethics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> is an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g topic <strong>for</strong> research from the po<strong>in</strong>t of view of<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics because <strong>design</strong> is one of the core activities of eng<strong>in</strong>eers.<br />
Moreover, technology has social <strong>and</strong> ethical implications because of the k<strong>in</strong>ds of<br />
products produced, as the outcomes of <strong>design</strong> processes. 2 Only recently has more<br />
attention been given to ethics <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> [Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby, 2003],<br />
[Devon et al., 2001], [Van de Poel, 2001]. Interest<strong>in</strong>g developments <strong>in</strong> ethics <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> can be found <strong>in</strong> the field of software <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> computer ethics. Ef<strong>for</strong>ts<br />
to <strong>in</strong>corporate values <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>design</strong> of software have been labelled “value<br />
sensitive <strong>design</strong>”.<br />
Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby use empirical data to describe how eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with<br />
ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> [Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby, 2003]. They use three ma<strong>in</strong> ethical<br />
theories to see whether reason<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> argumentation dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process<br />
fit with<strong>in</strong> these theories. They refer to the three ethical theories as<br />
“consequentialism”, “deontology” <strong>and</strong> “virtue ethics”. They looked at all<br />
reason<strong>in</strong>g, not just at reason<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>issues</strong> that are clearly ethical like safety<br />
[Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby, 2003, 514]. They relate, <strong>for</strong> example, reason<strong>in</strong>g about mak<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
better product to consequentialist reason<strong>in</strong>g. They conclude that, contrary to their<br />
expectations, consequentialist reason<strong>in</strong>g is not prevalent <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers also use deontological reason<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers identify what Lloyd<br />
<strong>and</strong> Busby call virtues of eng<strong>in</strong>eers like collectivity, consistency <strong>and</strong> emphasis<strong>in</strong>g<br />
evidence. Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby have considered normal day-to-day situations <strong>in</strong> which<br />
<strong>design</strong> decisions are made. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby a great number of<br />
small <strong>design</strong> decisions that each seem to be ethically neutral, can add up to<br />
ethically relevant consequences:<br />
‘Although it is simply a fact that not much of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g is<br />
specifically about what one might normally consider to be ethical <strong>issues</strong>,<br />
the products of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>- <strong>and</strong> particularly the use of those<br />
products- undoubtedly are.’ [Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby, 2003, 514]<br />
In many <strong>design</strong> processes, ethical problems are <strong>in</strong>deed difficult to recognise <strong>and</strong><br />
less specific than some of the examples given <strong>in</strong> the literature on disasters. I<br />
agree with Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby that <strong>in</strong> every <strong>design</strong> process “smaller” ethically<br />
relevant decisions are made. I th<strong>in</strong>k however that it is problematic to regard all<br />
decisions as be<strong>in</strong>g possibly ethically relevant. Some values like, <strong>for</strong> example,<br />
efficiency are not moral values (see section 1.1.1). Efficiency is there<strong>for</strong>e not<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
2 Of course also the extent to <strong>and</strong> the way <strong>in</strong> which products are used is important.<br />
23
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
necessarily an ethical issue. Decisions regard<strong>in</strong>g efficiency can, however, be<br />
ethically relevant if they are related to, <strong>for</strong> example, susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Mak<strong>in</strong>g a more<br />
energy efficient product is ethically relevant because it is a part of <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a<br />
more susta<strong>in</strong>able product. The same holds <strong>for</strong> try<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>design</strong> a product as<br />
simply as possible. Simplicity is a normative term but it need not be a moral<br />
term. Decisions concern<strong>in</strong>g simplicity are only sometimes related to moral<br />
values. Simplicity might be an ethical issue if it is related to ease of operation. A<br />
simple product can probably prevent accidents related to un<strong>in</strong>tended misuse. If<br />
operation of a mach<strong>in</strong>e requires a complex procedure, there is a chance that<br />
operators will make a mistake when carry<strong>in</strong>g out the procedure. Another issue<br />
related to simplicity might be that a simple product can be used by everyone,<br />
unlike some video recorders or microwave ovens that people f<strong>in</strong>d too difficult to<br />
use. Simplicity can there<strong>for</strong>e sometimes be related to moral values but this need<br />
not be the case.<br />
In contrast to Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby, who studied the (ethical) reason<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers use <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes, Van de Poel dist<strong>in</strong>guished five actions dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the <strong>design</strong> process that may be ethically relevant.<br />
24<br />
‘1) The <strong>for</strong>mulation of goals, <strong>design</strong> criteria <strong>and</strong> requirements <strong>and</strong> their<br />
operationalisation.<br />
2) The choice of alternatives to be <strong>in</strong>vestigated dur<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> process<br />
<strong>and</strong> the selection among those alternatives at a later stage <strong>in</strong> the process.<br />
3) The assessment of trade-offs between <strong>design</strong> criteria <strong>and</strong> decisions<br />
about the acceptability of particular trade-offs.<br />
4) The assessment of risks <strong>and</strong> secondary effects <strong>and</strong> decisions about the<br />
acceptability of these.<br />
5) The assessment of scripts <strong>and</strong> political <strong>and</strong> social visions that are<br />
(implicitly) <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> decisions about the desirability of<br />
these scripts.‘ [Van de Poel, 2000, 3]<br />
Van de Poel’s approach would imply that, <strong>for</strong> example, the <strong>for</strong>mulation of<br />
requirements is an action that can be expected to be done dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
processes. Formulat<strong>in</strong>g requirements can be ethically relevant, <strong>for</strong> example, if<br />
safety requirements are <strong>for</strong>mulated. These requirements need to be<br />
operationalised <strong>and</strong> this operationalisation is also ethically relevant. Different<br />
alternatives that score differently with respect to different requirements <strong>and</strong><br />
different operationalisations of requirements may have to be assessed. Trade-offs<br />
between different requirements may have to be made. In accordance with Van de<br />
Poel’s approach these actions can all be ethically relevant if related to moral<br />
values, <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e these are <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> this research.<br />
The concept of value sensitive <strong>design</strong> has been developed with<strong>in</strong> computer ethics<br />
<strong>and</strong> human computer <strong>in</strong>terface <strong>design</strong>. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Friedman <strong>and</strong> others:
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
‘Value Sensitive Design is a theoretically grounded approach to the <strong>design</strong><br />
of technology that accounts <strong>for</strong> human values <strong>in</strong> a pr<strong>in</strong>cipled <strong>and</strong><br />
comprehensive manner throughout the <strong>design</strong> process.’ [Friedman et al.,<br />
2003, 1]<br />
This def<strong>in</strong>ition does not imply that value sensitive <strong>design</strong> is only applicable<br />
with<strong>in</strong> software <strong>and</strong> computer <strong>design</strong>. Yet, the concept has until now been ma<strong>in</strong>ly<br />
used with<strong>in</strong> these fields <strong>and</strong> not with regard to the <strong>design</strong> of other k<strong>in</strong>ds of<br />
technology [www.nyu.edu/projects/values<strong>in</strong><strong>design</strong>/<strong>in</strong>dex.html]. In us<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
philosophical analysis of values <strong>and</strong> sociological research <strong>in</strong>to the use <strong>and</strong><br />
development of technology, value sensitive <strong>design</strong> is an attempt to make software<br />
<strong>design</strong>s that account <strong>for</strong> moral values like privacy <strong>and</strong> autonomy.<br />
The research under taken here may be considered research <strong>in</strong>to the way<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with moral values dur<strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> processes <strong>and</strong><br />
there<strong>for</strong>e research <strong>in</strong>to value sensitive <strong>design</strong>. There is, however, a difference:<br />
whereas researchers <strong>in</strong>to values sensitive <strong>design</strong> are try<strong>in</strong>g to develop a method<br />
<strong>for</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>g with moral values, I will concentrate on describ<strong>in</strong>g how eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong> like safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Another difference is that<br />
some ethical <strong>issues</strong> that are very important <strong>in</strong> software <strong>design</strong> like, <strong>for</strong> example,<br />
privacy <strong>and</strong> identity are not that important <strong>for</strong> my case-studies of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>design</strong>.<br />
2.2 Design<br />
The features of <strong>design</strong> problems <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes relevant to the topic of<br />
this thesis are presented <strong>in</strong> this section. At the end of this section I will present<br />
the conception of <strong>design</strong> processes used <strong>in</strong> this work.<br />
2.2.1 Design process<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Cross, the <strong>design</strong> process can be seen as a process <strong>in</strong> which<br />
products or tools are created to suit human purposes [Cross, 2000, 3]. The<br />
start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t of a <strong>design</strong> process is usually some stated or perceived customer’s<br />
needs. A material structure that meets these functional requirements is<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed. 3 The <strong>design</strong> process is usually constra<strong>in</strong>ed by economic <strong>and</strong> time<br />
restrictions. A <strong>design</strong> should be f<strong>in</strong>ished by a certa<strong>in</strong> date <strong>and</strong> the costs of the<br />
whole <strong>design</strong> process should not exceed a certa<strong>in</strong> amount of money.<br />
In the literature on <strong>design</strong> methodology a lot of different models of <strong>design</strong><br />
processes can be found ([Cross, 1989], [Roozenburg <strong>and</strong> Cross, 1991] <strong>and</strong> [Baxter,<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
3 One could also speak of the <strong>design</strong> of an organization <strong>in</strong> which an organizational structure is<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed rather than a material structure. I will focus on the <strong>design</strong> of material artefacts.<br />
25
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
1999]). Cross presents a model of the <strong>design</strong> process that consists of three<br />
phases: generation, evaluation <strong>and</strong> communication. A concept is generated <strong>in</strong> the<br />
first phase of the <strong>design</strong> process. A <strong>design</strong>er needs to underst<strong>and</strong> the <strong>design</strong><br />
problem <strong>and</strong> to f<strong>in</strong>d possible solutions <strong>for</strong> it; this usually happens<br />
simultaneously. Possible solutions help the <strong>design</strong>er to get a better<br />
underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>design</strong> problem. The concept is evaluated <strong>in</strong> the second<br />
phase. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the evaluation, a decision is made as to whether the possible<br />
solution meets the requirements. The concept is adapted <strong>in</strong> an iterative process.<br />
Often, more than one iterative step is necessary because adaptation of a part of<br />
the <strong>design</strong> can lead to problems <strong>in</strong> other parts of the <strong>design</strong>. The <strong>design</strong> is<br />
communicated to the people who are responsible <strong>for</strong> production <strong>in</strong> the third<br />
phase. Draw<strong>in</strong>gs, computer draw<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> descriptions of the <strong>design</strong> are used <strong>in</strong><br />
this communication [Cross, 1989].<br />
Another more detailed model is proposed by French [cited <strong>in</strong> Cross, 1989, 21<br />
–22]. French divides the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>in</strong>to four activities:<br />
• analysis of the problem<br />
• conceptual <strong>design</strong><br />
• embodiment of schemes<br />
• detail<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
An analysis of the <strong>design</strong> problem should lead to a clear statement of the<br />
problem. The requirements <strong>and</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts are <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> this phase. The<br />
<strong>design</strong>er searches <strong>for</strong> different possible solutions <strong>and</strong> makes schemes of them <strong>in</strong><br />
the conceptual <strong>design</strong> phase. In the next phase, embodiment of schemes, a<br />
choice is made between the schemes. The scheme is further detailed <strong>in</strong> the<br />
detail<strong>in</strong>g phase.<br />
Although there are different models that can be used to divide the <strong>design</strong><br />
process <strong>in</strong>to different phases <strong>and</strong> use different terms to name the phases, there<br />
are similarities between the models, (see also [Roozenburg <strong>and</strong> Cross, 1991] <strong>and</strong><br />
VDI 2221: Systematic Approach to the Design of Technical Systems <strong>and</strong> Products cited<br />
<strong>in</strong> [Cross, 2000, 39]). The <strong>design</strong> process can grosso modo be described as follows.<br />
The goal, requirements <strong>and</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts are def<strong>in</strong>ed at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>design</strong><br />
process. This is sometimes done by the customers or <strong>in</strong> co-operation between<br />
customer <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers. After this a creative part follows <strong>in</strong> which concepts are<br />
generated <strong>and</strong> evaluated. In the next phase, one concept is chosen <strong>and</strong> that<br />
concept is further detailed. F<strong>in</strong>ally, draw<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> descriptions of the <strong>design</strong> are<br />
made <strong>for</strong> the production of the product. The <strong>design</strong> process is not a l<strong>in</strong>ear<br />
process; it is iterative. It may always be necessary to go back one or more steps<br />
<strong>and</strong> then move <strong>for</strong>ward aga<strong>in</strong>.<br />
26
2.2.2 Design problems<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
If <strong>design</strong> problems are problems <strong>in</strong> which the requirements alone determ<strong>in</strong>e the<br />
solution then eng<strong>in</strong>eers can say that they are not responsible <strong>for</strong> ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
because the requirements determ<strong>in</strong>e everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> the customers def<strong>in</strong>e the<br />
requirements. Some authors ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that eng<strong>in</strong>eers are not, <strong>and</strong> should not be,<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mulation of <strong>design</strong> requirements, criteria or goals [Florman,<br />
1983]. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Florman, the <strong>for</strong>mulation of requirements <strong>and</strong> goals is<br />
ethically relevant, but this should not be done by eng<strong>in</strong>eers. Managers,<br />
politicians, customers etc should <strong>for</strong>mulate the requirements. In this l<strong>in</strong>e of<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, the task of eng<strong>in</strong>eers is to discover what is technologically the best<br />
solution given certa<strong>in</strong> requirements. This task is seen as ethically neutral. <strong>Ethical</strong><br />
questions may arise <strong>in</strong> the user phase when technologies are used <strong>for</strong> certa<strong>in</strong><br />
purposes <strong>and</strong> produce certa<strong>in</strong> (social) effects. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Florman these ethical<br />
questions concern<strong>in</strong>g use are also outside the scope of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> should<br />
be solved by the user (see figure 2.1). In this model, the sole responsibility of<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers is to carry out a task <strong>for</strong>mulated by others <strong>in</strong> a competent way.<br />
Figure 2.1: Division of labour with respect to eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> if <strong>design</strong><br />
problems were well-structured problems <strong>in</strong> which the requirements fully<br />
determ<strong>in</strong>e the solution, after [Van Gorp <strong>and</strong> Van de Poel, 2001].<br />
Design problems are, however, usually not problems where a clear set of<br />
requirements is available that completely determ<strong>in</strong>es the solution. Design<br />
problems are more or less ill-structured problems ([Simon, 1973] <strong>and</strong> [Cross,<br />
1989]). Simon states that <strong>in</strong> the ill-structured problem of <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a house:<br />
‘There is <strong>in</strong>itially no def<strong>in</strong>ite criterion to test a proposed solution, much<br />
less a mechanizeable process to apply the criterion. The problem space is<br />
not def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> any mean<strong>in</strong>gful way,’ [Simon, 1973, 311]<br />
27
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
For Simon the ma<strong>in</strong> characteristics of an ill-structured problem are that the<br />
solution space is not well-def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> that there is no criterion to test different<br />
solutions <strong>and</strong> decide which is best. Cross gives the follow<strong>in</strong>g characteristics of illstructured<br />
problems:<br />
28<br />
‘1. There is no def<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>for</strong>mulation of the problem.<br />
2. Any problem <strong>for</strong>mulation may embody <strong>in</strong>consistencies.<br />
3. Formulations of the problem are solution-dependent.<br />
4. Propos<strong>in</strong>g solutions is a means to underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the problem.<br />
5. There is no def<strong>in</strong>itive solution to the problem.’ [Cross, 1989, 11-12]<br />
Some <strong>design</strong> methods require that eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>for</strong>mulate the requirements <strong>and</strong><br />
solutions separately <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependently, but this is impossible if <strong>design</strong> problems<br />
are ill-structured. In a re<strong>design</strong> of an exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> it might be possible to<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulate most of the requirements at the start of the <strong>design</strong> process but this is<br />
not a def<strong>in</strong>ition of the requirements <strong>in</strong>dependent of the solution. The solution<br />
space is, <strong>in</strong> these cases, limited because a re<strong>design</strong> is made; certa<strong>in</strong> features of<br />
the product will rema<strong>in</strong> the same. Other <strong>design</strong> problems aim<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a<br />
completely new product are very ill-structured <strong>and</strong> only some vague<br />
requirements can be <strong>for</strong>mulated at the start of the <strong>design</strong> process. So <strong>design</strong><br />
problems can be more or less ill-structured.<br />
An example of an ill-structured problem is the follow<strong>in</strong>g. In the mid n<strong>in</strong>eteen<br />
n<strong>in</strong>eties substitutes were sought <strong>for</strong> replac<strong>in</strong>g CFCs as coolants <strong>in</strong> refrigerators,<br />
because CFCs damage the ozone layer [Van de Poel, 1998 <strong>and</strong> 2001]. Two<br />
alternatives were considered: HFC 134a <strong>and</strong> hydrocarbons, both have their<br />
advantages <strong>and</strong> their disadvantages. Hydrocarbons are <strong>for</strong> example flammable<br />
<strong>and</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g refrigerator <strong>design</strong> needed to be changed if hydrocarbons were<br />
used. HFC134a has a long atmospheric lifetime <strong>and</strong> if released would there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
still damage the environment, although to a lesser extent than CFCs. There were<br />
different operationalisations available <strong>for</strong> the environmental, health <strong>and</strong> safety<br />
criteria. Both proposed solutions scored differently under different<br />
operationalisations of the criteria. There was no solution that was best under all<br />
operationalisations. No def<strong>in</strong>ite criterion was available to say which solution was<br />
the better one. This example shows that even <strong>for</strong> the seem<strong>in</strong>gly simple case of<br />
look<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a substitute coolant <strong>in</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g refrigerator <strong>design</strong>, there are features<br />
of the problem that make it ill-structured.<br />
In cases where a <strong>design</strong> problem is an ill-structured problem, there may be<br />
more than one solution; each of these solutions can be valid. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers, <strong>in</strong> this<br />
case, have to make a choice: it is not the case that the requirements will lead to<br />
just one solution. At the start of a <strong>design</strong> process, there may not even be a clear<br />
<strong>and</strong> unambiguous set of requirements. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process it may be<br />
proved that there is no solution to the ill-structured problem. In some cases it
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
might prove to be necessary to adjust or drop some requirements because no<br />
solution meet<strong>in</strong>g all the requirements can be found. So a <strong>design</strong> problem can be<br />
under, or over, determ<strong>in</strong>ed by the requirements. Either way, eng<strong>in</strong>eers need to<br />
make choices dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> example regard<strong>in</strong>g which<br />
requirements can be dropped or which of the possible solutions to the <strong>design</strong><br />
problem is the best.<br />
2.2.3 The <strong>design</strong> process as a social process<br />
Most <strong>design</strong>s are made by a team of eng<strong>in</strong>eers. Design<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong> these cases a<br />
social process. Choices are made <strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> by groups of people. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong><br />
process, communication, negotiation, argumentation, (mis)trust between<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> power differences between eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong>fluence the <strong>design</strong>. This<br />
has consequences <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong> research as the <strong>design</strong> process should be<br />
conceptualised as a social process. There is some research <strong>in</strong>to actual <strong>design</strong><br />
processes with <strong>design</strong> teams [Bucciarelli, 1994], [Lloyd <strong>and</strong> Busby, 2001], [Lloyd,<br />
2000] <strong>and</strong> [Baird et al., 2000]. Bucciarelli describes the <strong>design</strong> process as a social<br />
process <strong>in</strong> which negotiation is necessary:<br />
‘Contemporary <strong>design</strong> is, <strong>in</strong> most <strong>in</strong>stances, a complex affair <strong>in</strong> which<br />
participants with different responsibilities <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests…. must br<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
stories <strong>in</strong> coherence’ [Bucciarelli, 1994, 83]<br />
The different eng<strong>in</strong>eers, with their different educational backgrounds <strong>and</strong><br />
experiences, will all conceive the <strong>design</strong> task differently. Take <strong>for</strong> example the<br />
cage construction <strong>and</strong> bodywork of a car. A mechanical eng<strong>in</strong>eer looks at stresses<br />
<strong>and</strong> stra<strong>in</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> the cage construction <strong>and</strong> bodywork of a car. He or she tries to<br />
<strong>design</strong> them <strong>in</strong> such a way that stresses <strong>and</strong> stra<strong>in</strong>s rema<strong>in</strong> low dur<strong>in</strong>g normal<br />
use <strong>and</strong> absorb energy dur<strong>in</strong>g a crash. An aerodynamics eng<strong>in</strong>eer might look at<br />
the same bodywork <strong>and</strong> sees a body that needs to have a low frontal area <strong>and</strong> a<br />
low drag coefficient. Although both the mechanical <strong>and</strong> the aerodynamics<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer look at the same parts they see someth<strong>in</strong>g different <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k of<br />
different requirements the parts should meet. All these different views have to be<br />
‘brought <strong>in</strong> coherence’ [Bucciarelli, 1994], just like all the parts have to fit <strong>and</strong><br />
function together. This ‘br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to coherence’ is done as a process of<br />
communication <strong>and</strong> negotiation.<br />
Other authors also recognise the importance of social processes dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process <strong>and</strong> stress the importance of communication. Lloyd stresses the<br />
importance of storytell<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process [Lloyd, 2000]. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
construct stories dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process. These stories are used to come to a<br />
common underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g:<br />
29
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
30<br />
‘Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> as a social activity consists <strong>in</strong> the construction of<br />
social agreements. We have observed storytell<strong>in</strong>g to be a mechanism that<br />
aids this construction.’ [Lloyd, 2000, 370]<br />
The stories can be used with<strong>in</strong> the entire company or with<strong>in</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gle departments.<br />
The whole company or <strong>design</strong> team might know the story of a previous <strong>design</strong><br />
failure. Stories of specific difficult customers might only be known <strong>in</strong> the sales<br />
department. Know<strong>in</strong>g the stories is part of be<strong>in</strong>g part of the <strong>design</strong> team or<br />
department. Stories can there<strong>for</strong>e be <strong>in</strong>clusive or exclusive <strong>in</strong> their use [Lloyd,<br />
2000].<br />
Baird <strong>and</strong> others conducted an ethnographic study at Rolls-Royce Aerospace<br />
[Baird et al., 2000]. They conclude that personal <strong>in</strong>teraction between eng<strong>in</strong>eers is<br />
crucial <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation to be dissem<strong>in</strong>ated throughout an organisation. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
who know each other from other projects tend to ask each other <strong>for</strong> advice when<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g on new projects. At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>design</strong> process more<br />
experienced senior eng<strong>in</strong>eers are very important. They help younger eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
<strong>and</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t them ‘to the sequences <strong>and</strong> sources of expert op<strong>in</strong>ion they should seek’<br />
[Baird et al., 2000, 350]. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Baird et al., this helps with structur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>design</strong> problem.<br />
2.2.4 Organisation of the <strong>design</strong> process<br />
A division of labour exists <strong>in</strong> most <strong>design</strong> processes. For example, the <strong>design</strong> of a<br />
car can be divided <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>design</strong> of the drive shaft, the eng<strong>in</strong>e, the seats, the<br />
electronic systems, the suspension <strong>and</strong> the styl<strong>in</strong>g of the car etc. The partition<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of a <strong>design</strong> team <strong>in</strong>to smaller <strong>design</strong> groups responsible <strong>for</strong> a part of the <strong>design</strong><br />
is, from an ethical po<strong>in</strong>t of view, noteworthy because it may lead to the problem<br />
of many h<strong>and</strong>s [Bovens, 1998] <strong>and</strong> [Thompson, 1980]. This problem presents<br />
itself with regard to active <strong>and</strong> passive responsibility. Passive responsibility is<br />
responsibility after someth<strong>in</strong>g has happened: be<strong>in</strong>g held accountable. Active<br />
responsibility refers to be<strong>in</strong>g or feel<strong>in</strong>g responsible <strong>for</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g or some task<br />
[Bovens, 1998].<br />
With regard to passive responsibility, the problem of many h<strong>and</strong>s is the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g. It might seem to be quite clear who is officially responsible <strong>for</strong> what as<br />
this depends on <strong>for</strong>mal job descriptions <strong>in</strong> organisations, but <strong>in</strong> practice it is very<br />
difficult to po<strong>in</strong>t out the people responsible <strong>for</strong> acts of organisations that have<br />
caused damage. Organisations are often opaque to people outside of the<br />
organisation. It is not clear who is responsible <strong>for</strong> what <strong>and</strong> who was able to<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence a certa<strong>in</strong> decision. Above this, when an organisation is organised<br />
hierarchically, people lower <strong>in</strong> the hierarchy can <strong>in</strong>dicate that those higher <strong>in</strong> the<br />
hierarchy are responsible while those higher <strong>in</strong> the hierarchy claim to have no<br />
knowledge of the situation.
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
With regard to active responsibility, the problem of many h<strong>and</strong>s can be seen<br />
when no one feels or th<strong>in</strong>ks that he or she is responsible <strong>for</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>issues</strong>. If<br />
<strong>issues</strong> are not specifically part of someone’s task description, everyone can avoid<br />
tak<strong>in</strong>g responsibility <strong>for</strong> them. These <strong>issues</strong> may then be neglected <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong><br />
process.<br />
In a paper on the relationship between how companies are organised <strong>and</strong> harm<br />
they cause other people, Darley studied a case of the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> test<strong>in</strong>g of l<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
gear <strong>for</strong> a military aircraft that failed dur<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g after test flights [Darley,<br />
1996]. People <strong>in</strong> the company knew that there were calculation errors <strong>and</strong><br />
because of these errors there was a large chance the l<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g gear would fail.<br />
Certa<strong>in</strong> social mechanisms made the people <strong>in</strong> the organisation actively conceal<br />
the calculation errors <strong>for</strong> their customers <strong>and</strong> t<strong>in</strong>ker with data <strong>in</strong> certify<strong>in</strong>g<br />
documents. In this case people felt either <strong>for</strong>ced by their superiors or felt they<br />
were already too <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>and</strong> caught up with the t<strong>in</strong>ker<strong>in</strong>g of the data to stop the<br />
conceal<strong>in</strong>g of calculation errors.<br />
Darley also po<strong>in</strong>ts to the way a decision is framed. Stopp<strong>in</strong>g a production<br />
process or chang<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> requires action, while go<strong>in</strong>g on is often seen as not<br />
requir<strong>in</strong>g action. Action has to be defended to other people while <strong>in</strong> the case of<br />
do<strong>in</strong>g or chang<strong>in</strong>g noth<strong>in</strong>g, such defence is not required. Action is only taken<br />
when there is proof of harm. This frames the decision <strong>in</strong> an “<strong>in</strong>nocent until<br />
proven guilty” way. This is different from us<strong>in</strong>g a precautionary frame <strong>for</strong> the<br />
decision, where no harm has to be proven. A suspicion of harm can be enough to<br />
warrant act<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st it. Fram<strong>in</strong>g a similar decision differently can lead to<br />
different actions [Darley, 1996]. This might be relevant <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes,<br />
especially when decisions have to be made to stop or go on with a <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
The aspects of <strong>design</strong> processes mentioned above are all relevant from an ethical<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t of view <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e they were <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the conception of <strong>design</strong><br />
processes used <strong>in</strong> this thesis. In view of the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g, I regard <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
as organised social processes which aim at solv<strong>in</strong>g more or less ill-structured <strong>design</strong><br />
problems <strong>in</strong> this work. All of these aspects mentioned above were used to support<br />
data-collection <strong>in</strong> the case-studies. For example, <strong>in</strong> the case-studies attention was<br />
paid to the organisation of the <strong>design</strong> team <strong>and</strong> the social processes with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>design</strong> team because this helped me to determ<strong>in</strong>e who was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> what<br />
decisions when deal<strong>in</strong>g with ethical <strong>issues</strong>.<br />
31
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
2.3 Characteristics of <strong>design</strong> processes <strong>in</strong> relation to ethical <strong>issues</strong> 4<br />
So far, some very general characteristics of <strong>design</strong> processes have been discussed.<br />
When study<strong>in</strong>g ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> it may be useful to make<br />
further dist<strong>in</strong>ctions between different k<strong>in</strong>ds of <strong>design</strong> processes. It might be<br />
expected <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>stance that dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> a bolt <strong>for</strong> a car wheel,<br />
different ethical decisions have to be made than those that have to be made<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> a completely new personal transportation device.<br />
Ideas drawn from the literature are used to characterise the different k<strong>in</strong>ds of<br />
<strong>design</strong> processes. Work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses are <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> the next chapter based<br />
on these ideas. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of some prelim<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
ideas regard<strong>in</strong>g what this research, <strong>and</strong> its results, might contribute to<br />
discussions about the moral responsibility of eng<strong>in</strong>eers dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> processes.<br />
These ideas will be further elaborated <strong>in</strong> the last chapter of this thesis.<br />
2.3.1 Design type <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy<br />
Let us go back to the example of a <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> a wheel bolt on a car as opposed to<br />
the <strong>design</strong> of a new personal transportation device. The bolt <strong>design</strong> has to comply<br />
with dimensional constra<strong>in</strong>ts, safety norms, st<strong>and</strong>ards, f<strong>in</strong>ancial constra<strong>in</strong>ts etc.<br />
It is a small part of a known product. Moreover, most <strong>design</strong>s of bolts are<br />
re<strong>design</strong>s of exist<strong>in</strong>g bolts. Norms, st<strong>and</strong>ards or dimensional constra<strong>in</strong>ts are<br />
absent <strong>for</strong> a new personal transportation device, or it is questionable whether<br />
exist<strong>in</strong>g norms, st<strong>and</strong>ards or dimensional constra<strong>in</strong>ts can or should be used. The<br />
<strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong> a new personal transportation device is more ill-structured<br />
than that of <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a bolt. The reason why the <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong> the bolt is<br />
better structured than that <strong>for</strong> the new transportation device is that there are<br />
more external constra<strong>in</strong>ts perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> of the bolt. 5 I use the term<br />
“external constra<strong>in</strong>ts” here <strong>for</strong> all constra<strong>in</strong>ts that are taken <strong>for</strong> granted dur<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
<strong>design</strong> process. Some of these constra<strong>in</strong>ts may be set by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers at the start<br />
of the <strong>design</strong> process, <strong>for</strong> example by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers decid<strong>in</strong>g to re<strong>design</strong> an<br />
exist<strong>in</strong>g bolt <strong>in</strong>stead of <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a new one. Other constra<strong>in</strong>ts are set by other<br />
stakeholders <strong>and</strong> not the eng<strong>in</strong>eers, such as the customer’s requirements,<br />
governmental regulations or codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards. These external constra<strong>in</strong>ts are<br />
usually already operationalised <strong>in</strong>to specific <strong>and</strong> clear requirements. In a re<strong>design</strong><br />
it is also usually obvious how these requirements can be implemented.<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
4 The ideas <strong>in</strong> section 2.3.1 <strong>and</strong> section 2.3.2 are based on the paper ‘The need <strong>for</strong> ethical<br />
reflection <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>; the relevance of type of <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy’ [Van de<br />
Poel <strong>and</strong> Van Gorp, 2006].<br />
5 I am not argu<strong>in</strong>g that more constra<strong>in</strong>ts always lead to better structured problems, because too<br />
many constra<strong>in</strong>ts can also lead to over determ<strong>in</strong>ed problems.<br />
32
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
As the example of the bolt <strong>and</strong> the new transportation device suggests,<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers are confronted with different degrees of external constra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> different<br />
<strong>design</strong> processes. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to V<strong>in</strong>centi [V<strong>in</strong>centi, 1992], this degree of external<br />
constra<strong>in</strong>t depends ma<strong>in</strong>ly on two dimensions: the level of <strong>design</strong> hierarchy <strong>and</strong><br />
the type of <strong>design</strong> (normal versus radical). 6<br />
Design hierarchy<br />
Most modern products consist of several parts, subassemblies <strong>and</strong> subsystems. 7<br />
In many cases these subsystems <strong>and</strong> parts are more or less <strong>in</strong>dependently<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed. Depend<strong>in</strong>g on how the <strong>design</strong> process is organised, different teams<br />
<strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers work on different parts of the product. There is communication<br />
<strong>and</strong> co-operation between the teams or at least there usually is. These <strong>design</strong><br />
teams can be from the same or from different companies. The parts,<br />
subassemblies <strong>and</strong> subsystems are ordered hierarchically. The complete product<br />
is <strong>design</strong>ed at the highest levels of the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy; subsystems <strong>and</strong> parts are<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed at lower levels. V<strong>in</strong>centi divides the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy of the <strong>design</strong><br />
process of an airplane <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g levels.<br />
‘1. Project def<strong>in</strong>ition: translation of some usually ill-def<strong>in</strong>ed military or<br />
commercial requirement <strong>in</strong>to a concrete technical problem <strong>for</strong> level 2.<br />
2. Overall <strong>design</strong>: layout of arrangement <strong>and</strong> proportions of the airplane to<br />
meet the project def<strong>in</strong>ition.<br />
3. Major-component <strong>design</strong>: division of project <strong>in</strong>to w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>, fuselage<br />
<strong>design</strong>, l<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g-gear <strong>design</strong>, electrical-system <strong>design</strong> etc.<br />
4. Subdivision of areas of component <strong>design</strong> from level 3 accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g discipl<strong>in</strong>e required (e.g., aerodynamic w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>, structural<br />
w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>, mechanical w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>).<br />
5. Further division of categories <strong>in</strong> level 4 <strong>in</strong>to highly specific problems e.g.<br />
aerodynamic w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong>to problems of plat<strong>for</strong>m, airfoil section <strong>and</strong><br />
high-lift devices).’ [V<strong>in</strong>centi, 1990, 9].<br />
There are similarities between V<strong>in</strong>centi’s ideas of <strong>design</strong> hierarchy <strong>and</strong> the<br />
<strong>design</strong> hierarchy levels def<strong>in</strong>ed by Disco et al. [Disco et al., 1992]. Disco et al.<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>guish the follow<strong>in</strong>g levels of hierarchy:<br />
• systems, like a plant, electricity or cable networks<br />
• functional artefacts, like cars, etc<br />
• devices like pumps, motors etc<br />
• components, like materials, nuts, condensers etc<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
6<br />
V<strong>in</strong>centi uses the term “technical constra<strong>in</strong>ts” <strong>in</strong>stead of external constra<strong>in</strong>t, but this is a<br />
mislead<strong>in</strong>g term <strong>in</strong> my view s<strong>in</strong>ce some of the constra<strong>in</strong>ts mentioned by V<strong>in</strong>centi are not<br />
technical but rather social <strong>in</strong> nature. V<strong>in</strong>centi seems to use the term technical constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>for</strong> all<br />
constra<strong>in</strong>ts that the eng<strong>in</strong>eer s of a <strong>design</strong> team cannot change [V<strong>in</strong>centi, 1992].<br />
7<br />
Walton, <strong>for</strong> example, estimates that there are about 30.000 parts <strong>in</strong> the Ford Taurus [Walton,<br />
1997].<br />
33
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
V<strong>in</strong>centi’s divisions of the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy are more f<strong>in</strong>e gra<strong>in</strong>ed at the lower<br />
levels. Component <strong>design</strong> is not the lowest level but middle level. Disco et al. add<br />
the systems level at the highest level.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to V<strong>in</strong>centi, the degree of external constra<strong>in</strong>t is larger if the <strong>design</strong><br />
process is lower <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy. The higher levels of the <strong>design</strong> process<br />
pose external constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>for</strong> the lower levels. Examples of these constra<strong>in</strong>ts are,<br />
amongst others, dimensional constra<strong>in</strong>ts, a part needs to fit <strong>in</strong> the whole product,<br />
but also constra<strong>in</strong>ts concern<strong>in</strong>g the function of the part.<br />
The ideas of V<strong>in</strong>centi <strong>and</strong> Disco et al. about <strong>design</strong> hierarchy seem to<br />
resemble the phases <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process presented <strong>in</strong> section 2.2.1, but there is<br />
a difference. The difference between <strong>design</strong> hierarchy <strong>and</strong> the phase of the <strong>design</strong><br />
process is that a <strong>design</strong> process is done <strong>for</strong> every product, subassembly or part.<br />
This means that at every level of the hierarchy all phases of the <strong>design</strong> process are<br />
gone through. One could th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>for</strong> example of the generation of concepts <strong>design</strong><br />
phase of a part of a product. This would be the generation of concepts <strong>design</strong><br />
phase of a middle level <strong>design</strong>. The relative importance of <strong>design</strong> phases can<br />
differ <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy, <strong>for</strong> example <strong>in</strong> high level <strong>design</strong> the phase of the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process <strong>in</strong> which detailed draw<strong>in</strong>gs are made can be relatively<br />
unimportant compared with the generation of concepts.<br />
Type of <strong>design</strong><br />
Besides the notion of <strong>design</strong> hierarchy V<strong>in</strong>centi also <strong>in</strong>troduced the notion of<br />
<strong>design</strong> type rang<strong>in</strong>g from normal to radical <strong>design</strong>. V<strong>in</strong>centi uses the terms<br />
“operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple” <strong>and</strong> “normal configuration” to <strong>in</strong>dicate what normal<br />
<strong>design</strong> as opposed to radical <strong>design</strong> is [V<strong>in</strong>centi, 1990]. “Operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple” is<br />
a term <strong>in</strong>troduced by Polanyi [Polanyi, 1962]. It refers to how a device works. The<br />
normal configuration is described by V<strong>in</strong>centi as:<br />
‘….. the general shape <strong>and</strong> arrangement that are commonly agreed to<br />
best embody the operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple.’ [V<strong>in</strong>centi, 1990, 209]<br />
Examples of different work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of car eng<strong>in</strong>es are a combustion eng<strong>in</strong>e<br />
<strong>and</strong> a fuel cell electrical eng<strong>in</strong>e. Both eng<strong>in</strong>es power cars but they have different<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples. In a combustion eng<strong>in</strong>e fuel <strong>and</strong> air are let <strong>in</strong>to a cyl<strong>in</strong>der<br />
<strong>and</strong> ignited. The exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g volume of the ignited gases is used to get a rotational<br />
movement. In fuel cell cars an electrochemical reaction between hydrogen <strong>and</strong><br />
oxygen produces electricity. This electricity is used to drive the car. So although<br />
both eng<strong>in</strong>es power the car they do so <strong>in</strong> a different way. In normal <strong>design</strong>, both<br />
operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> normal configuration are kept the same as <strong>in</strong> previous<br />
<strong>design</strong>s. In radical <strong>design</strong>, the operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong>/or normal configuration<br />
are unknown or it is decided that the conventional operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong><br />
normal configuration will not be used <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>.<br />
34
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
V<strong>in</strong>centi’s description of radical <strong>design</strong> focuses on the structure <strong>and</strong> physical<br />
aspects of the <strong>design</strong>. For my purpose, it is useful to <strong>in</strong>troduce a somewhat<br />
broader def<strong>in</strong>ition of radical <strong>design</strong>. In <strong>design</strong>, function <strong>and</strong> structure are jo<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
<strong>in</strong> an artefact (cf. [Kroes, 2002] <strong>and</strong> [www.dualnature.tudelft.nl]). This means<br />
that a <strong>design</strong> can also be radical with regard to its function or <strong>design</strong> criteria. An<br />
explicit choice can be made at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>design</strong> process to change the<br />
usual idea of a good product of this product type. This means sett<strong>in</strong>g different<br />
criteria or chang<strong>in</strong>g the relative importance of criteria. For example, speed is<br />
often accorded some importance but it is usually not the most important<br />
criterion <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of a car. The st<strong>and</strong>ard idea of a good car is a safe, reliable<br />
<strong>and</strong> perhaps fast car. If the aim of a <strong>design</strong> process is to <strong>design</strong> a car that can<br />
break the sound barrier, this is a radical <strong>design</strong> process. Radical <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this<br />
functional way can make reconsideration of the operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> the<br />
normal configuration necessary. Reconsider<strong>in</strong>g may, but does not have to, lead<br />
to changes <strong>in</strong> the operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple or normal configuration. Thus a radical<br />
<strong>design</strong> process with regard to the function may lead to a radical <strong>design</strong> of the<br />
physical structure, but this is not necessarily so. It is also possible that a new<br />
operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple leads to new criteria.<br />
Regulative framework<br />
V<strong>in</strong>centi claims that there are more external constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> normal as opposed to<br />
radical <strong>design</strong> [V<strong>in</strong>centi, 1992]. Normal <strong>design</strong> is a <strong>for</strong>m of st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>design</strong><br />
practice guided by exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>mal <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal rules. A system of regulations<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong>mal rules concern<strong>in</strong>g a product exists <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>. I will refer to this<br />
system as a regulative framework. A regulative framework <strong>for</strong> a certa<strong>in</strong> product<br />
consists of all relevant regulation, national <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational legislation, technical<br />
codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> rules <strong>for</strong> controll<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> certify<strong>in</strong>g products. A<br />
regulative framework is socially sanctioned, <strong>for</strong> example by a national or the<br />
European parliament or by organisations that approve technical codes. Besides<br />
the technical codes <strong>and</strong> legislation, <strong>in</strong>terpretation of legislation <strong>and</strong> technical<br />
codes are part of the regulative framework. Interpretations of codes <strong>and</strong><br />
legislation can be provided by the controll<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> certify<strong>in</strong>g organizations <strong>and</strong><br />
also by eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g societies <strong>for</strong> example <strong>in</strong> the courses they organise <strong>for</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers on state of the art <strong>design</strong> practices. Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g societies can also<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulate a code of ethics. This code is also part of the regulative framework.<br />
Note that the regulative framework does not <strong>in</strong>clude company specific norms<br />
<strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards. If company specific norms <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards were to be <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
then the regulative framework would differ <strong>in</strong> different companies. Companies<br />
are restricted <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g company specific norms <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards, because<br />
these norms <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards have to meet the rules <strong>and</strong> regulations of the<br />
35
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
regulative framework. Company specific norms <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards can there<strong>for</strong>e only<br />
impose stricter requirements than the regulative framework.<br />
The notion of a regulative framework differs from notions like technological<br />
regime or technological paradigm <strong>in</strong> that the regulative framework <strong>in</strong>cludes only<br />
<strong>for</strong>mal norms, rules <strong>and</strong> their <strong>in</strong>terpretations that perta<strong>in</strong> to the <strong>design</strong>,<br />
certification <strong>and</strong> construction of a product. Technological regimes are def<strong>in</strong>ed by<br />
Rip <strong>and</strong> Kemp as:<br />
36<br />
‘the rule-set or grammar embedded <strong>in</strong> a complex of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills<br />
<strong>and</strong> procedures, ways of h<strong>and</strong>l<strong>in</strong>g relevant artefacts <strong>and</strong> persons, ways of<br />
def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g problems- all of them imbedded <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructures.’ [Rip <strong>and</strong> Kemp, 1998, 338]<br />
A technological regime def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this way <strong>in</strong>cludes much more than the<br />
regulative framework as it also <strong>in</strong>cludes skills <strong>and</strong> ways of h<strong>and</strong>l<strong>in</strong>g artefacts <strong>and</strong><br />
persons. Other authors have used other def<strong>in</strong>itions of technological regimes. Van<br />
de Poel <strong>for</strong> example focuses on def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g technological regimes <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong><br />
processes. Although Van de Poel restricts his def<strong>in</strong>ition of technological regimes<br />
to technical regimes <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes, he <strong>in</strong>cludes more <strong>in</strong> a technical regime<br />
<strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of a product than is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> a regulative framework, such as<br />
promises <strong>and</strong> expectations of a product [Van de Poel, 1998 <strong>and</strong> 2000a].<br />
2.3.2 Normative frameworks<br />
The idea of normal <strong>design</strong> can be related to Grunwald’s idea that <strong>in</strong> ‘bus<strong>in</strong>ess-asusual’<br />
technology development there is no need <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers to reflect ethically<br />
[Grunwald, 2001]. Grunwald suggests that there are situations <strong>in</strong> which an<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer should ethically reflect on the development of technology <strong>and</strong> that there<br />
are situations which he classifies as bus<strong>in</strong>ess-as-usual <strong>in</strong> which there is no such<br />
need <strong>for</strong> ethical reflection ([Grunwald, 2000] <strong>and</strong> [Grunwald, 2001]). Grunwald<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates that <strong>in</strong> “bus<strong>in</strong>ess-as-usual” a normative framework exists that governs<br />
all ethically relevant decisions that are made dur<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> process. He th<strong>in</strong>ks<br />
that a lot, if not most, decisions <strong>in</strong> technology development are covered by<br />
normative frameworks. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Grunwald eng<strong>in</strong>eers have to apply the rules<br />
from the normative framework without further ethical reflection if this normative<br />
framework meets the follow<strong>in</strong>g requirements: 8<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
8 Grunwald does not explicitly state that eng<strong>in</strong>eers have an obligation to use the normative<br />
framework but the requirement “observed” seems to imply this. In an article from 2005,<br />
Grunwald has changed the requirement of observed to ‘compliance: the normative framework<br />
also has to be complied with <strong>in</strong> the field concerned.’ [Grunwald, 2005, 189].
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
‘Pragmatically complete: the normative framework has to comprehend<br />
adequately the decision to be made, <strong>and</strong> should leave out no essential<br />
aspects from consideration.<br />
Locally consistent: there has to be a “sufficient” degree of freedom from<br />
contradiction among the various elements of the normative<br />
framework.<br />
Unambiguous: beyond the normative framework, there has to be a<br />
sufficient common underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g among the actors <strong>in</strong> the context of<br />
the decision under discussion.<br />
Accepted: the normative framework has to be accepted as the basis <strong>for</strong><br />
the decision by those concerned.<br />
Observed: the normative framework has to be <strong>in</strong> fact observed; lip<br />
service, <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>in</strong> environmental concerns, is not enough’<br />
[Grunwald, 2001, 419].<br />
With regard to the acceptance of the normative framework Grunwald states that<br />
acceptance needs not be universal, but neither should it be restricted to the very<br />
narrow sphere of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. Instead it ‘must <strong>in</strong>clude further groups or<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals such as the assumed users, but also people possibly affected by the<br />
side-effects or other impacts’ [Grunwald, 2001, 419-420]. Grunwald considers the<br />
normative framework to be a “morale provisoire”: it is relative to ‘the actual state<br />
of the relation between culture, society <strong>and</strong> technology, relative to the moral<br />
convictions of society <strong>and</strong> to the knowledge about consequences <strong>and</strong> impact of<br />
technology.’ [Grunwald, 2000, 191]. The normative framework is there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
dynamic.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Grunwald, a normative framework consists of all obligations<br />
given by political regulation <strong>and</strong> all obligations result<strong>in</strong>g from other societal<br />
regulation like technical codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards, <strong>and</strong> codes of ethics [Grunwald,<br />
2000]. The normative framework that Grunwald has <strong>for</strong>mulated comprises<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e the same elements as the regulative framework. In my analyses of the<br />
different <strong>design</strong> processes the question whether regulative frameworks exist <strong>and</strong><br />
fulfil the above requirements plays an important role.<br />
2.3.3 Moral responsibility <strong>and</strong> the trust relationship between eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong><br />
society<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers have specific knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> play an important part <strong>in</strong><br />
the <strong>design</strong> of products. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers are given power to decide <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes.<br />
This power is limited by the regulative framework. In this thesis, I will assume<br />
that a trust relation exists between society <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g products.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers are given “a licence to operate” based on this trust relationship. Be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
trusted by society br<strong>in</strong>gs with it responsibilities <strong>for</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eers. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
have responsibilities towards their customers <strong>and</strong> to society as a whole. The<br />
37
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
codes of ethics <strong>for</strong>mulated by eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g societies all state that eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
should display <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>and</strong> honesty <strong>in</strong> their work, if they are to be trusted by<br />
customers <strong>and</strong> society. The Institution of Eng<strong>in</strong>eers, Australia states the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the second of their tenets <strong>in</strong> their code of ethics [www.ieaust.au].<br />
38<br />
‘Members shall act with honour, <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>and</strong> dignity <strong>in</strong> order to merit the<br />
trust of the community <strong>and</strong> the profession; [www.ieaust.au, 2]’<br />
It is this trust relation <strong>and</strong> its ethical relevance that I will further analyse here.<br />
Much more can be said about trust than I can do <strong>in</strong> this section <strong>and</strong> the last<br />
chapter. I will use a specific notion of trust based on ideas from Annette Baier<br />
<strong>and</strong> Bart Nooteboom as a basis <strong>for</strong> claims about the moral responsibility of<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers. 9<br />
In her paper ‘Trust <strong>and</strong> Antitrust’, Annette Baier uses the examples of<br />
plumbers <strong>and</strong> surgeons to illustrate that we trust them to do what is necessary to<br />
fix what is wrong. We trust them <strong>and</strong> we do not prescribe what they should do<br />
exactly to fix, <strong>for</strong> example a leak [Baier, 1986, p. 250]. Baier claims that it is not<br />
possible to prescribe precisely what plumbers <strong>and</strong> surgeons must do because we<br />
do not have that knowledge. If we would be able to prescribe precisely step by<br />
step what the plumber has to do <strong>and</strong> what he should not do then we could<br />
probably repair the leak ourselves. My claim is that <strong>in</strong> a similar ve<strong>in</strong> we trust<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers to <strong>design</strong> safe products without prescrib<strong>in</strong>g precisely what they should<br />
do <strong>and</strong> refra<strong>in</strong> from do<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Baier claims that trust is a special sort of reliance: <strong>in</strong> trust we rely on the<br />
goodwill of someone else. Trust can be seen as ‘a three- place predicate (A trusts<br />
B with valued th<strong>in</strong>g C)’ [Baier, 1986, 236]. Discretionary power is given to the<br />
trusted person. This means that the trusted person is allowed some discretion<br />
but not allowed to do everyth<strong>in</strong>g he or she th<strong>in</strong>ks is a way to take care of the<br />
valued th<strong>in</strong>g. There are limits as to what the entrusted person should be or is<br />
allowed to do. Baier uses the example of a babysitter:<br />
‘a babysitter who decides that the nursery would be improved if pa<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
purple <strong>and</strong> sets to work to trans<strong>for</strong>m it, will have acted, as a babysitter <strong>in</strong><br />
an untrustworthy way, however good his good will.’ [Baier, 1996, 236]<br />
In most everyday situations the limits of this discretionary power are not<br />
negotiated or expressed explicitly. People are expected to know the limits of the<br />
discretionary power they get if they are trusted. If I ask my neighbour to take<br />
care of my plants <strong>and</strong> mail while I am away on holiday, we both know that I do<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
9 Annette Baier has written an <strong>in</strong>fluential paper on trust with<strong>in</strong> ethics. Bart Nooteboom has written<br />
a book on trust that <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>in</strong>sights from economics, rational decision mak<strong>in</strong>g, behavioural<br />
sciences <strong>and</strong> ethics <strong>and</strong> focuses on trust <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> between organizations.
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
not expect or want her to read my mail, pay my bills or reply to my mail. I trust<br />
her to water my plants <strong>and</strong> place my mail on the table without read<strong>in</strong>g or<br />
answer<strong>in</strong>g it. There<strong>for</strong>e, trust gives power <strong>and</strong> responsibility but with<strong>in</strong> limits.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Baier trust can be morally decent or not. Hav<strong>in</strong>g trust <strong>in</strong><br />
someone who is cleverly conceal<strong>in</strong>g his or her untrustworth<strong>in</strong>ess might be<br />
morally wrong accord<strong>in</strong>g to Baier, especially if that untrustworthy person is<br />
us<strong>in</strong>g his or her discretionary power to ga<strong>in</strong> more power over the person who<br />
trusts him or her. In cases of sects, leaders are often trusted <strong>and</strong> abuse this trust<br />
to ga<strong>in</strong> power over their followers <strong>and</strong> harm them. This is of course quite a far<br />
fetched example but it shows that not all trust leads to the protection of what<br />
people value, <strong>and</strong> that trust can be morally wrong. Trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers might be<br />
misplaced <strong>and</strong> even morally wrong if eng<strong>in</strong>eers are try<strong>in</strong>g to harm people with<br />
their work.<br />
An <strong>in</strong>terest has also been shown <strong>in</strong> trust between people <strong>and</strong> trust <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions with<strong>in</strong> economics <strong>and</strong> management theory [Nooteboom, 2002].<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Nooteboom trust is a four-place predicate:<br />
‘Someone (1) trusts someone (or someth<strong>in</strong>g) (2) <strong>in</strong> some respect (3),<br />
depend<strong>in</strong>g on conditions such as context of action (4).’ [Nooteboom, 2002,<br />
38].<br />
For example, if I am ill then I trust my doctor to take care of me <strong>and</strong> cure me. If<br />
however, I have a term<strong>in</strong>al disease then the doctor has not behaved <strong>in</strong> an<br />
untrustworthy manner because he has not cured me. A doctor may behave <strong>in</strong> an<br />
untrustworthy manner <strong>in</strong> other respects but the fact that he cannot cure my<br />
term<strong>in</strong>al disease does not make him untrustworthy. Nooteboom’s notion of trust<br />
differs from the one Baier proposes <strong>in</strong> that the context of action is made explicit<br />
<strong>in</strong> his notion. You trust someone to do th<strong>in</strong>gs to the degree to which he or she<br />
can <strong>in</strong>fluence the situation <strong>and</strong> has the power to change certa<strong>in</strong> situations <strong>for</strong> the<br />
good. Another difference is that Nooteboom <strong>in</strong>cludes the possibility of trust<strong>in</strong>g<br />
an organisation.<br />
‘Of course an organization itself does not have an <strong>in</strong>tention, but it has<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests <strong>and</strong> can try to regulate the <strong>in</strong>tentions of its workers to serve those<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests.’ [Nooteboom, 2002, 75].<br />
Nooteboom <strong>in</strong>sists that trust should be subjected to development <strong>and</strong> learn<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
In Nooteboom’s terms bl<strong>in</strong>d trust, as <strong>in</strong> unconditional trust that is not<br />
withdrawn even if there is evidence that the trustee is behav<strong>in</strong>g untrustworthy, is<br />
unwise. Trustworth<strong>in</strong>ess is not assessed cont<strong>in</strong>uously; there are tolerance limits<br />
<strong>for</strong> trustworth<strong>in</strong>ess. With<strong>in</strong> these limits trust can be the default. If trustees<br />
trespass these limits then trust should be reconsidered. This differs from Baier’s<br />
notion that trust can be morally <strong>in</strong>decent <strong>for</strong> example if directed at a morally bad<br />
39
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
end. Unwise is a qualification that can be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as <strong>in</strong>strumental;<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g is unwise given certa<strong>in</strong> goals. Morally <strong>in</strong>decent is an ethical<br />
qualification.<br />
In the follow<strong>in</strong>g I will use a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of Baier’s <strong>and</strong> Nooteboom’s notions<br />
<strong>and</strong> apply it to eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> practice. The implicit limitations to the power<br />
given to a trustee <strong>and</strong> moral (<strong>in</strong>)decency of trust that Baier emphasizes seem to<br />
be important where analys<strong>in</strong>g trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g products <strong>and</strong><br />
technology. Nooteboom’s <strong>in</strong>clusion of the context of action <strong>and</strong> the possibility to<br />
trust organisations are also relevant, when both notions are comb<strong>in</strong>ed you get<br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g: eng<strong>in</strong>eers, when mak<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong>, have some discretionary or<br />
limited power <strong>and</strong> they have a responsibility to take care of th<strong>in</strong>gs people value.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers make <strong>design</strong>s <strong>in</strong> a context of action <strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts;<br />
they are part of a <strong>design</strong> team <strong>and</strong> part of an organization. Moreover, the<br />
products they <strong>design</strong> are subjected to the laws of physics. Expect<strong>in</strong>g an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<br />
to <strong>design</strong> a perpetuum mobile <strong>and</strong> reconsider<strong>in</strong>g trust <strong>in</strong> that eng<strong>in</strong>eer if he or<br />
she does not do this, does not take <strong>in</strong>to account the context of action by which<br />
the eng<strong>in</strong>eer is bound. The power eng<strong>in</strong>eers have been given is sometimes<br />
explicitly limited because certa<strong>in</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs are not allowed by law. Some decisions<br />
can be deemed too important <strong>and</strong> far-reach<strong>in</strong>g to be decided by eng<strong>in</strong>eers. The<br />
development of very new or controversial technologies like genetically modified<br />
food or animals is questioned by different actors <strong>in</strong> society. In these <strong>in</strong>stances, a<br />
government has to def<strong>in</strong>e some explicit limits, <strong>for</strong> example whether human<br />
embryonic cells may be cloned to be used <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g biotechnology or not. So<br />
some limits to the development of technology are explicitly stated <strong>in</strong> legislation.<br />
A tentative analysis of the <strong>in</strong>fluence of <strong>design</strong> type, hierarchy <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
particular the availability of a regulative framework on the trust relationship<br />
between eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> society will be given <strong>in</strong> chapter 9. A regulative<br />
framework can be seen as a way to provide eng<strong>in</strong>eers with explicit limits with<strong>in</strong><br />
which they are trusted to do their work. Regulative frameworks can be part of the<br />
limits <strong>in</strong> which trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers is the default. Besides mak<strong>in</strong>g limits explicit, a<br />
regulative framework can also be used to help to build <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> trust, <strong>in</strong><br />
particular <strong>in</strong> what is called <strong>in</strong>stitutions-based trust.<br />
Trust can be characteristics-based, <strong>in</strong>stitutions-based <strong>and</strong> process-based<br />
([Nooteboom, 2002, 86] <strong>and</strong> [Zucker, 1986]). Characteristics-based trust derives<br />
from membership of a community. You can <strong>for</strong> example trust someone because<br />
you have worked previously with his sister <strong>and</strong> she behaved <strong>in</strong> a trustworthy<br />
manner. Institutions-based trust derives from rules, codes of ethics but also<br />
from the professional st<strong>and</strong>ards used <strong>in</strong> that <strong>in</strong>stitution. For example, trust <strong>in</strong> a<br />
company that is go<strong>in</strong>g to produce someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> you can be based on the fact<br />
40
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
that the company is ISO 9001 certified. Process-based trust derives from the<br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g relationship between people. 10 A regulative framework can produce<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions-based trust. The public will tend to trust eng<strong>in</strong>eers to make good<br />
<strong>design</strong>s because the eng<strong>in</strong>eers adhere to the rules <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards of the regulative<br />
frameworks <strong>and</strong> act <strong>in</strong> a trustworthy manner.<br />
The trustworth<strong>in</strong>ess of eng<strong>in</strong>eers should not just refer to not act<strong>in</strong>g on bad<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentions towards the person(s) trust<strong>in</strong>g you. Trustworth<strong>in</strong>ess also <strong>in</strong>cludes<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g competent (cf [Jones, 1996, 7]). Eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g products have to have<br />
the competence to make good <strong>design</strong>s if they are to be trusted as eng<strong>in</strong>eers.<br />
Trustworthy eng<strong>in</strong>eers know what their competence is <strong>and</strong> when to ask someone<br />
else <strong>for</strong> help or advice to produce a safe <strong>design</strong>. Trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers that mean<br />
well but do not have a clue as to what they are do<strong>in</strong>g is misplaced.<br />
The public expects eng<strong>in</strong>eers to <strong>design</strong> products that will, <strong>in</strong> normal<br />
circumstances <strong>and</strong> use, not lead to disasters. If disasters do happen then trust<br />
may have to be reconsidered. Perhaps the <strong>design</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers behaved <strong>in</strong> an<br />
untrustworthy manner or maybe some unanticipated <strong>and</strong> un<strong>for</strong>eseeable<br />
circumstances materialized. A regulative framework has to <strong>in</strong>corporate these<br />
circumstances if the public is to trust eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>s us<strong>in</strong>g the same<br />
regulative framework aga<strong>in</strong>. It can be said that the boundaries with<strong>in</strong> which trust<br />
<strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers is the default are drawn anew <strong>in</strong> cases <strong>in</strong> which regulative<br />
frameworks are changed follow<strong>in</strong>g undesirable effects.<br />
Trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers might be misplaced if the regulative framework is not<br />
adequate. I assume that an adequate regulative framework provides a basis <strong>for</strong><br />
warranted trust. Grunwald’s requirements may be construed as requirements<br />
<strong>for</strong> an adequate regulative framework. If trustworthy <strong>and</strong> experienced eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
are given regulations that they should follow <strong>and</strong> do <strong>in</strong>deed follow, these<br />
regulations should lead to the protection of what people value. This might be<br />
achieved by requir<strong>in</strong>g that the framework is accepted. The requirements that a<br />
regulative framework should be complete, unambiguous <strong>and</strong> consistent can be<br />
regarded as requirements that make sure that the rules of a regulative<br />
framework can be used <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes. Based on the above I <strong>for</strong>mulate the<br />
hypothesis that trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>s is warranted if eng<strong>in</strong>eers (1)<br />
have good <strong>in</strong>tentions (2) are competent <strong>and</strong> work accord<strong>in</strong>g to a regulative<br />
framework <strong>and</strong> (3) the regulative framework is adequate, e.g. it complies with<br />
Grunwald’s requirements. I will analyse this hypothesis <strong>in</strong> more detail <strong>in</strong><br />
chapter 9.<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
10<br />
An example of process-based trust is that if loyalty has been shown then trust will be<br />
strengthened.<br />
41
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
2.4 Summary<br />
The idea that <strong>design</strong> processes are processes <strong>in</strong> which an organised group of<br />
people tries to solve more or less ill-structured technical <strong>design</strong> problems<br />
underp<strong>in</strong>ned the data-collection <strong>in</strong> the case-studies. In<strong>for</strong>mation about the<br />
organization of the <strong>design</strong> team, the <strong>design</strong> problem, social processes with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>design</strong> team <strong>and</strong> the phase of the <strong>design</strong> process that was studied, was obta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the case-studies<br />
It can be expected that different k<strong>in</strong>ds of ethical questions will come up<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g different k<strong>in</strong>ds of <strong>design</strong> processes. V<strong>in</strong>centi’s ideas about <strong>design</strong> type<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy are used to characterize <strong>design</strong> processes. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
V<strong>in</strong>centi, the <strong>design</strong> type has two extremes, radical <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>.<br />
The <strong>design</strong> hierarchy refers to whether a complete product or part of a product is<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed. What V<strong>in</strong>centi calls normal <strong>design</strong> may be the same as what<br />
Grunwald calls bus<strong>in</strong>ess-as-usual technology development. The availability of a<br />
pragmatically complete, locally consistent, unambiguous, accepted <strong>and</strong> observed<br />
normative framework <strong>in</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess-as-usual technology development would,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to Grunwald, mean that there is no need <strong>for</strong> ethical reflection by<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers should just follow the normative framework.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, eng<strong>in</strong>eers are trusted by the public to <strong>design</strong> products <strong>and</strong><br />
technologies. If a normative framework exists then this may pose the limits<br />
with<strong>in</strong> which trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g normal <strong>design</strong>s is the default <strong>and</strong> not<br />
misplaced. Regulative frameworks can help to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> develop <strong>in</strong>stitutionsbased<br />
trust. Trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g products would then be warranted if<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers (1) have good <strong>in</strong>tentions (2) are competent <strong>and</strong> work accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
regulative framework <strong>and</strong> (3) the regulative framework is adequate, e.g. it<br />
complies with Grunwald’s requirements.<br />
42
3 Introduction to the case-studies<br />
3.1 Work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses<br />
V<strong>in</strong>centi’s <strong>design</strong> hierarchy <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> type were <strong>in</strong>troduced as dimensions that<br />
can be used to characterise <strong>design</strong> processes <strong>in</strong> section 2.3. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to V<strong>in</strong>centi<br />
there are more external constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> normal, as opposed to radical <strong>design</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> low, as opposed to high level, <strong>design</strong>. As said <strong>in</strong> section 2.3.1, the solution<br />
space is limited <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> processes because normal configuration <strong>and</strong><br />
operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple are used. Moreover, the requirements perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
normal configuration <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple have probably already been<br />
operationalised. In radical <strong>design</strong> the solution space is less limited, <strong>and</strong> there are<br />
fewer given requirements that are operationalised to test possible solutions. This<br />
may mean that eng<strong>in</strong>eers have to face other k<strong>in</strong>ds of ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> radical, as<br />
opposed to normal, <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> low, as opposed to high level, <strong>design</strong>. Based on<br />
this idea the work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses 1a <strong>and</strong> 1b were <strong>for</strong>mulated as follows:<br />
1a) The k<strong>in</strong>ds of ethical <strong>issues</strong> faced by eng<strong>in</strong>eers depend on <strong>design</strong> type<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy.<br />
1b) The ways <strong>in</strong> which eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with these ethical <strong>issues</strong> depend on<br />
<strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy.<br />
I <strong>in</strong>troduced the idea of a regulative framework <strong>and</strong> Grunwald’s idea of a<br />
normative framework <strong>in</strong> section 2.3.1 <strong>and</strong> 2.3.2. If a normative framework, that<br />
meets certa<strong>in</strong> requirements, exists then all ethical problems are <strong>and</strong> should be<br />
solved by us<strong>in</strong>g the normative framework, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Grunwald. Assum<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that Grunwald’s bus<strong>in</strong>ess-as-usual technology development <strong>and</strong> normal <strong>design</strong><br />
refer to similar eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g practices, the follow<strong>in</strong>g questions arise. Do<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers make use of regulative frameworks to solve ethical problems? Do the<br />
regulative frameworks perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to a normal <strong>design</strong> meet the requirements<br />
Grunwald has <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>for</strong> normative frameworks? If the regulative<br />
framework meets these requirements then it can be considered a normative<br />
framework <strong>and</strong> this would, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Grunwald, free eng<strong>in</strong>eers from ethical<br />
reflection. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers should, <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> processes, use the normative<br />
framework to make decisions on ethical <strong>issues</strong>. Based on this the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses can be <strong>for</strong>mulated:<br />
43
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
44<br />
2a) In normal <strong>design</strong> processes a regulative framework is used by<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers to account <strong>for</strong> the decisions made on ethical <strong>issues</strong>.<br />
2b) This regulative framework fulfils all Grunwald’s requirements <strong>and</strong> is<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e a normative framework.<br />
3.2 Selection of the case-studies<br />
The cases were selected us<strong>in</strong>g V<strong>in</strong>centi’s characterisation of <strong>design</strong> processes <strong>in</strong><br />
terms of <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy. As I have <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> section 2.3.1,<br />
the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy can be characterized by several levels, i.e. aspects of<br />
components, components, devices, functional artefacts, systems. In this research,<br />
I will exclude the level of sociotechnical systems as the <strong>design</strong> of these systems<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduces additional questions. A sociotechnical system consists of different<br />
artefacts, organizations, <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals work<strong>in</strong>g together. In such<br />
cases it is not just the hardware that needs to be <strong>design</strong>ed it is also the<br />
organizations <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>and</strong> the relationships between them.<br />
Take <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>stance a high-speed tra<strong>in</strong> system. In order to make high-speed tra<strong>in</strong><br />
transportation possible, it is not sufficient to have a railway track <strong>and</strong> a tra<strong>in</strong>;<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs like time schedules, stations where tra<strong>in</strong>s stop, traffic control, ways to sell<br />
tickets, connections to exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure, driver education <strong>for</strong> the specific<br />
technical requirements of a high-speed tra<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong>surance etc all need to be<br />
developed. 1<br />
The cases were selected to represent cases vary<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> type. It was difficult to f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>design</strong> processes illustrat<strong>in</strong>g the extremes of<br />
<strong>design</strong> type. Design processes with the goal of <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a completely new<br />
product or even product type seem to be rare. The radical <strong>design</strong> processes that<br />
were selected were radical although some parts of the normal configuration <strong>and</strong><br />
work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple were used. Extremely normal <strong>design</strong> can amount to choos<strong>in</strong>g<br />
an off-the-shelf solution without requir<strong>in</strong>g any further activities that are usually<br />
understood as be<strong>in</strong>g part of the <strong>design</strong> process, i.e. <strong>for</strong>mulation <strong>and</strong><br />
operationalisation of requirements, generation of concepts, assessments of<br />
concepts <strong>and</strong> detail<strong>in</strong>g. This k<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>design</strong> processes is not very <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong><br />
this research because only one decision is made, namely what solution to choose.<br />
Some <strong>design</strong> processes especially of large objects, take several years or are divided<br />
<strong>in</strong>to several phases with wait<strong>in</strong>g periods <strong>in</strong> between phases dur<strong>in</strong>g which the<br />
customers have to decide whether to go on with the <strong>design</strong> process. In this<br />
research, the <strong>design</strong> processes used <strong>for</strong> the case-studies were observed over<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1 For more <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on large (sociotechnical) systems see <strong>for</strong> example [Hughes, 1987],<br />
[Hughes, 1983], [Ottens et al., 2004] <strong>and</strong> [Kroes et al., 2004].
Introduction to the case-studies<br />
several months but, due to time considerations it was not possible to observe a<br />
complete <strong>design</strong> process from problem def<strong>in</strong>ition to production <strong>and</strong> use.<br />
The follow<strong>in</strong>g four cases were selected:<br />
One, a <strong>design</strong> of a lightweight susta<strong>in</strong>able car at Delft University of<br />
Technology <strong>for</strong> the DutchEVO project. The conceptual <strong>design</strong> to produce a car of<br />
400 kg mass that can carry four persons <strong>and</strong> their luggage is radical high-level<br />
<strong>design</strong>. Normal car <strong>design</strong> leads to an average mass <strong>for</strong> the car of 1200 kg. The<br />
mass requirement <strong>in</strong> the DutchEVO project made reconsider<strong>in</strong>g the normal<br />
configuration <strong>and</strong> the work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of a car necessary.<br />
Two, a <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>for</strong> the petro(chemical) <strong>in</strong>dustry. In<br />
this case-study the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> pipes <strong>and</strong> pressure vessels was studied. The<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> normal configuration of pressure vessels <strong>and</strong> pipel<strong>in</strong>es<br />
were used <strong>in</strong> this case. This was normal <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> because it consisted of<br />
component <strong>design</strong>, it was low level <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Three, a <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> a bridge over the Amsterdam-Rijnkanaal. In this casestudy<br />
the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase <strong>for</strong> a bridge over a canal was studied at the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company owned by the city of Amsterdam. The bridge was <strong>design</strong>ed<br />
to have the normal configuration <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of arched bridges. It was<br />
high level <strong>design</strong> because the <strong>design</strong> process concerned the whole bridge.<br />
Four, a lightweight open trailer <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> loads such as s<strong>and</strong>. In this casestudy<br />
the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> feasibility study <strong>design</strong> phase <strong>for</strong> a light trailer<br />
was studied with<strong>in</strong> an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company. The trailer had to be able to be used<br />
<strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation with a truck, thus it was part of a comb<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e a<br />
middle or low level <strong>design</strong>. The trailer should have no roof, be made <strong>in</strong><br />
composites <strong>and</strong> able to <strong>in</strong>clude a new unload<strong>in</strong>g system. The normal<br />
configuration <strong>for</strong> an open trailer was not used because of the new unload<strong>in</strong>g<br />
system <strong>and</strong> the use of composites; giv<strong>in</strong>g a radical <strong>design</strong>.<br />
The selected case-studies are listed with regard to their <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong><br />
hierarchy <strong>in</strong> table 3.1.<br />
Table 3.1: the selected case-studies<br />
High-level <strong>design</strong> DutchEVO, light weight<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able car<br />
Low-level <strong>design</strong> A light open trailer <strong>for</strong> bulk<br />
loads<br />
radical normal<br />
Bridge<br />
Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment<br />
<strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> (petro)<br />
chemical <strong>in</strong>dustry<br />
45
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
All the case-studies were per<strong>for</strong>med <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s. There seem to be large<br />
differences <strong>in</strong> the importance of hierarchy <strong>and</strong> the way people <strong>in</strong>teract <strong>and</strong><br />
communicate with each other between countries. Although the different bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
cultures of different countries have been studied <strong>and</strong> have been given scores on<br />
scales <strong>for</strong> several dimensions, mak<strong>in</strong>g well-<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med hypotheses about the<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence of different cultures on the way eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong> is<br />
very difficult (cf. <strong>for</strong> differences <strong>in</strong> (company) cultures [Luegenbiehl, 2004],<br />
[Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars,1993], [Hofstede, 1991] <strong>and</strong> [Van der Vaart,<br />
2003]). Large differences <strong>in</strong> company cultures were observed even between<br />
North-European countries (see [Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1999] <strong>and</strong><br />
[Hofstede, 1991]). Besides the difficulty of mak<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses on the <strong>in</strong>fluence of<br />
different cultures on the way eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong>, it is necessary to<br />
limit the number of variable parameters as the number of necessary case-studies<br />
<strong>in</strong>creases with the number of variable parameters at play <strong>in</strong> the case-studies [Y<strong>in</strong>,<br />
1989]. I there<strong>for</strong>e chose to per<strong>for</strong>m all my case-studies <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s.<br />
3.3 Acquisition of empirical data<br />
The DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team was followed <strong>for</strong> over a year (from June 2000 to July<br />
2001). Extensive observations were made dur<strong>in</strong>g meet<strong>in</strong>gs (see appendix 1). This<br />
case-study was used as a pilot study to develop ideas <strong>for</strong> the research presented<br />
here.<br />
The case-study pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment consisted of <strong>in</strong>terviews with eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g at an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company, an <strong>in</strong>terview with an eng<strong>in</strong>eer who had<br />
worked <strong>in</strong> the petrochemical <strong>in</strong>dustry, an <strong>in</strong>terview with an <strong>in</strong>spector from<br />
Lloyd’s register Stoomwezen, an <strong>in</strong>terview with an advis<strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eer, coupled<br />
with read<strong>in</strong>g of background <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation regard<strong>in</strong>g codes <strong>and</strong> legislation etc. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>terviews were held between February <strong>and</strong> May 2002 (see appendix 1). It was<br />
not possible to observe a <strong>design</strong> team at work because the customers of the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company would not allow someone <strong>for</strong>m outside to observe a <strong>design</strong><br />
process <strong>for</strong> a (petro)chemical <strong>in</strong>stallation.<br />
The bridge case-study lasted from January 2004 to April 2004, the <strong>design</strong><br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs were observed <strong>and</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> the architect <strong>in</strong>volved were<br />
<strong>in</strong>terviewed (see appendix 1).<br />
The trailer <strong>design</strong> process was also observed; the observation period lasted<br />
roughly from March 2003 to August 2003. The eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>design</strong>ed<br />
the trailer <strong>for</strong> a customer, <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs with the customer<br />
were observed. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> team <strong>and</strong> the customer were also<br />
<strong>in</strong>terviewed.<br />
46
Introduction to the case-studies<br />
Empirical data on the follow<strong>in</strong>g features of the cases were obta<strong>in</strong>ed us<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses <strong>and</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account the features of <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
discussed <strong>in</strong> section 2.2.<br />
• <strong>design</strong> problem<br />
• <strong>design</strong> type<br />
• <strong>design</strong> hierarchy<br />
• the regulative framework: legislation, regulation, technical codes <strong>and</strong><br />
st<strong>and</strong>ards, <strong>in</strong>terpretations of these codes <strong>and</strong> regulation given by<br />
professional organisations or certify<strong>in</strong>g organisations<br />
• phase of the <strong>design</strong> process<br />
• organization of <strong>design</strong> team (<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal)<br />
• social processes with<strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> team<br />
In this research, no dist<strong>in</strong>ction is made between managers, eng<strong>in</strong>eers or<br />
technicians; whoever is part of the <strong>design</strong> team is regarded as a <strong>design</strong>er or<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer whatever their educational background might be. I looked at the <strong>for</strong>mal<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal organisation of the <strong>design</strong> team. Persons that were regularly<br />
present at <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs were regarded as be<strong>in</strong>g part of the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal <strong>design</strong><br />
team. The <strong>for</strong>mat of the <strong>for</strong>mal <strong>design</strong> team can be reconstructed us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>mal<br />
reports <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on the organisation.<br />
All the chapters on the case-studies (chapters 4-7) are structured similarly. 2 First<br />
a description of the <strong>design</strong> problem, the type of <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy<br />
is given. This section is followed by a section about the organisation of the <strong>design</strong><br />
process <strong>and</strong> the context. The context of the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>in</strong>cludes a description<br />
of the relevant codes, st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> regulations that may constitute the regulative<br />
framework. The way the eng<strong>in</strong>eers dealt with safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process is described <strong>in</strong> some detail. The empirical f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs are<br />
summarised <strong>and</strong> discussed <strong>in</strong> the last section <strong>in</strong> which any regulative frameworks<br />
used dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process are discussed <strong>in</strong> terms of a confrontation with<br />
Grunwald’s requirements.<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
2<br />
If wished the reader need only read the f<strong>in</strong>al section of the case-study chapters, followed by<br />
chapters 8 <strong>and</strong> 9.<br />
47
4 DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
Ryan: ‘We are not go<strong>in</strong>g to use airbags.’<br />
Several members: ‘No, get rid of them.’<br />
Dave: ‘But airbags are go<strong>in</strong>g to be required, you can’t leave them out.’<br />
Ryan: ‘Then we will say that we th<strong>in</strong>k they are useless.’<br />
Thomas: ‘We just want to br<strong>in</strong>g it up <strong>for</strong> discussion.’<br />
Pete: ‘Can I ask how heavy such an airbag is?’<br />
Dave: ‘I don’t want to discuss that now. We have to look at how it works <strong>and</strong><br />
if they have an effect. If it doesn’t work then we are go<strong>in</strong>g to br<strong>in</strong>g it up <strong>for</strong><br />
discussion.’<br />
Ryan: ‘Besides with airbags <strong>and</strong> ABS you need pumps <strong>and</strong> computer systems,<br />
this will rapidly <strong>in</strong>crease the total mass of the car.’<br />
The above example reproduces argumentation aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g airbags <strong>in</strong> a<br />
lightweight car, lightweight because the car is <strong>in</strong>tended to be susta<strong>in</strong>able.<br />
Although one of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers does not want to talk about the mass, it is still an<br />
important issue because <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g all k<strong>in</strong>ds of passive <strong>and</strong> active safety systems<br />
makes cars heavy. The example shows the types of trade-offs between safety <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability that were discussed <strong>and</strong> made <strong>in</strong> the DutchEVO project.<br />
A description of the <strong>design</strong> process of a light-weight susta<strong>in</strong>able car will be<br />
given <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g sections. I have already <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> chapter 2 <strong>and</strong> 3 what<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation is necessary to answer the question how eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes. In this chapter <strong>and</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g chapters on other<br />
cases this <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation will be presented. The goal of the <strong>design</strong> process, the type<br />
of <strong>design</strong> process <strong>and</strong> the context are described <strong>in</strong> section 4.1. The <strong>design</strong> team<br />
<strong>and</strong> how it is organised is described <strong>in</strong> section 4.2, this section <strong>in</strong>cludes a<br />
description of the way decisions were taken <strong>in</strong> this project. I focus on the ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> surround<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> of a car with respect to safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>in</strong><br />
the sections 4.3 to 4.5. In the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s alone about 1000 persons a year die <strong>in</strong><br />
traffic accidents [statl<strong>in</strong>e, 2003]. About half of them are passengers or drivers of<br />
cars. It is not only people <strong>in</strong> cars that get killed. Cars constitute a danger <strong>for</strong><br />
pedestrians, cyclists <strong>and</strong> children play<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the street. Susta<strong>in</strong>ability of cars is<br />
ethically relevant because, given the total number of cars <strong>in</strong> use <strong>and</strong> the amount<br />
of kilometres driven by car users. Reduc<strong>in</strong>g the energy used per kilometre can<br />
have a large effect on global CO2 emissions <strong>and</strong> the use of non-renewable energy<br />
sources. In this <strong>design</strong> process it is difficult to comb<strong>in</strong>e safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability.<br />
49
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
Most measures that will make the car safer will make it also less susta<strong>in</strong>able. The<br />
results from the case are summarised <strong>in</strong> section 4.6.<br />
4.1 A light family car<br />
The Delftse Interfacultaire Onderzoeks Centra (DIOC’s Delft Interfacultary<br />
Research <strong>Centre</strong>s) were founded <strong>in</strong> 1996, with the mission statement to carry<br />
out:<br />
50<br />
‘applied multi-discipl<strong>in</strong>ary research aimed at solv<strong>in</strong>g urgent societal<br />
problems.’ [www.smartproductsystems.tudelft.nl].<br />
Tak<strong>in</strong>g ten multi-discipl<strong>in</strong>ary technology themes a number of studies were<br />
carried out. The theme of DIOC 16 was ‘Model based optimisation of complex<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustrial processes’. DIOC 16 was <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>in</strong> February 1998 under the name<br />
‘Smart Product Systems’. The subject of this research was life cycle efficiency:<br />
the production of goods with m<strong>in</strong>imal waste <strong>and</strong> maximum recycl<strong>in</strong>g of raw<br />
materials, <strong>and</strong> reuse of components <strong>in</strong> electronic <strong>and</strong> other <strong>in</strong>dustries. The<br />
DutchEVO project was started as part of DIOC 16 <strong>in</strong> November 1998. The<br />
participat<strong>in</strong>g groups were Applied Earth Sciences, Industrial Design<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, Electrical Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, the Delft Institute<br />
of Microelectronics <strong>and</strong> Submicron Technology <strong>and</strong> Mechanical Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The goal of the DutchEVO project was to develop a knowledge base that could be<br />
used to make susta<strong>in</strong>able product development possible. Us<strong>in</strong>g the idea of<br />
produc<strong>in</strong>g a lightweight susta<strong>in</strong>able car as the basis <strong>for</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g such<br />
technology, this car was called DutchEVO [www.smartproductsystems.tudelft.nl].<br />
Other goals identified with<strong>in</strong> the project were the promotion of Delft<br />
University of Technology (DUT) by demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g that DUT could <strong>design</strong> a car<br />
that is both technically susta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>and</strong> “emotioneel duurzaam”(emotionally<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able, see section 4.4), <strong>and</strong> the need to start a debate with<strong>in</strong> society <strong>and</strong> the<br />
car <strong>in</strong>dustry regard<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>able cars. The project participants wanted to show<br />
car <strong>in</strong>dustry that it is possible to <strong>design</strong> a susta<strong>in</strong>able, very light (< 400 kg), car<br />
with af<strong>for</strong>dable mass production costs. For some of the team members the<br />
development of a physical prototype car seemed to be the goal while <strong>for</strong> others<br />
the project was seen as a way to deliver scientific papers <strong>and</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g a physical<br />
prototype was <strong>in</strong>cidental to that.<br />
The context of this case was very specific, the <strong>design</strong> process was a university<br />
project. One of the goals was the publication of scientific papers; another goal<br />
was the promotion of DUT with a third be<strong>in</strong>g the need to generate ideas <strong>for</strong> a<br />
more susta<strong>in</strong>able technology. The DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team <strong>and</strong> the university did<br />
not have the goal to develop a car, produce it <strong>and</strong> sell it. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers, there<strong>for</strong>e,
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
had a certa<strong>in</strong> freedom to change requirements as the project proceeded. If the<br />
car was <strong>design</strong>ed to be used on European roads <strong>in</strong> the near future the constra<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
on the <strong>design</strong> would become more str<strong>in</strong>gent. Such constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong>clude pric<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
exist<strong>in</strong>g legislation, image, market<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> br<strong>and</strong> portfolio arguments, all of<br />
which play a large part <strong>in</strong> commercial car <strong>design</strong>. In the DutchEVO case, these<br />
arguments did not have a role.<br />
I started follow<strong>in</strong>g the DutchEVO project <strong>in</strong> May 2000, one year after the start<br />
up. I there<strong>for</strong>e had to rely on exist<strong>in</strong>g documents <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terviews to obta<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about the start of the project.<br />
Design requirements<br />
In what follows, the <strong>design</strong> requirements, as <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> document<br />
‘DutchEVO the development of an ultralight susta<strong>in</strong>able conceptcar’, are quoted<br />
[Knoppert <strong>and</strong> Porcelijn, 1999]. This <strong>design</strong> document was written after the<br />
<strong>design</strong> work had started. The <strong>in</strong>itial aims of the project were:<br />
-‘To <strong>design</strong> a susta<strong>in</strong>able compact family car <strong>for</strong> use <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> around<br />
Western European cities after the year 2009,<br />
-to show that it is possible to create a susta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>and</strong> af<strong>for</strong>dable car <strong>for</strong><br />
mass production,<br />
- to <strong>design</strong> a means of transportation unrestricted by exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>,<br />
image, structure <strong>and</strong> production philosophies,<br />
- to create an <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g priority to weight, safety,<br />
cost, volume <strong>and</strong> com<strong>for</strong>t <strong>in</strong> this order. {Knoppert en Porcelijn, 1999]’<br />
A list of <strong>design</strong> requirements <strong>for</strong> the DutchEVO is given <strong>in</strong> table 4.1 below.<br />
Table 4.1: requirements of the DutchEVO [Knoppert <strong>and</strong> Porcelijn, 1999]<br />
Occupants 4 plus luggage<br />
Product lifespan 200.000 km or 15 years<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>e Front 20 kW Otto 4-stroke<br />
turbo eng<strong>in</strong>e 1<br />
Front suspension MacPherson<br />
Rear suspension trail<strong>in</strong>g arm suspension<br />
Doors 3<br />
Legislation <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards European<br />
Mass 400 kg<br />
Full payload 352 kg<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1<br />
Later on <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process it was decided that this eng<strong>in</strong>e should be comb<strong>in</strong>ed with a light<br />
hybrid system that recovers brak<strong>in</strong>g energy.<br />
51
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
52<br />
Units a year 100 000<br />
Consumer price 12 000 euro<br />
Maximum speed with full payload 130 km/h<br />
Maximum acceleration (0-100 km/h) 25 sec<br />
Fuel consumption 2,5 l/ 100 km<br />
Range 400 (+100) km<br />
Interior height 1150 mm<br />
Exterior length 3300 mm<br />
Exterior width 1550 mm<br />
Exterior height 1570 mm<br />
Ground clearance 400 mm<br />
Wheel-base 2500 mm<br />
Wheel-span 1415 mm<br />
Wheels R15/80/135<br />
Wheels arches R325<br />
Turn<strong>in</strong>g radius 10 000 mm<br />
Aerodynamic drag coefficient 0,25 Cd<br />
Frontal Area 1,8 m 2<br />
CdA 0,45 m 2<br />
Based on the <strong>design</strong> requirements given <strong>in</strong> table 4.1 the <strong>design</strong> process can be<br />
classified as high level <strong>and</strong> radical. The reasons <strong>for</strong> this classification are<br />
discussed below. At this moment European family cars usually weigh about<br />
1200 kg, even the two seats Smart has an empty mass of 720 kg. The <strong>design</strong><br />
requirement to produce a susta<strong>in</strong>able car with an empty mass of less than 400<br />
kg is what makes the <strong>design</strong> radical. This is radical <strong>in</strong> a functional way.<br />
Structurally, it was not certa<strong>in</strong> whether the normal configuration could be used<br />
or not, whether some parts of the normal configuration could be used was<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g that had to be decided on dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
A concept or prototype of a complete product is, automatically, a high level<br />
<strong>design</strong> process. At the lower levels, especially on component level, some parts<br />
can be (adapted) exist<strong>in</strong>g parts; other parts will need to be specially <strong>design</strong>ed. For<br />
example, dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process the decision was taken to use an exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>e (car or motorbike eng<strong>in</strong>e) because develop<strong>in</strong>g a new eng<strong>in</strong>e would be too<br />
time <strong>and</strong> money consum<strong>in</strong>g. This eng<strong>in</strong>e could, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the DutchEVO<br />
<strong>design</strong> team, then be comb<strong>in</strong>ed with a light hybrid system to recover brak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
energy. A sketch of the DutchEVO, made dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process, is shown <strong>in</strong><br />
figure 4.1.
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
Figure 4.1: Sketch of DutchEVO [picture courtesy of the DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team]<br />
4.2 The <strong>design</strong> team<br />
The <strong>design</strong> team <strong>in</strong> this case-study was a large <strong>and</strong> volatile group. Students<br />
participated <strong>for</strong> a year or less, com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> go<strong>in</strong>g throughout the project <strong>and</strong><br />
caus<strong>in</strong>g the group to change cont<strong>in</strong>uously. In total 17 people had actively<br />
participated dur<strong>in</strong>g the time I observed the <strong>design</strong> team. Most of the people<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> when I observed the group are listed <strong>in</strong> appendix 2, which<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude an overview of their educational background <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> how long <strong>and</strong> when<br />
they participated <strong>in</strong> the DutchEVO project.<br />
A lot of different university groups participated <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
Officially there were three subgroups with<strong>in</strong> the project deal<strong>in</strong>g with:<br />
1, the prototype study of the DutchEVO,<br />
2, explor<strong>in</strong>g applications of modern materials <strong>for</strong> automobile applications,<br />
<strong>and</strong><br />
3, the impact <strong>and</strong> safety of an advanced lightweight car structure<br />
[www.smartproductsystems.tudelft.nl].<br />
The first subgroup was concerned with what the team called the philosophy <strong>and</strong><br />
the packag<strong>in</strong>g, the second with the development of biodegradable plastics. The<br />
third group <strong>in</strong>cluded understructure <strong>and</strong> safety. This division was based on the<br />
different departments officially participat<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the project. A group from<br />
Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g was responsible <strong>for</strong> the safety <strong>and</strong> construction. The<br />
53
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
packag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> philosophy subgroup <strong>and</strong> the biodegradable plastics subgroup<br />
were located <strong>in</strong> the Industrial Design department. Any department officially<br />
participat<strong>in</strong>g was obliged to <strong>in</strong>vest man-hours <strong>in</strong> the project. The official<br />
organisational structure can be found <strong>in</strong> documents <strong>and</strong> on the <strong>in</strong>ternet site, but<br />
the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal organisation as observed looked somewhat different<br />
[www.smartproductsystems.tudelft.nl].<br />
The <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal organisation is shown <strong>in</strong> figure 4.2. This diagram is based on<br />
observation. The <strong>in</strong>dication is that the groups were stable <strong>in</strong> composition, but<br />
this was not the case. Students jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> their master’s or bachelor’s thesis <strong>and</strong><br />
left after f<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g. The groups were stable regard<strong>in</strong>g subject. There were always<br />
some people work<strong>in</strong>g on the subject <strong>and</strong> they used the results of their<br />
predecessors to move <strong>for</strong>ward with the project.<br />
In this picture I have differentiated between team members <strong>and</strong> advisors.<br />
Team members were actually <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>and</strong> they attended<br />
<strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs. These <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs dealt with the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> were held<br />
every two weeks from July 2000 to November 2001. After this period <strong>design</strong><br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs were held whenever Thomas, the project leader, thought that it was<br />
necessary. Team members regularly came to the project room to talk to some of<br />
the other team members. Project meet<strong>in</strong>gs were attended by team members,<br />
advisors <strong>and</strong> DUT staff. In these meet<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>design</strong> activities were planned,<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ances were discussed <strong>and</strong> there was usually a presentation on a part of the<br />
<strong>design</strong>. Project meet<strong>in</strong>gs were organised about 10 times a year.<br />
Thomas, Dave <strong>and</strong> Pete are central to the project. Dave <strong>and</strong> Pete def<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
most of the project <strong>and</strong> worked on it from the start. Thomas jo<strong>in</strong>ed later (May<br />
2000) to act as the project leader <strong>and</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ate the <strong>design</strong> process. Thomas,<br />
Dave <strong>and</strong> Pete supervised most of the students. Dave supervised the students<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g on Safety & Construction. Pete did a lot of work <strong>for</strong> Packag<strong>in</strong>g &<br />
Philosophy. In this Packag<strong>in</strong>g & Philosophy group some eng<strong>in</strong>eers worked <strong>for</strong> a<br />
few months on the project (Scot <strong>and</strong> some students work<strong>in</strong>g on a project on<br />
ergonomics). Drivel<strong>in</strong>e & suspension was mostly done by students from the<br />
HTS Autotechniek, a bachelor’s degree <strong>in</strong> automotive eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. These<br />
students always worked <strong>in</strong> couples, <strong>and</strong> only <strong>for</strong> three months <strong>for</strong> the DutchEVO<br />
project. Hence the subgroup drivel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> suspension changed very quickly <strong>and</strong><br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uously throughout the project.<br />
54
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
Figure 4.2: DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team as observed. Thomas, Pete <strong>and</strong> Dave are at<br />
the centre because they coord<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>and</strong> used <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation from people <strong>in</strong> the<br />
other groups. There was also some direct contact between members of different<br />
groups but most of the time this contact was organised via Thomas, Pete or Dave.<br />
Most PhD students were advisors. Kat<strong>in</strong>ka, Alex<strong>and</strong>er, Susan <strong>and</strong> Ann did not<br />
really participate <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>. 2 They regarded DuchtEVO as a case-study <strong>for</strong><br />
their scientific research. They gave <strong>in</strong>put <strong>in</strong> project meet<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>for</strong> example on<br />
recyclability. Kat<strong>in</strong>ka <strong>and</strong> Alex<strong>and</strong>er should really have participated <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong><br />
process accord<strong>in</strong>g to the official organisation but <strong>in</strong> reality they acted as advisors<br />
<strong>and</strong> not as team members.<br />
When <strong>in</strong>terviewed, the responsibilities that team members <strong>in</strong>dicated they felt<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong>, co<strong>in</strong>cided with their task description. Those <strong>in</strong> advis<strong>in</strong>g roles felt<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g good advice. Students felt they had clear descriptions of<br />
their tasks, they were confident that they knew what they had to do <strong>and</strong> what<br />
they could expect other team members to do. Students were usually given the<br />
task to <strong>design</strong> a part of the car, <strong>for</strong> example the suspension or the<br />
understructure. These task descriptions were made by the supervisors <strong>in</strong> co-<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
2<br />
Dave was a PhD student when the project started. He became a lecturer dur<strong>in</strong>g the project. Ed<br />
was a PhD student that participated <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> project.<br />
55
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
operation with the students at the start of their master’s or bachelor’s thesis<br />
project. The task descriptions consisted of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about the goals the<br />
student was expected to achieve, a time schedule <strong>and</strong> the names of the<br />
supervisors. The partition<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>in</strong>to a lot of small projects<br />
assigned to different persons seemed to diffuse the responsibility that people felt<br />
<strong>for</strong> the project <strong>and</strong> its completion. Students only felt responsible <strong>for</strong> the part they<br />
were <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Dave, Ed, Pete <strong>and</strong> Thomas <strong>in</strong> contrast to advisors <strong>and</strong> students, had vague<br />
task descriptions, as a result it was not obvious to the other team members what<br />
their task was: they seemed to feel responsible <strong>for</strong> the whole project.<br />
Thomas, Pete <strong>and</strong> Charlie stated <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terviews that they felt responsible <strong>for</strong><br />
communication between all the team members. It was very important that the<br />
different team members communicated with each other. Decisions made<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g one part of the car <strong>in</strong>fluenced how other parts of the car should be<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> because of the rapid changes <strong>in</strong> the composition of the team, it<br />
was difficult to keep track of who was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g what part. In the<br />
time that Charlie was do<strong>in</strong>g his master’s thesis project the team communicated<br />
more often. Team members knew what the others were do<strong>in</strong>g; there were<br />
discussions on a lot of subjects. This was not completely due to Charlie but he<br />
played a large part <strong>in</strong> facilitat<strong>in</strong>g this communication. Around the time that<br />
Charlie f<strong>in</strong>ished his master’s thesis some staff members decided that all the<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs were cost<strong>in</strong>g too much time <strong>and</strong> the team meet<strong>in</strong>gs ceased to be<br />
organised regularly. Without regular meet<strong>in</strong>gs only Thomas <strong>and</strong> Dave had an<br />
overview of what was go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> the project.<br />
4.2.1 ‘If you have thought it through then it is ok’<br />
There was no <strong>for</strong>mal decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g structure. Team members could decide<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mally on details themselves. These details were presented to the other team<br />
members <strong>in</strong> presentations <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> team members could comment on them.<br />
Larger <strong>issues</strong> were discussed with the team.<br />
56<br />
William: ‘As far as I know, I calculate or <strong>design</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> discuss<br />
that with Dave <strong>and</strong> Ed. If they do not have problems with it then it is<br />
decided.’<br />
Charlie: ‘We decided on some rough ideas together. I have made<br />
choices <strong>in</strong> consultation with the other team members.’<br />
To be part of the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g process it was necessary to be <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med<br />
about which decisions were go<strong>in</strong>g to be made based on what <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation. How<br />
well team members were <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med their colleagues, about what
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
they were do<strong>in</strong>g seemed to depend on commitment. It took ef<strong>for</strong>t to obta<strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation relevant <strong>for</strong> a specific <strong>design</strong> task <strong>and</strong> this had to be done<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uously as the <strong>design</strong> team <strong>and</strong> the <strong>design</strong> itself changed cont<strong>in</strong>uously.<br />
Some team members quit without f<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g a report on what they had done.<br />
This made it nearly impossible <strong>for</strong> other team members to use their results.<br />
If members were not committed to the team, <strong>and</strong> did not share the same<br />
goal, there was a risk that they did not know what the rest was do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> only<br />
showed up at some project meet<strong>in</strong>gs, thus fail<strong>in</strong>g to ga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to who was<br />
do<strong>in</strong>g what, when, <strong>and</strong> which decisions had been made or would be made with<strong>in</strong><br />
a few weeks. To participate <strong>in</strong> the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g, members of the team needed<br />
to <strong>in</strong>vest time <strong>in</strong> communicat<strong>in</strong>g with other team members. Kat<strong>in</strong>ka <strong>and</strong><br />
Alex<strong>and</strong>er were officially team members but they only attended some project<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> did not often communicate with project members apart from<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g these project meet<strong>in</strong>gs. As a result of this limited communication<br />
Kat<strong>in</strong>ka <strong>and</strong> Alex<strong>and</strong>er did not really participate <strong>in</strong> the overall <strong>design</strong> project.<br />
They were not aware of how decisions were made <strong>and</strong> when they were made.<br />
Kat<strong>in</strong>ka <strong>and</strong> Alex<strong>and</strong>er’s ma<strong>in</strong> goals were writ<strong>in</strong>g scientific papers about<br />
biodegradable plastics <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> recyclability, the DutchEVO was just a<br />
case-study <strong>for</strong> them.<br />
Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g was not ordered hierarchically. There were relations<br />
between different team members that could be regarded as hierarchical because<br />
some team members acted as supervisors <strong>for</strong> other team members. Although<br />
there was a hierarchical relation between the students <strong>and</strong> their supervisors this<br />
was not really observable. It seemed that every one had an equal voice <strong>in</strong> the<br />
decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g process.<br />
The project leader, Thomas, was responsible <strong>for</strong> guid<strong>in</strong>g the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
process of the team members <strong>and</strong> he felt responsible <strong>for</strong> check<strong>in</strong>g that team<br />
members <strong>in</strong>cluded all relevant aspects <strong>in</strong> their decisions. The role of the project<br />
leader <strong>in</strong> the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g process was clearly observable. He asked<br />
questions about the process <strong>and</strong> the arguments, especially with regards to the<br />
DutchEVO ideas on susta<strong>in</strong>ability. He sometimes closed a discussion by say<strong>in</strong>g<br />
‘if you have thought about it <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k this is possible then we will do it this<br />
way’. Although Thomas did not decide <strong>in</strong> technological choices, he had a central<br />
position as the project leader. He had an overview of the project <strong>and</strong> knew what<br />
team members were work<strong>in</strong>g on. Thomas knew that certa<strong>in</strong> decisions had been<br />
made while other team members did not always know what their colleagues<br />
were do<strong>in</strong>g. Thomas also knew the f<strong>in</strong>ancial status of the project, he knew<br />
whether certa<strong>in</strong> ideas were possible, given the budget they had been allotted.<br />
This gave the project leader a special position as he had access to critical<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation.<br />
57
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
Above I have described the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g process; I will now focus on the<br />
argumentation used dur<strong>in</strong>g the DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> process. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong><br />
process the <strong>in</strong>itial requirements, decided on at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the process,<br />
seemed to ga<strong>in</strong> authority over time. It seemed requirements like lightweight <strong>and</strong><br />
fun-tot-drive were taken to be self-evident. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the team, fun-to-drive<br />
meant that a ride <strong>in</strong> the car should feel bumpy <strong>and</strong> excit<strong>in</strong>g without lead<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
bodily discom<strong>for</strong>t.<br />
58<br />
Pete: ‘I want a good contact with the car but without bruised buts or<br />
headaches. A Spartan ride but no broken kidneys.’<br />
If an option was considered to be fun-to-drive or just fun then that was an<br />
argument to use that option <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>. It was not enough that an option was<br />
fun, as can be seen <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g quote about the sunroof but it was regarded<br />
as a strong argument <strong>for</strong> an option.<br />
Dave: ‘Why should the car have a sun roof?’<br />
Pete: ‘It is fun, the sun can come <strong>in</strong>.’<br />
Michael: ‘To be able to transport a ..’<br />
Thomas: ‘Fun is not enough.’<br />
Another example of the importance given to <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a car that is fun-to-drive<br />
is that the type of suspension chosen <strong>for</strong> the car was based on that used <strong>in</strong> the<br />
old M<strong>in</strong>i Cooper, aga<strong>in</strong> because this was considered to be a fun-to-drive car. Even<br />
<strong>in</strong> the choice of materials, fun was regarded a strong argument <strong>for</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
material.<br />
Dave: ‘You can do much nicer th<strong>in</strong>gs with composites; with glass fibre<br />
you can do fun th<strong>in</strong>gs.’<br />
New team members accepted criteria like fun-to-drive <strong>and</strong> lightweight without a<br />
lot of questions or critique. If new team members criticised these ideas they<br />
were easily conv<strong>in</strong>ced by old team members to accept these ideas. As an example<br />
of the authority that requirements ga<strong>in</strong>ed over time, take the follow<strong>in</strong>g. By the<br />
time that I started follow<strong>in</strong>g the project, about a year after the official start, it was<br />
no longer possible to question the criteria lightweight <strong>and</strong> emotional<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability as measures of susta<strong>in</strong>ability (<strong>for</strong> an explanation of emotional<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability see section 4.4). Even though there are contradictions between<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability as it is usually understood <strong>and</strong> what is meant by emotional<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Some project meet<strong>in</strong>gs were attended by people from outside the<br />
project team. The question whether an electrical or hydrogen car would be more<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able was raised on some occasions. The answer was usually that
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
hydrogen cars were not feasible <strong>and</strong> electrical cars were too heavy <strong>and</strong> used too<br />
many resources <strong>and</strong> too much energy consider<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>troduction date. A<br />
lightweight car was feasible <strong>and</strong> more susta<strong>in</strong>able accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> team.<br />
Most people, some team members as well as people from outside, found the<br />
term “emotional susta<strong>in</strong>ability” vague <strong>and</strong> did not know what it meant <strong>and</strong> this<br />
kept them from start<strong>in</strong>g a discussion. 3<br />
The personal experiences of eng<strong>in</strong>eers played a large part <strong>in</strong> arguments used<br />
<strong>and</strong> decisions made dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process. The ideas on car safety were<br />
based on the experiences of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers (see section 4.3). George <strong>and</strong> Jill<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed the suspension concept, they both had experience with old M<strong>in</strong>i<br />
Coopers <strong>and</strong> they thought that the suspension of these cars made them fun-todrive,<br />
simple, light <strong>and</strong> elegant. George <strong>and</strong> Jill per<strong>for</strong>med a multi-criteria<br />
analysis because they feared that they might be prejudiced <strong>in</strong> choos<strong>in</strong>g to base<br />
the suspension on that used <strong>in</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>i Cooper. The result be<strong>in</strong>g that the<br />
suspension based on that of the M<strong>in</strong>i Cooper was still the suspension of choice<br />
<strong>for</strong> a fun drive <strong>and</strong> a lightweight car. Another example of personal experience<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g arguments <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong> choices is the follow<strong>in</strong>g. Thomas was the only<br />
one of the <strong>design</strong> team who had children. The DutchEVO was <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> 2<br />
adults with 2 kids <strong>in</strong> the backseats. Thomas regularly emphasised the fact that<br />
there should be allowance made <strong>for</strong> children on the backseat. For example <strong>in</strong> a<br />
discussion on the use of fabric <strong>for</strong> the doors:<br />
Thomas: ‘Will there be a draught, there might be small children on the<br />
backseat.’<br />
Thomas also <strong>in</strong>dicated a few times that the car should not feel too vulnerable<br />
because he as a parent, would not want to put his children <strong>in</strong> a car that did not<br />
feel safe. A fabric door that would move <strong>in</strong> response to w<strong>in</strong>d would be<br />
unacceptable to him as a parent. None of the other team members ever<br />
mentioned that kids would be seated on the backseats.<br />
4.3 What does it mean <strong>for</strong> a car to be safe?<br />
As <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>troduction I regard safety as an ethically relevant issue. In<br />
this case-study safety is a very important issue. With<strong>in</strong> the car <strong>in</strong>dustry car safety<br />
is usually def<strong>in</strong>ed as comply<strong>in</strong>g with the relevant legislation <strong>and</strong> per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g well<br />
<strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> crash tests. Today a safe car is a car that protects the occupants from<br />
critical <strong>in</strong>juries <strong>and</strong> death if it is crashed <strong>in</strong>to a wall at 64 km/h (see figure 4.3).<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
3<br />
In <strong>in</strong>terviews some students said that they did not underst<strong>and</strong> what was meant by emotional<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability,( see section 4.4).<br />
59
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
This is accomplished by <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g safety cages <strong>and</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g airbags. The “safest”<br />
cars at this moment as tested by EuroNCAP, a cooperative of different European<br />
consumer <strong>and</strong> governmental organisations, <strong>in</strong>corporate the follow<strong>in</strong>g safety<br />
devices: tw<strong>in</strong> front airbags (dualchamber), thoracic side airbags, head protection<br />
airbags (curta<strong>in</strong>), load limiters <strong>for</strong> all belts, double pre-tensioner <strong>for</strong> driver belt,<br />
buckle pre-tensioner <strong>for</strong> front passenger belt, retractor pre-tensioners <strong>for</strong> rear<br />
outer belts, three-po<strong>in</strong>t centre belt, <strong>and</strong> ABS. 4 As I observed dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
DutchEVO project, safety can refer to five different aspects of the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
situations.<br />
60<br />
Figure 4.3: Picture from EuroNCAP of a frontal impact test [picture taken from<br />
the crash test pictures <strong>for</strong> download<strong>in</strong>g at the media centre of the EuroNCAP<br />
website]<br />
4.3.1 Active safety<br />
The DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team used the def<strong>in</strong>ition that active safety is prevent<strong>in</strong>g<br />
accidents from happen<strong>in</strong>g. Nowadays this prevention is done by <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g all<br />
k<strong>in</strong>ds of active safety systems like an anti-lock brak<strong>in</strong>g system (ABS), nightvision<br />
etc. The team thought that these systems are not really effective when it comes to<br />
prevent<strong>in</strong>g accidents. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> team, drivers may overestimate<br />
their ability <strong>and</strong> will try to keep the perceived risk constant. In the team’s ideas,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g active safety measures would there<strong>for</strong>e lead to more speed<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> not<br />
to fewer accidents. Moreover systems like ABS are heavy because they need<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
4 In<strong>for</strong>mation from www.euroncap.com accessed 22 May 2002 [www.eurncap.com, 2002]. The<br />
“safest” car <strong>and</strong> the systems <strong>in</strong> it will off course change when new models have been tested.<br />
The trend however is that more systems <strong>and</strong> airbags are <strong>in</strong>cluded to per<strong>for</strong>m even better <strong>in</strong> the<br />
tests. The list of airbags <strong>and</strong> systems will there<strong>for</strong>e only become longer.
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
pumps etc. There<strong>for</strong>e, it would be difficult to <strong>in</strong>clude ABS <strong>and</strong> still have a<br />
prototype of less than 400 kg. Another way, to prevent accidents, <strong>and</strong> the way<br />
preferred by the <strong>design</strong> team, is to change the behaviour of drivers. The<br />
responsibility <strong>for</strong> safe driv<strong>in</strong>g stays with the driver. The team wanted the driver<br />
to feel a bit vulnerable. In their discussions they talked about not <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
safety devices <strong>and</strong> about mak<strong>in</strong>g the driver responsible. 5<br />
They did not have a lot of argumentation or proof to underp<strong>in</strong> their op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />
that not <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g safety systems makes a driver drive more carefully. Dave was<br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g the safety ideas <strong>for</strong> the DutchEVO. He had done some literature<br />
research but the idea of mak<strong>in</strong>g a driver drive more safely because she feels<br />
vulnerable seemed to be based ma<strong>in</strong>ly on personal experience <strong>and</strong> gut feel<strong>in</strong>g. A<br />
master’s student did the ma<strong>in</strong> part of the literature survey, but came up with<br />
literature that only <strong>in</strong>directly supported the statement that if a driver feels<br />
vulnerable he or she will drive more safely. The master’s student who did the<br />
literature survey was not part of the <strong>design</strong> team. She was not <strong>in</strong>troduced to the<br />
team <strong>and</strong> there was no contact between her <strong>and</strong> the <strong>design</strong> team. Her literature<br />
survey was supposed to be done <strong>in</strong>dependently without knowledge of the ideas<br />
held with<strong>in</strong> the DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team. The literature survey could then be used<br />
as a check on the ideas prevalent with<strong>in</strong> the DutchEVO project. Dave was,<br />
however, the master’s student’s supervisor <strong>and</strong> it is questionable whether the<br />
literature survey was done completely without knowledge of the teams ideas on<br />
safety <strong>for</strong> the DutchEVO.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the time that I observed the <strong>design</strong> team the ideas about car safety<br />
were not discussed with<strong>in</strong> the team. The ideas about safety no longer seemed to<br />
be open to discussion. Students <strong>and</strong> other people jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the team accepted,<br />
without any notable criticism, the idea that mak<strong>in</strong>g a driver feel vulnerable<br />
would be beneficial <strong>for</strong> traffic safety. All discussions about safety that were<br />
observed concerned practical <strong>issues</strong> like the <strong>in</strong>clusion or not of airbags.<br />
4.3.2 Passive safety<br />
The <strong>design</strong> team used the def<strong>in</strong>ition that passive safety is m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g damage<br />
when accidents occur. Two sorts of reasons were given by members of the<br />
<strong>design</strong> team <strong>for</strong> reduc<strong>in</strong>g damage <strong>in</strong> the case of accidents. One reason given <strong>for</strong><br />
try<strong>in</strong>g to make the car passively safe has its roots <strong>in</strong> economics. The costs of<br />
damage <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>juries due to accidents would be too high if passive safety was not<br />
considered <strong>in</strong> car <strong>design</strong>. The second reason given <strong>for</strong> achiev<strong>in</strong>g good passive<br />
safety is related to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers’ responsibility <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a safe car. Some of<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
5<br />
In this they seem to <strong>for</strong>get that there are other drivers. If a driver is driv<strong>in</strong>g responsibly, he /<br />
she can still be hit by another less prudent or drunk driver.<br />
61
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
the <strong>design</strong> team felt the eng<strong>in</strong>eer was responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a car that<br />
protected passengers <strong>and</strong> driver <strong>in</strong> the event of a crash.<br />
These different reasons can lead to differences of op<strong>in</strong>ions when it comes to<br />
decid<strong>in</strong>g whether to <strong>in</strong>clude passive safety systems <strong>in</strong> a car <strong>design</strong>. If the reason<br />
to <strong>in</strong>clude passive safety systems is an economic one, a cost-benefit analysis can<br />
be used to determ<strong>in</strong>e whether a system must be <strong>in</strong>cluded. This requires,<br />
however that monetary value is placed on the lost lives of car crash victims <strong>and</strong><br />
assigned <strong>for</strong> the types of <strong>in</strong>juries likely to be caused <strong>in</strong> a car crash. These<br />
monetary values are always arbitrary to some extent, the costs of hospitalisation<br />
can be estimated but the price <strong>for</strong> suffer<strong>in</strong>g is much more difficult to estimate. If<br />
you th<strong>in</strong>k that an eng<strong>in</strong>eer is responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a car that protects the<br />
people <strong>in</strong>side the car, the use of cost-benefit analysis can be problematic. There<br />
was one discussion dur<strong>in</strong>g a project meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> which an assistant professor<br />
specialis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> reliability did not agree with the use of cost-benefit analyses<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g safety <strong>issues</strong>. It was not right to put money on a person’s life <strong>in</strong> his<br />
op<strong>in</strong>ion. He thought it was not possible to decide about <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g passive safety<br />
systems based on a comparison of the costs of these safety systems <strong>and</strong> the costs<br />
of the human lives that would be saved.<br />
62<br />
Associate professor: ‘But how many millions is it worth to save one<br />
person? You can’t express the life of one human be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> terms of the<br />
costs of a change.’<br />
Thomas : ‘In pr<strong>in</strong>ciple I agree but that’s how it works.’<br />
Dave: ‘In aerospace we calculate it that way.’<br />
With this the discussion ended <strong>and</strong> was never started aga<strong>in</strong>. The arguments put<br />
<strong>for</strong>ward by Thomas <strong>and</strong> Dave seem to imply a naturalistic fallacy: it is usually<br />
done this way there<strong>for</strong>e it should be done this way. In other presentations where<br />
‘the costs of unsusta<strong>in</strong>abilities , i.e. deaths, <strong>in</strong>juries, lost labour hours, oil spills,<br />
of car accidents’ were presented no one objected to putt<strong>in</strong>g a monetary value on<br />
a human life <strong>and</strong> compar<strong>in</strong>g this with the costs of remov<strong>in</strong>g oil from the road. 6<br />
The fact that the project team was <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a very light car decreases<br />
passive safety as the lighter car will always have the highest acceleration <strong>in</strong> a<br />
crash with a heavier car. This is a law of nature <strong>and</strong> cannot be prevented. It is<br />
however possible to change the <strong>design</strong> of cars <strong>in</strong> such a way that crashes cause<br />
less damage to the drivers <strong>and</strong> passengers <strong>in</strong> cars. One way to prevent <strong>in</strong>juries is<br />
to use airbags. Another way is called crash compatibility. A heavy car crash<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>to a smaller lighter car already has the advantage of the lower acceleration.<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
6 Note that <strong>in</strong> this presentation deaths are regarded as part of the “unsusta<strong>in</strong>abilities” of traffic.<br />
This use of the term unsusta<strong>in</strong>abilities <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g deaths <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>jured people was observed<br />
sometimes <strong>in</strong> presentations.
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
Often the heavy car is also very stiff <strong>and</strong> will de<strong>for</strong>m less than the small lighter<br />
car. The heavy car uses the de<strong>for</strong>mation zone of the lighter smaller car. This<br />
damages the lighter car even more <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creases the chances of <strong>in</strong>jury <strong>and</strong> death<br />
<strong>in</strong> the lighter car. If the heavier car is an MPV (Multiple Purpose vehicle) or SUV<br />
(Sports Utility Vehicle) then most of the times it also has a large ground<br />
clearance. The stiff load bear<strong>in</strong>g structure is higher above the ground than the<br />
load bear<strong>in</strong>g structure of the smaller car. There<strong>for</strong>e the heavy car will crash<br />
above the load bear<strong>in</strong>g structure of the smaller car, <strong>for</strong> example it will crash <strong>in</strong>to<br />
the door <strong>in</strong>stead of <strong>in</strong>to the floor <strong>in</strong> a side impact. This further dim<strong>in</strong>ishes the<br />
chance of the occupants of surviv<strong>in</strong>g the crash <strong>in</strong> the smaller, lighter car. A way<br />
to make such a light car safer <strong>in</strong> crashes is to change the <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong> such a way<br />
that heavy cars will crash <strong>in</strong>to the load-bear<strong>in</strong>g structure. This is called crash<br />
compatibility. In view of the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g it was decided that the floor of the<br />
DutchEVO will be higher, so that, <strong>in</strong> event of a crash, <strong>in</strong>com<strong>in</strong>g cars will crash<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the load-bear<strong>in</strong>g floor.<br />
Includ<strong>in</strong>g more <strong>and</strong> more passive safety systems (belts, airbags) would<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> team, also enhance the feel<strong>in</strong>g of safety <strong>and</strong> would<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e lead to an overestimation of the driver’s <strong>and</strong> car’s capabilities.<br />
There<strong>for</strong>e the team wanted to evaluate critically all exist<strong>in</strong>g passive safety<br />
systems <strong>and</strong> did not want to <strong>in</strong>clude all of them. In the <strong>design</strong> team there was a<br />
difference of op<strong>in</strong>ion about what to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>and</strong> what not, especially regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />
airbags. Inclusion of airbags adds mass. One of the discussions on airbags can<br />
be found <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>troduction of this chapter. In this quote it can be seen that <strong>for</strong><br />
some team members the lightweight criterion was more important. So <strong>in</strong> a<br />
trade-off between safety <strong>and</strong> lightweight, the mass of a system was decisive <strong>for</strong><br />
them. Dave, <strong>in</strong> contrast, did not want to make a decision about the <strong>in</strong>clusion of<br />
passive safety system based on the mass of the system. He wanted to make that<br />
decision based on the efficacy of the system <strong>for</strong> prevent<strong>in</strong>g deaths <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>juries.<br />
4.3.3 Partner protection<br />
Protection of other people on the roads is often called partner protection. The<br />
protection of other road users has recently begun to ga<strong>in</strong> more attention from<br />
governmental organisations <strong>and</strong> the car <strong>in</strong>dustry. Recently EuroNCAP started<br />
test<strong>in</strong>g new car models <strong>in</strong> pedestrian impact situations. Most cars do not score<br />
well <strong>in</strong> these tests; they score 1 or 2 stars where 4 is the maximum number of<br />
stars that can be scored. There are at this moment only few car models that score<br />
3 stars <strong>for</strong> the new pedestrian impact tests. 7 Some roadsters <strong>and</strong> large off-road<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
7 In<strong>for</strong>mation from EuroNCAP accessed 15 Jan 2004 [www.euroncap.com, 2004]. The tests <strong>for</strong><br />
pedestrian impact were changed 1 Jan 2002. The scores <strong>for</strong> the old test are accord<strong>in</strong>g to Euro-<br />
NCAP <strong>in</strong>comparable to scores <strong>for</strong> the new tests.<br />
63
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
cars per<strong>for</strong>m especially poorly <strong>in</strong> pedestrian impact. New European regulation<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g partner protection <strong>and</strong> pedestrian impact will come <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> 2010.<br />
There seemed to be a consensus with<strong>in</strong> the team that try<strong>in</strong>g to prevent<br />
<strong>in</strong>juries <strong>and</strong> deaths among pedestrians <strong>and</strong> cyclists is primarily the responsibility<br />
of the driver. Although they considered the driver to be responsible <strong>for</strong> driv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
safely the <strong>design</strong> team thought that they had to keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the more<br />
vulnerable road users as cyclists <strong>and</strong> pedestrians. Thomas had previous<br />
experience with the regulation that will come <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> 2010 as he has<br />
worked on a project <strong>for</strong> an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company to <strong>design</strong> a prototype car that<br />
complies with the proposed regulation. It was mentioned a few times that the<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence of the high floor dur<strong>in</strong>g impact with a pedestrian needed to be<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigated us<strong>in</strong>g computer simulations. As far as I know, this had not been<br />
done.<br />
4.3.4 Car security<br />
64<br />
Thomas: ‘..but there can be constructive parts where there should not<br />
be, especially regard<strong>in</strong>g pedestrian impact. You could simulate that.’<br />
Pete: ‘Yeah simulate that.’<br />
Dave: ‘… [At this moment] there is no reason to change the geometry,<br />
pedestrian impact still needs to be simulated.’<br />
Car theft, theft of th<strong>in</strong>gs stored <strong>in</strong> the car or armed carjack<strong>in</strong>g are daily events <strong>in</strong><br />
most European countries. This aspect was overlooked by the <strong>design</strong> team <strong>for</strong><br />
some time. After a presentation that Thomas gave to some people from Renault<br />
he received some questions on this issue. This might be a special problem<br />
because the <strong>design</strong> team proposed us<strong>in</strong>g fabrics <strong>in</strong> the non-load-bear<strong>in</strong>g parts of<br />
the car doors. Break<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the DutchEVO would then be easy.<br />
4.3.5 Regulation<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g observation of <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs, it became clear that the way this <strong>design</strong><br />
team dealt with safety regulations was ambivalent. The quotes given below are<br />
loose fragments of discussions on regulations <strong>and</strong> the DutchEVO.<br />
Charlie: ‘In general you should follow that regulation. You need very<br />
strong arguments to not comply with the regulations.’<br />
Dave: ‘If the regulations say this, I sometimes th<strong>in</strong>k the hell with those<br />
regulations.’
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
Thomas: ‘You have to challenge regulations; regulations do tend to lag<br />
beh<strong>in</strong>d.’<br />
Some regulations were used to guide the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>and</strong> were seen by the<br />
team members as someth<strong>in</strong>g that smart people had worked on <strong>for</strong> a long time,<br />
so they should strive to comply with the regulations. For example the regulations<br />
on light<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> view angles should be met accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> team. The<br />
<strong>design</strong> team also thought that <strong>for</strong> a concept car to be realistic most regulations<br />
should be taken <strong>in</strong>to account.<br />
Dave: ‘regulations give guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process…… They give<br />
guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> we want a realistic car so you take them [regulations] as<br />
a guidel<strong>in</strong>e, you could take someth<strong>in</strong>g else but you want to be realistic<br />
<strong>and</strong> this is easy <strong>and</strong> well documented.’<br />
However, some regulations were regarded as silly or not effective <strong>and</strong> the team<br />
felt that regulations should be challenged. This was the case with crash safety<br />
regulations. The team thought that the obligatory crash tests were <strong>in</strong>efficient.<br />
Most actual crashes do not resemble the prescribed crash tests. A lot of fatalities<br />
are due to speed<strong>in</strong>g on roads <strong>and</strong> crash<strong>in</strong>g at a speed of about 80 km/h or more<br />
<strong>in</strong>to a tree or lamp post or other solid object. The st<strong>and</strong>ard crash test at 64 km/h<br />
<strong>in</strong>to a wall is very different from a crash <strong>in</strong>to a tree. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> team<br />
challeng<strong>in</strong>g crash safety regulations can only be done us<strong>in</strong>g very good<br />
argumentation.<br />
4.4 Light throw away after use?<br />
The def<strong>in</strong>ition used by the <strong>design</strong> team <strong>for</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability is that of the World<br />
Commission on Environment <strong>and</strong> Development, the Brundtl<strong>and</strong>-commission<br />
[WCED, 1987]. This commission def<strong>in</strong>ed susta<strong>in</strong>able development as a<br />
development that meets the needs of the present generation without<br />
compromis<strong>in</strong>g the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Two<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs are important <strong>in</strong> this def<strong>in</strong>ition.<br />
1. The concept of ‘needs’, refers <strong>in</strong> particular to the essential needs of the<br />
world’s poor, to which overrid<strong>in</strong>g priority should be given.<br />
2. The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology <strong>and</strong> social<br />
organisation on the environment’s ability to meet present <strong>and</strong> future<br />
needs.<br />
The choice <strong>for</strong> a certa<strong>in</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of susta<strong>in</strong>ability is not ethically neutral<br />
because such a choice implies a choice to <strong>in</strong>clude some th<strong>in</strong>gs as part of a<br />
65
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
community with moral rights. In us<strong>in</strong>g the Brundtl<strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition a choice was<br />
made <strong>for</strong> an anthropocentric view on the conservation of nature <strong>and</strong> resources.<br />
In an anthropocentric vision on nature, only humans have <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic value <strong>and</strong><br />
moral rights. Nature only has <strong>in</strong>strumental value <strong>for</strong> humans. It can help<br />
humans to survive <strong>and</strong> flourish. In anthropocentric visions, the conservation of<br />
nature is aimed at secur<strong>in</strong>g that future human generations can live <strong>in</strong><br />
comparable or better conditions than humans do today.<br />
Be<strong>for</strong>e I started follow<strong>in</strong>g the project, discussions had taken place regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />
whether personal transportation can be susta<strong>in</strong>able. The fact rema<strong>in</strong>s that<br />
consider<strong>in</strong>g the Brundtl<strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition it is difficult to justify <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a city car.<br />
In cities there are usually enough other <strong>for</strong>ms of transportation available, such<br />
as bicycles or public transportation that use fewer resources than driv<strong>in</strong>g a car.<br />
The DutchEVO team decided that people should be enticed to behave more<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able without deny<strong>in</strong>g them personal mobility. So a more susta<strong>in</strong>able car<br />
would lead to a more susta<strong>in</strong>able world <strong>and</strong> this can be done us<strong>in</strong>g today’s<br />
technology. The <strong>design</strong> team thought that try<strong>in</strong>g to conv<strong>in</strong>ce people to use other<br />
modes of transportation was not effective because the number of kilometres<br />
driven <strong>in</strong> cars is still grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s.<br />
Dave wrote most of the documents on susta<strong>in</strong>ability used with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong><br />
team. He <strong>in</strong>dicated that he only knew of the Brundtl<strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>and</strong> was not aware that there are also non-anthropocentric views<br />
on susta<strong>in</strong>ability. The def<strong>in</strong>ition was compatible with the ideas of the team<br />
members. In the <strong>in</strong>terviews it became clear that all the team members embraced<br />
an anthropocentric view on the conservation of nature <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cluded the needs of<br />
future generations.<br />
66<br />
Thomas: ‘Well you assume the cont<strong>in</strong>uity of humanity.’<br />
Dave: ‘.. base is just the def<strong>in</strong>ition from the Brundtl<strong>and</strong> report, to take<br />
care that we can offer future generations the same chances that we<br />
have now.’<br />
One important feature of the Brundtl<strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition is that a susta<strong>in</strong>able<br />
development should lead to better conditions <strong>in</strong> underdeveloped countries <strong>and</strong><br />
regions. In <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a family car <strong>for</strong> Europe this was much more difficult to<br />
implement. This feature of the Brundtl<strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition was not recognised by all<br />
the team members, perhaps <strong>for</strong> this reason.<br />
Operationalisation of the def<strong>in</strong>ition was done <strong>in</strong> two ways. The team<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>guished technological susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>and</strong> emotional susta<strong>in</strong>ability. For team
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
members it was important to make the technological part of susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
measurable. The team wanted to express technological susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>in</strong> one<br />
measurable quantity, because this makes comparison between alternative<br />
options possible. There<strong>for</strong>e they used the idea of an energy balance as a unit of<br />
measurement. To obta<strong>in</strong> an energy balance <strong>for</strong> a product all energy used dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
production, use <strong>and</strong> discard<strong>in</strong>g of a product is added. Other balances like the<br />
ecological balance require that th<strong>in</strong>gs like emissions <strong>and</strong> noise h<strong>in</strong>drance are<br />
also <strong>in</strong>cluded. Weight factors need to be decided on <strong>and</strong> the diverse effects need<br />
to be added to get one measure <strong>for</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Dave regarded such th<strong>in</strong>gs as<br />
subjective <strong>and</strong> preferred not to have to decide on questions such as: What is<br />
worse, emissions or noise h<strong>in</strong>drance? Besides he claimed that emissions are<br />
related to energy use. So m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g energy use <strong>in</strong>corporates m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g<br />
emissions <strong>in</strong> his view. There<strong>for</strong>e technological susta<strong>in</strong>ability was expressed <strong>in</strong><br />
terms of energy consumption.<br />
In the summer <strong>and</strong> fall of 2000 more emphasis was placed on the mass of<br />
the car. Mass of a car <strong>and</strong> energy consumption are strongly correlated because<br />
the mass of a car has a large <strong>in</strong>fluence on energy consumption <strong>in</strong> the use phase.<br />
It is however not the only factor that <strong>in</strong>fluences energy consumption dur<strong>in</strong>g use.<br />
Aerodynamic shape, eng<strong>in</strong>e technology <strong>and</strong> roll<strong>in</strong>g resistance also play a part <strong>in</strong><br />
energy consumption. The <strong>design</strong> team sometimes neglected these other factors.<br />
Charlie: ‘Susta<strong>in</strong>ability of the car is especially <strong>in</strong> the mass, the use of<br />
fuel.’<br />
Later on <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> project the emphasis shifted somewhat, back from only<br />
mass of the car to energy consumption. Factors <strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g energy use like<br />
aerodynamics <strong>and</strong> the possibility of recycl<strong>in</strong>g parts were also sometimes taken <strong>in</strong><br />
account. Recycl<strong>in</strong>g had, however, a low priority: the team was primarily aim<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>for</strong> a light car. European laws have been prepared that will make car<br />
manufacturers build recyclable cars. In the future 95% of the materials used <strong>in</strong><br />
cars will need to be recyclable [2000/53/EC]. 8 The DutchEVO team did not aim to<br />
comply with this percentage; they chose <strong>for</strong> a very light “throw-away after use car”<br />
rather than a heavy iron car that could be recycled. They hoped that their research<br />
would show that such a light but hard to recycle car is much better <strong>for</strong> the<br />
environment. Of course there was some attention <strong>for</strong> recycl<strong>in</strong>g as Ann <strong>and</strong> Susan<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
8 That is, 95% of the total mass of the car. A very heavy steel car will easily comply with this<br />
legislation. When the <strong>in</strong>terior, electrical wir<strong>in</strong>g, battery <strong>and</strong> dangerous chemicals are removed,<br />
the steel structure <strong>and</strong> bodywork can be melted <strong>and</strong> reused. To comply with this legislation<br />
when <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a very light car is much harder because the hard to recycle <strong>in</strong>terior, electrical<br />
wir<strong>in</strong>g, battery etc will make up much more than 5% of the mass of the car. The relative mass of<br />
the easy-to-recycle body panels <strong>and</strong> cage construction is much lower than <strong>in</strong> the heavy car [De<br />
Kanter <strong>and</strong> Van Gorp, 2002].<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
were both advisors <strong>for</strong> the project <strong>and</strong> were work<strong>in</strong>g on PhD-projects concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
recycl<strong>in</strong>g of cars. However, a choice <strong>for</strong> an easy to recycle option was only made<br />
<strong>in</strong> cases where this option was not significantly heavier than a lighter more<br />
difficult to recycle option. A part where recycl<strong>in</strong>g was deemed important by the<br />
<strong>design</strong> team was the understructure. The understructure was made of<br />
alum<strong>in</strong>ium <strong>and</strong> alum<strong>in</strong>ium foam. It is usually understood <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
alum<strong>in</strong>ium is easy to recycle if two guidel<strong>in</strong>es are used. The first guidel<strong>in</strong>e is that<br />
wrought <strong>and</strong> cast alum<strong>in</strong>ium should not be used together. If wrought alum<strong>in</strong>ium<br />
(more pure, less alloy<strong>in</strong>g elements <strong>and</strong> contam<strong>in</strong>ation) is recycled together with<br />
cast alum<strong>in</strong>ium (less pure, more alloy<strong>in</strong>g elements <strong>and</strong> contam<strong>in</strong>ation) then you<br />
will get cast alum<strong>in</strong>ium. The second guidel<strong>in</strong>e is that welded alum<strong>in</strong>ium is easier<br />
to recycle than bonded alum<strong>in</strong>ium, the adhesive will contam<strong>in</strong>ate the secondary<br />
alum<strong>in</strong>ium if it is not removed be<strong>for</strong>e smelt<strong>in</strong>g. The <strong>design</strong> team acknowledged<br />
these guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> tried to use them <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Pete <strong>and</strong> Dave <strong>in</strong>troduced the term “emotional susta<strong>in</strong>ability” <strong>in</strong> the sense that<br />
more satisfaction than only that of arriv<strong>in</strong>g at B hav<strong>in</strong>g set out from A should be<br />
ga<strong>in</strong>ed from driv<strong>in</strong>g with the car. The car should give more pleasure <strong>and</strong><br />
satisfaction while driv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> while st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g still than other cars. Emotional<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>in</strong>cluded, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> team, the car be<strong>in</strong>g fun-to-drive<br />
<strong>and</strong> the driver hav<strong>in</strong>g “an age<strong>in</strong>g, car<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> explor<strong>in</strong>g relationship” with the car.<br />
68<br />
Pete: ‘…that we create a susta<strong>in</strong>able use without the user realis<strong>in</strong>g this<br />
because they are <strong>for</strong>ced to h<strong>and</strong>le the car susta<strong>in</strong>ably. Light-heartedly,<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g able to have fun driv<strong>in</strong>g.’<br />
Drivers should get more value <strong>and</strong> satisfaction from us<strong>in</strong>g the car than only<br />
gett<strong>in</strong>g from one place to another. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> team the extra value<br />
should not only be experienced <strong>in</strong> the driv<strong>in</strong>g. More value can be ga<strong>in</strong>ed from<br />
multiple use <strong>for</strong> the car, e.g. us<strong>in</strong>g the car when st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g still i.e. as playground<br />
<strong>for</strong> children (see figure 4.4).<br />
Figure 4.4: Make use of the car when st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g still [picture courtesy of the<br />
DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team].
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
Emotional susta<strong>in</strong>ability should lead to a strong bond between car <strong>and</strong> driver. It<br />
should be possible to personalise the car <strong>and</strong> the car should age beautifully. One<br />
phrase that was often repeated is that it should be a pleasure to age with the car.<br />
People should like the car so much that they will not discard it be<strong>for</strong>e it brakes<br />
down. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to some <strong>design</strong> team members this would mean that less new<br />
cars are sold <strong>and</strong> that would be more susta<strong>in</strong>able because less scarce raw<br />
materials would be used to produce the cars.<br />
Supervisor of a student: ‘What do you mean by susta<strong>in</strong>ability?’<br />
Dave: ‘That it does not conflict with the <strong>in</strong>terests of future generations.<br />
So that can be energy use or wastes.’<br />
Thomas: ‘It can also be that if you ride two years longer with your car<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e you buy a new one that is also a contribution to susta<strong>in</strong>ability.’<br />
Dave: ‘This is not valid <strong>for</strong> 10 years.’<br />
With his remark Dave po<strong>in</strong>ted to the fact that as eng<strong>in</strong>es age they become more<br />
pollut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> also eng<strong>in</strong>e technology will improve. Driv<strong>in</strong>g a car that is old can<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e at one po<strong>in</strong>t become more pollut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> energy consum<strong>in</strong>g than<br />
recycl<strong>in</strong>g that old car <strong>and</strong> produc<strong>in</strong>g a new one.<br />
Students <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g parts of the DutchEVO tried to use the ideas on<br />
technological <strong>and</strong> emotional susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>in</strong> their <strong>design</strong>s. With regard to<br />
technological susta<strong>in</strong>ability this was relatively easy because this was<br />
operationalised as lightweight. Yet, it must be said that <strong>for</strong> some students,<br />
especially two students from HTS Autotechniek, technological as well as<br />
emotional, susta<strong>in</strong>ability were difficult concepts. They were seen as typical<br />
DutchEVO words but what they referred to, the students did not know exactly.<br />
The Dutch word <strong>for</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability is often <strong>in</strong>terpreted as durability, this causes<br />
confusion.<br />
Jill: ‘Oh that word susta<strong>in</strong>able that is really a disaster. It is a disaster<br />
word…..[explanation of what she th<strong>in</strong>ks susta<strong>in</strong>able means] ….But it is<br />
really a DutchEVO buzz word, I must say.’<br />
So some students <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> team, who sometimes used the term<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability, did not really underst<strong>and</strong> what was meant by it.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
4.5 Susta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>and</strong> / or safe<br />
Safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability are values that are difficult to comb<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> a car.<br />
Depend<strong>in</strong>g on the operationalisation of both safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability it can even<br />
be impossible to <strong>design</strong> a car that is both optimally safe <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able. In the<br />
DutchEVO project the lightweight criterion was regarded as the most important<br />
part of the operationalisation of susta<strong>in</strong>ability. This had a negative <strong>in</strong>fluence on<br />
the safety of the people <strong>in</strong>side the car. A light car will always experience the<br />
larger acceleration <strong>in</strong> a crash with a heavier car. In a car with a mass of 400 kg it<br />
is also very difficult to <strong>in</strong>clude all k<strong>in</strong>ds of active safety systems. Active safety<br />
systems like ABS <strong>and</strong> Electronic Stability Program (ESP) require a lot of<br />
electrical devices <strong>and</strong> hydraulical pumps, <strong>and</strong> above the mass added by <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
these active safety systems these safety systems consume energy <strong>in</strong> use.<br />
In discussions with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> team on <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g safety systems, the<br />
argument that the systems would <strong>in</strong>crease the mass was deemed very important.<br />
The trade-offs that needed to be made between safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability (mass)<br />
triggered a change <strong>in</strong> the operationalisation of safety. Some of the <strong>design</strong> team<br />
members thought that mass should be a decisive argument. In most <strong>in</strong>stances of<br />
trade-offs between safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability, susta<strong>in</strong>ability or at least mass got the<br />
highest priority. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process it became apparent that it was not<br />
possible to <strong>in</strong>clude all k<strong>in</strong>ds of safety systems <strong>and</strong> still <strong>design</strong> a car of 400 kg.<br />
First the criterion <strong>for</strong> safety was comply<strong>in</strong>g with relevant legislation <strong>and</strong><br />
per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g well <strong>in</strong> crash tests (see <strong>for</strong> example the requirements <strong>in</strong> section 4.1).<br />
Later <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process safety became someth<strong>in</strong>g like: as safe as the car can<br />
be weigh<strong>in</strong>g no more than 400 kg comb<strong>in</strong>ed with mak<strong>in</strong>g the driver feel a bit<br />
vulnerable. Instead of <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g all k<strong>in</strong>ds of systems <strong>and</strong> devices the team<br />
wanted to make the driver feel a bit vulnerable <strong>and</strong> responsible, thereby<br />
promot<strong>in</strong>g safe driv<strong>in</strong>g. A goal of the project became to challenge the exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
way of <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g safe cars <strong>in</strong> which more systems <strong>and</strong> heavier cars are deemed<br />
safer. Because it was not possible to use the operationalisation of car safety that<br />
car <strong>in</strong>dustry uses nowadays <strong>and</strong> still <strong>design</strong> a car of 400 kg, the DutchEVO<br />
<strong>design</strong> team was <strong>for</strong>ced to th<strong>in</strong>k about the operationalisation of car safety. If the<br />
DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team had not set the requirement of a maximum mass of 400<br />
kg they probably would not have had to th<strong>in</strong>k about <strong>and</strong> discuss about car safety.<br />
They could just have <strong>in</strong>cluded all systems that the price of the car would allow.<br />
4.6 Summary of the case <strong>and</strong> the regulative framework<br />
Although cars have existed <strong>for</strong> over a century, it can be concluded that<br />
DutchEVO was a radical <strong>design</strong> process. It was radical <strong>in</strong> the functional way (see<br />
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DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
section 2.3.1). The priority order of the requirements usually posed <strong>for</strong> cars were<br />
especially different <strong>in</strong> this case. Mass was the most important requirement. This<br />
made reconsider<strong>in</strong>g the work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> normal configuration necessary.<br />
Some parts of exist<strong>in</strong>g cars were used, like <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>stance the eng<strong>in</strong>e. Other parts<br />
were newly <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> very different from those used <strong>in</strong> normally <strong>design</strong>ed<br />
cars, <strong>for</strong> example the doors <strong>and</strong> the understructure. The ethically relevant<br />
questions that could be discerned <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process were related to it be<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
radical <strong>design</strong> process. The operationalisation of safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability was<br />
ethically relevant <strong>and</strong> was very important <strong>in</strong> this radical <strong>design</strong> process. The<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers were confronted with ethically relevant questions concern<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
operationalisations because they did not want to use the regulative framework. If<br />
the team had chosen to make a normal <strong>design</strong> these questions would not have<br />
been posed. The regulative framework gives an operationalisation of safety <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability that is used <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> processes.<br />
4.6.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong><br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> concern<strong>in</strong>g the operationalisation of car safety, the<br />
operationalisation of susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>and</strong> trade-offs between safety <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability played a part <strong>in</strong> this case-study<br />
The ethical issue concern<strong>in</strong>g the operationalisation of car safety was the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g. The DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team wanted people to feel a bit vulnerable <strong>in</strong><br />
the DutchEVO because the <strong>design</strong> team thought that people would drive more<br />
carefully <strong>in</strong> a light car with less safety systems because they would feel a little<br />
vulnerable. The <strong>design</strong> team based this idea on personal experience.<br />
The <strong>design</strong> team recognised the ethical relevance of susta<strong>in</strong>ability. The<br />
motives of the <strong>design</strong> team to <strong>design</strong> a lightweight susta<strong>in</strong>able car were to a<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> extent moral. They thought that <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g such a car could make the<br />
world a bit better. 9 In this case five ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> the operationalisation of<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability can be identified. Parts of the operationalisation used <strong>in</strong> the<br />
DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> could even contradict each other.<br />
First, consider<strong>in</strong>g the Brundtl<strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of susta<strong>in</strong>ability it is doubtful<br />
whether personal transportation can be considered susta<strong>in</strong>able. It is not clear<br />
whether personal transportation is a basic need that should be met.<br />
Second, the <strong>design</strong> team operationalised the Brundtl<strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability as m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g energy use dur<strong>in</strong>g the life cycle of a car because<br />
they thought that this was reasonably easy to work with. Different options only<br />
needed to be compared on one dimension, energy consumption <strong>in</strong> the life cycle<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
9 In the <strong>in</strong>terviews most team members referred to their moral motives <strong>for</strong> jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the DutchEVO<br />
team. Another motive that they mentioned was that the DutchEVO project was a nice technical<br />
project with <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g technical challenges.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> no weight<strong>in</strong>g factors were necessary to compare different negative<br />
environmental effects of cars like CO2 emissions, smell <strong>and</strong> noise pollution. This<br />
operationalisation could lead to <strong>in</strong>consistencies <strong>in</strong> cases like the use of catalytic<br />
converters. Catalytic converters <strong>in</strong>crease the amount of energy used by the car<br />
but decrease emissions of NOx. So although emissions are often related to<br />
energy use, a slightly higher energy use caused by a catalytic converter can lead<br />
to a decrease <strong>in</strong> noxious emissions.<br />
Third, a further operationalisation of m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g energy use dur<strong>in</strong>g the lifecycle<br />
was to m<strong>in</strong>imise the mass of the car. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the DutchEVO <strong>design</strong><br />
team, energy consumption <strong>for</strong> cars is largest <strong>in</strong> the use phase (about 85%).<br />
Energy consumption <strong>in</strong> the use phase is mass dependent. There<strong>for</strong>e decreas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the mass of a car decreases energy consumption, hence the ma<strong>in</strong><br />
operationalisation of susta<strong>in</strong>ability was the requirement that the car should have<br />
a mass of 400 kg or less. So the criterion of susta<strong>in</strong>ability was operationalised as<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g energy consumption <strong>and</strong> that was operationalised ma<strong>in</strong>ly as a need<br />
to <strong>design</strong> a lightweight car.<br />
Fourth, <strong>in</strong> co-operation with another project of the DIOC focused on<br />
recyclability (Susan <strong>and</strong> Ann were both part of this DIOC project), friction can<br />
exist between susta<strong>in</strong>ability as clos<strong>in</strong>g the materials cycle <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability as<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g energy consumption dur<strong>in</strong>g the whole life cycle. A problem with a<br />
lot of lightweight materials is their bad recycl<strong>in</strong>g properties. Start<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> autumn<br />
2000, more attention was given to recycl<strong>in</strong>g. Mass rema<strong>in</strong>ed, however, the most<br />
important selection criterion <strong>for</strong> options. Only if little mass was added to make a<br />
part better recyclable, was recycl<strong>in</strong>g considered. Jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g could be an issue with<br />
regard to this; us<strong>in</strong>g adhesives is light but makes recycl<strong>in</strong>g difficult, us<strong>in</strong>g bolts<br />
makes the car heavier but eases dismantl<strong>in</strong>g. One of the team’s arguments not<br />
to build a car that could be dismantled is that dismantl<strong>in</strong>g is not economically<br />
feasible <strong>and</strong> would there<strong>for</strong>e not be done. This argument disregards possible<br />
future legislation or subsidies that might make dismantl<strong>in</strong>g feasible or dump<strong>in</strong>g<br />
material on l<strong>and</strong>fills very expensive. In this subject the importance of lightweight<br />
was visible aga<strong>in</strong>. The comb<strong>in</strong>ation of lightweight <strong>and</strong> recycl<strong>in</strong>g was very<br />
difficult to atta<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> recycl<strong>in</strong>g was given a low priority.<br />
Fifth, another part of the operationalisation of susta<strong>in</strong>ability focussed on<br />
what the <strong>design</strong> team called “emotional susta<strong>in</strong>ability”. Emotional susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
meant that a good relationship between driver <strong>and</strong> the DutchEVO should<br />
develop <strong>and</strong> that the DutchEVO would be fun-to-drive. Frictions can occur<br />
between emotional susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>and</strong> energy consumption. Design<strong>in</strong>g a city car<br />
that is fun-to-drive can lead to behaviour that will <strong>in</strong>crease energy consumption<br />
although the car itself is energy efficient. It is possible that users will use the car<br />
more frequently because it is fun-to-drive. In cities a lot of alternative ways of<br />
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DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
transportation are available, like buses, trams, walk<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> bicycl<strong>in</strong>g. Some of<br />
these ways of transportation are def<strong>in</strong>itely more energy efficient than driv<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
lightweight car. Moreover, if the “good relationship” between user <strong>and</strong> car leads<br />
to prolonged possession <strong>and</strong> use of the car, it is less clear to see what the effect<br />
on energy consumption is, on the one h<strong>and</strong> the prolonged use might lead to less<br />
use of raw materials, the production of raw materials usually consumes energy. 10<br />
The recycl<strong>in</strong>g of materials consumes substantially less energy. On the other<br />
h<strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>e technology advances <strong>and</strong> older eng<strong>in</strong>es are more pollut<strong>in</strong>g than<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>es us<strong>in</strong>g new technology. Above this, eng<strong>in</strong>es become more pollut<strong>in</strong>g as<br />
they age. It might be possible to only renew the eng<strong>in</strong>e after a period of time.<br />
However, this shows that it is not obvious that emotional susta<strong>in</strong>ability leads to<br />
lower energy consumption.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, two ethical problems concern<strong>in</strong>g the trade-off between safety <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability were encountered by the <strong>design</strong> team. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers wanted to<br />
challenge exist<strong>in</strong>g ideas on car safety, which have led to <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly heavier cars<br />
with lots of passive <strong>and</strong> active safety systems. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers wanted a<br />
lightweight car. This meant first of all that passive safety systems were only<br />
go<strong>in</strong>g to be used if the eng<strong>in</strong>eers thought that they were effective <strong>and</strong> not too<br />
heavy. There were discussions about <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g airbags <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
amount of safety systems used because these systems make a car heavy. The<br />
trade-off between safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability led to the second ethical problem that<br />
a light car will always come off worst <strong>in</strong> a crash with a heavier car so people <strong>in</strong><br />
the light car will always be at a disadvantage. Trade-offs between safety <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability were made <strong>in</strong> which the mass of the car was usually given priority.<br />
4.6.2 Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
The decision mak<strong>in</strong>g processes <strong>in</strong> the DutchEVO case can be characterised as<br />
non-hierarchical; decisions on ethical <strong>issues</strong> were based on personal experience<br />
<strong>and</strong> some criteria which became self-evident dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
The organisation of the <strong>design</strong> process was non-hierarchical. Students made<br />
decisions themselves, or together with their supervisor, about the part they were<br />
<strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g. They discussed this choice <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs. All participants <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>design</strong> team were confronted with ethical <strong>issues</strong>. For some students the ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> were related mostly to the operationalisation of susta<strong>in</strong>ability, <strong>for</strong> others<br />
the ethical <strong>issues</strong> were related to the trade-off between safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability.<br />
It was not the case that some people made the decisions concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> example<br />
the operationalisation of safety <strong>and</strong> others were required to work with this<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
10 This is only the case when large parts of the car are discarded after use, not when every part<br />
or the complete car are sold or recycled rather then discarded.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
operationalisation. The first ef<strong>for</strong>ts to operationalise susta<strong>in</strong>ability were made by<br />
Dave at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the project. The operationalisation cont<strong>in</strong>ued to evolve<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process. In <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>design</strong> team members discussed<br />
ethical <strong>issues</strong> that might not be so relevant to the part that they <strong>design</strong>ed but that<br />
were relevant <strong>for</strong> other members of the team.<br />
In mak<strong>in</strong>g decisions on ethical <strong>issues</strong> the personal experience of <strong>design</strong> team<br />
members played a large part. The idea that people will drive more carefully if<br />
they feel vulnerable <strong>and</strong> that there<strong>for</strong>e the car should make people feel<br />
vulnerable was based on the personal experience of the <strong>design</strong> team members.<br />
They could have found theories to support their ideas <strong>in</strong> the literature. There is,<br />
<strong>for</strong> example a theory called target risk theory with<strong>in</strong> traffic psychology that states<br />
that a driver will keep the perceived risk <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with his or her target risk [Wilde,<br />
1994]. This theory implies that if a car feels safer, a driver will drive more<br />
dangerously or that if roads are illum<strong>in</strong>ated at night, drivers will drive faster.<br />
This target risk theory has been heavily debated with<strong>in</strong> traffic psychology. There<br />
is empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis <strong>and</strong> empirical evidence that<br />
seems to falsify it [Rothengatter, 2002]. In the DutchEVO case the eng<strong>in</strong>eers did<br />
not really know what the effect will be of the driver feel<strong>in</strong>g vulnerable. They<br />
could have known more about this issue if they had done some research <strong>in</strong>to the<br />
literature on traffic psychology, but this literature is not conclusive. So it is very<br />
difficult to say what the effect will be of people feel<strong>in</strong>g vulnerable <strong>in</strong> their car<br />
<strong>in</strong>stead of feel<strong>in</strong>g protected by their car on, <strong>for</strong> example, the amount of traffic<br />
deaths. Yet based on personal experience the <strong>design</strong> team decided that a safe car<br />
is a car <strong>in</strong> which the driver feels a bit vulnerable.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process ideas, especially those concern<strong>in</strong>g a susta<strong>in</strong>able<br />
car be<strong>in</strong>g a lightweight car, seemed to become self-evident <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> team<br />
<strong>and</strong> to <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> importance. After a while the lightweight criterion as a<br />
measure <strong>for</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability ceased to be discussed. This self-evidence prevented<br />
discussions on some possible contradictions <strong>in</strong> the team’s ideas of susta<strong>in</strong>ability.<br />
The <strong>design</strong> team started with the idea of a susta<strong>in</strong>able product, yet questions can<br />
be raised as to whether a fun city car can be really susta<strong>in</strong>able.<br />
4.6.3 Regulative framework<br />
The complete system of legislation, regulations, technical codes <strong>and</strong> crash tests<br />
constitute a regulative framework. With regard to car safety the tests per<strong>for</strong>med<br />
by EuroNCAP are an important element of the regulative framework. The<br />
regulative framework was only partly used <strong>in</strong> the DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> because the<br />
mass of the car was given high priority. The operationalisation of car safety that<br />
was available <strong>in</strong> the exist<strong>in</strong>g regulative framework leads to heavy <strong>and</strong> stiff cars.<br />
The DucthEVO <strong>design</strong> team could not, <strong>and</strong> did not want to, use this<br />
74
DutchEVO, safe or susta<strong>in</strong>able?<br />
operationalisation <strong>and</strong> rejected this large part of the regulative framework. Most<br />
of the ethical <strong>issues</strong> can be related to the rejection of the regulative framework.<br />
The regulative framework gives m<strong>in</strong>imal requirements concern<strong>in</strong>g safety <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability that exclude certa<strong>in</strong> choices that the DutchEVO team had to<br />
consider. It is <strong>for</strong> example not a question whether or not to <strong>in</strong>clude airbags <strong>in</strong> a<br />
normal <strong>design</strong>; the exist<strong>in</strong>g regulative framework requires that all new cars have<br />
at least an airbag <strong>for</strong> the driver. Trade-offs that have to be made <strong>in</strong> a normal<br />
<strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> a car are usually trade-offs between costs <strong>and</strong> safety. In an<br />
expensive car more active safety systems can be <strong>in</strong>cluded. The exist<strong>in</strong>g regulative<br />
framework <strong>in</strong>cludes ideas about what a good <strong>and</strong> safe car is. The trade-offs are<br />
guided by these ideas. No car manufacturer wants to make a car that per<strong>for</strong>ms<br />
really badly <strong>in</strong> EuroNCAP tests. Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g less than other cars <strong>in</strong> EuroNCAP<br />
tests is bad <strong>for</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess so it is economically seen good to make cars that<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m well <strong>in</strong> these tests. The DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team rejected these ideas, <strong>and</strong><br />
especially the EuroNCAP crash tests, because they lead to heavy cars <strong>and</strong> only<br />
address passive safety. An <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g question is whether the regulative<br />
framework meets the requirements that Gunwald has def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> a normative<br />
framework (see section 2.3.2). 11<br />
Pragmatically complete: It is questionable whether the regulative framework is<br />
pragmatically complete although it is extensive. There are rules <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />
<strong>for</strong> dimensions, head lights, hoods, bumpers etc. Most parts of a car are<br />
subjected to regulation. Questions can be raised as to whether the regulative<br />
framework is pragmatically complete when it comes to <strong>issues</strong> about protect<strong>in</strong>g<br />
all traffic participants. There is an emphasis on protect<strong>in</strong>g people <strong>in</strong>side a car.<br />
This emphasis on people <strong>in</strong>side a car might lead to a more dangerous car <strong>for</strong><br />
people outside the car. An example of this is that pedestrian impact tests are not<br />
required by legislation as yet. Another situation <strong>in</strong> which protective measures <strong>for</strong><br />
people <strong>in</strong>side the car are dangerous <strong>for</strong> people outside the car is when an<br />
accident has happened <strong>and</strong> people need to be rescued from a car wreck. Airbags<br />
that have not gone off dur<strong>in</strong>g impact can do so dur<strong>in</strong>g the rescue process thereby<br />
<strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g fire-fighters or other people <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> rescu<strong>in</strong>g victims from car<br />
crashes. A pragmatically complete framework would have to <strong>in</strong>clude rules <strong>and</strong><br />
measure to protect others than the drivers <strong>and</strong> passengers of cars.<br />
Accepted: The ma<strong>in</strong> problem concern<strong>in</strong>g the framework is acceptability. The<br />
framework is accepted by most actors <strong>in</strong> the car <strong>in</strong>dustry <strong>and</strong> by people buy<strong>in</strong>g<br />
new cars. It is questionable whether traffic participants, other than drivers of<br />
cars, accept the framework. This framework imposes large risks on other traffic<br />
participants. It is even questionable whether people driv<strong>in</strong>g older cars accept the<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
11 Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, Grunwald uses an example of <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g parts <strong>for</strong> automobile <strong>in</strong>dustry as an<br />
example of bus<strong>in</strong>ess-as-usual technology development [Grunwald, 2000, 188].<br />
75
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
framework, because people <strong>in</strong> old cars, often lighter <strong>and</strong> less stiff than newer<br />
cars, have a disadvantage <strong>in</strong> crashes with newer cars that per<strong>for</strong>m well <strong>in</strong> the<br />
crash tests. With<strong>in</strong> the government there are some doubts about current<br />
developments <strong>in</strong> car safety. The government has asked SWOV (Sticht<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid, an <strong>in</strong>stitute <strong>for</strong> research <strong>in</strong>to<br />
traffic safety) to conduct research to see whether SUVs are <strong>in</strong>deed dangerous <strong>for</strong><br />
other cars <strong>and</strong> traffic participants. So although the framework is still accepted by<br />
car <strong>in</strong>dustry <strong>and</strong> probably most people buy<strong>in</strong>g new cars, other actors like<br />
environmentalists <strong>and</strong> pedestrians object to the regulative framework. It might<br />
even be the case that the framework leads to a k<strong>in</strong>d of coord<strong>in</strong>ation problem. If<br />
someone is buy<strong>in</strong>g a car he or she might want the safest car <strong>for</strong> him- or herself<br />
<strong>and</strong> his or her family because most other car buyers also do this. Driv<strong>in</strong>g a light<br />
car gives people a disadvantage <strong>in</strong> traffic accidents. So even if people agree that it<br />
would be better if everyone drove <strong>in</strong> a lighter car then they still might not want to<br />
be the first <strong>in</strong> a lighter car. So even though people do not accept the regulative<br />
framework, they might feel <strong>for</strong>ced to buy a heavy <strong>and</strong> stiff car that seems to<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicate that they, as consumers, accept the regulative framework.<br />
Observed: The regulative framework is observed, partly because it is legally<br />
en<strong>for</strong>ced. Cars have to meet certa<strong>in</strong> regulations be<strong>for</strong>e they are allowed to be on<br />
the road <strong>in</strong> Europe. The EuroNCAP test results are available to potential buyers<br />
of cars. Although barely meet<strong>in</strong>g the requirements is legally seen as enough, this<br />
is usually not enough from a market<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t of view. It is very important from a<br />
market<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t of view to per<strong>for</strong>m really well <strong>in</strong> the EuroNCAP crash tests, so<br />
there are other than legal reasons to observe the regulative framework.<br />
I cannot judge whether the regulative framework <strong>for</strong> cars is locally consistent<br />
<strong>and</strong> unambiguous but because it is not accepted by all affected actors it is not a<br />
normative framework anyway. The DutchEVO eng<strong>in</strong>eers thus did not reject a<br />
normative framework.<br />
4.7 Acknowledgements<br />
I would like to thank the DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team <strong>and</strong> DIOC 16 <strong>for</strong> their cooperation.<br />
I would specially like to thank Elmer <strong>and</strong> Jens <strong>for</strong> their co-operation<br />
<strong>and</strong> support.<br />
76
5 Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Equipment<br />
Stress eng<strong>in</strong>eer: ‘It can be that you do not completely agree with the codes or that<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g is not completely clear <strong>in</strong> the code, <strong>for</strong> example loads caused by w<strong>in</strong>ds. In<br />
such cases you <strong>design</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to your own <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>and</strong> experience. The Stoomwezen<br />
has to approve it. Norms <strong>and</strong> codes are developed over time <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Stoomwezen have learnt from previous failures, near misses <strong>and</strong> problems. You do not<br />
lightly deviate from norms <strong>and</strong> codes. Hav<strong>in</strong>g said this there are some <strong>issues</strong> that are<br />
not really covered by norms <strong>and</strong> codes, if you notice such a case you discuss it with the<br />
Stoomwezen <strong>and</strong> ask them how the codes should be <strong>in</strong>terpreted. These <strong>in</strong>stances are,<br />
however, exceptions.’<br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> concern<strong>in</strong>g safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability are not that difficult to<br />
imag<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the area of chemical <strong>in</strong>stallations. I will not make an extensive list of<br />
possible <strong>and</strong> actual accidents <strong>in</strong> (petro) chemical <strong>in</strong>stallations as I th<strong>in</strong>k that it is<br />
quite obvious that safety is an important issue <strong>in</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>design</strong>.<br />
There have been large scale accidents such as <strong>in</strong> Bhopal <strong>and</strong> Seveso. Less<br />
disastrous accidents also happen such as small leeks of toxic substances from<br />
chemical <strong>in</strong>stallations, small scale explosions <strong>and</strong> other accidents <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>juries to one or two people or the death of workers. Not all these accidents are<br />
caused by <strong>design</strong> flaws, there are many different causes. Some may be due to<br />
flaws <strong>in</strong> the start<strong>in</strong>g process <strong>for</strong> an <strong>in</strong>stallation or to flaws <strong>in</strong> operation, however,<br />
some accidents are at least partially caused by <strong>design</strong> problems.<br />
The <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> pressure equipment <strong>for</strong> (petro) chemical<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallations is <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> this chapter. The <strong>design</strong> process is described <strong>in</strong> the<br />
first section. All legislation, regulation <strong>and</strong> codes perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> of<br />
pipes <strong>and</strong> pressure vessels are <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the second section. This system of<br />
rules <strong>and</strong> requirements will be considered a regulative framework (see section<br />
2.3.1). The division of responsibilities <strong>and</strong> tasks is described <strong>in</strong> the third section<br />
<strong>and</strong> this is based on <strong>in</strong>terviews with eng<strong>in</strong>eers (see section 3.3). The ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> are described <strong>in</strong> section 5.4. The case-study is summarised, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
regulative framework is evaluated us<strong>in</strong>g Grunwald’s requirements, <strong>in</strong> section<br />
5.5.<br />
5.1 The <strong>design</strong> of a (petro)chemical plant<br />
The product that is go<strong>in</strong>g to be produced at an <strong>in</strong>stallation is developed by a<br />
(petro)chemical company be<strong>for</strong>e the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment is <strong>design</strong>ed. The site<br />
77
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
where the (petro)chemical <strong>in</strong>stallation will be built has also usually been selected<br />
by the (petro) chemical company be<strong>for</strong>e the <strong>design</strong> of the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment<br />
is started [De Haan et al., 1998]. Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g firms are often contracted to <strong>design</strong><br />
the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>for</strong> a (petro)chemical plant. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
<strong>in</strong>terviewees, (petro)chemical companies used to have their own eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
departments but most of them have outsourced these departments <strong>and</strong> now hire<br />
an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company to <strong>design</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>for</strong> new plants. The<br />
actual construction of the <strong>in</strong>stallation is done by a construction company.<br />
There are different k<strong>in</strong>ds of contracts between customers <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
companies. In reimbursable contracts the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company is paid per man<br />
hour. The customer pays <strong>for</strong> the costs of materials <strong>and</strong> the costs of construction.<br />
The customer is then free to choose to use cheaper or more expensive material as<br />
long as it complies with regulations. Another type of contract is a turn-key<br />
contract, with this type of contract the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company is responsible <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> construction. If the customer wants a more expensive material or take<br />
more safety measures then it is necessary to check if these measures were<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the orig<strong>in</strong>al contract. At the company where I <strong>in</strong>terviewed<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers the specification of the <strong>design</strong> used <strong>in</strong> contract negotiations, was called<br />
the scope of a project. Specialists from an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company must first work<br />
with a customer to def<strong>in</strong>e precisely the scope of a project <strong>and</strong> thus determ<strong>in</strong>e all<br />
the customer’s requirements. These turn-key contracts can lead to discussions<br />
about whether certa<strong>in</strong> features or materials are specified <strong>in</strong> the scope <strong>and</strong> who<br />
has to pay <strong>for</strong> extra costs relat<strong>in</strong>g to us<strong>in</strong>g specific material <strong>and</strong> safety systems.<br />
In the (petro)chemical <strong>in</strong>dustry the <strong>design</strong> problem is predom<strong>in</strong>antly<br />
del<strong>in</strong>eated <strong>in</strong> the earlier stages by the (petro)chemical company. From the<br />
moment an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company is contracted to produce a plant <strong>design</strong> there is<br />
communication <strong>and</strong> co-operation between the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>and</strong> the<br />
(petro)chemical company. At the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
equipment <strong>design</strong> process starts with the mak<strong>in</strong>g of a flow chart. This chart is<br />
used to specify the amount <strong>and</strong> rates of the different liquid <strong>and</strong>/or gas flows, <strong>and</strong><br />
will be based on <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation provided by the customer. After the chemical flows<br />
have been established, pipe diameters, vessel sizes <strong>and</strong> other dimensions are<br />
calculated. When the necessary types of apparatus <strong>and</strong> pipel<strong>in</strong>es are known, the<br />
positions of the various vessels <strong>in</strong> the plant <strong>and</strong> pipel<strong>in</strong>es, lay-out, are decided.<br />
Th<strong>in</strong>gs like access <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>spection <strong>and</strong> clean<strong>in</strong>g are taken <strong>in</strong>to account dur<strong>in</strong>g this<br />
process. The stresses <strong>in</strong> the material are calculated, <strong>and</strong> decisions are made as to<br />
what specific pipe materials etc to use. There is feedback between those mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the calculations of stresses <strong>and</strong> those determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the positions of pipes <strong>and</strong><br />
vessels <strong>in</strong> the plant. These processes are followed by fill<strong>in</strong>g out the details of the<br />
<strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> the bear<strong>in</strong>g understructure. The “Manager of Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g” of the<br />
78
Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company estimated that about 75% of the <strong>design</strong> process time at this<br />
company was consumed by the process of detail<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Design<strong>in</strong>g pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment can be considered middle to low level, normal<br />
<strong>design</strong> (see section 2.3.1). Higher levels of the <strong>design</strong> process deal with the<br />
specification of the product <strong>and</strong> the chemical reactions <strong>in</strong> the chemical<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation under construction. The overall <strong>design</strong> of the <strong>in</strong>stallation, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
flows of chemical substances <strong>and</strong> the pressure <strong>in</strong> different parts of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallations, is a given constra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process of the parts of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation. It is a normal <strong>design</strong> process because the equipment that will be<br />
used <strong>and</strong> possible pipes are well known <strong>and</strong> have been used be<strong>for</strong>e. The<br />
operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, layout <strong>and</strong> functional requirements are known at the start<br />
of the <strong>design</strong> process. St<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> codes exist that prescribe the <strong>design</strong> or at<br />
least provide the <strong>design</strong> process with guidel<strong>in</strong>es. A problem that can arise is that<br />
all these st<strong>and</strong>ards, codes, regulations, the customer’s requirements, practical<br />
restrictions of the plant site, economic restrictions etc clash. For example, stairs<br />
are required <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallations that have a hydrogen sulphide flow. It is dangerous<br />
to <strong>in</strong>hale the toxic hydrogen sulphide <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e the total <strong>in</strong>stallation needs to<br />
be accessible <strong>for</strong> people with tanks of compressed air on their back dur<strong>in</strong>g an<br />
accident. However, it is sometimes not possible to use stairs throughout the<br />
whole <strong>in</strong>stallation due to a lack of space. In such a case a choice might be made to<br />
have both stairs <strong>and</strong> a ladder, a ladder on one side of the <strong>in</strong>stallation <strong>and</strong> stairs on<br />
the other side. The <strong>in</strong>stallation is accessible <strong>in</strong> emergency situations but space<br />
has been saved. So, <strong>in</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>design</strong>, the <strong>design</strong> problem is<br />
sometimes over determ<strong>in</strong>ed by external constra<strong>in</strong>ts. 1 Such over determ<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
might <strong>for</strong>ce eng<strong>in</strong>eers to change requirements or not to fulfil all of a customer’s<br />
requirements. Criteria to evaluate options are available <strong>in</strong> this case so the<br />
problem is reasonably well-structured. However, possible over determ<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
prevents a pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>design</strong> problem be<strong>in</strong>g really well-structured <strong>in</strong><br />
all cases. Requirements may have to be adapted to arrive at a solution to the<br />
<strong>design</strong> problem.<br />
5.2 Regulation regard<strong>in</strong>g pressure vessels <strong>and</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Different regulations play an important part <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> use of (petro)<br />
chemical <strong>in</strong>stallations. The regulations, codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards that play a part<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process of pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>in</strong> the (petro)chemical<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1 I use over determ<strong>in</strong>ation here <strong>in</strong> the sense that there are requirements that cannot possibly be<br />
complied with simultaneously. Certa<strong>in</strong> options comply with certa<strong>in</strong> requirements <strong>and</strong> it is not<br />
possible to f<strong>in</strong>d an option that complies with all requirements.<br />
79
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation are listed <strong>in</strong> table 5.1. Note, I have <strong>in</strong>cluded company st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong><br />
specs <strong>in</strong> this table, however, these do not <strong>for</strong>m part of the regulative framework.<br />
Table 5.1: regulation, codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />
regulations codes st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />
Be<strong>for</strong>e 29-05-2002 Steam act (Stoomwet), Steam Regels (NL), ISO, NEN, DIN,<br />
Decree (Stoombesluit), Decree on<br />
company<br />
dangerous tools (wet op<br />
gevaarlijke werktuigen), Nuisance<br />
Act (H<strong>in</strong>derwet)<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />
After 29-05-2002 EU Pressure Equipment<br />
ASME (US), ISO-EN-NEN,<br />
Directive, NL: Nuisance Act Regels (NL) EN-NEN, NEN,<br />
(H<strong>in</strong>derwet), Law on goods NEN-EN 13445 company<br />
(Warenwet), Pressure vessel <strong>and</strong> 13480, st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />
decree (Drukvatenbesluit), Merkblätter<br />
Pressure systems decree<br />
(GE), Codap<br />
(Drukapparatuurbesluit)<br />
(FR), British<br />
St<strong>and</strong>ards (UK)<br />
5.2.1 Regulations<br />
Pressure vessels have to meet sever specifications, under Dutch legislation,<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g hazard prevention to protect the health <strong>and</strong> safety of persons, domestic<br />
animals <strong>and</strong> property, be<strong>for</strong>e they can be used <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s. This law is a<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance based law: a certa<strong>in</strong> goal should be atta<strong>in</strong>ed although the means to<br />
this goal are not specified. In the law there is little reference to specific hardware<br />
that should be used. However, if codes are approved by the m<strong>in</strong>ister, then<br />
products <strong>design</strong>ed us<strong>in</strong>g those codes are assumed to comply with the Dutch law.<br />
The codes do make reference to specific hardware.<br />
At the time this research took place, a transition was tak<strong>in</strong>g place, mov<strong>in</strong>g<br />
from national regulation to European regulation. The Pressure Equipment<br />
Directive (PED) came <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce 29 May 2002 [European directive 97/23/EC].<br />
The PED substituted national legislation <strong>in</strong> European Union countries regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the production <strong>and</strong> use of pressure equipment. If pressure equipment is<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed to comply to European harmonised codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards it is assumed<br />
to comply to the PED requirements. However, because most of the codes <strong>and</strong> the<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ards had not been harmonised at the time of the transition, the use of<br />
national codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards was permitted dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> processes.<br />
Additionally the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies had to show that <strong>design</strong>s made<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to the national codes also complied to the safety levels required by the<br />
PED. Certification bodies, called Notified Bodies, were appo<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> EU countries<br />
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to check whether new <strong>design</strong>s <strong>and</strong> refurbishments comply with PED regulations.<br />
Approved <strong>design</strong>s obta<strong>in</strong> a CE mark. In the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s Lloyd’s Register<br />
Stoomwezen is one of the Notified Bodies. If no harmonised EU codes exists <strong>for</strong><br />
a product or these are not used <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> then a Competent Body has to check<br />
the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> help the producer prove compliance with EU directives. 2 Under<br />
the PED the producer of an <strong>in</strong>stallation has certa<strong>in</strong> responsibilities, <strong>for</strong> example<br />
the request <strong>for</strong> CE certification has to be made by the producer. It is sometimes<br />
very difficult to <strong>in</strong>dicate who the producer is. Is it the contractor who welds<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g on a pipe? Is it the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company that has made the <strong>design</strong> or<br />
perhaps the chemical company that uses the pipel<strong>in</strong>e? The <strong>issues</strong> around who to<br />
regard as the producer still had to be resolved at the time the PED was<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduced. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Stoomwezen the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company is the<br />
producer.<br />
Other regulations relevant to the <strong>design</strong> of (petro)chemical <strong>in</strong>stallations, are<br />
those encompass<strong>in</strong>g environmental regulations <strong>and</strong> regulations regard<strong>in</strong>g noise<br />
<strong>and</strong> smell. Such regulations are commonly used to regulate the outcome of the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process. The <strong>in</strong>stallation should per<strong>for</strong>m with<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the limits of allowed<br />
noise levels <strong>and</strong> emissions.<br />
5.2.2 Codes regard<strong>in</strong>g pressure vessels <strong>and</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Legislation <strong>and</strong> regulation often make references to codes. The organisations that<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulate the codes differ <strong>in</strong> different countries. Codes can be <strong>for</strong>mulated by<br />
professional organisations (the American Society of Mechanical Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
(ASME)), <strong>in</strong>dustry (Regels <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s) or by governmental <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
(British St<strong>and</strong>ards). Codes are usually written rules of good <strong>design</strong> practice that, if<br />
used correctly, should protect the health <strong>and</strong> safety of persons <strong>and</strong> the<br />
environment. In some countries, the application of a certa<strong>in</strong> code is required by<br />
law. In many states of the United States, the application of the ASME codes <strong>for</strong><br />
pressure vessels <strong>and</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g is required by law. Codes are often prescriptive; they<br />
prescribe certa<strong>in</strong> hardware <strong>and</strong> calculations. In the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s the Regels were<br />
guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> it was there<strong>for</strong>e not required by law to use them. However, a<br />
<strong>design</strong> made us<strong>in</strong>g the Regels was assumed to comply with current legislation. At<br />
this moment there are some harmonised EU codes, <strong>for</strong> example NEN-EN 13445<br />
<strong>and</strong> 13480 but not all national codes have been substituted by European codes as<br />
yet. Under the PED it is possible to use the codes of another EU country <strong>in</strong>stead<br />
of always us<strong>in</strong>g the national code. In the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s a choice can be made to<br />
<strong>design</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to the German Merkblätter <strong>for</strong> example.<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
2 A Notified Body can also be a Competent body but this need not be the case. Until the PED<br />
came <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> May 2002, the Stoomwezen was the only certify<strong>in</strong>g organization <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Netherl<strong>and</strong>s. Under the PED other organizations can also become Notified Bodies.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
The contents of the codes differ. The American ASME codes are low-stress<br />
codes. The stresses permitted <strong>in</strong> the materials are low. This means that American<br />
constructions are heavier. The ASME codes require little test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> few<br />
<strong>in</strong>spections once the system is <strong>in</strong> use. The ASME code is extensive, <strong>and</strong> the rules<br />
are very detailed. The European codes (BS, Merkblätter, Regels) are high stress<br />
codes. They allow higher stresses <strong>in</strong> the materials. A construction will probably<br />
be lighter us<strong>in</strong>g European codes, but regular <strong>in</strong>spections <strong>and</strong> tests dur<strong>in</strong>g use are<br />
required on an ongo<strong>in</strong>g basis.<br />
5.2.3 St<strong>and</strong>ards regard<strong>in</strong>g pressure vessels <strong>and</strong> pipes<br />
St<strong>and</strong>ards are <strong>design</strong>ed to achieve compatibility <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terchangeability [Hunter,<br />
1995]. Most reasons to st<strong>and</strong>ardise measures, products <strong>and</strong> systems have<br />
economic orig<strong>in</strong>s. In most countries there is a national st<strong>and</strong>ardisation<br />
organisation, <strong>for</strong> example the American National St<strong>and</strong>ards Institute (AINSI) <strong>and</strong><br />
NEN (Netherl<strong>and</strong>s St<strong>and</strong>ardization Institute). 3 A European normalisation<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitute (CEN) exists <strong>for</strong> the European community. Worldwide the International<br />
St<strong>and</strong>ards Organisation (ISO) is prepar<strong>in</strong>g worldwide st<strong>and</strong>ards. St<strong>and</strong>ards are<br />
conventions that make trade between different companies <strong>and</strong> countries <strong>and</strong> the<br />
application of spare parts possible. St<strong>and</strong>ards are prescriptive <strong>and</strong> describe <strong>in</strong><br />
detail the hardware <strong>and</strong> conventions required <strong>for</strong> any item. Dimensions of certa<strong>in</strong><br />
parts are exactly <strong>and</strong> unambiguously established <strong>in</strong> a st<strong>and</strong>ard as are conventions<br />
on the technical draw<strong>in</strong>g of an object. St<strong>and</strong>ardisation ensures that a bolt<br />
produced by a certa<strong>in</strong> company will fit a screw produced by another company<br />
provided that both companies use the same st<strong>and</strong>ard. St<strong>and</strong>ards are usually not<br />
en<strong>for</strong>ced by legislation. Legislation can however, refer to st<strong>and</strong>ards. Codes also<br />
often refer to st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />
Larger companies will have company st<strong>and</strong>ards, these company st<strong>and</strong>ards are<br />
like national st<strong>and</strong>ards, conventions. These conventions can be about <strong>issues</strong> such<br />
as what k<strong>in</strong>d of pipe is used <strong>for</strong> which temperature <strong>and</strong> medium. Some<br />
companies also have company st<strong>and</strong>ards that are conventions on good <strong>design</strong><br />
practice or conventions to <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallations that are safe. Company st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />
often refer to (<strong>in</strong>ternational) st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> codes. As said be<strong>for</strong>e these company<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ards are not part of the regulative framework. The regulative framework<br />
only comprises the rules <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es that hold <strong>for</strong> all products of a product<br />
type <strong>in</strong> a country or with<strong>in</strong> Europe. The regulation sets the m<strong>in</strong>imum required<br />
safety level. Company st<strong>and</strong>ards can there<strong>for</strong>e only comply to, or be stricter than,<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
3 The NEN <strong>for</strong>mulates both codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards. The st<strong>and</strong>ards are primarily meant to lead to<br />
<strong>in</strong>terchangeability. The codes are used to guarantee levels of safety <strong>and</strong> quality, see also<br />
section 6.3.<br />
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Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment<br />
regulation. Companies are free to impose stricter requirements on the products<br />
they make or purchase.<br />
5.3 Clear responsibilities <strong>and</strong> tasks<br />
The organisation of the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company was as follows. The company had a<br />
matrix organisation; this meant that there was l<strong>in</strong>e organisation <strong>in</strong> discipl<strong>in</strong>es<br />
<strong>and</strong> horizontal organisation <strong>in</strong> project teams. Every project team consisted of<br />
people who were also part of a l<strong>in</strong>e organisation. A project manager would, at the<br />
start of a <strong>design</strong> process, consult l<strong>in</strong>e managers about the people he or she<br />
wanted <strong>in</strong> the project team. If the project was large, the project team members<br />
were relocated to work <strong>in</strong> the same space. There was a clear division of labour<br />
<strong>and</strong> function descriptions were clear.<br />
Job eng<strong>in</strong>eer: The job eng<strong>in</strong>eer is usually an experienced eng<strong>in</strong>eer. He or she is<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> the plant lay-out. The job eng<strong>in</strong>eer has to deal with constra<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
related to regulation <strong>and</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts related to economy. Environmental, safety<br />
<strong>and</strong> nuisance regulation are important <strong>in</strong> the plant lay out. For example, he or<br />
she has to take care that safety distances between tanks <strong>and</strong> stoves <strong>and</strong> between<br />
tanks conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong> chemicals <strong>and</strong> the outer fence of the company are taken<br />
<strong>in</strong>to account. Apparatus that produces too much noise needs to be shielded to<br />
reduce noise levels <strong>in</strong>side <strong>and</strong> outside the <strong>in</strong>stallation.<br />
Stress eng<strong>in</strong>eer: The stress eng<strong>in</strong>eer calculates the stresses <strong>in</strong> the pipes, the<br />
stresses <strong>in</strong> the connections between pipes <strong>and</strong> vessels <strong>and</strong> the stresses the pipes<br />
exert on the support<strong>in</strong>g structures. These calculations are made once there is a<br />
plant lay-out. If the calculations show that stresses are too high, some changes <strong>in</strong><br />
the plant lay-out may have to be made. The calculations are made accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
codes. The codes used at the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company of the case-study are the<br />
ASME code <strong>and</strong> the Dutch Stoomwezen Regels.<br />
Materials eng<strong>in</strong>eer: The materials eng<strong>in</strong>eer chooses which materials are used <strong>in</strong><br />
an <strong>in</strong>stallation. Criteria used to choose materials are strength <strong>and</strong> chemical<br />
resistance. He or she uses the ASME <strong>and</strong> American Society <strong>for</strong> Test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
Materials (ASTM) codes <strong>and</strong> the Dutch Stoomwezen Regels.<br />
Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>er: The pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>er makes a three dimensional computer<br />
model of the <strong>in</strong>stallation. The many elements of the computer model are preprogrammed.<br />
The pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>er chooses between exist<strong>in</strong>g elements to build<br />
the model. Once the three dimensional model is ready, simulations of people<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
walk<strong>in</strong>g through the <strong>in</strong>stallation or parts be<strong>in</strong>g taken apart are made. If the<br />
pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>er notices problems, he or she confers with the stress eng<strong>in</strong>eer, the<br />
job eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>and</strong> / or the materials eng<strong>in</strong>eer. At this stage of the <strong>design</strong><br />
accessibility <strong>and</strong> the ergonomics of the <strong>in</strong>stallation are important subjects.<br />
5.4 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong><br />
An important ethical issue <strong>in</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>design</strong> is safety. The<br />
question ‘What is safe enough <strong>for</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>in</strong> a (petro)chemical<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation?’ is <strong>in</strong> practice usually answered by referr<strong>in</strong>g to codes <strong>and</strong><br />
regulations. The <strong>design</strong> team does not try to answer this question itself. In fact,<br />
the <strong>design</strong> team <strong>design</strong>s an <strong>in</strong>stallation that is safe enough accord<strong>in</strong>g to exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
codes <strong>and</strong> regulations. Although legislation, regulation, codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards play<br />
a large part <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of (petro) chemical <strong>in</strong>stallations, there are still some<br />
choices on safety that eng<strong>in</strong>eers have to make.<br />
First, a decision on which codes to follow is made. The customer usually<br />
makes this choice. The customer is sometimes legally bound to follow certa<strong>in</strong><br />
codes, <strong>for</strong> example <strong>in</strong> some American States the ASME codes are legally<br />
prescribed. When a code has been chosen then there are still some choices<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g safety that are not regulated by the codes.<br />
A lot of the decisions regard<strong>in</strong>g safety are already specified <strong>in</strong> codes, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, safety factors, <strong>for</strong>mulas, material properties <strong>and</strong> maximum allowed<br />
stress or stra<strong>in</strong>s. The <strong>design</strong> team has no freedom <strong>in</strong> the calculations. However,<br />
the team has to decided what load scenarios to calculate. It has to decide whether<br />
to take w<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> earthquake load<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account. Decisions have to be made<br />
about the comb<strong>in</strong>ation of certa<strong>in</strong> events <strong>in</strong> load scenario’s <strong>for</strong> example snow <strong>and</strong><br />
extreme w<strong>in</strong>d load<strong>in</strong>g comb<strong>in</strong>ed. These decisions are usually made by the stress<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer, sometimes <strong>in</strong> co-operation with the job eng<strong>in</strong>eer, customer <strong>and</strong><br />
Notified Body. The decision regard<strong>in</strong>g which load scenarios to use is ethically<br />
relevant because it sets the limits <strong>for</strong> the <strong>in</strong>stallation. The <strong>in</strong>stallation should be<br />
stiff <strong>and</strong> strong enough to withst<strong>and</strong> the loads of the load scenarios but loads that<br />
exceed these scenarios are allowed to damage the <strong>in</strong>stallation. If certa<strong>in</strong> loads that<br />
will occur are not taken <strong>in</strong>to account then the <strong>in</strong>stallation can fail at the moment<br />
these loads occur. Sudden failure of the <strong>in</strong>stallation due to overload<strong>in</strong>g could lead<br />
to a chemical spill thereby pollut<strong>in</strong>g large areas or, even worse, a gas leak of<br />
dangerous <strong>and</strong> toxic gases, which may kill employees <strong>and</strong> people liv<strong>in</strong>g near the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation.<br />
In the European Pressure Equipment Directive (PED), a risk analysis is<br />
required but the accident scenarios that should be taken <strong>in</strong>to account are not<br />
specified. The <strong>design</strong> team, notably the stress eng<strong>in</strong>eer, there<strong>for</strong>e also has to<br />
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Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment<br />
decide what the possible <strong>and</strong> probable accident scenarios are <strong>and</strong> to what load<br />
levels these scenarios will lead. This is related to the po<strong>in</strong>t made above about load<br />
scenarios. However, accident scenarios are not limited to mechanical loads, they<br />
also <strong>in</strong>clude human failure. An operator might, <strong>for</strong> example, <strong>for</strong>get to close a<br />
valve. The accident scenario “<strong>for</strong>get to close a valve” should predict what happens<br />
<strong>in</strong> such a case. In some cases an accident scenario can lead to a specific load<br />
scenario. For example, if it is possible that a small scale explosion occurs <strong>in</strong> a<br />
pressure vessel then the explosion <strong>in</strong>side the vessel should also be a load scenario<br />
<strong>for</strong> the vessel. The decision as to what accident scenarios to <strong>in</strong>clude is ethically<br />
relevant because an accident or <strong>in</strong>cident not considered dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process<br />
can lead to a disaster. For example, a failure to close a valve could lead to an<br />
explosion which could lead to the complete destruction of an <strong>in</strong>stallation. Some<br />
accident scenarios are easy to decide to use because they are specified <strong>in</strong> the<br />
codes. This, however, is not the case <strong>for</strong> all accident scenarios. An example of an<br />
accident scenario that is not <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> regulation is the water hammer scenario.<br />
Accumulation of water <strong>in</strong> a steam l<strong>in</strong>e can lead to a build up of pressure released<br />
as a sudden small explosion. This can cause a l<strong>in</strong>e to come loose from its<br />
support<strong>in</strong>g structure if the attachment to the support<strong>in</strong>g structure is too weak <strong>for</strong><br />
such loads. Accidents due to a water hammer can lead to employees be<strong>in</strong>g stuck<br />
under collapsed construction parts or employees be<strong>in</strong>g burned by hot steam or<br />
water. With<strong>in</strong> the codes <strong>and</strong> regulations there are no explicit rules about how to<br />
deal with water hammer hazard. The <strong>design</strong> team, especially the stress eng<strong>in</strong>eer,<br />
has to decide whether or not to take it <strong>in</strong>to account.<br />
The calculations <strong>and</strong> load scenarios are checked by the Notified Body, but the<br />
Notified Body is not allowed to check the risk analysis made by the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>design</strong> company under official PED rules. The Stoomwezen, however, checks risk<br />
analyses <strong>and</strong> advises eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies on them.<br />
The codes prescribe a lot of small details <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. If it is not<br />
possible to follow the detailed rules of the codes then the codes give alternative<br />
<strong>and</strong> less detailed ways of <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a pipe or pressure vessel. If the <strong>for</strong>mulas<br />
cannot be used <strong>in</strong> a specific case, then the use of f<strong>in</strong>ite element methods is<br />
prescribed by the code. If the method of f<strong>in</strong>ite element calculation is also not<br />
possible, the vessel can be <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> put through a pressure test. This last<br />
alternative only prescribes the pressure test to which the vessel must be<br />
subjected.<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g codes should lead to the m<strong>in</strong>imum level of safety required by law.<br />
In the European Union, the decision whether the <strong>design</strong> is <strong>in</strong>deed safe enough<br />
from a legal po<strong>in</strong>t of view is made by Notified Bodies. There are possibilities to<br />
deviate from codes if this is approved by the Notified Body <strong>and</strong> the customer.<br />
Deviation from the codes <strong>and</strong> regulation could lead to unsafe <strong>in</strong>stallations. Such<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
decisions to not adhere to regulation or codes are there<strong>for</strong>e not taken lightly. An<br />
example of not follow<strong>in</strong>g the codes would be when a certa<strong>in</strong> plastic can be used at<br />
a maximum temperature of 280 °C. The codes also specify that if this plastic is<br />
welded, the maximum allowable temperature is only 250 °C. It is <strong>for</strong>bidden by<br />
the codes to use the welded plastic <strong>in</strong> an environment at 280 °C. In co-operation<br />
with the Notified Body <strong>and</strong> the customer, the materials eng<strong>in</strong>eer can decide to<br />
use the welded plastic <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>stallation that very rarely reaches 280 °C. In such a<br />
case, the Notified Body will require that a prediction is made regard<strong>in</strong>g how often<br />
the temperature might exceed 250 °C, <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> how long. Additional age<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />
material due to a high temperature has to be taken <strong>in</strong>to account <strong>in</strong> the calculation<br />
of the lifetime of an <strong>in</strong>stallation. Plastic, as it ages, can become brittle, this can<br />
lead to the rapid failure of plastic components mak<strong>in</strong>g the use of particular types<br />
of plastics, or welded plastics, less suitable <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> environments such as that<br />
described above.<br />
There is a difference <strong>in</strong> safety between a <strong>design</strong> that barely complies with a<br />
code <strong>and</strong> a <strong>design</strong> made follow<strong>in</strong>g the code <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation with the <strong>design</strong>er’s<br />
experience <strong>and</strong> skill. All codes will conta<strong>in</strong> specified marg<strong>in</strong>s. Designs that<br />
comply with the lower boundary of the marg<strong>in</strong>s cannot be refused by the Notified<br />
Bodies, but these <strong>design</strong>s are less safe than <strong>design</strong>s that fall well with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
limits. For example, a <strong>design</strong>er might <strong>in</strong>sist on a greater than legally required<br />
distance between a chlor<strong>in</strong>e storage tank <strong>and</strong> the boundary fence of an<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation. 4 A leak <strong>in</strong> such a tank could cause a cloud of chlor<strong>in</strong>e gas to escape<br />
<strong>and</strong> reach to publicly accessible roads; there<strong>for</strong>e there are legally b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>imal<br />
safety distances between tanks conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g chlor<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> public places that must be<br />
observed when <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a storage tank. In the case of chlor<strong>in</strong>e storage it can be<br />
said that the greater the distance between a storage tank <strong>and</strong> places to which the<br />
public has access the safer it is. This means that although there is a m<strong>in</strong>imum<br />
safety distance, greater distances are usually better. Thus, though the distance<br />
from a chlor<strong>in</strong>e tank to a boundary beyond which the public have access might be<br />
adequate from a legal po<strong>in</strong>t of view, the distance may not be enough from a<br />
moral po<strong>in</strong>t of view.<br />
There can be <strong>in</strong>consistencies between customer requirements, codes, st<strong>and</strong>ards,<br />
regulation, legislation <strong>and</strong> practical restrictions. The most <strong>in</strong>consistencies can be<br />
found between customer requirements <strong>and</strong> legislation or codes. The customer<br />
usually wants a safe but cheap <strong>in</strong>stallation.<br />
In some situations it can be impossible to follow codes because of practical<br />
constra<strong>in</strong>ts. When an exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stallation is exp<strong>and</strong>ed it may be impossible to<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
4 I take chlor<strong>in</strong>e gas as an example but this po<strong>in</strong>t can be made <strong>for</strong> all chemicals that lead to<br />
highly toxic fumes or gases <strong>in</strong> case of a leak <strong>in</strong> a pipe or vessel.<br />
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Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment<br />
place a new vessel with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>stallation without compromis<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>imum safety<br />
distances. Safety distances are not only def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> vessels conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong><br />
dangerous chemicals <strong>and</strong> the boundaries of the chemical plant, safety distances<br />
are also specified <strong>for</strong> distances between pipes <strong>and</strong> vessels <strong>and</strong> between different<br />
vessels. A vessel under pressure might explode, if such an event occurs it should<br />
not lead to additional problems. Other vessels should be placed at such a distance<br />
that they are not affected by such an explosion.<br />
Inconsistencies between codes <strong>and</strong> legislation are less prone to arise than<br />
<strong>in</strong>consistencies between customer requirements <strong>and</strong> codes <strong>and</strong> regulation.<br />
Legislation <strong>and</strong> regulation are mostly goal based <strong>and</strong> codes usually apply to<br />
hardware provid<strong>in</strong>g calculation rules that should lead to the per<strong>for</strong>mance levels<br />
required by legislation <strong>and</strong> regulation. There<strong>for</strong>e <strong>in</strong>consistencies are not really an<br />
issue. It can however, occur that new processes or materials have yet to be<br />
codified <strong>and</strong> are there<strong>for</strong>e not automatically legal. In such cases it is sometimes<br />
allowed to use those new processes or materials provided that a Notified Body has<br />
explicitly allowed their use. A new material or process might be safer than those<br />
specified <strong>in</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g codes <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stances. From a moral po<strong>in</strong>t of view it is<br />
good to use new materials or processes if this enhances the safety of an<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation <strong>and</strong> has no other downsides e.g. with regard to susta<strong>in</strong>ability. 5 From a<br />
legal po<strong>in</strong>t of view special permission has to be obta<strong>in</strong>ed to be allowed to use new<br />
materials or processes. Duplex steel was, <strong>for</strong> example, not <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the Dutch<br />
code (Regels), the Stoomwezen however allowed the use of duplex steel <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stallations.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>terviewed eng<strong>in</strong>eers have <strong>in</strong>dicated that the codes <strong>for</strong> (chemical)<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallations are based on years of experience <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of pipes etc, <strong>and</strong> that<br />
they do not put these codes aside easily. If there are situations <strong>in</strong> which the code<br />
is difficult to apply, an eng<strong>in</strong>eer will contact the Notified Body about what to do.<br />
In the end, the decision as to whether a <strong>design</strong> is <strong>in</strong>deed safe enough is made by<br />
a Notified Body such as the Stoomwezen. If a <strong>design</strong> is approved the product will<br />
have the CE mark.<br />
Another important issue <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>al stages of the <strong>design</strong> process is the question<br />
of whether an <strong>in</strong>stallation, as drawn with a computer can be actually built. It is<br />
sometimes easier to leave the difficult details out of the draw<strong>in</strong>gs. These details<br />
then have to be decided on site, dur<strong>in</strong>g the actual construction of the <strong>in</strong>stallation,<br />
where a pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>er from the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company must be present. A<br />
question about responsibility can be discerned here. Are the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
5 Whether or not it is morally required to use new materials or processes if this enhances safety<br />
depends also on other <strong>issues</strong> like amongst other th<strong>in</strong>gs the costs <strong>and</strong> the environmental impact<br />
of the new process or material.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>stallation that is complete <strong>in</strong> details <strong>and</strong> which is<br />
producible <strong>in</strong> practice? If an eng<strong>in</strong>eer specifies a certa<strong>in</strong> way of construction that<br />
is difficult <strong>and</strong> labour <strong>in</strong>tensive, the constructor might use an easier way to<br />
produce someth<strong>in</strong>g that he or she judges to be similar or good enough.<br />
However, such changes may not be as good as those prescribed <strong>and</strong> may not<br />
achieve what the <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eers expected, this can lead to problems later.<br />
There are several cases <strong>in</strong> which details that were changed or further <strong>design</strong>ed<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g construction, have led to disasters, <strong>for</strong> example, the Hyatt Regency<br />
walkway collapse (see also [Gillum, 2000] <strong>and</strong> [Pfatteicher, 2000]).<br />
Some of the alterations that might be made are predictable <strong>for</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eers.<br />
Should the eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong> a way that is easy to construct <strong>and</strong> anticipate the<br />
sometimes difficult work<strong>in</strong>g conditions of, <strong>for</strong> example, welders? Or should an<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>design</strong> the best construction <strong>and</strong> then give his or her draw<strong>in</strong>gs to the<br />
contractor? An eng<strong>in</strong>eer can argue that he or she does not have all the relevant<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation to decide what is easy to construct <strong>and</strong> what not. The eng<strong>in</strong>eer does<br />
not always know what production techniques the specific contractor has available<br />
<strong>and</strong> has experience with. Not <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g some details <strong>in</strong> the draw<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> lett<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the construction company decide on some details might tempt eng<strong>in</strong>eers to leave<br />
the difficult details out (see figure 5.1).<br />
88<br />
Figure 5.1:…..<strong>and</strong> this pipe should be connected to that pressure vessel<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to the draw<strong>in</strong>gs? [picture courtesy of S. Roeser]
Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment<br />
In a turn-key contract the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company is also responsible <strong>for</strong> the<br />
construction. So it is <strong>in</strong> its own <strong>in</strong>terest to make a <strong>design</strong> that is easy to construct<br />
economically, efficiently <strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the codes. Under a reimbursable contract the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company is only responsible <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong>, not <strong>for</strong> construction;<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e problems are more likely to occur with a reimbursable contract.<br />
Although there are opportunities to <strong>in</strong>clude susta<strong>in</strong>ability concerns <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong><br />
of (petro) chemical <strong>in</strong>stallations susta<strong>in</strong>ability is assigned little attention <strong>and</strong><br />
importance <strong>in</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>design</strong>. An <strong>in</strong>stallation is <strong>design</strong>ed to have a<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> lifespan <strong>and</strong> what is done after that has expired is not the concern of the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers do not know if some of the materials of an <strong>in</strong>stallation<br />
will be recycled or whether the <strong>in</strong>stallation will be demolished <strong>and</strong> no material<br />
recycled. In the <strong>in</strong>terviews eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong>dicated that they considered recycl<strong>in</strong>g<br />
unimportant. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers, Notified Bodies <strong>and</strong> customers also<br />
regarded susta<strong>in</strong>ability to be of no <strong>in</strong>terest.<br />
Some systems <strong>for</strong> predict<strong>in</strong>g the costs of <strong>in</strong>stallations have a built <strong>in</strong> bias <strong>for</strong><br />
cheap, not very durable <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able, materials. A <strong>for</strong>mer eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
specialist told me that <strong>in</strong> a company she had worked <strong>for</strong>, the costs <strong>for</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance were taken to be a percentage of the cost <strong>for</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g. Sta<strong>in</strong>less steel<br />
is more expensive but needs less ma<strong>in</strong>tenance than other steels. However,<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g the choice to use sta<strong>in</strong>less steel cannot be economically justified if the<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance costs are taken to be a percentage of the build<strong>in</strong>g costs. Only very<br />
small diameter pipel<strong>in</strong>es that are very costly to pa<strong>in</strong>t are made of sta<strong>in</strong>less steel.<br />
In this company specific guidel<strong>in</strong>e, an <strong>in</strong>herent bias towards short life-time <strong>and</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance <strong>in</strong>tensive materials can be dist<strong>in</strong>guished. If such types of guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />
exist it is very difficult to <strong>in</strong>troduce new, more expensive, materials even if these<br />
would be more durable <strong>and</strong>/or susta<strong>in</strong>able.<br />
Another ethical issue that was brought up by some of the <strong>in</strong>terviewees is that<br />
companies have less knowledge nowadays. Large chemical produc<strong>in</strong>g companies<br />
no longer have eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g departments such departments have been outsourced<br />
<strong>and</strong>/or closed. Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g consultancy companies hire young eng<strong>in</strong>eers without<br />
experience, experienced eng<strong>in</strong>eers are too expensive <strong>and</strong> they (have to) leave the<br />
consultancy companies. Some organisations, to save money, <strong>for</strong> example the<br />
Stoomwezen, have had a vacancy stop, no new people had been hired dur<strong>in</strong>g six<br />
years. The older eng<strong>in</strong>eers are retir<strong>in</strong>g while the young eng<strong>in</strong>eers have not ga<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
a lot of experience. Moreover, <strong>in</strong>ternal education has been neglected. An<br />
experienced eng<strong>in</strong>eer makes more money <strong>for</strong> a company when he or she is<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a customer then when he or she is educat<strong>in</strong>g his or her younger<br />
colleagues. This means that the knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience required to <strong>design</strong><br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
safely is decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, not only <strong>in</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies, but also <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Stoomwezen. The Stoomwezen does not have specialists <strong>in</strong> every field. They used<br />
to rely on the knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience of the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g departments of<br />
(petro)chemical companies <strong>for</strong> some <strong>issues</strong>. In the past eng<strong>in</strong>eers from the<br />
(petro)chemical companies had experience <strong>in</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g with, <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>,<br />
specific chemicals <strong>and</strong> the problems <strong>in</strong>volved with h<strong>and</strong>l<strong>in</strong>g such chemicals.<br />
Approval by the Stoomwezen was partly based on it hav<strong>in</strong>g positive experiences<br />
with (petro)chemical companies <strong>and</strong> trust<strong>in</strong>g the eng<strong>in</strong>eers of those companies to<br />
make a safe <strong>and</strong> reliable <strong>design</strong>. Nowadays (petro)chemical companies do not<br />
have an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g department, this coupled with the retirement of experienced<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers means that the knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience is no longer available <strong>in</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies <strong>and</strong> at the Stoomwezen. This may cause problems <strong>in</strong> the<br />
future when <strong>in</strong>experienced eng<strong>in</strong>eers from an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>design</strong> an<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation <strong>for</strong> a (petro)chemical company that no longer reta<strong>in</strong>s knowledge <strong>and</strong><br />
experience with <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g such <strong>in</strong>stallations. This may lead to unsafe <strong>design</strong>s. Of<br />
course these <strong>design</strong>s have to be approved by the Notified Body but the<br />
Stoomwezen has the same problem. Inspectors do not have knowledge of, <strong>and</strong><br />
experience with, the possible problems of all specific <strong>in</strong>stallations. So it is<br />
questionable whether the Stoomwezen is always able to check whether a <strong>design</strong> is<br />
safe enough, <strong>and</strong> if it is not safe enough, to provide advice to the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company with respect to mak<strong>in</strong>g it safer. If there is too little knowledge <strong>in</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> companies <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the organisation that has to certify the<br />
<strong>design</strong>s, then unsafe chemical <strong>in</strong>stallation may be constructed, <strong>and</strong> this lack of<br />
knowledge becomes an ethical issue.<br />
5.5 Summary of the case <strong>and</strong> the regulative framework<br />
The <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>in</strong> a (petro) chemical <strong>in</strong>stallation is<br />
usually middle to low level normal <strong>design</strong>. The work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> normal<br />
configuration are already known. Pipes to transport fluids <strong>and</strong> gases have been<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> some decades. In most <strong>design</strong> processes the functional<br />
requirements are comparable to the functional requirements <strong>for</strong> previous<br />
<strong>design</strong>s. In some <strong>design</strong> processes a more radical <strong>design</strong> might be needed if the<br />
pipes have to transport a chemical that has not been used previously, research<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the effects of the chemical on the possible materials <strong>for</strong> pipes becomes<br />
necessary. In the higher levels of the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy, the product to be<br />
produced <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>stallation is <strong>design</strong>ed, the flow of chemicals established <strong>and</strong><br />
the site selected. The <strong>design</strong> process is organised hierarchically people have<br />
different functions <strong>and</strong> clear task descriptions <strong>and</strong> responsibilities.<br />
90
5.5.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong><br />
Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment<br />
Any <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment gives rice to ethical <strong>issues</strong>,<br />
particularly those perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to safety. These ethical <strong>issues</strong> are discussed <strong>in</strong> more<br />
detail <strong>in</strong> section 5.4, I will review them here shortly.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers believe that <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g accord<strong>in</strong>g to legislation <strong>and</strong> codes leads to<br />
safe <strong>in</strong>stallations. Legislation <strong>and</strong> codes prescribe a lot, but do not cover all<br />
choices regard<strong>in</strong>g safety.<br />
At the start of the <strong>design</strong> process, a choice has to be made between us<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
different codes that the pert<strong>in</strong>ent legislation permits. Some choices regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />
safety are not specified <strong>in</strong> a code <strong>and</strong> have to be made by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> / or<br />
customer. For example, accident <strong>and</strong> load scenarios are not def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> European<br />
codes <strong>and</strong> legislation. Under the PED eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies are obliged to<br />
make a risk analysis of their <strong>design</strong> but what accident <strong>and</strong> load scenarios should<br />
be used are not specified.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers there is a difference between merely follow<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
code <strong>and</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g that code well with<strong>in</strong> its limits. The Notified Body cannot<br />
reject <strong>design</strong>s that comply with legislation <strong>and</strong> codes but there is a difference <strong>in</strong><br />
safety between a <strong>design</strong> on the lower limits of a code or a <strong>design</strong> well with<strong>in</strong> its<br />
limits.<br />
There are also ethical <strong>issues</strong> related to the division of responsibility especially<br />
if the <strong>design</strong> is to be constructed by another company. Some details are not<br />
specified <strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong> because a construct<strong>in</strong>g company needs some freedom to<br />
decide what method to use <strong>for</strong> construction. This may tempt eng<strong>in</strong>eers not to<br />
specify any of the difficult details because the construction company will do this.<br />
The <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g company might make a <strong>design</strong> that cannot be produced, or one<br />
that is only possible if employees at the build<strong>in</strong>g site run large risks.<br />
Another ethical issue that was raised by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers at the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company <strong>and</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer from a Notified Body was that the level of knowledge<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g safe <strong>in</strong>stallations with<strong>in</strong> chemical companies, eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
companies <strong>and</strong> the Notified Body was decreas<strong>in</strong>g. Chemical companies have<br />
outsourced most of their eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g work where once they had some<br />
experienced eng<strong>in</strong>eers work<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g departments. Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
companies fired some of their very experienced senior eng<strong>in</strong>eers when the<br />
dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g work was low dur<strong>in</strong>g the n<strong>in</strong>eteen n<strong>in</strong>eties. The<br />
Stoomwezen has not been allowed to hire new eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>for</strong> some years <strong>and</strong><br />
now its experienced senior eng<strong>in</strong>eers are retir<strong>in</strong>g without the junior eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
hav<strong>in</strong>g ga<strong>in</strong>ed enough experience <strong>and</strong> knowledge to carry out their certify<strong>in</strong>g<br />
tasks at the same level as that of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers who have retired.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
5.5.2 Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
In this case, decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong> can be described as <strong>in</strong>dividual,<br />
hierarchical <strong>and</strong> based on a regulative framework.<br />
Compared with the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g DutchEVO case, decisions regard<strong>in</strong>g ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> were made more by <strong>in</strong>dividuals than by a complete <strong>design</strong> team. <strong>Ethical</strong><br />
<strong>issues</strong> were dealt with by the eng<strong>in</strong>eer that encountered the ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>for</strong> the<br />
part he or she <strong>design</strong>ed. Different eng<strong>in</strong>eers have different tasks <strong>and</strong> have to deal<br />
with different ethical <strong>issues</strong>. The job eng<strong>in</strong>eer will be confronted with ethically<br />
relevant questions concern<strong>in</strong>g safety distances. M<strong>in</strong>imum safety distances are<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the framework but <strong>in</strong> some cases these safety distances cannot be<br />
met, <strong>for</strong> example, if an older <strong>in</strong>stallation is changed. In other <strong>in</strong>stances the job<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer might want to keep greater than required safety distances. The stress<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer has to make the decisions regard<strong>in</strong>g load <strong>and</strong> accident scenarios. The<br />
materials eng<strong>in</strong>eer has to choose between different materials. Not all eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
will be confronted with all ethical <strong>issues</strong>. Some ethical <strong>issues</strong> will come up <strong>in</strong> the<br />
work of the stress eng<strong>in</strong>eer others <strong>in</strong> the work of the job eng<strong>in</strong>eer.<br />
If eng<strong>in</strong>eers encounter large problems <strong>in</strong> their <strong>design</strong> tasks, they are required<br />
to discuss these problems with their superiors <strong>and</strong> the project manager. The<br />
project manager will decide together with the eng<strong>in</strong>eer whether the problem can<br />
be solved by the <strong>design</strong> team or not. In important decisions the customer is<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. Sometimes the Notified Body is <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med of<br />
the problem <strong>and</strong> asked <strong>for</strong> advice.<br />
Legislation <strong>and</strong> codes give rules <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong> a lot of decisions<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g ethical <strong>issues</strong>. In addition to the rules <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es, there are<br />
Notified Bodies that should check the <strong>design</strong> be<strong>for</strong>e it is certified. The Notified<br />
Bodies can provide eng<strong>in</strong>eers with advice.<br />
5.5.2 Regulative framework<br />
There was a regulative framework available <strong>for</strong> this case. The most important<br />
part of the regulative framework was the PED (European Pressure Equipment<br />
Directive). This PED is implemented <strong>in</strong> Dutch law. The legislation specifies a<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imum required level of safety. The PED is on most po<strong>in</strong>ts very general <strong>and</strong><br />
goal oriented. If a harmonised European code is used <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>, an<br />
assumption is made that the <strong>design</strong> complies with the legislation. At this<br />
moment some national codes are still be<strong>in</strong>g used. The regulative framework<br />
m<strong>and</strong>ates that all new <strong>design</strong>s are checked by organisations licensed to check<br />
whether a <strong>design</strong> complies with current legislation, i.e. Lloyd’s Register<br />
Stoomwezen. Can this regulative framework be considered to be a normative<br />
framework as def<strong>in</strong>ed by Grunwald? To answer this question, I will follow<br />
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Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment<br />
Grunwald’s requirements <strong>for</strong> a normative framework <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicate whether the<br />
regulative framework meets them.<br />
Pragmatically complete: The framework is not complete. Some relevant<br />
decisions regard<strong>in</strong>g load <strong>and</strong> accident scenarios are not <strong>in</strong>cluded. The Notified<br />
Body will check the <strong>design</strong>. If some obvious load scenarios are not <strong>in</strong>cluded they<br />
can require changes <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>. However, the Notified Body does not check<br />
the risk analysis <strong>and</strong> accident scenarios made by the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company.<br />
When I conducted the <strong>in</strong>terviews <strong>for</strong> the case-study (February to May 2002)<br />
there were no established ideas on good <strong>design</strong> practice with<strong>in</strong> the profession<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g what load <strong>and</strong> accidents scenarios to consider. The transition to the<br />
PED <strong>in</strong> May 2002 led to a lot of questions among eng<strong>in</strong>eers, <strong>and</strong> at the Notified<br />
Body Lloyd’s Register Stoomwezen, <strong>for</strong> example, it was not clear who should<br />
apply <strong>for</strong> the CE mark.<br />
Locally consistent: The framework is reasonably consistent as long as one code is<br />
selected <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong>. It is difficult, <strong>and</strong> not allowed, to comb<strong>in</strong>e different codes<br />
<strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong> because this would lead to a lot of <strong>in</strong>consistencies. Contradictions are<br />
regularly encountered between customers’ wishes <strong>and</strong> requirements <strong>and</strong> the<br />
regulative framework.<br />
Unambiguous: At the time of the transition to the PED the framework was<br />
def<strong>in</strong>itely ambiguous. A lot of rules needed <strong>in</strong>terpretations that were not yet<br />
available or had not be decided. This will probably get better when experience<br />
has been ga<strong>in</strong>ed with the PED.<br />
Accepted: Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Grunwald a normative framework should be accepted by<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> by all the people affected by it. Yet, with regard to chemical <strong>and</strong><br />
petrochemical <strong>in</strong>stallations, we regularly see that people liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the<br />
neighbourhood of such an <strong>in</strong>stallation do not accept the regulative framework.<br />
For example, <strong>in</strong> the south of the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s an <strong>in</strong>stallation us<strong>in</strong>g hydrocyanic<br />
acid borders an estate. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the company own<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>stallation, the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation is safe because it complies with codes <strong>and</strong> legislation. The local<br />
government of the village, neighbours <strong>and</strong> environmentalists doubt whether the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallation is safe enough even if it <strong>in</strong>deed meets all codes <strong>and</strong> legislation<br />
[Trouw, 17 June 2002].<br />
Observed: The framework is observed. It is legally en<strong>for</strong>ced <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong>s are<br />
checked by Notified Bodies. Moreover, as can be seen <strong>in</strong> the quote at the<br />
beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of this chapter eng<strong>in</strong>eers adhere to the framework. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers see it as<br />
a good guidel<strong>in</strong>e to <strong>design</strong> a safe <strong>in</strong>stallation.<br />
From the above it can be seen that there is an extensive regulative framework but<br />
that it is not a normative framework. The ambiguity of the regulative framework<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
is due to the change from national to European legislation <strong>and</strong> this may be<br />
resolved with<strong>in</strong> a few years time. Other problems arise as a result of a lack of<br />
experience with <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation of, the PED. For example, the problem of who<br />
should apply <strong>for</strong> the CE mark requires legal <strong>in</strong>terpretation. These problems will<br />
be resolved with<strong>in</strong> some time. Other problems are more difficult. Notified<br />
Bodies are not allowed to check the risk analysis provided by eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
companies. This means that eng<strong>in</strong>eers can decide on accident scenarios without<br />
guidel<strong>in</strong>es or control on these decisions. This does not mean that eng<strong>in</strong>eers will<br />
immediately try to set very low st<strong>and</strong>ards but they may be pushed by customers<br />
only to consider some accident scenarios. From a moral po<strong>in</strong>t of view, the ma<strong>in</strong><br />
problem with the regulative framework would probably be that it is not accepted<br />
<strong>and</strong> this is someth<strong>in</strong>g that is not easily resolved. I will come back on this po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong><br />
chapter 9.<br />
5.6 Acknowledgements<br />
I would like to thank the eng<strong>in</strong>eers at Jacobs Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, Lloyd’s Register<br />
Stoomwezen, Ger Küpers <strong>and</strong> Nancy Kuipers <strong>for</strong> the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation provided by<br />
them.<br />
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6 Design<strong>in</strong>g a Bridge<br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> with regard to the <strong>design</strong> of a bridge might not be that obvious. Yet,<br />
safety plays an important part <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process of a large bridge. Not just<br />
safety <strong>for</strong> the people <strong>and</strong> drivers of the vehicles us<strong>in</strong>g the bridge but also <strong>for</strong><br />
workers work<strong>in</strong>g on the bridge dur<strong>in</strong>g its construction <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> ships pass<strong>in</strong>g<br />
underneath a bridge. Accidents that happen on a bridge might lead to cars or<br />
trucks hitt<strong>in</strong>g some structural part of the bridge. People might want to dive from<br />
the bridge <strong>in</strong>to the water, etc. A case-study about the <strong>design</strong> of a bridge is<br />
presented <strong>in</strong> this chapter. The <strong>design</strong> problem is <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the first section.<br />
The stakeholders <strong>and</strong> their wishes <strong>and</strong> requirements are <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the second<br />
section. The ma<strong>in</strong> difficulty <strong>in</strong> this <strong>design</strong> process was try<strong>in</strong>g to reconcile all the<br />
requirements <strong>and</strong> wishes of all the stakeholders. The legislation <strong>and</strong> codes<br />
perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>for</strong> bridges <strong>for</strong>m the focus of the third<br />
section. These codes <strong>and</strong> legislation constitute the regulative framework <strong>for</strong><br />
bridge <strong>design</strong>. This section is followed by a section on the division of<br />
responsibilities <strong>and</strong> the organisation of the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> bridges. The<br />
results are summarised <strong>and</strong> the regulative frameworks evaluated <strong>in</strong> section 6.5.<br />
How far the regulative framework complies with Grunwald’s requirements <strong>and</strong><br />
can there<strong>for</strong>e be considered a normative framework is established.<br />
6.1 The <strong>design</strong> problem<br />
Ingenieursbureau Amsterdam (IBA) is the municipal eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company of<br />
the city of Amsterdam which <strong>design</strong>ed the bridge <strong>in</strong> this case-study. The IBA is<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> of bridges, tunnels <strong>and</strong> other<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure projects <strong>in</strong> Amsterdam. The IBA is a part of the municipality of<br />
Amsterdam <strong>and</strong> has a lot of experience with <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g of bridges <strong>in</strong><br />
Amsterdam. Under European law Amsterdam has to tender their assignments.<br />
Hence the IBA does not get an assignment automatically, it has to compete with<br />
other eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies. This case deals with a phase of a <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong><br />
a bridge over a large canal. The bridge will provide the eastern access <strong>for</strong> a new<br />
estate called IJburg <strong>in</strong> Amsterdam. IJburg is located <strong>in</strong> a region with a lot of<br />
waterways. The different parts of IJburg will be connected by bridges. The bridge<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
of the case-study is a large bridge connect<strong>in</strong>g IJburg to local highways. 1 The<br />
bridge will span the Amsterdam-Rijnkanaal, which at this po<strong>in</strong>t is about 130 m<br />
wide. The span of the bridge will be 150 m <strong>and</strong> on one side (Reliant Energy side)<br />
of the bridge 33 m of road lead<strong>in</strong>g to the bridge is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the project; on the<br />
other side (Diemen) 66 m is <strong>in</strong>cluded. Large ships must be able to pass under the<br />
bridge, there<strong>for</strong>e the bridge needs to be at least 9,30 m above water level.<br />
The <strong>design</strong> process <strong>and</strong> construction of this large bridge will take years.<br />
There<strong>for</strong>e only one of the phases of the <strong>design</strong> process was studied. The phase of<br />
the <strong>design</strong> process that I studied was the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase. The IBA used<br />
a st<strong>and</strong>ard contract made by a Dutch professional association <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers that is<br />
used mostly by eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies work<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> civil eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Netherl<strong>and</strong>s. In this contract the <strong>design</strong> process is divided <strong>in</strong>to the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
eight phases [KIvI, 2003]. The eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company can be hired <strong>for</strong> one or more<br />
of the phases of the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
Research: Research <strong>in</strong>to the feasibility, environmental effects, societal acceptation<br />
etc <strong>for</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g a go, no go decision <strong>for</strong> the project. This research is also used to<br />
decide on <strong>design</strong> requirements.<br />
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong>: Based on the <strong>design</strong> requirements a sketch <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
descriptions on how the object will function are made <strong>and</strong> used to <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m the<br />
customer about the costs <strong>and</strong> the time necessary to build the <strong>design</strong>. The<br />
customer has to approve the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> be<strong>for</strong>e the next phase is started.<br />
Def<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>design</strong>: The dimensions are fixed <strong>and</strong> the costs of materials <strong>and</strong><br />
apparatus <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>for</strong> use <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> are calculated (us<strong>in</strong>g codes<br />
if necessary), drawn <strong>and</strong> specified. At the end of this phase there should be a<br />
clear idea about what the costs to build <strong>and</strong> operate the object will be <strong>and</strong> the time<br />
needed to build it.<br />
Tender specification <strong>and</strong> construction documents: The location, the amount <strong>and</strong><br />
quality of materials <strong>and</strong> processes used to construct the object are described <strong>in</strong><br />
the tender specifications. The tender specifications also <strong>in</strong>clude adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
<strong>and</strong> legal requirements. The tender specifications are necessary <strong>for</strong> tender<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
they will be used as part of the contract with the build<strong>in</strong>g contractor.<br />
Price <strong>and</strong> contract: Build<strong>in</strong>g contractors bid to obta<strong>in</strong> the contract.<br />
Detail<strong>in</strong>g: The <strong>design</strong> is further detailed by the build<strong>in</strong>g contractor <strong>in</strong> cooperation<br />
with the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company to ensure that it can be built accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to the tender<strong>in</strong>g specifications.<br />
Build<strong>in</strong>g: The eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> company ensures that the <strong>design</strong> is built<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to the specifications <strong>in</strong> the tender<strong>in</strong>g specifications.<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1<br />
For people who are familiar <strong>in</strong> the area, the bridge will connect IJburg with the A1 <strong>and</strong> A9<br />
highway near exit Diemen.<br />
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Design of a bridge<br />
Completion: The eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> company controls whether the build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
contractor has built an object that satisfies the requirements. Advice is given on<br />
payments.<br />
The prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase started <strong>in</strong> January 2004 <strong>and</strong> was f<strong>in</strong>ished by the<br />
end of April 2004. The phase resulted <strong>in</strong> a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> report <strong>for</strong> the<br />
customer. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase I attended the technical meet<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
<strong>and</strong> I <strong>in</strong>terviewed five eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> the architect work<strong>in</strong>g on the project. I will<br />
expla<strong>in</strong> more about the context of the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>in</strong> the next section, there the<br />
stakeholders <strong>and</strong> the customer will be described.<br />
The bridge should be constructed <strong>and</strong> be ready <strong>for</strong> use <strong>in</strong> 2007. A document<br />
with the <strong>design</strong> requirements had already been written dur<strong>in</strong>g the research phase<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase. The IBA had participated <strong>in</strong> the research<br />
phase <strong>and</strong> the writ<strong>in</strong>g of the requirements. Other stakeholders <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the<br />
research phase were the architect <strong>and</strong> the DRO, the municipal organisation <strong>for</strong><br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> urbanism. The prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> of this bridge is high to middle<br />
level <strong>design</strong>, it is somewhat lower <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy than the conceptual <strong>design</strong><br />
of the bridge but it is the first ef<strong>for</strong>t to make a <strong>design</strong> of the construction of the<br />
bridge based on the architect’s draw<strong>in</strong>gs of the desired shape of the bridge.<br />
Design<strong>in</strong>g this bridge is a normal <strong>design</strong> process. In this regard the bridge is<br />
just another arched bridge although it is a rather large one. The work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, how arched bridges work, <strong>and</strong> normal configuration, what they look<br />
like, are well known. The architect tried to make the work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of the<br />
arched bridge visible <strong>in</strong> its shape. In an arched bridge there are either strong <strong>and</strong><br />
heavy arches to support the mass or there are two strong beams at either side of<br />
the bridge deck that carry most of the loads. In this case the architect had chosen<br />
to use heavy arches. In short the <strong>design</strong> problem is: build a beautiful arched<br />
bridge that is not too expensive <strong>and</strong> that does not h<strong>in</strong>der ships dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
construction or while <strong>in</strong> use. Take all legislation <strong>in</strong>to account <strong>and</strong> take care that<br />
no one gets <strong>in</strong>jured or killed dur<strong>in</strong>g construction.<br />
The difficulty <strong>in</strong> this <strong>design</strong> process is not <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a new work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple or a new configuration; it is <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g all<br />
requirements, <strong>in</strong> the coord<strong>in</strong>ation of all the different tasks <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the<br />
communication between all the stakeholders. A lot of stakeholders are <strong>in</strong>volved:<br />
among others two municipalities, a power station, an architect, the municipal<br />
service <strong>for</strong> urban development, <strong>and</strong> the Rijkswaterstaat. 2 All these stakeholders<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
2 The <strong>design</strong> process is at the time not f<strong>in</strong>ished. After the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase the <strong>design</strong><br />
process was temporarily stopped. There were some f<strong>in</strong>ancial problems concern<strong>in</strong>g IJburg <strong>and</strong><br />
the customer needed to deal with them. The customer probably also needs to get the<br />
permission of the Amsterdam city council to exp<strong>and</strong> the budget <strong>for</strong> the bridge.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
have their wishes, requirements <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s that need to be <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>design</strong>. Some stakeholders need to give their permission because they own part<br />
of the l<strong>and</strong> on which the bridge will be build. Different permits from local <strong>and</strong><br />
national authority are necessary be<strong>for</strong>e the actual build<strong>in</strong>g can start. As the rest of<br />
this chapter will show, the <strong>design</strong> process is also governed by a lot of legislation<br />
<strong>and</strong> codes perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> the build<strong>in</strong>g of bridges.<br />
6.2 Try<strong>in</strong>g to reconcile all requirements <strong>and</strong> stakeholders<br />
As <strong>in</strong>dicated above a lot of stakeholders were <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. In<br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g I will first list all the stakeholders that have participated, or will<br />
participate, <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process or that have to give permission be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
bridge can be built.<br />
A number of different municipal services of the city of Amsterdam were<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of the bridge, these are listed below.<br />
The DRO (Dienst Ruimtelijke Orden<strong>in</strong>g): this is a municipal organisation that is<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> urbanism <strong>in</strong> Amsterdam. The DRO decided that a<br />
bridge over the Amsterdam-Rijnkanaal is necessary <strong>and</strong> together with the IBA,<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulated the requirements <strong>for</strong> the bridge. The DRO decided how the bridge<br />
should be placed <strong>in</strong> the l<strong>and</strong>scape <strong>and</strong> what it should look like <strong>and</strong> gave the<br />
architect of the bridge guidel<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
The OGA (Ontwikkel<strong>in</strong>gsbedrijf Gemeente Amsterdam): This is a municipal<br />
agency <strong>for</strong> urban development. The OGA controlled the budgets <strong>and</strong> acted as<br />
customer <strong>for</strong> the IBA. The DRO <strong>in</strong>itiated the project <strong>for</strong> the bridge <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>ed it<br />
over to the OGA.<br />
The DIVV (Dienst Infrastructuur, Verkeer en Vervoer): This municipal service<br />
<strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure, traffic <strong>and</strong> transport, will be responsible <strong>for</strong> the control <strong>and</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of the bridge once it is build. The DIVV was officially not <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
The DMB (Dienst Milieu en Bouw toezicht): This municipal service <strong>for</strong><br />
environmental <strong>and</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>spections, <strong>issues</strong> permissions to build. An<br />
<strong>in</strong>spection is made to determ<strong>in</strong>e whether the <strong>design</strong> complies with the relevant<br />
legislation <strong>and</strong> codes. This takes place at the end of the <strong>design</strong> process when a<br />
<strong>design</strong> is filed <strong>for</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g permission.<br />
The DWR (Dienst Waterbeheer en Rioler<strong>in</strong>g): The DWR is the municipal service<br />
<strong>for</strong> management of water <strong>and</strong> sewage. The DWR manages the dike on one side<br />
of the Amsterdam-Rijnkanaal.<br />
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Design of a bridge<br />
Other stakeholders:<br />
The Rijkswaterstaat: The Rijkswaterstaat is a government organisation<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> the Dutch waterways, dikes, dams <strong>and</strong> canals. The<br />
Rijkswaterstaat imposes rules <strong>for</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g the radar disturbance caused by a<br />
bridge. Once a bridge is built there should still be enough vision <strong>and</strong> radar vision<br />
downstream. The Rijkswaterstaat also imposes limits on the amount of<br />
disturbance to shipp<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g the construction of a bridge. One side of the<br />
bridge <strong>in</strong> the case will st<strong>and</strong> on a important dam controlled by the<br />
Rijkswaterstaat. Another part of the Rijkswaterstaat, the Civil Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Division (Rijkswaterstaat Bouwdienst), checks the calculations <strong>for</strong> the bridge.<br />
The IBA has hired the Rijkswaterstaat Civil Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g Division as advisor.<br />
The Reliant Energy: This company has a power station near the bridge site. Road<br />
embankments are necessary between the bridge <strong>and</strong> the connect<strong>in</strong>g roads<br />
because of the height of the bridge. One of the road embankments will be on<br />
Reliant Energy’s l<strong>and</strong>, so permission is required to build on this l<strong>and</strong>. The<br />
Reliant Energy also has a dock that the contractor might want to use to transport<br />
materials to the build<strong>in</strong>g site, thus the construction company needs to obta<strong>in</strong><br />
permission from the Reliant Energy to use the dock.<br />
The TENET: There are high voltage transmission l<strong>in</strong>es above part of the bridge<br />
<strong>and</strong> part of the terra<strong>in</strong> needed to build the bridge. Build<strong>in</strong>g underneath high<br />
voltage l<strong>in</strong>es imposes specific hazards on people work<strong>in</strong>g on such a site. It will<br />
also make build<strong>in</strong>g the bridge upstream <strong>and</strong> shipp<strong>in</strong>g it to the site difficult. It<br />
will not be possible to load the already constructed bridge onto a ship <strong>and</strong><br />
transport it <strong>in</strong>to position because it is not possible <strong>for</strong> a ship with the bridge on it<br />
to pass under the power l<strong>in</strong>es. The TENET might be will<strong>in</strong>g to cut the power<br />
through the l<strong>in</strong>es if the power dem<strong>and</strong> is low dur<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong> hours of the day or<br />
<strong>for</strong> some months. Whether or not this is possible has to be discussed with the<br />
TENET.<br />
The Municipality Diemen: Part of the bridge will be on l<strong>and</strong> owned by the<br />
municipality Diemen, so their permission to build is needed.<br />
The Architect: The customer has hired an architect <strong>for</strong> the architectural <strong>design</strong> of<br />
the bridge. The architect had already per<strong>for</strong>med a study <strong>for</strong> the DRO concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
bridges <strong>in</strong> IJburg.<br />
The Groengebied: On one side of the Amsterdam-Rijnkanaal, (the Diemer side)<br />
there is a nature reserve. The Groengebied manages this area. The Groengebied<br />
has to give permission be<strong>for</strong>e the build<strong>in</strong>g can start. The Groengebied will<br />
amongst other th<strong>in</strong>gs, need to check whether animals can still get from one side<br />
of the earth embankment to the other.<br />
The Prov<strong>in</strong>cie North Holl<strong>and</strong>: The Netherl<strong>and</strong>s are divided <strong>in</strong> 12 prov<strong>in</strong>ces. A<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce has its own council <strong>and</strong> is responsible <strong>for</strong> spatial plann<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>for</strong> part of<br />
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the Dutch <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>and</strong> Dutch water management, there<strong>for</strong>e the Prov<strong>in</strong>cie<br />
North Holl<strong>and</strong> also has to approve the build<strong>in</strong>g of the bridge.<br />
All the above organisations, the municipal services <strong>and</strong> companies, had their<br />
own wishes, dem<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> requirements. Some of these requirements were<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> requirements. In other <strong>in</strong>stances there was only an<br />
<strong>in</strong>dication that permission needed to be obta<strong>in</strong>ed from an organisation to do<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g or that an organisation should be contacted.<br />
Some of these organisations may have dem<strong>and</strong>s that will cause serious<br />
problems later. For example, the customer <strong>and</strong> the IBA did not contact the<br />
Reliant Energy <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase, yet an eng<strong>in</strong>eer from the IBA<br />
had heard that the Reliant Energy had <strong>in</strong>dicated some time ago that they would<br />
not allow an earth embankment of several metres high to be built over their<br />
cables. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eer, this <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation had been obta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> an<br />
earlier phase of plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the IJburg estate. If the Reliant Energy refuses to<br />
give permission <strong>for</strong> the road embankment then the bridge <strong>design</strong> will need to be<br />
changed. The <strong>design</strong> team was wait<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> another project, the road lead<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the bridge, to be started be<strong>for</strong>e they would talk to the Reliant Energy. This road<br />
project was to be carried out by another <strong>design</strong> team with<strong>in</strong> IBA. This division of<br />
projects <strong>in</strong>to the bridge <strong>and</strong> the roads on the Diemer <strong>and</strong> IJburger side was<br />
apparently due to separated budgets <strong>for</strong> the whole project at the OGA.<br />
Another problem may arise with the DIVV. Facilities <strong>for</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>spection of bridges are necessary, such as stairs, rails or perhaps a cart that can<br />
be moved along the bottom of the bridge to <strong>in</strong>spect or pa<strong>in</strong>t it. In most <strong>design</strong><br />
processes that the IBA had participated <strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> the past, the DIVV was <strong>in</strong>volved.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the bridge <strong>design</strong> process the DIVV was officially not <strong>in</strong>volved, yet after<br />
the bridge has been built, it will be h<strong>and</strong>ed over to the DIVV. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers of<br />
the <strong>design</strong> team were experienced <strong>and</strong> they knew most of the facilities required<br />
<strong>for</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance. However, to prevent problems later on <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process<br />
the eng<strong>in</strong>eers from IBA asked the DIVV <strong>for</strong> advice on facilities necessary <strong>for</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance. A facility can be easily <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> earlier phases of the <strong>design</strong><br />
process, at the end of the <strong>design</strong> process it is more difficult to <strong>in</strong>clude a facility<br />
<strong>for</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance. It might then be necessary to change the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> to<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m further calculations.<br />
Tension can arise between the architect <strong>and</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> company.<br />
Both the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> architect thought that this tension was necessary to come<br />
to a good <strong>design</strong>. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> the architect, the architect<br />
should try to push the eng<strong>in</strong>eers to the limit as to what is possible <strong>for</strong><br />
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eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g work. 3 The regulative framework poses some of the limits of what is<br />
possible <strong>in</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g work. The architect defended his ideas about what<br />
the bridge should look like <strong>and</strong> he did not like compromises. The architect is<br />
well-known <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> he has experience with <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g bridges..<br />
The architectural <strong>design</strong> specified the way the bridge should look <strong>and</strong> it dealt<br />
with the shape <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong>m of the bridge. The eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> dealt with the<br />
bridge’s construction. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers tried to make an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> that<br />
fitted the architectural <strong>design</strong> In this phase of the <strong>design</strong> process the architect<br />
led, with the eng<strong>in</strong>eers stay<strong>in</strong>g as close as possible to the architectural <strong>design</strong>.<br />
The customer had asked the <strong>design</strong> team, dur<strong>in</strong>g the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase,<br />
to look <strong>for</strong> options to lower the costs of the bridge without compromis<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
architectural <strong>design</strong>. The architect <strong>and</strong> customer judged whether the proposals<br />
made by the <strong>design</strong> team were with<strong>in</strong> the scope of the architectural <strong>design</strong> or<br />
would change the architectural <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong>tolerably.<br />
With<strong>in</strong> the IBA a number of eng<strong>in</strong>eers drawn from different discipl<strong>in</strong>es worked<br />
on the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>, two eng<strong>in</strong>eers worked on the steel arches <strong>and</strong> two<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers worked on the concrete foundations <strong>and</strong> pillars. Furthermore, three<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers were <strong>in</strong>volved with the preparation of the build<strong>in</strong>g site <strong>and</strong> methods<br />
that would be used dur<strong>in</strong>g construction. One of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers work<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
preparation of the build<strong>in</strong>g site was also delegated to make a health <strong>and</strong> safety<br />
document <strong>for</strong> the bridge project.<br />
A <strong>design</strong> leader <strong>and</strong> a project leader had been appo<strong>in</strong>ted. The project leader<br />
communicated with the other stakeholders, especially the customer. One of the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g the steel parts was also the <strong>design</strong> leader. The <strong>design</strong> leader<br />
was responsible <strong>for</strong> the exchange of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation between the different eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
<strong>and</strong> the architect. The <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> project leader were jo<strong>in</strong>tly responsible <strong>for</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegration of the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> report. Every<br />
two weeks there was a <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the purpose of exchang<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation. The <strong>design</strong> leader had made a decision document <strong>for</strong> the next<br />
<strong>design</strong> phase. Every eng<strong>in</strong>eer had to fill <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>m when they made a decision.<br />
The decision, the reasons <strong>for</strong> the decision <strong>and</strong> additionally the eng<strong>in</strong>eers from<br />
other discipl<strong>in</strong>es whose work will be <strong>in</strong>fluenced by the decision had to be noted<br />
on the <strong>for</strong>m. These decision <strong>for</strong>ms were then sent to the <strong>design</strong> leader <strong>and</strong> the<br />
other relevant groups.<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
3 This rema<strong>in</strong>s normal <strong>design</strong> because “push<strong>in</strong>g to the limits” <strong>in</strong> this case means with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
normal configuration <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. The architect <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers seem to refer to, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, th<strong>in</strong>ner arches or less bulky look<strong>in</strong>g road segments.<br />
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6.3 Legislation <strong>and</strong> codes<br />
A bridge should be safe <strong>and</strong> comply to all relevant bridge legislation. The safety<br />
of the <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> a bridge should be demonstrated be<strong>for</strong>e permission <strong>for</strong><br />
construction is given. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers can <strong>in</strong>dicate that the <strong>design</strong> is safe by<br />
demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g that they have followed the relevant codes <strong>and</strong> complied to<br />
legislation. Safety consists of different aspects with regards to a bridge. The<br />
different aspects were identified by look<strong>in</strong>g at the relevant legislation <strong>and</strong> codes<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview<strong>in</strong>g the project manager be<strong>for</strong>e the observation period started.<br />
One, it is desirable that the bridge can be built without any workers be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>jured or any fatalities. Accidents happen regularly dur<strong>in</strong>g construction work.<br />
People fall down from heights, they get stuck under heavy construction parts,<br />
they can be hit by fall<strong>in</strong>g parts. These k<strong>in</strong>ds of accidents should be prevented if<br />
possible <strong>for</strong> example by limit<strong>in</strong>g the amount of work that needs to be done at a<br />
height <strong>and</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g that safety features are built <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Two, the bridge should be strong enough to withst<strong>and</strong> all normal load<strong>in</strong>g<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the whole of its lifetime <strong>and</strong> all exceptional load<strong>in</strong>g that might occur<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g accidents.<br />
Three, the IJburg bridge is quite high above the water level <strong>and</strong> the arches are<br />
also high. People on the bridge might throw th<strong>in</strong>gs down onto ships or climb<br />
onto the arches. All k<strong>in</strong>ds of misuse can be imag<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
Four, to prevent collisions between ships on the canal, the l<strong>in</strong>e of sight from<br />
ships <strong>and</strong> radar scann<strong>in</strong>g should not be h<strong>in</strong>dered by the bridge.<br />
In the follow<strong>in</strong>g sub-sections I will come back to all these po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicate<br />
how the eng<strong>in</strong>eers dealt with all these aspects of bridge safety. I will divide the<br />
aspects <strong>in</strong>to safety dur<strong>in</strong>g use <strong>and</strong> safety dur<strong>in</strong>g construction, because different<br />
legislation <strong>and</strong> codes hold <strong>for</strong> use <strong>and</strong> construction.<br />
6.3.1 Safety dur<strong>in</strong>g construction<br />
European Directive 89/391/EC gives general requirements <strong>for</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
conditions <strong>and</strong> directive 92/57/EC def<strong>in</strong>es the m<strong>in</strong>imal requirements <strong>for</strong> health<br />
<strong>and</strong> safety on construction sites. The European directives are <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong><br />
Dutch legislation <strong>in</strong> the “Arbeidsomst<strong>and</strong>ighedenbesluit” (work<strong>in</strong>g conditions<br />
decree) [Arbeidsomst<strong>and</strong>ighedenbesluit version Feb 2004]. This work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
conditions decree requires that a health <strong>and</strong> safety plan is made <strong>for</strong> the<br />
construction of the bridge. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers, contractors <strong>and</strong> customers are held<br />
responsible <strong>in</strong> this legislation <strong>for</strong> different parts of the health <strong>and</strong> safety plan.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> phase, a <strong>design</strong> health <strong>and</strong> safety coord<strong>in</strong>ator has to list <strong>and</strong><br />
evaluate all risks. This legislation is procedural; it requires that risks are listed.<br />
There are some substantial rules <strong>in</strong> the work<strong>in</strong>g conditions decree to restrict<br />
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Design of a bridge<br />
physical loads or to protect pregnant or young employees. There are <strong>for</strong> example<br />
rules about lift<strong>in</strong>g loads <strong>and</strong> the mass that bricks are allowed to have. The <strong>design</strong><br />
team did not know these rules <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e did not use them <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>.<br />
They considered that compliance with these substantial rules was part of the<br />
responsibilities of the contractor, because the contractor is the employer at the<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g site. This is also regarded as the responsibility of the employer <strong>in</strong> the<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g conditions decree.<br />
Until recently eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> companies <strong>in</strong>cluded a very general list of<br />
risks as a health <strong>and</strong> safety plan with the tender<strong>in</strong>g specifications. Th<strong>in</strong>gs like<br />
the possibility of workers fall<strong>in</strong>g from heights or the obligation to use personal<br />
protection like safety shoes or a safety helmet were mentioned. Design decisions<br />
cannot be changed once this tender<strong>in</strong>g phase is reached. Some risks might be<br />
preventable if another choice is made <strong>in</strong> an earlier <strong>design</strong> process phase. The<br />
idea beh<strong>in</strong>d the obligation to make a health <strong>and</strong> safety plan dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> is<br />
that health <strong>and</strong> safety considerations should play a part dur<strong>in</strong>g the whole of the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process <strong>and</strong> not just dur<strong>in</strong>g construction when most of the decisions have<br />
already been made. Nowadays more attention is given to the <strong>for</strong>mulation of the<br />
health <strong>and</strong> safety plan with<strong>in</strong> the IBA; it is no longer a st<strong>and</strong>ard list. Whereas the<br />
health <strong>and</strong> safety plan used to be made at the end of the <strong>design</strong> process it is now<br />
started <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase <strong>and</strong> it is updated throughout the <strong>design</strong><br />
process. This bridge project was the first time that eng<strong>in</strong>eers from the IBA<br />
worked on a health <strong>and</strong> safety plan <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase. Risks were<br />
listed <strong>and</strong> possible measures to prevent or mitigate such risks were mentioned<br />
together with whether the measures had already been taken or had to be taken<br />
later <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> phase. All risks <strong>and</strong> measures were listed <strong>in</strong> the health <strong>and</strong><br />
safety plan of the bridge with an <strong>in</strong>dication that someth<strong>in</strong>g should be done about<br />
it <strong>in</strong> a later phase. It can be concluded that mak<strong>in</strong>g a health <strong>and</strong> safety plan<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase has not led to changes <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
<strong>design</strong>.<br />
A health <strong>and</strong> safety plan is also necessary <strong>for</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance <strong>and</strong> refurbishment.<br />
This means that a new plan needs to be made when ma<strong>in</strong>tenance work is done.<br />
The IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers do not make this health <strong>and</strong> safety plan, the contractor <strong>for</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance is responsible <strong>for</strong> this, however, the IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers were aware that<br />
their construction should not only be build but also <strong>in</strong>spected <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
This meant that perhaps stairs, rails, provisions to secure a safety l<strong>in</strong>e when<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g on heights, manholes <strong>and</strong> elevators needed to be <strong>in</strong>cluded. In this case<br />
the IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers asked the DIVV <strong>for</strong> advice as to what <strong>in</strong>spection <strong>and</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance provisions were needed.<br />
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6.3.2 Safety <strong>in</strong> use<br />
The “Bouwbesluit” (build<strong>in</strong>g decree) imposes m<strong>in</strong>imal requirements with<br />
regards to safety, user friendl<strong>in</strong>ess, health <strong>and</strong> environment <strong>in</strong> use <strong>for</strong> bridges<br />
<strong>and</strong> other constructions [Bouwbesluit version 2002]. The requirements range<br />
from structural reliability requirements to emergency evacuation requirements<br />
<strong>in</strong> case of a fire <strong>in</strong> a build<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The build<strong>in</strong>g decree po<strong>in</strong>ts to NEN (Netherl<strong>and</strong>s St<strong>and</strong>ardization Institute)<br />
codes or NEN-EN codes (Dutch codes made <strong>in</strong> accordance with European<br />
regulation, <strong>and</strong> harmonised with other European countries’ codes) that can be<br />
used <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> the structural reliability (see section 7.3.1 <strong>for</strong> a<br />
further elaboration on what is meant by structural reliability). If NEN or EN-NEN<br />
codes are used <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> then it is taken as given that the <strong>design</strong> complies<br />
with the legislation. It is assumed that us<strong>in</strong>g the codes <strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong> will lead to<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g the m<strong>in</strong>imal requirements that the build<strong>in</strong>g decree imposes. It is not<br />
compulsory to follow codes <strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong>, but if the codes are not used the burden<br />
of proof is shifted to the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company. The eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company must<br />
provide evidence that the m<strong>in</strong>imal requirements of the build<strong>in</strong>g decree are met.<br />
This means that if it is possible to use codes, many eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies will<br />
use them.<br />
The Dutch codes are <strong>for</strong>mulated by committees under the supervision of the<br />
NEN. The committee members are usually experienced eng<strong>in</strong>eers drawn from<br />
different organizations <strong>and</strong> companies or scientists from universities. There are<br />
different po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the development of a code when comments on versions of the<br />
code are solicited from eng<strong>in</strong>eers outside the committee, <strong>for</strong> example on the<br />
green version. The IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers all <strong>in</strong>dicated that they knew to whom they<br />
could turn if they thought that there were flaws or omissions <strong>in</strong> the codes they<br />
used. The codes are <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed by eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> the committee.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the codes <strong>and</strong> the decision when to use certa<strong>in</strong> codes is<br />
made by <strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eers or small groups of eng<strong>in</strong>eers work<strong>in</strong>g on certa<strong>in</strong><br />
parts of a <strong>design</strong>. At the IBA, all <strong>in</strong>terpretations of codes <strong>and</strong> calculations are<br />
checked by a colleague. After a <strong>design</strong> is f<strong>in</strong>ished a civil servant from the local<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>spection will check the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> control whether the <strong>design</strong><br />
complies with the build<strong>in</strong>g decree. Most of the times, this check will <strong>in</strong>clude a<br />
check of the use <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation of codes <strong>and</strong> a check of the calculations.<br />
There are courses <strong>for</strong> young eng<strong>in</strong>eers to teach them how to <strong>design</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
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certa<strong>in</strong> codes. If new codes are developed professional associations of eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
organise courses <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers to learn about these new codes. 4<br />
There are special codes <strong>for</strong> the loads on concrete bridges <strong>and</strong> steel bridges<br />
[NEN 6723, 1995] <strong>and</strong> [NEN 6788, 1995], respectively. The problem is that these<br />
codes are still based on codes <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> 1963. The predictions of traffic flows<br />
over bridges <strong>in</strong> these codes are not realistic. Axle loads <strong>and</strong> frequencies are<br />
predicted based on these traffic predictions, <strong>and</strong> as a result, the predicted axleloads<br />
<strong>and</strong> frequencies are too low, lead<strong>in</strong>g to heavier actual fatigue loads than<br />
those used to calculate the bridge. The use of the traffic predictions of these old<br />
codes to <strong>design</strong> new bridges has led to the need to completely renew large parts<br />
of a bridge because fatigue damage made this necessary, the Van<br />
Brienenoordbrug. This bridge was opened <strong>in</strong> 1990 <strong>and</strong> steel parts of the bridge<br />
support<strong>in</strong>g the road had to be renewed after large fatigue cracks were found <strong>in</strong><br />
1997 [Barsten <strong>in</strong> de brug, 1997]. Some of the fatigue cracks needed to be<br />
repaired immediately. The situation was dangerous because a heavy truck might<br />
have caused a local failure of the bridge <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> example have gotten a wheel<br />
stuck <strong>in</strong> a hole <strong>in</strong> the bridge deck.<br />
With<strong>in</strong> a few years there will be a European code <strong>for</strong> bridges. This code will<br />
be <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to the Dutch code system as NEN-EN 6706. This European<br />
code was developed <strong>in</strong> the n<strong>in</strong>eties <strong>and</strong> the fatigue loads are more realistic <strong>and</strong><br />
have been determ<strong>in</strong>ed statistically. This European code is now available <strong>in</strong> a not<br />
yet def<strong>in</strong>ite version. At the time of the case-study there was a “prelim<strong>in</strong>ary green<br />
version”. This meant that comments were be<strong>in</strong>g solicited on this version. After<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporation of the comments it will become a “green version”. The green<br />
version of the European code can be used <strong>and</strong> compliance with the build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
decree is assumed, however, the old NEN codes can also be used. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong><br />
companies are also asked to comment on the green version. After a given period<br />
of time the green version will be changed tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account the comments, at<br />
this po<strong>in</strong>t it becomes the def<strong>in</strong>ite version. The def<strong>in</strong>ite version of the European<br />
code will replace the NEN codes <strong>in</strong> use at present.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> the IJburg bridge a choice had to be made to use either<br />
the NEN or the European code. The European code has realistic fatigue loads.<br />
This might lead to more material be<strong>in</strong>g required to be used <strong>in</strong> the bridge. If<br />
fatigue is important then more attention needs to be paid to detail<strong>in</strong>g: sharp<br />
edges <strong>and</strong> corners are not recommended under fatigue loads. The safety factors<br />
are a bit lower <strong>in</strong> the European code than those <strong>in</strong> the NEN codes, because the<br />
loads are determ<strong>in</strong>ed with less uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty. Lower safety factors may decrease<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
4 There are several professional associations <strong>for</strong> the different discipl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> construction. There<br />
is, <strong>for</strong> example, an association <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers who work with steel (Bouwen met Staal), there is<br />
also a research centre <strong>for</strong> civil eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s called the CUR.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
the amount of material required to build the bridge. The prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> was<br />
calculated us<strong>in</strong>g NEN 6723 <strong>and</strong> NEN 6788, because the calculations were<br />
prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>and</strong> only general, no details were known at the time, it was not<br />
necessary to cont<strong>in</strong>ue to use the NEN 6723 <strong>and</strong> 6788 codes <strong>in</strong> further <strong>design</strong><br />
phases. The Rijkswaterstaat Civil Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g Division, which was asked by the<br />
IBA to check its calculations, had a strong preference <strong>for</strong> the European code. The<br />
IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers were undecided as to which code they wanted to use. They knew<br />
the NEN 6723 <strong>and</strong> 6788 very well <strong>and</strong> had a lot of experience <strong>in</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g them.<br />
Us<strong>in</strong>g the European code would require them gett<strong>in</strong>g to know that code <strong>and</strong><br />
might cost more calculation time. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not decide which code to<br />
use <strong>in</strong> the def<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>design</strong> phase; the customer, the OGA, had to decide this.<br />
Because the eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not know what the consequences of us<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
European code were they made a quick analysis, which was <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the<br />
prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> report. The customer could choose based on this analysis. In<br />
the analysis the follow<strong>in</strong>g arguments were given <strong>for</strong> <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st us<strong>in</strong>g the green<br />
version of the European code [Aalste<strong>in</strong>, 2004].<br />
106<br />
‘-The prediction of the fatigue loads are more accurate <strong>in</strong> the European<br />
code.<br />
-Us<strong>in</strong>g the European code the non-permanent loads are higher. 5 The<br />
total loads, the comb<strong>in</strong>ation of non-permanent <strong>and</strong> permanent loads,<br />
however, is lower due to lower safety factors<br />
-Us<strong>in</strong>g the European code the dynamic fatigue loads are higher <strong>and</strong><br />
can be decisive <strong>for</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imal thicknesses. The stresses calculated <strong>in</strong> the<br />
prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase are low enough to assume that the<br />
prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> will also suffice accord<strong>in</strong>g to the European code.<br />
-The f<strong>in</strong>ancial consequences of us<strong>in</strong>g the European code will be<br />
limited. In total the use of the European code can even lead to the use<br />
of less material.’ [Aalste<strong>in</strong>, 2004]<br />
Consider<strong>in</strong>g all these arguments the IBA advised OGA to choose the European<br />
code.<br />
Besides hav<strong>in</strong>g to choose between NEN codes or the European code, a choice<br />
needed to be made between different types of codes <strong>for</strong> some parts of the bridge.<br />
For example, the <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong>volved mak<strong>in</strong>g a wall on either side of the canal to act<br />
as a support <strong>for</strong> the bridge <strong>and</strong> keep soil from slid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the canal. What is the<br />
primary function of such a wall? If the primary function is to support the road<br />
then the calculations should be made us<strong>in</strong>g construction codes. If the primary<br />
function of the wall is to keep the soil from slid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the canal then<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
5 Non-permanent loads are loads caused by traffic on the bridge, loads caused by snow or<br />
temperature differences <strong>and</strong> other non-permanent conditions. Permanent loads are loads<br />
caused by such th<strong>in</strong>gs as the weight of the bridge, creep <strong>and</strong> uneven settlement.
Design of a bridge<br />
geotechnical codes could be used. These codes differ <strong>and</strong> can lead to different<br />
required material thicknesses <strong>and</strong> qualities. In the construction codes the<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>cipal loads are vertical <strong>and</strong> come from the road onto the wall. Us<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
geotechnical code the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal loads will be horizontal, <strong>and</strong> due to the <strong>for</strong>ce<br />
exerted by the soil which will push aga<strong>in</strong>st the wall. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
<strong>in</strong>terviewed it is uncommon <strong>for</strong> a choice to have to be made between different<br />
types of codes but it does occur as it did <strong>in</strong> the bridge case. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated that what code is chosen <strong>for</strong> the calculations is based on experience<br />
with similar situations.<br />
People <strong>and</strong> drivers on the bridge participate <strong>in</strong> traffic, thus, all traffic safety<br />
legislation is relevant <strong>for</strong> a road bridge. All the requirements perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to traffic<br />
safety, such as the width of the bridge, protect<strong>in</strong>g of cyclists <strong>and</strong> pedestrians<br />
from cars <strong>and</strong> illum<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g the roads, must be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
The IBA did not <strong>design</strong> the road deck on the bridge, this was the responsibility<br />
of the DRO. The IBA only made the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> the bridge. Because<br />
exact division of the bridge <strong>in</strong>to road, pavement, cycle path etc was not done by<br />
the IBA <strong>and</strong> was not that important with regard to the construction of the bridge<br />
I will not get <strong>in</strong>to the details of regulation <strong>and</strong> codes perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to road. It was,<br />
however, important <strong>for</strong> this eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> to take <strong>in</strong>to account the fact that<br />
traffic accidents can happen on a bridge. A car or truck might crash <strong>in</strong>to the<br />
guard rail on one of the sides of the bridge or crash <strong>in</strong>to a load bear<strong>in</strong>g structure<br />
of a bridge. A bridge should not collapse <strong>in</strong> such exceptional circumstances. The<br />
codes <strong>in</strong>clude rules <strong>for</strong> calculations that should be made to simulate cars or<br />
trucks crash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the load bear<strong>in</strong>g structures of the bridge <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> trucks<br />
st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g very near to the sides of a bridge.<br />
The IJburg bridge will be partly on publicly accessible terra<strong>in</strong>, so it is possible <strong>for</strong><br />
people to access all parts of the bridge. People will be walk<strong>in</strong>g or cycl<strong>in</strong>g on the<br />
bridge. The bridge will be about 9 meters above water level <strong>and</strong> the arches will<br />
be about 22 meters above the bridge deck. The build<strong>in</strong>g decree requires that<br />
preventive measures should be <strong>in</strong> place to prevent people be<strong>in</strong>g blown of the<br />
bridge <strong>in</strong> high w<strong>in</strong>ds. To protect cyclists <strong>and</strong> pedestrians on the bridge a rail will<br />
be <strong>in</strong>stalled on the bridge, us<strong>in</strong>g build<strong>in</strong>g decree guidel<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
In the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase no measures to prevent people from<br />
climb<strong>in</strong>g on the arches were taken <strong>in</strong>to account. One of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers said <strong>in</strong> an<br />
<strong>in</strong>terview that he thought that someth<strong>in</strong>g should be done to prevent people from<br />
climb<strong>in</strong>g onto the arches because the arches were not steep, the <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation is<br />
such that it might be possible to walk on the arch. The arches of some arched<br />
bridges are so steep that it is impossible to climb on them. In this case, the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer thought that a gate to prevent people from walk<strong>in</strong>g onto the arch might<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
be needed. There are no rules or codes that specify that arches should be<br />
<strong>in</strong>accessible. After my presentation of the results of the case-study there was a<br />
discussion on this issue of misuse. In that discussion, an eng<strong>in</strong>eer said that<br />
walk<strong>in</strong>g on the arch to the top (about 30 m above water level) was a stupid th<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to do. He thought that they should try to keep people off the arches, but not at<br />
any cost. In the eng<strong>in</strong>eers’ op<strong>in</strong>ion people themselves have a responsibility to be<br />
prudent <strong>and</strong> realise that climb<strong>in</strong>g on the unprotected arches of a bridge is a<br />
dangerous th<strong>in</strong>g to do. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers agreed that <strong>in</strong> postpon<strong>in</strong>g the discussion<br />
on this po<strong>in</strong>t, they risked that later on <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process they would need to<br />
make large changes to the arches to prevent people from walk<strong>in</strong>g on them. In<br />
the case of a bridge <strong>in</strong> the Dutch city Maastricht the arch of a bridge <strong>for</strong><br />
pedestrians <strong>and</strong> cyclists is not very steep (see figure 6.1). S<strong>in</strong>ce the open<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
the bridge <strong>in</strong> 2003, there have been at least five known attempts to walk over the<br />
arch. The city council is consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stall<strong>in</strong>g CCTV cameras <strong>and</strong> claim<strong>in</strong>g any<br />
would be daredevils the costs of any result<strong>in</strong>g rescue operations<br />
[www.frontpage.fok.nl] <strong>and</strong> [Algemeen Dagblad, 30 March 2005].<br />
108
Design of a bridge<br />
Figure 6.1a <strong>and</strong> b: Bridge <strong>for</strong> pedestrians <strong>and</strong> cyclists <strong>in</strong> Maastricht. People<br />
climb on the arch <strong>and</strong> sometimes try to walk to the other side us<strong>in</strong>g the arch<br />
[photos A. van Gorp].<br />
Other possibly dangerous activities connected to bridges are div<strong>in</strong>g from a<br />
bridge, committ<strong>in</strong>g suicide <strong>and</strong> throw<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs down onto ships pass<strong>in</strong>g under<br />
a bridge. No attention was paid to prevent<strong>in</strong>g this <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong><br />
phase. There is no legislation that requires bridge <strong>design</strong>ers to <strong>in</strong>stall measures<br />
to prevent people from throw<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs down or from div<strong>in</strong>g of a bridge. In the<br />
Netherl<strong>and</strong>s it is <strong>for</strong>bidden to dive from bridges but no measures have to be put<br />
<strong>in</strong> place to prevent people from do<strong>in</strong>g this. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> the<br />
discussion after my presentation that they did take care to <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong> such a way<br />
that th<strong>in</strong>gs such as a crucial bolt, which might be unscrewed, <strong>and</strong> if undone<br />
would then <strong>in</strong>fluence a bridge’s stability, was not accessible. This was not<br />
mentioned explicitly <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers wondered what other<br />
misuse should be prevented <strong>and</strong> whose responsibility it was to take such<br />
prevention <strong>in</strong>to account. There are no norms or codes <strong>for</strong> this.<br />
The issue of misuse was not discussed <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase. The<br />
<strong>design</strong> leader said that they had decided that some measures to prevent access to<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> parts of the bridge would be taken <strong>in</strong> the def<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>design</strong> phase. The<br />
<strong>design</strong> leader also <strong>in</strong>dicated that he expected feedback from the Rijkswaterstaat<br />
on this issue when they sent the <strong>design</strong> to the Rijkswaterstaat <strong>for</strong> a check of the<br />
<strong>design</strong>. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>design</strong> leader the Rijkswaterstaat Civil Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Division had a lot of experience with <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g large bridges <strong>and</strong> they probably<br />
had ideas about what types of misuse to prevent <strong>and</strong> how to prevent it. The<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> leader thought / hoped that the Rijkswaterstaat would give them<br />
comments <strong>and</strong> advice on misuse. The question rema<strong>in</strong>s whether the architect<br />
would accept a gate or some other measure to keep people off the arch. This<br />
might become a problem later on <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
Large ships <strong>and</strong> conta<strong>in</strong>erships use the Amsterdam-Rijnkanaal to go southeast<br />
to Tiel <strong>and</strong> further on to Germany. Large ships need a lot of time to turn corners,<br />
to stop <strong>and</strong> avoid a collision with another ship. It is there<strong>for</strong>e important that<br />
capta<strong>in</strong>s have a good enough l<strong>in</strong>e of sight to see other ships further up or down a<br />
river or canal. At the location <strong>for</strong> the bridge the canal is not completely straight;<br />
there is a small curve. Locat<strong>in</strong>g the columns of the bridge directly on the bank of<br />
the canal will obscure a ship’s capta<strong>in</strong>’s l<strong>in</strong>e of sight. The Rijkswaterstaat would<br />
not allow this. The columns will there<strong>for</strong>e be located 10 meters <strong>in</strong>l<strong>and</strong>. This<br />
position<strong>in</strong>g of the columns had another advantage, if the columns are placed 10<br />
m <strong>in</strong>l<strong>and</strong> there is no requirement to <strong>design</strong> the bridge <strong>in</strong> such a way that it can<br />
withst<strong>and</strong> a collision of a ship <strong>in</strong>to one of its columns.<br />
Light<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the road on the bridge should be done <strong>in</strong> such a way that it does<br />
not bl<strong>in</strong>d capta<strong>in</strong>s on the bridges of ships pass<strong>in</strong>g underneath. To aid ship<br />
navigation radar is also used. A bridge will disturb the radar profile. There are<br />
rules <strong>for</strong> radar disturbance. The Rijkswaterstaat will check whether or not the<br />
<strong>design</strong> causes too much radar disturbance. The Rijkswaterstaat recommends<br />
that surfaces perpendicular to the canal have an <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation of more than 5 to 10°<br />
to avoid radar disturbance. The arches <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e 15° to the <strong>in</strong>side so this<br />
recommendation is met <strong>for</strong> the IJburg bridge arches. The beams under the sides<br />
of the road deck also have an <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation of 15°. The beam that is located under<br />
the middle of the road deck is straight <strong>and</strong> should, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
Rijkswaterstaat be f<strong>in</strong>ished with bevelled edges.<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eers considered all the mentioned aspects to be important but dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the case-study <strong>design</strong> process when us<strong>in</strong>g the term “safety” they usually referred<br />
only to safety <strong>in</strong> use. Safety dur<strong>in</strong>g construction is called health <strong>and</strong> safety.<br />
6.3.3 Susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
Some of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers mentioned <strong>in</strong> their <strong>in</strong>terviews that the estate <strong>and</strong> the<br />
bridge would be built <strong>in</strong> a <strong>for</strong>mer nature park. They thought that the<br />
environment <strong>and</strong> especially build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a nature park was an ethically relevant<br />
issue. The decision to develop an estate <strong>in</strong> a nature park was taken by the<br />
Amsterdam city council. This was an important ethical issue but not one that the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers could really <strong>in</strong>fluence. The Amsterdam city council held a referendum<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1997 to ask the Amsterdam community whether or not they agreed with the<br />
110
Design of a bridge<br />
plans to build IJburg. If the percentage of people that participated <strong>in</strong> the<br />
referendum was high enough then the city council would abide by the result of<br />
the referendum. The majority of the people that voted <strong>in</strong> the referendum was<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st the estate IJburg but the turnout was too low <strong>and</strong> did not reach the<br />
required percentage of all possible voters. Because of the low turnout <strong>in</strong> the<br />
referendum the result of the referendum was not considered <strong>in</strong> the decision<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g process. Yet concern <strong>for</strong> the ecological value of the place where the<br />
bridge would be situated has steered the requirements on ecology.<br />
A separate section on ecology was <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> requirements. Local<br />
flora should have a chance to grow undisturbed on the sides of the road<br />
embankment. There<strong>for</strong>e the road embankment should be steep to prevent<br />
people from climb<strong>in</strong>g onto it. There was also a requirement that the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
should pay attention to needs of nest<strong>in</strong>g swallows <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> [DRO <strong>and</strong> IBA,<br />
2003 p 17]. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not know what this requirement about nest<strong>in</strong>g<br />
swallows was supposed to mean, or what they should do, so <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
<strong>design</strong> report they stated that they would not <strong>in</strong>clude measures <strong>for</strong> nest<strong>in</strong>g<br />
swallows [Aalste<strong>in</strong>, 2004, p 4].<br />
The requirements <strong>for</strong> the bridge conta<strong>in</strong>ed some guidel<strong>in</strong>es concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability. The work<strong>in</strong>gs conditions decree <strong>for</strong>bids the use of certa<strong>in</strong><br />
materials <strong>and</strong> substances because they can harm the health of workers<br />
[Arbeidsomst<strong>and</strong>ighedenwet, 2004]. These materials <strong>and</strong> substances are<br />
sometimes also harmful <strong>for</strong> the environment such as, <strong>for</strong> example, lead.<br />
Recently, requirements have been <strong>in</strong>cluded on the use of energy <strong>in</strong> the build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
decree but this concerns proper <strong>in</strong>sulation of build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> has little to do with<br />
bridges or tunnels. There are also requirements concern<strong>in</strong>g the use of materials<br />
[DRO <strong>and</strong> IBA, 2003 p.18]. For example, any wood used should be FSC certified.<br />
The FSC certificate guarantees that the wood is sourced from susta<strong>in</strong>able<br />
<strong>for</strong>estry. 6 With respect to the selection of materials, materials that are recyclable<br />
were preferred. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong>tended to use a document from the<br />
Rijkswaterstaat that gives guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong> materials <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able build<strong>in</strong>g. This<br />
document was not used <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase; though the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
expected to use it <strong>in</strong> the def<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>design</strong> phase <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g the tender<strong>in</strong>g<br />
specifications.<br />
So, although the available legislation <strong>and</strong> the <strong>design</strong> requirements paid<br />
attention to susta<strong>in</strong>ability, susta<strong>in</strong>ability was given little attention <strong>in</strong> the<br />
prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase. This was partly due to the fact that the choice of<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
6 The Forest Stewardship Council is an <strong>in</strong>ternational, non-profit organization that offers <strong>for</strong>est<br />
certification. FSC has developed some pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>and</strong> criteria that should be met. The pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<br />
<strong>and</strong> criteria take <strong>in</strong>to account the environmental impacts of <strong>for</strong>est management <strong>and</strong> social<br />
<strong>issues</strong> like labor conditions <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples’ rights [www.fsc.org].<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
materials was not made <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase. In a discussion held<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase where susta<strong>in</strong>ability might have been<br />
relevant, the eng<strong>in</strong>eer said that new legislation was anticipated. This legislation<br />
will limit the amount of volatile substances allowed <strong>in</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>and</strong> it will be <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>for</strong>ce when the bridge is built. The discussion on pa<strong>in</strong>ts took place when the<br />
means <strong>for</strong> conserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the steel arches was discussed. A<br />
conservation system consist<strong>in</strong>g of a metallic coat<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>for</strong> example z<strong>in</strong>c, <strong>and</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<br />
is required <strong>in</strong> the requirements. This <strong>for</strong>m of conservation system is very<br />
expensive <strong>and</strong> the OGA wanted a cheaper conservation system. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers from the IBA the conservation system us<strong>in</strong>g a metal layer <strong>and</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<br />
was perhaps too expensive <strong>and</strong> over eng<strong>in</strong>eered. They agreed with the OGA that<br />
it might suffice to have another, cheaper system. The IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers, however,<br />
wanted to look at more than the costs of pa<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>and</strong> their application, they also<br />
wanted to reduce ma<strong>in</strong>tenance requirements. They decided to look <strong>for</strong> an<br />
organic pa<strong>in</strong>t system that conserves the steel arches of the bridge as well as the<br />
systems used to conserve similar large bridges. One of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers contacted<br />
different pa<strong>in</strong>t producers to determ<strong>in</strong>e what k<strong>in</strong>ds of organic pa<strong>in</strong>ts would be<br />
suitable <strong>for</strong> the bridge, he also mentioned <strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g that when the<br />
bridge was pa<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> 2007 there would be new legislation cover<strong>in</strong>g a reduction<br />
of volatile substances <strong>in</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>ts. The organic pa<strong>in</strong>t system that he advised us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
complies with the upcom<strong>in</strong>g legislation.<br />
6.4 Responsibility <strong>and</strong> liability<br />
The IBA is NEN-EN-ISO 9001:2000 certified. This quality system requires that<br />
every calculation <strong>and</strong> draw<strong>in</strong>g is checked. Every official document must have the<br />
signatures of the eng<strong>in</strong>eer that has written it <strong>and</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer that has checked<br />
appended. The responsibility <strong>for</strong> calculations is thus divided between two<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers; the one that has per<strong>for</strong>med the calculations <strong>and</strong> one that has checked<br />
them. After the document has been checked the project leader has to append his<br />
signature <strong>for</strong> release to the customer or other external <strong>in</strong>stances. This system<br />
should make all decisions traceable. The NEN-EN–ISO certificate is a quality<br />
system that focuses ma<strong>in</strong>ly on procedures.<br />
In the <strong>in</strong>terviews I asked the eng<strong>in</strong>eers whether the check<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> sign<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
documents were related to liability <strong>issues</strong>. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not know if this was<br />
the case <strong>and</strong> started ask<strong>in</strong>g me whether they could be held liable <strong>in</strong> cases where<br />
they had signed some calculation or other documents. There is very little<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on eng<strong>in</strong>eers be<strong>in</strong>g held liable if people are <strong>in</strong>jured or killed due to a<br />
<strong>design</strong> flaw. There have been very few cases <strong>in</strong> which an eng<strong>in</strong>eer has been sued<br />
<strong>and</strong> convicted. Most cases have been settled or the eng<strong>in</strong>eers were acquitted. For<br />
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example, <strong>in</strong> a court case <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g three eng<strong>in</strong>eers that had worked, <strong>in</strong> different<br />
organisations, on the wheels of the ICE tra<strong>in</strong> that crashed <strong>in</strong>to a bridge at<br />
Eschede <strong>in</strong> Germany severe guild could not be proven <strong>and</strong> the case was settled<br />
[Oberl<strong>and</strong>esgerichtcelle, 2003]. After a new hall at the Charles-de-Gaulle airport<br />
near Paris <strong>in</strong> France had collapsed on the 23 rd of May 2004, the district attorney<br />
announced that an <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>voluntary manslaughter would be made<br />
[Doden na <strong>in</strong>storten vertrekhal Parijs, 2004]. It is not yet clear whether some<br />
companies, eng<strong>in</strong>eers or the architect will be held liable.<br />
In general there are three criteria used to decide whether persons can be held<br />
liable. A norm has to be transgressed, there should be a causal connection<br />
between this transgression <strong>and</strong> the failure <strong>and</strong> a person should be blameworthy<br />
[Bovens, 1998, 28-31]. 7 Because there are not a lot of cases <strong>in</strong> which eng<strong>in</strong>eers are<br />
convicted <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong> flaws caus<strong>in</strong>g death or <strong>in</strong>juries to third parties, it is not clear<br />
how these criteria are <strong>in</strong>terpreted.<br />
Liability <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong> omissions is regulated <strong>in</strong> the contract between the customer<br />
<strong>and</strong> the IBA, [KIvI, 2003]. A <strong>design</strong> omission is def<strong>in</strong>ed as someth<strong>in</strong>g that a<br />
good, prudent eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company, that has the relevant knowledge <strong>and</strong> means,<br />
should have avoided. The customer has to po<strong>in</strong>t out the <strong>design</strong> omission to the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>and</strong> give the company time to amend it. The eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company is liable <strong>for</strong> the cost of amend<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> omission <strong>and</strong> any damage<br />
directly related to the <strong>design</strong> omission. The maximum amount to be paid by the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company is the amount that the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company will be paid<br />
<strong>for</strong> the assignment with a maximum of 1 million euros. Thus liability is limited to<br />
1 million euros <strong>and</strong> only direct damage is covered. In this contract the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company is not liable if people are killed or <strong>in</strong>jured as a result of the<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ished object collaps<strong>in</strong>g or otherwise seriously malfunction<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
6.5 Summary of the case <strong>and</strong> the regulative framework<br />
The arched <strong>design</strong> of the IJburg bridge was clearly a normal <strong>design</strong>. The work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> normal configuration <strong>for</strong> an arched bridge are well known.<br />
Functionally, the <strong>design</strong> was also normal, the requirements <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>for</strong> this<br />
bridge were not exceptional compared to other arched bridges. I studied the<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
7 Follow<strong>in</strong>g the codes is usually a way to show that the <strong>design</strong> complies with the law. It is<br />
however not this straight<strong>for</strong>ward, if a <strong>design</strong> complies with the codes it does not necessarily<br />
mean that no norm has been transgressed, because the use of codes is not required by law. An<br />
object should meet the requirements of the Dutch build<strong>in</strong>g decree. Usually follow<strong>in</strong>g the codes<br />
will lead to compliance but an obviously unsafe object transgresses the law even if it is<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed us<strong>in</strong>g the codes.<br />
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prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase <strong>for</strong> a bridge that would <strong>for</strong>m part of a larger system of<br />
roads to l<strong>in</strong>k IJburg to the rest of Amsterdam. The task was high to middle level<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy. It was not really a conceptual <strong>design</strong> because the<br />
architectural image of the bridge <strong>and</strong> the requirements <strong>for</strong> the bridge had been<br />
previously decided. At the stage I observed it was not a detailed <strong>design</strong>, details<br />
would be added <strong>in</strong> the def<strong>in</strong>itive <strong>design</strong> phase, <strong>in</strong> the tender<strong>in</strong>g specifications<br />
phase <strong>and</strong> probably also by the contractor after tender<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
6.5.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong><br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong>dicated that susta<strong>in</strong>ability played a part <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process<br />
but that most choices related to susta<strong>in</strong>ability would be made <strong>in</strong> later stages of<br />
the <strong>design</strong> process when the materials <strong>for</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g the bridge would be chosen.<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eers expected to use a document from the Rijkswaterstaat on materials<br />
<strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able build<strong>in</strong>g as a guidel<strong>in</strong>e. There were some discussions <strong>in</strong> the<br />
observed prelim<strong>in</strong>ary phase of the <strong>design</strong> process regard<strong>in</strong>g the conservation of<br />
the steel arches of the bridge that can be seen as a discussion about<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Some pa<strong>in</strong>ts conta<strong>in</strong> more volatile substances that can be harmful<br />
to humans <strong>and</strong> nature, these will not be allowed to be used by 2007 when the<br />
bridge will be pa<strong>in</strong>ted.<br />
The ethical <strong>issues</strong> that played a part <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary phase of the <strong>design</strong><br />
process were related to safety. A choice needed to be made as to which codes to<br />
use. It is not legally required that eng<strong>in</strong>eers work with the European code, but<br />
the fatigue loads <strong>in</strong> the European code are much more realistic. Is it justifiable to<br />
still work with the NEN codes while it is commonly known that these codes<br />
underestimate parts of the loads? This question was not raised by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers.<br />
They did advise their customer to use the European code <strong>in</strong> the def<strong>in</strong>itive <strong>design</strong><br />
phase provided that a green version was available at that time. The IBA<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers advised this because they expected that apply<strong>in</strong>g these codes would<br />
not make the bridge more expensive. I have described the reasons that the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers gave <strong>in</strong> their prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> report <strong>in</strong> section 6.3.2. Dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
technical meet<strong>in</strong>gs an additional reason aga<strong>in</strong>st us<strong>in</strong>g the European code was<br />
given. Some eng<strong>in</strong>eers were aga<strong>in</strong>st its use because they said that the European<br />
code was very different <strong>and</strong> that it would cost a lot of extra time <strong>for</strong> calculat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the dimensions of the bridge. Although this argument aga<strong>in</strong>st us<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
European code was mentioned <strong>in</strong> technical meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terviews it was not<br />
mentioned <strong>in</strong> the report. Another argument that the eng<strong>in</strong>eers could have given<br />
<strong>in</strong> the report was that us<strong>in</strong>g a new code might <strong>in</strong>crease the uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>design</strong>. Until a green version is available, a new code can only be used if<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies provide evidence that the legal requirements concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
safety are met. Provid<strong>in</strong>g this evidence costs time <strong>and</strong> money, there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
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Design of a bridge<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies prefer to work accord<strong>in</strong>g to codes that are assumed to be<br />
<strong>in</strong> accordance with the current legislation. At the present eng<strong>in</strong>eers have limited<br />
experience with the new European code compared to their experience with the<br />
older NEN 6723 <strong>and</strong> 6788 codes.<br />
There was another choice related to types of codes used. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong><br />
process <strong>for</strong> some of the concrete parts of the bridge a choice had to be made<br />
between us<strong>in</strong>g different types of codes. If geotechnical codes are chosen over<br />
construction codes or vice versa the chosen code has consequences <strong>for</strong> the<br />
required material thicknesses of such concrete parts. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers,<br />
hav<strong>in</strong>g to make a choice between two types of codes is the exception, most of the<br />
time it is obvious which type of code should be used. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers work<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
the problematic concrete parts made their choice based on their <strong>design</strong><br />
experience.<br />
There were ethically relevant <strong>issues</strong> concern<strong>in</strong>g work<strong>in</strong>g conditions. The<br />
legislation concern<strong>in</strong>g work<strong>in</strong>g conditions seemed to be purely procedural. The<br />
requirement to make a health <strong>and</strong> safety plan only requires that a plan is made,<br />
what it should <strong>in</strong>clude is not m<strong>and</strong>ated. It was there<strong>for</strong>e possible to act <strong>in</strong><br />
accordance with the responsibility assigned to the IBA <strong>and</strong> make a health <strong>and</strong><br />
safety plan <strong>in</strong> which every possible risk was <strong>in</strong>dicated but no risk was reduced. It<br />
was difficult to reduce risk <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase. Most of the<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation needed to make a good risk assessment <strong>and</strong> to propose measures to<br />
reduce the risk was not available. Later on <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process, more<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation would be available <strong>for</strong> example on the high voltage transmission<br />
l<strong>in</strong>es, however, extra <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation did not mean that the IBA would have to<br />
change the <strong>design</strong> to reduce risks. The IBA could always <strong>in</strong>dicate that it was the<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g contractor’s responsibility to reduce the risks. A health <strong>and</strong> safety plan<br />
could just be a list of risks that the contractor must <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong> his health <strong>and</strong><br />
safety plan while not reduc<strong>in</strong>g any of the identified risks or tak<strong>in</strong>g any<br />
precautionary measures. This shifts the responsibility to the contractors <strong>and</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals work<strong>in</strong>g at the build<strong>in</strong>g site. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the work<strong>in</strong>g conditions<br />
decree this is where most of the responsibility <strong>and</strong> liability lies. If an accident<br />
happens at a build<strong>in</strong>g site a contractor can be held liable. However, decisions<br />
could be made <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase that deeply <strong>in</strong>fluence the<br />
possibilities <strong>for</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g safely <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. Even though primarily the<br />
responsibility lies with the contractor <strong>and</strong> the employees work<strong>in</strong>g on the<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g site, the <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eers could take on some responsibility <strong>for</strong><br />
work<strong>in</strong>g conditions dur<strong>in</strong>g construction. Yet, because the requirements set out<br />
<strong>in</strong> law are purely procedural, no safeguard is provided to make <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers take on this responsibility. Whether or not <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
should take on such responsibility <strong>for</strong> health <strong>and</strong> safety is an ethical question.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
What misuse should be accounted <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> was not made clear <strong>in</strong> the<br />
prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase. 8 It is quite possible <strong>for</strong> aesthetics <strong>and</strong> safety concerns<br />
to clash on this po<strong>in</strong>t: because the arches were not very steep, people would be<br />
able to walk on them once the bridge is built. If this is to be prevented, a gate<br />
should be built or some other measure taken to keep people from climb<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
the arch. Such a gate may disturb the architectural image of the bridge. The IBA<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not <strong>in</strong>clude any preventive measures regard<strong>in</strong>g arch climb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong>. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did <strong>in</strong>dicate that they were responsible <strong>for</strong><br />
a <strong>design</strong> with rails so that people could not be blown from the bridge <strong>in</strong> high<br />
w<strong>in</strong>ds. The build<strong>in</strong>g decree gives some rules <strong>for</strong> this. There are, however, no<br />
rules or guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong> prevent<strong>in</strong>g people from climb<strong>in</strong>g on potentially<br />
dangerous structures, from throw<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs onto ships or from div<strong>in</strong>g from the<br />
bridge <strong>in</strong>to the water.<br />
The IJburg bridge would <strong>for</strong>m part of a public space. This is probably one of the<br />
reasons why there was no real tension between costs <strong>and</strong> safety. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated that the customer <strong>and</strong> every other stakeholder were sensitive to safety<br />
concerns regard<strong>in</strong>g the bridge. If the eng<strong>in</strong>eers gave clear argumentation as to<br />
why a certa<strong>in</strong> idea or option was not safe enough, then the idea or option was not<br />
used. Every stakeholder wanted the bridge to be safe. The aim was that the<br />
bridge should be safe, yet built as cheaply as possible with<strong>in</strong> the architectural<br />
<strong>design</strong>.<br />
6.5.2 Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
The <strong>design</strong> process was organised accord<strong>in</strong>g to different discipl<strong>in</strong>es. With<strong>in</strong> the<br />
IBA there are eng<strong>in</strong>eers that are specialised <strong>in</strong> concrete, <strong>in</strong> steel <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the<br />
preparation of a build<strong>in</strong>g site <strong>and</strong> construction. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process, two<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers worked on the steel arches, two eng<strong>in</strong>eers worked on the concrete<br />
parts of the bridge <strong>and</strong> three eng<strong>in</strong>eers worked on the build<strong>in</strong>g site <strong>and</strong><br />
construction preparation, there was also a project leader. One of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g on the steel arches was also the <strong>design</strong> leader <strong>and</strong> one of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g on build<strong>in</strong>g site <strong>and</strong> construction preparation was also responsible <strong>for</strong><br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g the health <strong>and</strong> safety plan. A lot of ef<strong>for</strong>t was needed to get the<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation to everyone that needed the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>in</strong> this <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
Some of the decisions made by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g the concrete parts would<br />
possibly have a large <strong>in</strong>fluence on the <strong>design</strong> of steel arches or on the build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
8 Note that movable bridges are subjected to the European Mach<strong>in</strong>ery Directive [98/37/EC]. A<br />
Dutch code <strong>for</strong> movable bridges, NEN 6787, <strong>in</strong>cludes some rules on possible misuse of movable<br />
bridges <strong>and</strong> access to movable parts [NEN 6787, 2004].<br />
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Design of a bridge<br />
site or vice versa. So although the eng<strong>in</strong>eers worked <strong>in</strong> one field they needed to<br />
be <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med about what the other eng<strong>in</strong>eers had decided <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong>ed.<br />
Because of the division of labour different eng<strong>in</strong>eers dealt with different<br />
ethical <strong>issues</strong>. For example, the eng<strong>in</strong>eers work<strong>in</strong>g on the concrete parts had to<br />
deal with <strong>issues</strong> like which type of codes to choose <strong>for</strong> some of the concrete<br />
parts. Although every eng<strong>in</strong>eer was expected to take work<strong>in</strong>g conditions <strong>in</strong>to<br />
account <strong>and</strong> make a list of risks, the primary responsibility <strong>for</strong> health <strong>and</strong> safety<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g construction was placed on the eng<strong>in</strong>eer mak<strong>in</strong>g the health <strong>and</strong> safety<br />
plan. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers work<strong>in</strong>g on the steel arches will be confronted with <strong>issues</strong> of<br />
misuse <strong>and</strong> have to decide on what misuse to prevent <strong>in</strong> later phases of the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process. <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> were primarily dealt with by one or two eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g on a subject. If ethical <strong>issues</strong> were problematic or any choices the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers made were expected to <strong>in</strong>fluence other parts of the bridge then choices<br />
were discussed with the other <strong>design</strong> team members.<br />
The choice between us<strong>in</strong>g European codes <strong>and</strong> NEN codes had to be taken by<br />
the customer supported by argumentation provided by the <strong>design</strong> team. The<br />
Rijkswaterstaat Civil Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g Division was asked to check the construction<br />
<strong>design</strong> of the bridge. The IBA was not required to have the Rijkswaterstaat check<br />
the construction <strong>design</strong>, however, the eng<strong>in</strong>eers wanted this because the<br />
Rijkswaterstaat has a lot of experience with <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g large bridges.<br />
When decid<strong>in</strong>g about ethical (<strong>and</strong> other) <strong>issues</strong> reference was made to<br />
elements of what I have called regulative frameworks. The regulative<br />
frameworks provided operationalisations, calculation rules, m<strong>in</strong>imal<br />
requirements etc that were used by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
6.5.3 Regulative frameworks<br />
Detailed <strong>and</strong> extensive regulative frameworks were used <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process,<br />
these consisted of legislation, codes <strong>and</strong> ideas as to how these codes should be<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpreted. The relevant legislation is, at some po<strong>in</strong>ts, very detailed, while at<br />
other po<strong>in</strong>ts it refers to codes. The legislation def<strong>in</strong>es a m<strong>in</strong>imum required level<br />
of safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability. When build<strong>in</strong>g large <strong>in</strong>frastructural objects there are<br />
at least three regulative frameworks that can be dist<strong>in</strong>guished. One is the<br />
regulative framework perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to safety of workers on build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance sites. Another regulative framework is the one perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
safety of the bridge as a construction. 9 The third regulative framework is the one<br />
perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to road <strong>design</strong>. It might even be possible to dist<strong>in</strong>guish another<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
9 There are of course overlaps between the two frameworks especially with regards to safety<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>in</strong>tenance. The build<strong>in</strong>g decree also sets out requirements <strong>for</strong> accessibility <strong>for</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance.<br />
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regulative framework, one that deals with the level of h<strong>in</strong>drance that a bridge is<br />
allowed to cause ships <strong>in</strong> a canal, river or harbour.<br />
I will start with a discussion of some aspects of the regulative framework<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g safety dur<strong>in</strong>g construction. Dutch legislation on work<strong>in</strong>g conditions<br />
is an implementation of European directives 89/391/EC (health <strong>and</strong> safety at<br />
work <strong>in</strong> general) <strong>and</strong> 92/57/EC (health <strong>and</strong> safety on construction sites). The law<br />
on work<strong>in</strong>g conditions is very general <strong>and</strong> only states goals, <strong>for</strong> example that an<br />
employee should not be put at risk. However, the law is supplemented with<br />
several policy rules, rules on f<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong> breaches of safety regulation, rules <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>spection of work<strong>in</strong>g conditions etc. All these rules are much more detailed <strong>and</strong><br />
are supplemented by ideas on how to <strong>in</strong>terpret the rules, law etc [Wilders, 2004].<br />
The complete Dutch work<strong>in</strong>g conditions regulation system constitutes a<br />
regulative framework.<br />
The IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers only used part of this regulative framework, they only<br />
made the required health <strong>and</strong> safety plan. The rest of the regulative framework,<br />
such as the more detailed rules, was not considered by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers. The IBA<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers only carried out the requirement to make a health <strong>and</strong> safety plan<br />
because they considered the rest outside the scope of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>. The<br />
law also assigns only this specific responsibility to the <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eers. The<br />
complete regulative framework is relevant <strong>for</strong> contractors not <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers accord<strong>in</strong>g to the IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers.<br />
I will not go <strong>in</strong>to the question of whether or not the regulative framework<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g work<strong>in</strong>g conditions is a normative framework. I conclude that the<br />
regulative framework was not used by eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> this case. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers have a<br />
task assigned to them by the regulative framework but because the task is<br />
limited <strong>and</strong> procedural they can per<strong>for</strong>m this task without us<strong>in</strong>g the rest of the<br />
framework. If a health <strong>and</strong> safety plan made by <strong>design</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers does not<br />
contribute to better work<strong>in</strong>g conditions on a build<strong>in</strong>g site then it might be a good<br />
idea to assign more substantial responsibilities to the <strong>design</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g work<strong>in</strong>g conditions. This would <strong>for</strong>ce the eng<strong>in</strong>eers to use the<br />
regulative framework concern<strong>in</strong>g work<strong>in</strong>g conditions.<br />
There is also a regulative framework <strong>for</strong> road <strong>design</strong>. This regulative<br />
framework requires, amongst other th<strong>in</strong>gs, m<strong>in</strong>imum widths of roads. The<br />
requirements from the road <strong>design</strong> framework are decisive <strong>for</strong> the width of a<br />
bridge. So although the eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not work with<strong>in</strong> the road <strong>design</strong> regulative<br />
framework their work was <strong>in</strong>fluenced by some of its rules. With regard to the<br />
possible regulative framework concern<strong>in</strong>g h<strong>in</strong>drance of ships on canals, rivers<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> harbours, the same holds. The IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers only knew some of the<br />
rules <strong>and</strong> just sent their <strong>design</strong> to the Rijkswaterstaat to be controlled. The IBA<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers there<strong>for</strong>e did not use all of the rules or legislation concern<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
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h<strong>in</strong>drance of ships to make decisions <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. So even if there is a<br />
regulative framework that covers the h<strong>in</strong>drance of ships on a waterway, this was<br />
not a regulative framework used by the <strong>design</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers at the IBA, <strong>in</strong>stead it<br />
was used by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers at the Rijkswaterstaat. There<strong>for</strong>e I will not consider<br />
this framework <strong>in</strong> what follows.<br />
Safety <strong>in</strong> use; a normative framework?<br />
I will use Gurnwald’s requirements <strong>for</strong> normative frameworks to establish to<br />
what extent the regulative framework concern<strong>in</strong>g safety <strong>in</strong> use can be considered<br />
a normative framework. First I will describe the elements of the regulative<br />
framework <strong>and</strong> some relations between the elements <strong>in</strong> the framework. Then I<br />
will return to Grunwald’s requirements <strong>and</strong> evaluate whether the regulative<br />
framework meets them.<br />
The ma<strong>in</strong> part of this regulative framework consists of the Dutch build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
decree. It is common that this k<strong>in</strong>d of Dutch legislation is an implementation of<br />
European law. In this <strong>in</strong>stance there is <strong>in</strong>deed a European directive (89/106/EC)<br />
but this directive deals with construction products <strong>and</strong> not with actual<br />
constructions. The European directive requires that construction products are<br />
CE marked <strong>and</strong> should lead to build<strong>in</strong>gs that are safe, that cause no hazard to<br />
health, that can be evacuated <strong>in</strong> case of a fire <strong>and</strong> that are energy efficient<br />
[89/106/EC]. Very general requirements <strong>for</strong> constructions can be found <strong>in</strong><br />
annex 1 of the European directive <strong>for</strong> construction products, as I will illustrate<br />
us<strong>in</strong>g the requirement <strong>for</strong> mechanical resistance <strong>and</strong> stability.<br />
‘The construction works must be <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> built <strong>in</strong> such a way that<br />
the load<strong>in</strong>gs that are liable to act on it dur<strong>in</strong>g its constructions <strong>and</strong> use<br />
will not lead to any of the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
(a) collapse of the whole or part of the work,<br />
(b) major de<strong>for</strong>mations to an <strong>in</strong>tolerable degree,<br />
(c) damage to other parts of the works or to fitt<strong>in</strong>gs or <strong>in</strong>stalled<br />
equipment as a result of major de<strong>for</strong>mation of the load-bear<strong>in</strong>g<br />
construction,<br />
(d) damage by an event to an extent disproportionate to the orig<strong>in</strong>al<br />
cause.’ [89/106/EC]<br />
The directive that gives detailed requirements <strong>for</strong> construction products should<br />
lead to constructions that fulfil these general requirements.<br />
The Dutch build<strong>in</strong>g decree mentions the European directive on construction<br />
products, but its focus is on constructions as a whole. Some parts of the build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
decree requirements are very detailed; others refer to codes <strong>for</strong> details. The codes<br />
referred to are Dutch NEN codes or already European harmonized EN-NEN<br />
codes. Most national codes should <strong>in</strong> the end be harmonized with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
European Union to ensure a free European market.<br />
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In short, there is a regulative framework consist<strong>in</strong>g of European <strong>and</strong> Dutch<br />
legislation, codes, certification, ideas of <strong>in</strong>terpretations, teach<strong>in</strong>g materials <strong>and</strong><br />
courses. Does this regulative framework meet Grunwald’s requirements <strong>for</strong><br />
normative frameworks? The requirements were outl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> section 2.3.2. A<br />
normative framework should be pragmatically complete, locally consisted,<br />
unambiguous, accepted <strong>and</strong> observed [Grunwald, 2000] <strong>and</strong> [Grunwald, 2001].<br />
Pragmatically complete: The framework is reasonably complete. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the eng<strong>in</strong>eers, most of the decisions that have to be made are encompassed by<br />
the framework. There is one subject that is not dealt with explicitly <strong>in</strong> the<br />
framework: misuse.<br />
Locally consistent: Most elements of the framework are l<strong>in</strong>ked <strong>and</strong> there is little<br />
contradiction because the build<strong>in</strong>g decree is the decisive document. The<br />
construction should, <strong>in</strong> the end, comply to the Dutch build<strong>in</strong>g decree. Possible<br />
contradictions arise if parts of the construction can be <strong>design</strong>ed us<strong>in</strong>g one of two<br />
types of codes <strong>for</strong> example a geotechnical or a construction code but this is the<br />
exception. Different codes pose different requirements, so the same part will<br />
look different when <strong>design</strong>ed accord<strong>in</strong>g to different codes. This problem arises<br />
only <strong>for</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> parts of certa<strong>in</strong> constructions <strong>in</strong> which the type of code that<br />
should be used is not fixed <strong>and</strong> can be debated. So, strictly speak<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
framework is not locally consistent, because it allows, <strong>in</strong> some cases, the use of<br />
different types of codes.<br />
Unambiguous: At this moment the framework is unambiguous, but the new<br />
European code will cause temporarily problems. In the near future the European<br />
code <strong>for</strong> loads on bridges will become available <strong>in</strong> a green version. At that<br />
moment both the old NEN codes <strong>and</strong> the new European code can be used. Until<br />
the European code is available <strong>in</strong> a def<strong>in</strong>ite version this situation will cont<strong>in</strong>ue.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers can, dur<strong>in</strong>g this time period, choose between the codes. Some<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers may choose immediately to use the new European code because the<br />
fatigue load predictions are better, other eng<strong>in</strong>eers may choose to cont<strong>in</strong>ue us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the old NEN codes because they have experience with these old codes.<br />
Accepted: The framework is accepted by the IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
them the framework is widely accepted <strong>in</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g profession. There is<br />
little evidence that the public or policy makers or eng<strong>in</strong>eers do not accept the<br />
framework. With regard to the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> a bridge there are no signs that<br />
the framework is contested. The public seems to accept the bridges that are built.<br />
There have not been any recent disasters with bridges <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, so<br />
there is little reason <strong>for</strong> the public to doubt the framework. The Van<br />
Brienenoordbrug case is an example of problems caused by us<strong>in</strong>g the NEN<br />
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Design of a bridge<br />
codes but the fatigue cracks were found <strong>and</strong> repaired be<strong>for</strong>e an accident<br />
happened (see section 6.3.2).<br />
Observed: The framework is observed this observation is partly due to the fact<br />
that <strong>design</strong>s are checked be<strong>for</strong>e build<strong>in</strong>g permits are issued. The fact that<br />
observation of the build<strong>in</strong>g decree is legally required does not seem to be the<br />
only reason <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers to observe the framework. The IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers wanted<br />
to <strong>design</strong> a safe bridge, they feel responsible <strong>for</strong> this <strong>and</strong> were conv<strong>in</strong>ced that<br />
observ<strong>in</strong>g the framework is a good way to <strong>design</strong> a safe bridge.<br />
The regulative framework meets most of the requirements, at least partly, but<br />
not completely. So this regulative framework approaches a normative<br />
framework, but, sensus strictus, it is not a normative framework. This framework<br />
is contrary to the regulative framework perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to cars <strong>and</strong> the regulative<br />
framework perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>design</strong>, at least with regard to<br />
bridge <strong>design</strong> widely accepted. There will be some problems because the<br />
framework will be ambiguous once a green version of the European code is<br />
available, but this will only be temporary. The framework will not be<br />
pragmatically complete until some guidel<strong>in</strong>es on misuse of structures are<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded.<br />
6.6 Acknowledgements<br />
I would like to thank the architect Wim Quist <strong>and</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eers at IBA <strong>for</strong> their<br />
co-operation dur<strong>in</strong>g the case-study.<br />
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7 Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer: I can’t really th<strong>in</strong>k of any ethical <strong>issues</strong> related to trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers, they are<br />
not murder weapons. I know cyclists get killed by trucks but….yeah well that has<br />
noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with ethics.<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eer above relates ethics to murder<strong>in</strong>g people. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to him ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> are <strong>in</strong>volved when <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g products that (are <strong>in</strong>tended to) kill people. He<br />
acknowledges that some people die <strong>in</strong> traffic because of accidents <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
trucks but, as he <strong>in</strong>dicates, a truck is not a murder weapon <strong>and</strong> thus there are no<br />
ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> truck <strong>and</strong> trailer <strong>design</strong>. In the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s each year<br />
more people are killed <strong>in</strong> accidents <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g a truck than are murdered by<br />
someone us<strong>in</strong>g a firearm (numbers from Dutch Statistical Database (CBS)<br />
[statl<strong>in</strong>e, 2003] <strong>and</strong> SWOV (Dutch Society <strong>for</strong> Scientific Research on Traffic<br />
safety) [www.swov.nl] <strong>and</strong> [Van Kampen, 2003]). The difference is that truck<br />
drivers usually do not <strong>in</strong>tend to kill other road users but the construction <strong>and</strong><br />
mass of a truck give other road users little chance of surviv<strong>in</strong>g an accident<br />
<strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g a collision with a truck. So even if ethics is limited to <strong>design</strong>s, that due<br />
to <strong>design</strong> features, can kill someone then the <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g of trucks <strong>in</strong>cludes ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong>.<br />
The <strong>design</strong> process that is the focus of this chapter is a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong><br />
process <strong>for</strong> a trailer. The <strong>design</strong> problem will be <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the first section.<br />
The way <strong>in</strong> which decisions are made is described <strong>in</strong> the second section. In this<br />
case the <strong>design</strong> process was per<strong>for</strong>med <strong>for</strong> a customer. The focus of the third<br />
section is on the safety of the trailer. This section is quite elaborate because a lot<br />
of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation is necessary to underst<strong>and</strong> how the eng<strong>in</strong>eers def<strong>in</strong>e safety <strong>and</strong><br />
why they def<strong>in</strong>e it <strong>in</strong> such a way. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers do not feel responsible <strong>for</strong> traffic<br />
safety. In this case a clear ascription of responsibilities by eng<strong>in</strong>eers can be seen,<br />
as will be shown <strong>in</strong> section 7.4. The government, the driver or the customer<br />
should be responsible <strong>for</strong> traffic safety accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers. A summary of<br />
the results is given <strong>in</strong> section 7.5. In contrast to the other chapters, this chapter<br />
will not <strong>in</strong>clude a separate section on susta<strong>in</strong>ability. In my op<strong>in</strong>ion such a section<br />
would not add anyth<strong>in</strong>g new to what has been said <strong>in</strong> other cases. Susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
is aga<strong>in</strong> not deemed important (see chapter 5 <strong>and</strong> 6). So although they <strong>design</strong>ed a<br />
lightweight truck the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> customer thought this had little to do with<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability. The problems concern<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>and</strong> lightweight<br />
technologies, such as the difficulties encountered when recycl<strong>in</strong>g lightweight<br />
materials are discussed more thoroughly <strong>in</strong> chapter 4.<br />
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7.1 A lightweight truck trailer<br />
A customer own<strong>in</strong>g a small company, called Ruflo, that focuses on <strong>in</strong>novations<br />
with<strong>in</strong> trailer <strong>design</strong> asked an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> team from another company to<br />
make a feasibility study <strong>and</strong> a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> a lightweight trailer <strong>for</strong> bulk<br />
transports of s<strong>and</strong>. The customer used to own a larger successful company that<br />
produces trailers. He sold that company <strong>and</strong> started the small company focus<strong>in</strong>g<br />
on <strong>in</strong>novation <strong>and</strong> development. The customer had a lot of practical experience<br />
with produc<strong>in</strong>g alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailers but he had little knowledge of composites <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> methods or calculat<strong>in</strong>g methods like f<strong>in</strong>ite element modell<strong>in</strong>g. The<br />
customer had always used trial <strong>and</strong> error <strong>in</strong> the past to <strong>design</strong> trailers.<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> team given the assignment was part of the <strong>Centre</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Lightweight Structures (CLC) TUD-TNO. The CLC is a co-operative between<br />
TNO <strong>and</strong> Delft University of Technology. The TNO (Nederl<strong>and</strong>se Organisatie<br />
voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s<br />
Organisation <strong>for</strong> Applied Scientific Research) is a research agency that supports<br />
companies, government bodies <strong>and</strong> public organizations. The TNO helps<br />
companies to <strong>in</strong>novate by translat<strong>in</strong>g scientific knowledge <strong>in</strong>to practice<br />
[www.tno.nl]. The TNO is an <strong>in</strong>termediary between universities <strong>and</strong> companies<br />
or government bodies <strong>and</strong> public organizations. It is a commercial company but<br />
at least some of the projects are f<strong>in</strong>anced by the Dutch government through<br />
subsidies <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>novation. CLC is part of TNO’s Industrial Technology division.<br />
CLC is housed <strong>in</strong> the same build<strong>in</strong>g as the department of Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
at Delft University of Technology, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s. About half of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> CLC have a masters’ degree <strong>in</strong> Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. With<strong>in</strong> CLC<br />
there is considerable experience with the <strong>design</strong> of lightweight cool<strong>in</strong>g trailers.<br />
As said be<strong>for</strong>e, the customer asked <strong>for</strong> a feasibility study <strong>and</strong> a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
<strong>design</strong>. He gave this assignment to two eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g companies. The customer<br />
would decide, when both studies <strong>and</strong> prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong>s were ready, whether to<br />
go on with one of the proposals. The most important objective was to <strong>design</strong> a<br />
trailer that had significantly less mass without be<strong>in</strong>g a lot more expensive than a<br />
conventional trailer. Regulations specify maximum masses <strong>for</strong> loaded trailers.<br />
Lightweight trailers can there<strong>for</strong>e transport more load. Every tonne of mass<br />
saved <strong>in</strong> the structure of the trailer can be used to transported extra freight. The<br />
customer thought that a not too expensive, lightweight trailer, was possible if<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed us<strong>in</strong>g glass fibre re<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>ced plastic i.e. composites.<br />
The prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> was ready when estimates about the mass <strong>and</strong> the<br />
costs of produc<strong>in</strong>g the trailer <strong>in</strong> different materials were made. The <strong>design</strong><br />
process was stopped at this stage. One of the objectives of the process was to<br />
establish whether a lightweight trailer made of composite material could be<br />
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Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
produced. The term “produced” had different mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>for</strong> the customer <strong>and</strong><br />
the eng<strong>in</strong>eers. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers specified a way <strong>in</strong> which the trailer could be<br />
produced <strong>and</strong> calculated the material costs to estimate the costs. The customer<br />
expected that CLC would contact companies about produc<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>for</strong> example, the<br />
side panels <strong>and</strong> the floor. For him a trailer is producible once he knows that<br />
companies will produce the parts he needs <strong>for</strong> a reasonable price. These<br />
differences regard<strong>in</strong>g the mean<strong>in</strong>g of “producible” may have contributed to the<br />
customer’s decision to stop the <strong>design</strong> process after the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong><br />
phase.<br />
Transport <strong>in</strong> Europe is a highly competitive bus<strong>in</strong>ess; profit marg<strong>in</strong>s are<br />
small. Every tonne of freight that can be transported extra <strong>in</strong>creases a company’s<br />
profit marg<strong>in</strong>s. The motivation to have a lightweight trailer is mostly economic.<br />
Lighter trailers use less fuel if driven empty <strong>and</strong> can transport more load be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
exceed<strong>in</strong>g load<strong>in</strong>g regulations. The total mass bear<strong>in</strong>g on the axles of a truck <strong>and</strong><br />
trailer is limited to 9 tonnes <strong>and</strong> the total mass of a truck, trailer <strong>and</strong> load<br />
comb<strong>in</strong>ation is also regulated by national laws. The mass of the total comb<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
is not allowed to exceed 44 tonnes <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, <strong>in</strong> Germany it is 40<br />
tonnes. 1 In a few years these national laws will be substituted by a European law.<br />
The maximum mass permitted <strong>for</strong> truck, trailer <strong>and</strong> load will be around 40<br />
tonnes. A mass reduction of 1000 kg <strong>for</strong> the physical trailer means that an<br />
additional 1000 kg of freight can be transported. The motivation <strong>for</strong> lightweight<br />
<strong>design</strong> is there<strong>for</strong>e not to obta<strong>in</strong> a more susta<strong>in</strong>able trailer but to transport more<br />
load.<br />
The lightweight trailer had to be <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> use beh<strong>in</strong>d conventional<br />
European trucks. The truck-trailer configuration would stay more or less the<br />
same. The trailer had to comply with exist<strong>in</strong>g regulations <strong>for</strong> traffic, <strong>and</strong> it was<br />
expected to <strong>in</strong>clude a new unload<strong>in</strong>g system lead<strong>in</strong>g to some changes <strong>in</strong> the<br />
normal configuration of the trailer. The materials that the eng<strong>in</strong>eers proposed<br />
have not yet been widely used <strong>in</strong> trailer production. The CLC has <strong>design</strong>ed a<br />
cool<strong>in</strong>g trailer us<strong>in</strong>g composites. However, a cool<strong>in</strong>g trailer has a roof, whereas<br />
trailers <strong>for</strong> bulk load such as s<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> agricultural products do not have a roof.<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g a roof closes the perimeter <strong>and</strong> provides <strong>for</strong> a torsionally stiff box, so<br />
hav<strong>in</strong>g no roof is very important <strong>for</strong> stiffness calculations. The normal<br />
configuration of a bulk transport trailer was changed to <strong>in</strong>clude a new unload<strong>in</strong>g<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1 The maximum total loads of truck <strong>and</strong> trailer comb<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>and</strong> axles load<strong>in</strong>g are based on<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation obta<strong>in</strong>ed from the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> the customer. In a version of the Dutch “voertuigreglement”,<br />
I found a maximum of 10 tonnes on axles [voertuigreglement, 2005]. This<br />
difference is probably due to harmonization <strong>in</strong> the European Union. The maximum load on axles<br />
<strong>and</strong> the maximum total load of truck trailer comb<strong>in</strong>ations will eventually become the same<br />
throughout Europe. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> customer possibly anticipate the lower, harmonized,<br />
masses that will eventually be en<strong>for</strong>ced.<br />
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system <strong>and</strong> “new” materials were used to built it. There<strong>for</strong>e I considered this<br />
<strong>design</strong> process to be radical. The <strong>design</strong> hierarchy is somewhere middle level. As<br />
said be<strong>for</strong>e, the trailer should be part of a conventional truck <strong>and</strong> trailer couple.<br />
The prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> of the trailer was there<strong>for</strong>e a middle level <strong>design</strong>, it is a<br />
product <strong>in</strong> its own right but it has to be used with another exist<strong>in</strong>g product, the<br />
truck.<br />
The <strong>design</strong> methods used by CLC are not widely used <strong>in</strong> trailer <strong>design</strong>. There<br />
are trailer produc<strong>in</strong>g companies that use these techniques but most small trailer<br />
producers build trailers us<strong>in</strong>g experience. If an alum<strong>in</strong>ium panel of 5 mm<br />
suffices then perhaps next time a trailer producer will try a 4.5 mm thick panel.<br />
7.2 “The customer is always right”<br />
The customer has an important role <strong>in</strong> the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g process. The<br />
customer’s role will be outl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this section. This will be followed by a<br />
description of the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g process that took place between the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
when the customer was absent.<br />
The customer had decided that he wanted a lightweight, preferably composite<br />
trailer <strong>for</strong> his new unload<strong>in</strong>g floor system. The customer had developed a new<br />
load<strong>in</strong>g/unload<strong>in</strong>g system. This system makes it possible to load pallets or bulk<br />
material <strong>in</strong> the same trailer. Flexibility <strong>in</strong> what load to transport reduces the<br />
number of kilometres driven with an empty trailer. To get an idea of the<br />
load<strong>in</strong>g/unload<strong>in</strong>g system that had to be <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the trailer see figures<br />
7.1a <strong>and</strong> 7.1b). 2 It can be argued that it is more economical <strong>and</strong> perhaps even<br />
more susta<strong>in</strong>able, if trailers are always driven with a load on board <strong>in</strong>stead of<br />
driv<strong>in</strong>g from A to B with a load <strong>and</strong> back to A empty.<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
2 Both figures are only meant to show the load<strong>in</strong>g system, the trailer itself was not <strong>design</strong>ed<br />
when these draw<strong>in</strong>gs were made. The eventual trailer might look quite different from these<br />
draw<strong>in</strong>gs but the load<strong>in</strong>g/unload<strong>in</strong>g system showed here will be part of the trailer. The pictures<br />
are taken from a promotional booklet <strong>and</strong> are repr<strong>in</strong>ted here with the customer’s consent.<br />
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Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
Figure 7.1 a <strong>and</strong> b: Load<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> unload<strong>in</strong>g a bulk load. Goods on pallets are<br />
loaded from the door at the back. The floor slides to the front with the pallets on<br />
it [pictures courtesy of Ruflo].<br />
The requirements <strong>for</strong> the trailer were established <strong>in</strong> the first meet<strong>in</strong>g. This was<br />
done <strong>in</strong> co-operation between customer <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company, where the<br />
customer decided what to <strong>in</strong>corporate <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> requirements. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduced ideas <strong>and</strong> arguments about what requirements to <strong>in</strong>clude. The<br />
customer decided to follow the eng<strong>in</strong>eers’ ideas if he was conv<strong>in</strong>ced they were<br />
workable. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers the customer had to decide what the<br />
requirements would be because the customer would pay <strong>for</strong> the project. However,<br />
this view is a bit simplistic: the customer came to the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>for</strong><br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
advice <strong>and</strong> he had to pay <strong>for</strong> that, hence, the customer expected <strong>in</strong>put from the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers.<br />
The requirements were listed <strong>in</strong> a table. Most of the requirements were<br />
specific <strong>and</strong> measurable, <strong>for</strong> example the maximum mass of the trailer was to be<br />
5000 kg, the <strong>in</strong>side volume of the trailer should be 2.47*2.75*13.67 m 3 , the trailer<br />
lifetime was specified etc. Some of the requirements related to the environment<br />
<strong>in</strong> which the trailer would be used. For example, pebbles or branches can scratch<br />
or dent a trailer <strong>and</strong> this should be prevented. One of the requirements<br />
concerned price <strong>and</strong> another requirement concerned susta<strong>in</strong>ability, the trailer<br />
was required to be aerodynamic if possible. This aerodynamic requirement was<br />
given no attention dur<strong>in</strong>g the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
The requirements also <strong>in</strong>cluded some regulations about the maximum<br />
heights of truck <strong>and</strong> trailer comb<strong>in</strong>ations, the <strong>in</strong>stallation of safety guardrails <strong>and</strong><br />
the structure of the rear bumper [voertuigreglement, 2005]. The maximum<br />
height of trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers is regulated to prevent damage to tunnels <strong>and</strong><br />
bridges. A truck <strong>and</strong> trailer comb<strong>in</strong>ation that is too high might get stuck <strong>in</strong> a<br />
tunnel or under a bridge caus<strong>in</strong>g damage to the tunnel or bridge. The safety<br />
guardrails on the side of a trailer between the wheels <strong>and</strong> k<strong>in</strong>gp<strong>in</strong> are <strong>in</strong>tended to<br />
prevent cyclists from go<strong>in</strong>g under the wheels of a trailer. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to current<br />
regulation, two small beams are deemed sufficient <strong>for</strong> safety purposes.<br />
The customer <strong>in</strong>dicated that transportation companies <strong>and</strong> trailer producers<br />
do not always live by the rules. Sometimes trailers are loaded too high, exceed<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the maximum allowable mass. There are weigh<strong>in</strong>g bridges to control the total<br />
mass of the truck, trailer <strong>and</strong> load comb<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> some roads systems are<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporated to weigh the mass of pass<strong>in</strong>g truck <strong>and</strong> trailer comb<strong>in</strong>ations.<br />
Drivers driv<strong>in</strong>g too heavy trucks can be f<strong>in</strong>ed. Trailer produc<strong>in</strong>g companies<br />
sometimes make trailers that are officially too high, <strong>for</strong> example the trailer is 4,15<br />
m while only 4 m is allowed [voertuigreglement, 2005]. This is due to the fact<br />
that conta<strong>in</strong>ers <strong>for</strong> aircraft use are 3 m high so the trailer’s <strong>in</strong>side height should<br />
be just over 3 m to transport these conta<strong>in</strong>ers. The k<strong>in</strong>gp<strong>in</strong>, the po<strong>in</strong>t where the<br />
trailer is comb<strong>in</strong>ed with the truck is at 1,15 m so the total height of a truck <strong>and</strong><br />
trailer comb<strong>in</strong>ation can be 4,15 m. Be<strong>for</strong>e trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers are allowed on the<br />
road they have to be certified by the Rijksdienstwegverkeer (governmental road<br />
traffic agency). The height is checked but there are tricks that can be used like<br />
lower<strong>in</strong>g tire pressure to make the trailer slightly lower. So it seems it is possible<br />
to get certification <strong>for</strong> a truck that will be too high when used on the road. In<br />
some countries, <strong>for</strong> example Switzerl<strong>and</strong>, regulation is very strict <strong>and</strong> controls are<br />
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Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
set <strong>in</strong> place so drivers will not use trailers that are too high because they face high<br />
f<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> it is very likely that they will get caught. 3<br />
After the requirements had been established the eng<strong>in</strong>eers started to generate<br />
concepts. Most of the work was done by two eng<strong>in</strong>eers. One eng<strong>in</strong>eer acted as the<br />
project leader, she had a master’s degree <strong>in</strong> Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> about 5<br />
years of experience with <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g lightweight structures. Another eng<strong>in</strong>eer did<br />
the f<strong>in</strong>ite element modell<strong>in</strong>g. He also had a master’s degree <strong>in</strong> Aerospace<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g followed by a two year <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g course <strong>and</strong> about 7 years of<br />
experience with <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g lightweight structures. His speciality was f<strong>in</strong>ite<br />
element modell<strong>in</strong>g. 4 CLC is a flat organization; an employee can be the project<br />
leader <strong>for</strong> one project while participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> other projects. There is one person<br />
who coord<strong>in</strong>ates the employees <strong>and</strong> another whose ma<strong>in</strong> task is the acquisition of<br />
projects, although every employee should try to obta<strong>in</strong> projects. The ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><br />
team <strong>for</strong> the trailer consisted only of the two eng<strong>in</strong>eers previously described but<br />
they consulted with other eng<strong>in</strong>eers when they needed their expertise. Two<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers were regularly <strong>in</strong>volved, one an expert on structural <strong>design</strong> with fibre<br />
re<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>ced plastics, work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the same room as the project f<strong>in</strong>ite element<br />
specialist, gave advice dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process; <strong>and</strong> one eng<strong>in</strong>eer who had a lot<br />
of experience with trailer <strong>design</strong> was regularly asked <strong>for</strong> his op<strong>in</strong>ion. The<br />
atmosphere at the department <strong>in</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company was open.<br />
Liz was as project leader responsible <strong>for</strong> the plann<strong>in</strong>g of the project <strong>and</strong> the<br />
communication with the customer. Hans was responsible <strong>for</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ite element<br />
models <strong>and</strong> calculations. In the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g Hans was rather passive <strong>and</strong> wanted to<br />
be directed. However, further on <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process this became less the case.<br />
Hans’ passivity at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the project was probably due to the fact that<br />
he had other projects <strong>for</strong> which he had to do a lot of work.<br />
The division of responsibilities <strong>and</strong> tasks was not static. What should be done<br />
<strong>and</strong> who should do it was discussed dur<strong>in</strong>g the process. When certa<strong>in</strong> data<br />
should be gathered or certa<strong>in</strong> calculations made there was always some active<br />
assign<strong>in</strong>g of tasks. This was done almost casually as the quotes, taken from<br />
several discussions, <strong>in</strong>dicate.<br />
Hans talk<strong>in</strong>g to Liz about prepar<strong>in</strong>g the customer <strong>for</strong> the limited<br />
applicability of the f<strong>in</strong>ite element model: ‘You have to prepare the<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
3 Switzerl<strong>and</strong> has a lot of long tunnels which add additional danger if a truck trailer comb<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
gets stuck <strong>in</strong> one, <strong>and</strong> of course it will cause serious delays while the truck <strong>and</strong> trailer<br />
comb<strong>in</strong>ation is extracted from the tunnel.<br />
4 From this po<strong>in</strong>t on I will use the name “Liz” <strong>for</strong> the project leader <strong>and</strong> the name “Hans” <strong>for</strong> the<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ite Element Model<strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eer, “Theo” is used <strong>for</strong> the roommate who is an expert on<br />
structural <strong>design</strong> with fibre re<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>ced plastics.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
130<br />
customer, so that he underst<strong>and</strong>s that we will only make a sketchy<br />
model. If he wants us to calculate the dimensions more precisely, he<br />
will need a new more ref<strong>in</strong>ed model.’<br />
Hans asks Liz what he is responsible <strong>for</strong>: ‘You are responsible <strong>for</strong> the<br />
strength calculations, I only calculate the stiffnesses?’<br />
Liz: ‘I th<strong>in</strong>k that this is really a part of report<strong>in</strong>g to the customer.'<br />
When the eng<strong>in</strong>eers were work<strong>in</strong>g together <strong>and</strong> try<strong>in</strong>g to decide what to do<br />
<strong>and</strong> what option would “work” a number of different ways were used to reach a<br />
decision. Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans <strong>and</strong> the other eng<strong>in</strong>eers that were sometimes <strong>in</strong>volved<br />
tried to conv<strong>in</strong>ce each other. They tried to reach a k<strong>in</strong>d of consensus, although<br />
they did not always do this explicitly. Sometimes there was no separate step of<br />
conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g the other(s) because the scenario was sketched as a team. This<br />
occurred, <strong>for</strong> example when Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans were look<strong>in</strong>g at the f<strong>in</strong>ite element<br />
model <strong>and</strong> were th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g about chang<strong>in</strong>g the thickness of some materials <strong>and</strong><br />
what the <strong>in</strong>fluence would be on the total de<strong>for</strong>mation of the trailer under a<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> load. There were also situations <strong>in</strong> which one of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers had<br />
already made a scenario or had an idea about what to do. Usually this eng<strong>in</strong>eer<br />
tried to conv<strong>in</strong>ce the other(s) that his or her idea was sound. The other eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
could be conv<strong>in</strong>ced or they could disagree. If agreement was reached discussion<br />
on the topic was only started aga<strong>in</strong> when new <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation made this necessary.<br />
If there was still disagreement then the one responsible <strong>for</strong> the decision decided<br />
what was to be done, <strong>in</strong> this case Liz. The other eng<strong>in</strong>eer(s) could then close the<br />
discussion with words like “We will see what happens”. The discussion on the<br />
topic was not closed if disagreement rema<strong>in</strong>ed even though a decision had been<br />
made. The discussion could be started aga<strong>in</strong> at any time.<br />
In another project per<strong>for</strong>med simultaneously with this trailer <strong>design</strong> process<br />
at the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company, I observed that there was another way of mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
decisions if tasks were divided <strong>in</strong> a way that every eng<strong>in</strong>eer was responsible <strong>for</strong><br />
certa<strong>in</strong> parts of the <strong>design</strong>. The one who was responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a part<br />
decided. This could make discussion on the contents of decisions superfluous,<br />
but was not necessarily so. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers liked to test their ideas aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
colleagues, so an eng<strong>in</strong>eer might start a discussion on a topic he or she was<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong>.<br />
When there was a meet<strong>in</strong>g between the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>and</strong> the<br />
customer, they chose to sit on opposite sites of the table, eng<strong>in</strong>eers from the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company on one side <strong>and</strong> the customer <strong>and</strong> his advis<strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eer<br />
on the other side. In such meet<strong>in</strong>gs the CLC eng<strong>in</strong>eers all seemed to defend one<br />
idea, there seemed to be no disagreement among the CLC eng<strong>in</strong>eers. Dur<strong>in</strong>g
Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
such a meet<strong>in</strong>g, an eng<strong>in</strong>eer proposed <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a hatch somewhere <strong>in</strong> the<br />
trailer so spare parts could be put away beh<strong>in</strong>d the hatch. That same eng<strong>in</strong>eer<br />
had <strong>in</strong>dicated, <strong>in</strong> a discussion between the CLC eng<strong>in</strong>eers, that he did not like<br />
hatches <strong>in</strong> structural parts bear<strong>in</strong>g loads <strong>and</strong> above that “a hatch might be used<br />
by illegal immigrants to cross borders unseen”.<br />
There were about four meet<strong>in</strong>gs between the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>and</strong> the<br />
customer. Liz made the presentations <strong>for</strong> those meet<strong>in</strong>gs. The options <strong>for</strong><br />
certa<strong>in</strong> parts were sketched <strong>in</strong> those presentations. For example, <strong>in</strong> the first<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g after the requirements meet<strong>in</strong>g, the presentation featured three<br />
different options to get the <strong>design</strong> stiff enough. In a normal trailer <strong>design</strong><br />
alum<strong>in</strong>ium or steel beams are used under the trailer floor to provide stiffness.<br />
This structure of steel or alum<strong>in</strong>ium beams under the floor of a trailer is usually<br />
called the chassis. In this case this had to be solved <strong>in</strong> another way, us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
different materials <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong>s. There were three options, one mak<strong>in</strong>g a k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />
beam from composites <strong>and</strong> two <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g “torsionboxes” underneath the floor.<br />
These options were sketched, then the advantages <strong>and</strong> disadvantages were listed<br />
<strong>and</strong> the customer could decide between them. Liz preferred one of the<br />
torsionbox options. That was the option the customer chose. Later on <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process the customer <strong>in</strong>dicated that the “torsionbox chassis” might be too<br />
exotic. He said that transportation companies might not be <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong><br />
that was completely different from that which they are familiar with. The<br />
customer thought that transportation companies <strong>and</strong> truck drivers were<br />
generally quite conservative.<br />
In later presentations different materials <strong>for</strong> the side panels <strong>and</strong> the floor<br />
were proposed with subsequent estimated costs <strong>and</strong> masses <strong>and</strong> stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the<br />
material dur<strong>in</strong>g the calculated load scenarios. The <strong>for</strong>mat was similar <strong>in</strong> all<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs. Liz or Hans presented some options or some f<strong>in</strong>ite element<br />
calculations followed by a discussion. The customer <strong>in</strong>dicated what his<br />
preferences were dur<strong>in</strong>g these meet<strong>in</strong>gs. Some of his preferences seemed<br />
biased. For example, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g wood <strong>and</strong> steel were not an option because he<br />
claimed that ‘wood is an old fashion material <strong>and</strong> steel will always rust’.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers, us<strong>in</strong>g steel could make the trailer lightweight.<br />
Although this could <strong>in</strong>deed cause problems with corrosion, corrosion can be<br />
prevented with a coat<strong>in</strong>g. The decisions that were taken dur<strong>in</strong>g the meet<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
were recapitulated at the end so everyone knew what was to be done next.<br />
7.3 Safe <strong>in</strong> what sense?<br />
Traffic safety was not often mentioned by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> discussions. In one<br />
discussion on the different <strong>design</strong>s of the chassis, it was mentioned that safety<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
guardrails to protect cyclists could be <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong> one option. In the f<strong>in</strong>ite<br />
element models <strong>and</strong> load scenarios safety factors were mentioned but these were<br />
related only to structural reliability. However, safety aspects concern<strong>in</strong>g trailers<br />
are much broader than those concern<strong>in</strong>g structural reliability. Accidents <strong>in</strong> traffic<br />
are common, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s about 13 % of them <strong>in</strong>volve trucks.<br />
Nowadays the concept of crash compatibility is becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly important.<br />
In crashes between different vehicles the masses, stiffness <strong>and</strong> height of vehicles<br />
may be different lead<strong>in</strong>g to severe <strong>in</strong>jury to occupants <strong>in</strong> one of the vehicles <strong>and</strong><br />
little or no <strong>in</strong>juries to occupants of the other. For example, a truck is very heavy,<br />
this cannot easily be changed. A truck is, however, usually constructed <strong>in</strong> such a<br />
way that when crash<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st a car the truck will not de<strong>for</strong>m. A car can go<br />
under the truck thereby decapitat<strong>in</strong>g or seriously <strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g the driver <strong>and</strong><br />
passengers (see figure 7.2). Note that the ground clearance of a trailer is about<br />
1,15 m, there<strong>for</strong>e most of the bonnet <strong>and</strong> a large part of the safety cage of a car can<br />
skid underneath a trailer. The possibility of a car skidd<strong>in</strong>g under a truck or trailer<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g a crash can be reduced by chang<strong>in</strong>g truck <strong>and</strong> trailer <strong>design</strong>.<br />
132<br />
Figure 7.2: Truck <strong>and</strong> trailer. This is a trailer without cyclists safety guardrails<br />
to illustrate the po<strong>in</strong>t that cars <strong>and</strong> cyclists can get under a trailer. Legislation<br />
requires that between the three wheels at the back <strong>and</strong> the one <strong>in</strong> front there are<br />
two beams to prevent cyclists <strong>and</strong> pedestrians from gett<strong>in</strong>g under the trailer<br />
[picture courtesy of Piet Knapen].<br />
Cyclists can go under the wheels of trailers when a truck turns, especially <strong>in</strong><br />
city traffic truck drivers sometimes overlook a cyclist when turn<strong>in</strong>g. The<br />
government requires trucks to have bl<strong>in</strong>d spot mirrors <strong>and</strong> safety guardrails<br />
<strong>in</strong>stalled. This should prevent such accidents but the bl<strong>in</strong>d spot mirrors are not<br />
always correctly <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>and</strong> the safety guardrails do not shield bicyclists <strong>and</strong><br />
pedestrians completely from the wheels. Guardrails <strong>and</strong> bl<strong>in</strong>d spot mirror are<br />
added to a trailer when it is f<strong>in</strong>ished. It is possible to prevent cars go<strong>in</strong>g under
Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
trucks or trailers <strong>in</strong> crashes. These prevention measures can be added to the<br />
trailer structure but they can also be <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of trailer<br />
structure. Regulation on precautions to prevent cars from go<strong>in</strong>g under trucks is<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g prepared <strong>in</strong> the European Union <strong>and</strong> will come <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the next few<br />
years. It is, however, possible to <strong>in</strong>corporate some precautions <strong>in</strong> present day<br />
<strong>design</strong>s.<br />
In one of the meet<strong>in</strong>gs the eng<strong>in</strong>eer/salesperson from the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company mentioned a trailer (called Safel<strong>in</strong>er) built by Krone that is constructed<br />
<strong>in</strong> a way such that cars cannot go under the trailer <strong>in</strong> a crash. In the same Krone<br />
<strong>design</strong> the sides of the trucks are completely covered to prevent cyclists <strong>and</strong><br />
pedestrians from be<strong>in</strong>g drawn under the wheels dur<strong>in</strong>g an accident. In the<br />
Safel<strong>in</strong>er <strong>design</strong>, traffic safety features are <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the structure <strong>and</strong> not<br />
added at the end of the <strong>design</strong> [www.krone.de]. The customer thought that a<br />
Safel<strong>in</strong>er would be very expensive.<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> this case equated a safe trailer with a structurally reliable<br />
trailer without pay<strong>in</strong>g any attention to traffic safety. This was partly due to the<br />
customer. The customer said <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terview that he thought that traffic safety<br />
was very relevant <strong>and</strong> that it was part of the image of the trailer. His idea was to<br />
completely cover the sides, but this cover was not someth<strong>in</strong>g he considered to be<br />
part of the structure. There<strong>for</strong>e he had not <strong>in</strong>corporated this need <strong>in</strong>to the<br />
requirements <strong>for</strong> the structure. For the customer the side cover<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> underrun<br />
protection were part of the image of the trailer <strong>and</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g you add to the<br />
structural <strong>design</strong> of the trailer after it has been <strong>design</strong>ed. In the Safel<strong>in</strong>er the side<br />
cover<strong>in</strong>g is part of the structure.<br />
7.3.1 Structural reliability<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans, a safe trailer was a structurally reliable trailer that<br />
manoeuvres well. There are different aspects to structural reliability. The strength<br />
of the trailer is important to prevent sudden failure of the trailer <strong>in</strong> the case of an<br />
extreme load<strong>in</strong>g. In some parts of a trailer fatigue can be a problem. The stiffness<br />
of the floor <strong>and</strong> side panels should prevent extreme bend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> deflection. The<br />
resistance aga<strong>in</strong>st rotation called torsional stiffness <strong>in</strong>fluences driv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
manoeuvre possibilities (cf. [Gere <strong>and</strong> Timoshenko, 1995, 162]).<br />
The stiffness of the floor of the trailer was important because it should be<br />
level <strong>for</strong> the unload<strong>in</strong>g system to work <strong>and</strong> should not feel unstable when a heavy<br />
driver walks through the empty trailer. A trailer will also not look reliable if the<br />
floor or side panels are too flexible. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers called this requirement <strong>for</strong><br />
stability an optical requirement, the trailer should look reliable. This optical<br />
requirement was given a value by stat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> requirements that the<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
floor should not deflect more than 20 mm. This specification is commonly used<br />
<strong>for</strong> trailer <strong>design</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company.<br />
Torsional stiffness is a subjective requirement accord<strong>in</strong>g to Liz. Some drivers<br />
like a very stiff trailer because they prefer the manoeuvrability of a stiff trailer,<br />
other drivers prefer a less stiff trailer also because they like its manoeuvrability.<br />
There was some discussion as to whether the <strong>design</strong> problem would be<br />
stiffness or strength dom<strong>in</strong>ated. By this the eng<strong>in</strong>eers meant that one of the<br />
features would <strong>in</strong> the end determ<strong>in</strong>e thicknesses of the materials used <strong>for</strong> the<br />
trailer. With some <strong>design</strong> problems the strength requirements are so strict that<br />
the strength requirements will determ<strong>in</strong>e the thickness dimensions. In other<br />
<strong>design</strong> problems the stiffness requirements are so strict that these dom<strong>in</strong>ate the<br />
<strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> material thicknesses. Based on their eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g judgement, the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers decided that the trailer should probably be stiffness dom<strong>in</strong>ated.<br />
Connected to this issue is the fact that local strength has to be calculated once<br />
all the <strong>design</strong> details are known. Sharp corners <strong>and</strong> connections can have a large<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence on the local strength because such po<strong>in</strong>ts can lead to stress<br />
concentrations. A structure that is strong <strong>and</strong> stiff enough overall may still need<br />
some re<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>cement of places with stress concentrations. These re<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>cements<br />
have to be <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the detail <strong>design</strong>. In the feasibility study <strong>and</strong> prelim<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
<strong>design</strong> only the overall strength of the trailer was taken <strong>in</strong>to account. Places <strong>for</strong><br />
which detailed strength calculations would have to be made were identified <strong>in</strong> the<br />
prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Load scenarios <strong>and</strong> allowable stresses or stra<strong>in</strong>s (stresses <strong>in</strong> metal<br />
components <strong>and</strong> stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> composite components) were used to calculate the<br />
material thicknesses <strong>for</strong> a stiff <strong>and</strong> strong enough <strong>design</strong>. 5 Calculat<strong>in</strong>g allowable<br />
stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> load scenarios both <strong>in</strong>volve eng<strong>in</strong>eers hav<strong>in</strong>g to make choices. If an<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer overestimates the allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s or underestimates the load scenarios<br />
then a trailer may fail dur<strong>in</strong>g normal use.<br />
Allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s<br />
There are different k<strong>in</strong>ds of allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s or stresses, some are meant to give<br />
a maximum <strong>for</strong> permanent loads, others <strong>for</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> peak loads. Maximum stra<strong>in</strong>s<br />
are used <strong>for</strong> composites, these stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>cluded a safety factor of 1.5 because<br />
composites are non-homogeneous materials. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the production of<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
5 In homogenous materials like metals allowable stresses are used because stresses are<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uous through a section. In non-homogenous materials like composites the stresses differ<br />
<strong>in</strong> the different layers. In these cases allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s are used because the stra<strong>in</strong>s are<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uous through a section. Note that stress is def<strong>in</strong>ed as the <strong>in</strong>tensity of <strong>for</strong>ce that is the<br />
<strong>for</strong>ce per unit area <strong>and</strong> that stra<strong>in</strong> is def<strong>in</strong>ed as the elongation per unit length [Gere <strong>and</strong><br />
Timoshenko 1995, 4-5].<br />
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Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
composites, especially <strong>in</strong> the steps <strong>in</strong> which the fibres are woven <strong>and</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
with the res<strong>in</strong>s, flaws may be <strong>in</strong>troduced that will weaken the composite.<br />
With composites, moisture <strong>and</strong> temperature can sometimes degrade the<br />
mechanical properties of the material over time; there<strong>for</strong>e these <strong>in</strong>fluences need<br />
to be accounted <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong> a conversion factor. Different organisations have<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulated different allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>for</strong> composites us<strong>in</strong>g different conversion<br />
factors. Hans had considerable experience with projects <strong>for</strong> yacht <strong>design</strong>s <strong>and</strong><br />
there the maximum allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s def<strong>in</strong>ed by Lloyd’s Register are used. Liz<br />
had just f<strong>in</strong>ished a project <strong>in</strong> which she had used maximum stra<strong>in</strong>s def<strong>in</strong>ed by<br />
the CLC together with the Rijkswaterstaat <strong>and</strong> a Research centre <strong>for</strong> civil<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s (CUR). In this project they used values taken<br />
from the literature <strong>and</strong> from tests <strong>design</strong>ed to def<strong>in</strong>e the lower boundaries of<br />
mechanical properties of composites produced us<strong>in</strong>g different production<br />
methods. A choice had to be made between the different available maximum<br />
stra<strong>in</strong>s, i.e. whether to choose those detailed by the Lloyd’s Register or those<br />
provided by the CLC, Rijkswaterstaat <strong>and</strong> CUR.<br />
Hans: ‘Lloyd’s <strong>in</strong>dicates that you can allow 0,25% stra<strong>in</strong>.’<br />
Liz: ‘0.25%? Theo said that you could allow 1,2% stra<strong>in</strong> but then you<br />
need some safety factors.’<br />
Hans: ‘You can allow 1% stra<strong>in</strong> under compression <strong>and</strong> tension. Well,<br />
<strong>in</strong> fact you can allow a bit more under tension than under<br />
compression but when you take the same strength <strong>for</strong> compression<br />
then you can allow 1,0 % with a safety factor of 4 so that makes 0,25%<br />
maximum stra<strong>in</strong>.’<br />
Liz: ‘That’s conservative because Theo got to 1,2 % with a safety factor<br />
of 3.’<br />
Liz had no previous experience with the Lloyd’s data. She did not know what was<br />
accounted <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong> these allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> what was not. She there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
preferred to use the allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s from the CLC, Rijkswaterstaat <strong>and</strong> CUR. In<br />
one of the presentations <strong>for</strong> the customer the maximum allowable stra<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated on the slide was 0,35%.<br />
Load scenarios<br />
Load scenarios are necessary to help eng<strong>in</strong>eers calculate m<strong>in</strong>imum material<br />
thickness. Load scenarios are descriptions of what might happen, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>for</strong>ces that will be exerted on the trailer, when it is used. If the load scenarios lead<br />
to stra<strong>in</strong>s higher than the allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s then the material thickness should be<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased or another material must be chosen. Usually there are scenarios <strong>for</strong><br />
normal use, <strong>for</strong> example a trailer mak<strong>in</strong>g a turn while carry<strong>in</strong>g a load of s<strong>and</strong>.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
There are also load scenarios <strong>for</strong> strength calculations <strong>for</strong> the more extreme<br />
situations that might occur, such as a fully loaded trailer driv<strong>in</strong>g too fast over a<br />
pothole.<br />
In this <strong>design</strong> process the load scenarios were not known. Liz had experience<br />
with <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g trailers but this was her first assignment to <strong>design</strong> a trailer<br />
without a roof that could be loaded with s<strong>and</strong>. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not know how<br />
the s<strong>and</strong> would behave when the trailer turned a corner. The s<strong>and</strong> might, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, shift <strong>and</strong> push, with its total mass beh<strong>in</strong>d it aga<strong>in</strong>st the side panels. The<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers could refer to previous projects <strong>for</strong> some load scenarios, but at the start<br />
of the <strong>design</strong> project Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans tried to reason out what the loads would be<br />
us<strong>in</strong>g educated guesses <strong>and</strong> an aerospace eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g method.<br />
An example of an educated guess is that Liz thought that the torsional<br />
stiffness of the trailer should be somewhat higher than that of an exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer. At the time of the <strong>design</strong> period there were problems with<br />
alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailers, with the welds used to connect the side panels to the front<br />
panel. Fractures <strong>in</strong> these structures were probably be<strong>in</strong>g caused by movement<br />
<strong>and</strong> displacement of the side panels caus<strong>in</strong>g extreme stresses <strong>in</strong> the welds. A<br />
more torsional stiff trailer or a more flexible connection between the front <strong>and</strong><br />
side panels would solve this problem.<br />
The aerospace eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g method <strong>in</strong>cluded the follow<strong>in</strong>g ideas: calculations<br />
were done us<strong>in</strong>g limit <strong>and</strong> ultimate load. In aerospace eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g limit load is a<br />
load that the structure will experience with a certa<strong>in</strong> chance dur<strong>in</strong>g its lifetime. A<br />
limit load may lead to some elastic de<strong>for</strong>mation but never to permanent damage.<br />
An ultimate load scenario was used <strong>for</strong> strength calculations. An ultimate load is<br />
a load that may damage a plane <strong>and</strong> lead to permanent (plastic) de<strong>for</strong>mation but<br />
will still allow the plane to l<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> reasonable safety. As a <strong>design</strong> rule the ultimate<br />
load is 1.5 times the limit load. This 1.5 is called the safety factor.<br />
This aerospace eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g method was comb<strong>in</strong>ed with a dynamic factor<br />
common <strong>in</strong> automotive eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. This dynamic factor was used to account <strong>for</strong><br />
extra <strong>for</strong>ces on the trailer, when <strong>for</strong> example, a pothole is encountered. This<br />
dynamic factor was 2. 6 The ultimate load was then 3g (1,5*2g) times the mass of<br />
the cargo <strong>in</strong> which g is the gravitational constant. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Liz, trailer<br />
producers use a total factor of 3, as established <strong>for</strong> a previous trailer project.<br />
All calculations were done us<strong>in</strong>g a maximum mass of 32 tonnes of s<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> a<br />
maximum mass of 9 tonnes on the axles. This maximum load <strong>for</strong> the s<strong>and</strong> was<br />
calculated tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account the allowed maximum total mass of 44 tonnes <strong>for</strong><br />
a truck, trailer <strong>and</strong> load comb<strong>in</strong>ation. The trailer will have a mass of about 5.5<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
6 It is <strong>in</strong>deed mentioned <strong>in</strong> a h<strong>and</strong>book that a dynamic factor to account <strong>for</strong> rough roads should<br />
be <strong>in</strong>cluded but there a factor of 3 is proposed [Fenton, 1996 , 44].<br />
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Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
tonnes <strong>and</strong> the truck 6.5 tonnes, this leaves 44 - 5.5 -6.5 = 32 tonnes <strong>for</strong> the load<br />
to be transported.<br />
The load scenarios changed dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process, <strong>and</strong> the trailer <strong>and</strong> the<br />
load scenarios appeared to be <strong>design</strong>ed simultaneously. The load scenarios that<br />
were assumed <strong>in</strong> the first f<strong>in</strong>ite element calculations were the follow<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Load on the floor: 32 tonnes, dynamic factor 2 <strong>and</strong> safety factor 1,5 makes 32<br />
tonnes x 3g<br />
Load on the floor <strong>and</strong> pressure on the side panels: floor 32 tonnes x 3g plus a<br />
hydrostatic pressure on the side panels of “density of the s<strong>and</strong>” x “the height”<br />
x g<br />
Turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner: as a trailer takes a corner the pile of s<strong>and</strong> is subjected to a<br />
gravitational field of 32 tonnes x 3g on floor <strong>and</strong> 32 tonnes x 3g on the side<br />
panel<br />
Us<strong>in</strong>g these load scenarios, calculations were made us<strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>ite element<br />
model. These calculations led to surpris<strong>in</strong>g results: the pressure on the side<br />
panels would lead to a 40 cm of displacement if carry<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>and</strong>! Turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner<br />
would lead to a displacement of 5 m <strong>in</strong> the side panels. Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans concluded<br />
that the load scenarios were not realistic <strong>and</strong> too severe.<br />
Hans: ‘The <strong>design</strong> problem will succeed or fail with these load<br />
scenarios. Could we not use the same load scenarios as the customer<br />
used when <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g an alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer?’<br />
Liz: ‘That’s the problem. They are not able to deliver load scenarios.<br />
We will use the ones we have used <strong>in</strong> other projects.’<br />
Hans: ‘There have been load scenarios made <strong>for</strong> other projects, but we<br />
have to know what the customer does with his alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer. If<br />
you want to be smart you have to change the load scenarios, otherwise<br />
we will not get the 10% mass reduction.’<br />
Liz: ‘But the customer cannot give me any load scenarios, not even <strong>for</strong><br />
the alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer they produce now.’<br />
Hans: ‘The risk is that the customer built the alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer based<br />
on experience. He has learnt that he can reduce the material thickness<br />
because it doesn’t fail. This also happened <strong>in</strong> a yacht build<strong>in</strong>g project.<br />
The load scenarios that we have used <strong>for</strong> our calculations are much too<br />
severe, this will lead to extra mass <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>. We can say that the<br />
material is necessary because we have calculated that there is a need,<br />
but probably hav<strong>in</strong>g used too severe load scenarios.’<br />
Liz: ‘We could f<strong>in</strong>d out what our concept does <strong>in</strong> comparison with the<br />
strength <strong>and</strong> stiffness of the exist<strong>in</strong>g alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer.’<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
138<br />
Hans: ‘Then you should do both calculations. Make the calculations<br />
<strong>for</strong> their alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> our concept <strong>and</strong> compare them.’<br />
The displacement of the floor was 34,5 mm, which was too much accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the eng<strong>in</strong>eers’ self imposed requirement <strong>for</strong> a maximum of 20 mm. A discussion<br />
was started as to whether this should be local bend<strong>in</strong>g of the floor or the total<br />
displacement of the floor with regard to the <strong>in</strong>itial unloaded situation. At the end<br />
of this discussion it was decided that the safety factor of 1,5 should not be<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded. The safety factor was used to get from limit to ultimate load <strong>and</strong> the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers seemed to change their m<strong>in</strong>ds about what load to use <strong>in</strong> the load<br />
scenarios. At first the eng<strong>in</strong>eers calculated the displacement of the floor us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
ultimate load <strong>and</strong> then they decided to use limit load. They argued that the<br />
displacement is one of the stiffness requirements <strong>and</strong> these should always be<br />
calculated us<strong>in</strong>g limit load. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans a structure is allowed to<br />
fail to a certa<strong>in</strong> extent at ultimate load, so ultimate load is way too severe <strong>for</strong> a<br />
stiffness requirement. The use of limit <strong>in</strong>stead of ultimate load reduced the<br />
displacement of the floor to 34,5 : 1,5= 23 mm (calculations were l<strong>in</strong>ear elastic),<br />
which was much closer to the required maximum of 20 mm.<br />
The safety factor, 1,5, was also removed from the load scenario <strong>for</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
corner, but the displacement of the side panels rema<strong>in</strong>ed more than 1 m.<br />
Subsequently, the dynamic factor (2) was also removed from the scenario but the<br />
displacement rema<strong>in</strong>ed at about a meter. Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans started to doubt whether<br />
it was realistic to assume that the complete load of s<strong>and</strong> will push aga<strong>in</strong>st the side<br />
panel. After the discussions the load scenarios were changed to the follow<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Load on the floor: 32 tonnes, dynamic factor 2 makes 32 tonnes x 2g<br />
Load on the floor <strong>and</strong> pressure on the side panels: floor 32 tonnes x 2g <strong>and</strong><br />
hydrostatic pressure on the side panels “density of the s<strong>and</strong>” x “the height” x<br />
g<br />
Turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner: dur<strong>in</strong>g turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner the pile of s<strong>and</strong> is with<strong>in</strong> a gravitational<br />
field, 32 tonnes x 1g on the floor <strong>and</strong> on the side panel<br />
Torsion: a torsion moment of 1 Nmm will be used<br />
As can be seen <strong>in</strong> the previous quote Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans also decided to make a f<strong>in</strong>ite<br />
element model of the exist<strong>in</strong>g alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer <strong>for</strong> comparison. These above<br />
load scenarios were used to calculate the displacements <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ite element<br />
models of the exist<strong>in</strong>g alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> the concept composite trailer.<br />
The load scenario turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner still led to extreme displacements of the side<br />
panels, 290 mm <strong>in</strong> the alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer <strong>and</strong> 770 mm <strong>in</strong> the concept trailer. The<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers started th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g about whether the trailer would roll over when the
Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
load pushed completely aga<strong>in</strong>st one side of a trailer. The scenario load on the<br />
floor <strong>and</strong> pressure on the side panels led to 60 mm displacement of the side<br />
panels <strong>in</strong> the alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer. This displacement would probably be visible<br />
when a trailer was be<strong>in</strong>g loaded. A trailer might look unstable when be<strong>in</strong>g loaded<br />
<strong>and</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g corners because of the visible displacement of the side panels.<br />
Look<strong>in</strong>g at the results Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans concluded that the stresses <strong>in</strong> the side panels<br />
were low enough so there was no strength problem only a stiffness problem.<br />
To check whether the load scenarios were realistic Liz asked the customer<br />
whether he had ever seen any displacement <strong>in</strong> the side panels of an alum<strong>in</strong>ium<br />
trailer when the trailer was fully loaded. The customer said that he saw no<br />
displacement <strong>in</strong> the side panels of the alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer. Liz thought that this<br />
might be due to the fact that there was no hydrostatic pressure from the s<strong>and</strong> on<br />
the side panels. The <strong>in</strong>ternal friction of the s<strong>and</strong> might prevent the pile of s<strong>and</strong><br />
from completely slid<strong>in</strong>g to the side panel. Because both Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans had no<br />
experience with calculations concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternal friction <strong>in</strong> a pile of s<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
time they had <strong>for</strong> this prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> was limited, the decision was made that<br />
the side panels should have the same stiffness as the side panels of the exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer. So they decided to skip the load on the floor <strong>and</strong> pressure on<br />
the side panels scenario completely. Instead of this they calculated the stiffness of<br />
the side panels of the exist<strong>in</strong>g alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong>ed the composite<br />
trailer side panels to have similar stiffness.<br />
The customer <strong>in</strong>dicated that he had seen no displacement of the side panels<br />
<strong>in</strong> an alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer as it turned corners. The calculation us<strong>in</strong>g the load<br />
scenario given above led to 290 mm displacement <strong>in</strong> the side panels <strong>in</strong> an<br />
alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer. If this really happened then it would be visible. Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans<br />
decided that a load scenario where the complete load of s<strong>and</strong> pushed aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
side panel <strong>in</strong> a corner was too severe. They decided to use a load scenario used <strong>in</strong><br />
a previous project <strong>for</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner. This load scenario was used <strong>for</strong> h<strong>and</strong><br />
calculations.<br />
Only two load<strong>in</strong>g scenarios rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ite element modell<strong>in</strong>g<br />
calculations:<br />
Load on the floor: 32 tonne, dynamic factor 2 makes 32 tonne x 2g<br />
Torsion: a torsion moment of 1 Nmm will be used<br />
Turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner: this will not be calculated us<strong>in</strong>g FEM but “by h<strong>and</strong>”<br />
Brak<strong>in</strong>g: this will not be calculated us<strong>in</strong>g FEM but “by h<strong>and</strong>”<br />
As described above the other scenarios were not realistic accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers. One of the scenarios was discarded as irrelevant, i.e. load on the floor<br />
<strong>and</strong> pressure on the side panels. One of the scenarios was calculated differently,<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
i.e. turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner. One scenario had been changed, i.e. load on the floor. One<br />
scenario, torsion, was not changed, but this is not really a load scenario. A load<br />
scenario is meant to be used to describe what loads can be expected. To<br />
determ<strong>in</strong>e torsional stiffness one unit torsion is placed on a model. When the two<br />
scenarios, mentioned be<strong>for</strong>e, were <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ite element model, the<br />
maximum displacement of the floor was 33 mm. 7 Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans reasoned that this<br />
displacement was calculated us<strong>in</strong>g 2g so the displacement would only be 16,5<br />
mm if the trailer is at rest. This was actually with<strong>in</strong> the requirement of maximum<br />
20 mm but Liz preferred a larger marg<strong>in</strong>.<br />
140<br />
Hans: ‘In fact, let’s look at the relative displacements. Because I th<strong>in</strong>k<br />
that that is what is important, <strong>and</strong> it is probably a lot less. This is really<br />
the bend<strong>in</strong>g of the floor. You see the yellow part is not 0.’<br />
Liz: ‘Yellow is 6.’<br />
Hans: ‘It is 7, the displacement ranges from 7 to 33 mm so the<br />
bend<strong>in</strong>g 33-7=26 divided by 2. The bend<strong>in</strong>g is 13 mm by 1g.’<br />
From this quote it can be seen that Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans decided the bend<strong>in</strong>g over the<br />
largest span should be less than 20 mm not the total overall displacement. The<br />
bend<strong>in</strong>g over the largest span was 13 mm. The bend<strong>in</strong>g was there<strong>for</strong>e well with<strong>in</strong><br />
the requirement. The stresses <strong>and</strong> stra<strong>in</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> the materials were lower than<br />
the allowable stresses <strong>and</strong> stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e the concept composite trailer was<br />
stiff <strong>and</strong> strong enough.<br />
Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans had also calculated very quickly whether a heavy driver walk<strong>in</strong>g<br />
through the trailer would cause the trailer to bend too much. To calculate this<br />
they considered a mass of 200 kg on a surface of 20 cm 2 , this should simulate a<br />
heavy weight driver st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g on one foot. The stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the floor were found to<br />
be below allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> the driver would not have the feel<strong>in</strong>g that the floor<br />
was saggy.<br />
The load scenarios turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner <strong>and</strong> brak<strong>in</strong>g were calculated by h<strong>and</strong>, not<br />
us<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ite element modell<strong>in</strong>g. 8 Load scenarios were still needed to make the<br />
brak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g corners calculations. Estimations of the mass <strong>and</strong><br />
acceleration dur<strong>in</strong>g brak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner were necessary. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
7 Notice that this is different from the 23 mm that the eng<strong>in</strong>eers atta<strong>in</strong>ed be<strong>for</strong>e but the material<br />
thicknesses had also changed. As I <strong>in</strong>dicated be<strong>for</strong>e, material thicknesses <strong>and</strong> properties were<br />
changed simultaneously with the load scenarios.<br />
8 These calculations are called “h<strong>and</strong> calculations” but <strong>for</strong> most calculations a computer<br />
program (Mathlab) is used to solve the equations. This computer program is widely used<br />
throughout the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g world <strong>for</strong> analytical <strong>and</strong> numerical calculations. The difference with<br />
the f<strong>in</strong>ite element program is that f<strong>in</strong>ite element calculations are always numerical solutions,<br />
<strong>and</strong> that, to per<strong>for</strong>m such calculations a model of the product or part needs to be made. It is not<br />
necessary to make a model when us<strong>in</strong>g Mathlab.
Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
used results from a previous project to estimate the mass <strong>and</strong> the acceleration.<br />
Hans had a lot of trouble reconstruct<strong>in</strong>g what had been done <strong>in</strong> the previous<br />
project. There were some typ<strong>in</strong>g flaws <strong>in</strong> numbers of the report. This made the<br />
reconstruction of what loads were added to which other loads very difficult, <strong>for</strong><br />
example the loads exerted by driv<strong>in</strong>g straight always seemed to be added to the<br />
other loads such as those <strong>for</strong> brak<strong>in</strong>g or turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner. In the f<strong>in</strong>ite element<br />
calculations the complete trailer was modelled <strong>and</strong> the load they used <strong>for</strong><br />
calculat<strong>in</strong>g was the load of the s<strong>and</strong>. The by h<strong>and</strong> calculations beg<strong>in</strong> with the axle<br />
loads which was 9 tonnes as def<strong>in</strong>ed by regulations. Acceleration figures were<br />
taken from a report of a previous project. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers tried to compare the<br />
geometry of the trailer near the axles with st<strong>and</strong>ard geometries used to calculate<br />
stresses <strong>and</strong> stra<strong>in</strong>s. For example, the moment of <strong>in</strong>ertia of a certa<strong>in</strong><br />
configuration was calculated by us<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong>ard geometries from a h<strong>and</strong>book. In<br />
these calculations the eng<strong>in</strong>eers tried to decide what the material thickness <strong>and</strong><br />
the orientation of the fibres <strong>in</strong> the composites should be to get the stra<strong>in</strong>s below<br />
the allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>for</strong> composites <strong>and</strong> the stresses below allowable stresses <strong>for</strong><br />
the alum<strong>in</strong>ium parts. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers discussed how far the stra<strong>in</strong>s should be<br />
under the allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s because holes need to be drilled <strong>in</strong> some of the load<br />
bear<strong>in</strong>g structures to connect them with other parts. Such holes lead to stress or<br />
stra<strong>in</strong> concentrations that are difficult to predict <strong>in</strong> composites. The stra<strong>in</strong>s were<br />
required to be well below the allowable stra<strong>in</strong>s to allow <strong>for</strong> the stra<strong>in</strong><br />
concentrations round the holes.<br />
7.3.2 Misuse <strong>and</strong> overload<strong>in</strong>g<br />
The customer told some stories about misuse of the trailers <strong>in</strong> the meet<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g transportation it is not uncommon <strong>for</strong> some trailers to be overloaded,<br />
thus a load <strong>for</strong> the composite trailer might be much more than 32 tonnes allowed<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>. As said be<strong>for</strong>e a truck <strong>and</strong> trailer comb<strong>in</strong>ations can be subjected to<br />
spot checks <strong>and</strong> weighed but this does not always happen <strong>and</strong> drivers can<br />
deliberately or un<strong>in</strong>tentionally load a trailer with more than 32 tonnes. The<br />
customer said that his <strong>for</strong>mer company had had a verdict from court <strong>in</strong> which it<br />
was stated that a trailer producer should know that trailers are commonly<br />
overloaded <strong>in</strong> use <strong>and</strong> that they should account <strong>for</strong> this <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of a trailer.<br />
It was not clear how much extra load should be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>. The<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers had calculated a 32 tonnes load, but the customer <strong>in</strong>dicated that the<br />
load could sometimes be as high as 40 tonnes. Neither the customer nor the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers changed the requirements or suggested mak<strong>in</strong>g calculations <strong>for</strong> a<br />
trailer carry<strong>in</strong>g more than 32 tonnes. In my <strong>in</strong>terview with her, Liz said that it<br />
was not obvious to her that she should account <strong>for</strong> overload<strong>in</strong>g of the trailer <strong>in</strong><br />
the <strong>design</strong>. She had not noticed the remarks on overload<strong>in</strong>g. Further, the<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
requirements stated that 32 tonnes of s<strong>and</strong> would be carried, an allowance <strong>for</strong><br />
overload<strong>in</strong>g was not required. Liz <strong>and</strong> Hans said that if a trailer was consequently<br />
overloaded <strong>and</strong> a driver drove too fast such actions would take out a part of the<br />
safety marg<strong>in</strong>s <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>to the trailer. There<strong>for</strong>e, overload<strong>in</strong>g would reduce the<br />
safety marg<strong>in</strong>. Hans wondered <strong>in</strong> his <strong>in</strong>terview whose responsibility it was to<br />
decide to <strong>in</strong>clude overload<strong>in</strong>g. Hans drew the conclusion that the customer<br />
should do this <strong>and</strong> change his requirements. Hans <strong>and</strong> Liz <strong>in</strong>dicated that the<br />
customer knew more about use <strong>and</strong> misuse of trailers than they did <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
the customer should <strong>in</strong>clude this <strong>in</strong> his requirements if necessary. Liz also<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated that overload<strong>in</strong>g would not really cause problems as the <strong>design</strong> was<br />
stiffness dom<strong>in</strong>ated. Hence, the strength of the trailer was sufficient to withst<strong>and</strong><br />
the overload<strong>in</strong>g, the floor will displace more than with a load of 32 tonnes but this<br />
will not cause failure of the trailer.<br />
Another possible problem might be that misuse with regard to the use of the<br />
rods <strong>in</strong> the trailer might occur. As said be<strong>for</strong>e the trailer had no roof. The absence<br />
of a roof can make a trailer unstable when loaded. The load pushes aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
side panels which are only fixed on the floor. The side panels can deflect<br />
outwards as sketched <strong>in</strong> figure 7.3.<br />
142<br />
Figure 7.3: sketch of trailer loaded with s<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> rods open<br />
To prevent this, three rods were <strong>in</strong>serted at the upper side between the side<br />
panels. These rods will stay <strong>in</strong> place most of the time dur<strong>in</strong>g use but need to be<br />
removed be<strong>for</strong>e load<strong>in</strong>g a trailer with long materials, once loaded the trailer rods<br />
need to be re<strong>in</strong>serted. 9 While discuss<strong>in</strong>g misuse of trailers, Hans asked the<br />
customer whether the rods are always <strong>in</strong>serted. Fail<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>sert the rods will<br />
compromise the stiffness of the total trailer. The side panels can move<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependently. The customer answered that he had not often seen rods left out<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
9<br />
The trailer was <strong>design</strong>ed to be loaded from above <strong>and</strong> the rods are <strong>in</strong> the way when load<strong>in</strong>g<br />
long materials.
Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
after load<strong>in</strong>g, although he knew that some drivers transport<strong>in</strong>g sugar beets<br />
sometimes load too much <strong>and</strong> cannot re<strong>in</strong>sert the rods. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
customer you can see the side panels move when this happens. He also said that<br />
his customers are <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med not to use his trailers <strong>in</strong> this way. The extreme<br />
scenario of a trailer loaded with more than 40 tonnes of sugar beets without<br />
closed rods turn<strong>in</strong>g a corner while driv<strong>in</strong>g fast may cause the stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the<br />
material to exceed those that are allowed <strong>and</strong> calculated <strong>in</strong> the safety marg<strong>in</strong>s.<br />
7.4 Ascrib<strong>in</strong>g responsibilities<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terviews <strong>and</strong> the discussion after my presentation some implicit<br />
ideas about the responsibilities of the different <strong>in</strong>volved stakeholders were made<br />
explicit (see section 1.2 <strong>and</strong> 3.3). The contract terms from the TNO waive all legal<br />
liability <strong>for</strong> the use of results from TNO research to the customer(s). Only <strong>in</strong><br />
cases of fraud or severe negligence can the TNO be held liable <strong>for</strong> problems<br />
caused by the application of their research results. So persons affected by<br />
products <strong>design</strong>ed us<strong>in</strong>g results from the TNO cannot easily turn to the TNO <strong>for</strong><br />
liability claims [TNO, 2003]. In accordance with this, the customer is ascribed<br />
the major part of the responsibility <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
The customer <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> his <strong>in</strong>terview that he felt responsible <strong>for</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />
all the relevant <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers. This could be <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about<br />
what he wanted but also about what problems he had encountered <strong>in</strong> previous<br />
<strong>design</strong>s. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers should then come up with a <strong>design</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to what he<br />
wanted. The customer said that sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> adapt<strong>in</strong>g requirements was his<br />
responsibility. With regard to overload<strong>in</strong>g he <strong>in</strong>dicated that while test<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
prototypes he would deliberately overload the trailer to test whether accidental<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional overload<strong>in</strong>g would cause problems. He thought of us<strong>in</strong>g a load<br />
of 39 tonnes <strong>and</strong> was consider<strong>in</strong>g test<strong>in</strong>g the trailer to failure po<strong>in</strong>t. He also said<br />
that a 32 tonnes load is reasonably high <strong>for</strong> some European countries, <strong>for</strong><br />
example <strong>in</strong> Switzerl<strong>and</strong> or Germany 32 tonnes of s<strong>and</strong> will exceed the total mass<br />
allowed <strong>in</strong> these countries.<br />
Basically, the eng<strong>in</strong>eers thought that the customer had to decide what they<br />
should <strong>design</strong>. If the customer def<strong>in</strong>ed a very narrow <strong>design</strong> problem then the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers had to stick to this narrow description of the problem. If the<br />
description of the <strong>design</strong> problem was widened to <strong>in</strong>clude more aspects, then<br />
they would <strong>in</strong>clude more aspects <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers came up<br />
with examples of <strong>design</strong> problems where they had looked at broader safety<br />
concerns than only structural reliability, <strong>for</strong> example when <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g composite<br />
yachts. There a collision with another boat might cause a leak. Usually collisions<br />
did not lead to leaks but if th<strong>in</strong>ner lam<strong>in</strong>ates are used this might happen. For the<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
yacht<strong>in</strong>g case they could not research the problem or solve it with<strong>in</strong> the budget<br />
of the project. They did, however, <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m the customer about this possible<br />
problem. In the trailer case, the customer only wanted a lightweight trailer that<br />
would not be too expensive. S<strong>in</strong>ce, the customer was focused on the structure,<br />
this is what the eng<strong>in</strong>eers focused on. If the customer wanted a trailer that was<br />
safe <strong>in</strong> traffic then he should have <strong>in</strong>dicated this <strong>in</strong> his requirements. In this<br />
case, traffic safety was not <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the requirements except <strong>for</strong> a short<br />
statement that the trailer should meet legal requirements.<br />
When asked <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terviews, the eng<strong>in</strong>eers told me that they would <strong>design</strong> a<br />
trailer that was too high accord<strong>in</strong>g to the regulations if that is what the customer<br />
wanted. They said that as long as they thought that a <strong>design</strong> would be safe, safe<br />
here most of the time <strong>in</strong>terpreted as structurally reliable, they would do what a<br />
customer asked them. Liz told me that she had had some doubts <strong>in</strong> another<br />
project where they had to <strong>design</strong> a trailer that was too high accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
regulation. She was not the project manager <strong>for</strong> that project. She asked a<br />
representative from an organisation of transport bus<strong>in</strong>esses <strong>in</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s<br />
whether it was common practice to <strong>design</strong> trailers higher than permitted by the<br />
regulations. The representative told her that that was <strong>in</strong>deed done regularly.<br />
144<br />
Liz: ‘When you hear that they do that [produce trailers too high] all the<br />
time <strong>and</strong> that it is <strong>in</strong> one way or another possible to drive with these<br />
trailers,… well yes we <strong>design</strong>ed a trailer that was 4,15 m high. But I did<br />
not completely agree with this.’<br />
Hans said that they usually <strong>design</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to regulations. If the customer<br />
wants a trailer that is too high, the customer has to specify this. Hans <strong>in</strong>dicated<br />
that he would go aga<strong>in</strong>st the regulations if asked to do so by a customer as long as<br />
he had the idea that the <strong>design</strong> was safe or structurally reliable. He also said that<br />
whether or not to go aga<strong>in</strong>st the regulations depended on the product be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>design</strong>ed. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hans this would not happen <strong>in</strong> airplane <strong>design</strong> because<br />
there the plane has to fulfil FAA criteria, otherwise it cannot be flown.<br />
A reason given by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers as to why the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company should<br />
not be responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> the requirements <strong>in</strong> addition to<br />
what the customer wants is that they do not know what k<strong>in</strong>d of problems there<br />
are with a product. An eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company does projects <strong>for</strong> very different<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustries <strong>and</strong> products. They do not, <strong>and</strong> cannot, have <strong>in</strong>-depth knowledge of<br />
the problems encountered with such a variety of products dur<strong>in</strong>g, production or<br />
<strong>in</strong> use. The customer has the experience <strong>and</strong> should know what can go wrong.<br />
Transportation companies come to the customer when someth<strong>in</strong>g has gone<br />
wrong with a trailer. The customer knows how his customers (transportation<br />
companies <strong>and</strong> drivers) used or misused his products. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the
Design of a lightweight trailer<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers, they should always ask whether a customer knows about problems<br />
with the production or use of their products. Sometimes the CLC eng<strong>in</strong>eers will<br />
have more experience with a product because of hav<strong>in</strong>g made previous <strong>design</strong>s<br />
<strong>for</strong> similar products. In these cases the eng<strong>in</strong>eers mention problems<br />
encountered <strong>in</strong> earlier <strong>design</strong> projects. However, the customer is responsible <strong>for</strong><br />
the requirements <strong>and</strong> should <strong>in</strong>dicate what problems might arise <strong>in</strong> use <strong>and</strong><br />
misuse situations. In this case-study, the customer had <strong>in</strong>dicated that<br />
overload<strong>in</strong>g might occur but he never changed the requirements. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
thought that chang<strong>in</strong>g the requirements to <strong>in</strong>clude overload<strong>in</strong>g was the<br />
customer’s responsibility. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not know whether overload<strong>in</strong>g<br />
caused problems <strong>for</strong> the customer. So although overload<strong>in</strong>g was mentioned on<br />
occasions, the requirements were not changed because the eng<strong>in</strong>eers expected<br />
the customer to change the requirements if necessary. The customer did not<br />
change the requirements to <strong>in</strong>clude overload<strong>in</strong>g because he preferred to test a<br />
prototype to break<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t.<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eers would only <strong>in</strong>corporate the legal requirements on traffic safety <strong>in</strong><br />
a further phase of the <strong>design</strong> process. The customer thought that the sides<br />
needed to be covered <strong>and</strong> that underrun protection needed to be <strong>in</strong>stalled. The<br />
reasons he gave were that he thought that this would look good <strong>and</strong> that traffic<br />
safety was a good market<strong>in</strong>g tool. Because the customer considered the side<br />
covers to be part of the image of the trailer <strong>and</strong> not part of the structure he did<br />
not <strong>in</strong>clude this <strong>in</strong> the list of requirements, nor was it part of his negotiations<br />
with the eng<strong>in</strong>eers. He asked the eng<strong>in</strong>eers to make a reliable structure <strong>and</strong><br />
considered that the image of the trailer was quite another issue that he would<br />
deal with after a structural <strong>design</strong> had been obta<strong>in</strong>ed. 10<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not th<strong>in</strong>k that they were responsible <strong>for</strong> traffic safety, they<br />
deemed themselves only responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a manoeuvrable, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
normal use, structurally reliable trailer. They thought that the customer was<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g the relevant <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on experiences from practice.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers, the government is responsible <strong>for</strong> traffic safety <strong>and</strong><br />
should provide adequate regulation <strong>for</strong> traffic safety. The driver of a truck <strong>and</strong><br />
trailer comb<strong>in</strong>ations has the responsibility to drive with care. Although the<br />
customer thought that traffic safety was important he did not require the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers to consider it because he saw it as someth<strong>in</strong>g completely separate<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
10 Note that a lightweight trailer was <strong>in</strong>tended <strong>and</strong> that add<strong>in</strong>g covers onto a structurally reliable<br />
trailer adds material <strong>and</strong> mass that is not used to support loads. Usually <strong>in</strong> lightweight <strong>design</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers try to prevent the use of extra materials <strong>in</strong> places where they do not bear loads or<br />
where there is already enough material to support the loads.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
from the structure of the trailer. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers were there<strong>for</strong>e not asked to revise<br />
their vision on who was responsible <strong>for</strong> traffic safety.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the discussion after my presentation at the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company, some<br />
nuances were made <strong>in</strong> the idea that the customer is responsible <strong>for</strong> the<br />
requirements <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e <strong>for</strong> decid<strong>in</strong>g what to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>and</strong> what not. An<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer said that the TNO, <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e also the CLC, has the obligation to<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m the government <strong>and</strong> public when a product is dangerous. In the contract<br />
terms there is a clause regard<strong>in</strong>g breach<strong>in</strong>g secrecy if TNO eng<strong>in</strong>eers expect a<br />
product <strong>design</strong> to be dangerous. TNO can, preferably after contact<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
customer, warn the affected stakeholders or authorities [TNO, 2003]. One<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer told a story about an <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong> which an eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>for</strong>m a different<br />
department of the TNO went to the EU authorities <strong>in</strong> Brussels because of<br />
possible problems with certa<strong>in</strong> food packag<strong>in</strong>g materials.<br />
Although the eng<strong>in</strong>eers were really conv<strong>in</strong>ced that the customer should set<br />
the requirements, they felt responsible <strong>for</strong> help<strong>in</strong>g the customer <strong>in</strong> this. Liz said<br />
that she had a list of subjects with regard to requirements <strong>for</strong> trailer <strong>design</strong>. She<br />
followed this list to make sure she <strong>and</strong> the customer did not <strong>for</strong>get an important<br />
issue when sett<strong>in</strong>g the requirements. The CLC salesperson <strong>and</strong> Liz agreed that<br />
perhaps, <strong>in</strong> a future trailer project, they could propose that the customer<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded traffic safety <strong>in</strong> the requirements. Another department of the TNO<br />
located <strong>in</strong> the same city as the CLC specialises <strong>in</strong> traffic safety. The salesperson<br />
said that <strong>in</strong> any future trailer project they could offer the customer the chance to<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude an expert on traffic safety from the traffic safety department of TNO. The<br />
customer has to decide whether to <strong>in</strong>clude such an expert but the eng<strong>in</strong>eers can<br />
always propose a safety expert be <strong>in</strong>cluded.<br />
There was also an agreement between the eng<strong>in</strong>eers work<strong>in</strong>g on trailer<br />
projects that traffic safety <strong>and</strong> especially the Krone Safel<strong>in</strong>er might be a good<br />
topic <strong>for</strong> a presentation at the Focwa, the Dutch organisation <strong>for</strong> companies <strong>in</strong><br />
car <strong>and</strong> trailer body work production. They thought it was a good idea to <strong>in</strong>vite<br />
the German eng<strong>in</strong>eer who <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> developed the Safel<strong>in</strong>er to give a<br />
presentation. Organisations like Focwa are sometimes <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> projects<br />
f<strong>in</strong>anced by the government to implement new ideas on traffic safety or<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability [www.focwa.nl]. These projects can amount to new regulations.<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eers said that these organisations should provide trailer eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong><br />
producers with <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation.<br />
One of the CLC eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong>dicated that they probably have more<br />
responsibility <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong> processes than <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> processes. 11<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
11<br />
I used <strong>and</strong> expla<strong>in</strong>ed the terms radical <strong>and</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong> my presentation <strong>and</strong> this<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer immediately started to use these terms.<br />
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Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> processes everyth<strong>in</strong>g that could go<br />
wrong with a product had already gone wrong. A lot of regulation will have been<br />
made to prevent accidents <strong>and</strong> damage. In this case the CLC should just follow<br />
the regulations. This eng<strong>in</strong>eer said that the CLC was responsible <strong>for</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<br />
about what could go wrong when regulation is absent. Perhaps they should even<br />
contact the appropriate authorities to get them to change regulations or make<br />
new regulations <strong>for</strong> a product.<br />
7.5 Summary of the case <strong>and</strong> the regulative framework<br />
I studied the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> feasibility study <strong>design</strong> phase <strong>for</strong> a<br />
lightweight composite trailer us<strong>in</strong>g a new unload<strong>in</strong>g system. This prelim<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
<strong>design</strong> was made by an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>for</strong> a customer. The trailer had to<br />
be used <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation with a conventional truck, there<strong>for</strong>e it was middle level<br />
<strong>design</strong>. The trailer would be made of composites <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>clude a new unload<strong>in</strong>g<br />
system. Hence the normal configuration was changed <strong>and</strong> the <strong>design</strong> was to a<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> extent radical.<br />
7.5.1 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong><br />
The ethical <strong>issues</strong> that came up <strong>in</strong> this <strong>design</strong> process were ma<strong>in</strong>ly related to the<br />
operationalisation of safety <strong>and</strong> ascriptions of responsibility. As <strong>in</strong>dicated,<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability did not play a big part. Of course it is an ethical question whether<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>issues</strong> should have played a part. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> customer only<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulated one requirement with respect to susta<strong>in</strong>ability. The aerodynamic<br />
shape was <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the requirements but it was very vague <strong>and</strong> not<br />
operationalised. The flexible load<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> unload<strong>in</strong>g system should lead to fewer<br />
kilometres driven empty. This could make the trailer more susta<strong>in</strong>able. However,<br />
<strong>in</strong> this <strong>design</strong> process, this flexibility was seen as an economic advantage <strong>and</strong> it<br />
was not clear whether it was <strong>in</strong>deed more susta<strong>in</strong>able. It can be argued that if a<br />
regulative framework was used this framework might have <strong>in</strong>cluded less vague<br />
requirements on susta<strong>in</strong>ability. In a regulative framework concern<strong>in</strong>g traffic, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, a maximum amount of certa<strong>in</strong> emissions will be specified. It can be<br />
argued that this is not relevant <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of a trailer but only <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of<br />
the eng<strong>in</strong>e of a truck. This argument disregards the effects of the aerodynamic<br />
shape of a trailer on fuel consumption <strong>and</strong> emissions. So a regulative framework<br />
<strong>for</strong> traffic could have <strong>in</strong>cluded requirements or operationalisations concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability that might have been relevant <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. I will not<br />
discuss further the ethical question of whether susta<strong>in</strong>ability criteria should have<br />
been <strong>in</strong>cluded.<br />
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In the operationalisation of safety, the eng<strong>in</strong>eers equated a safe trailer with a<br />
structurally reliable trailer. With<strong>in</strong> the CLC there are ideas on good <strong>design</strong><br />
practice concern<strong>in</strong>g structural reliability. These ideas are based on a shared<br />
educational background <strong>and</strong> previous <strong>design</strong> experience with<strong>in</strong> the CLC. It can be<br />
concluded that there are norms about good <strong>design</strong> practice <strong>and</strong> that the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
used these norms <strong>in</strong> the trailer <strong>design</strong>. These norms were <strong>in</strong>ternal CLC norms.<br />
These <strong>in</strong>ternal norms were not imposed by legislation or professional or technical<br />
codes. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers reflected <strong>and</strong> thought about how these norms should be<br />
used <strong>in</strong> the case <strong>design</strong> project. Discussions on whether or not to use ultimate<br />
load <strong>in</strong> calculations could be regarded as discussions about the application of the<br />
norms <strong>in</strong> this specific case. These discussions were also ethically relevant because<br />
structural reliability poses limits <strong>for</strong> safe use. If a trailer collapses dur<strong>in</strong>g use<br />
because of metal fatigue or overload<strong>in</strong>g this can cause <strong>in</strong>juries or fatalities.<br />
Torsional stiffness has an important <strong>in</strong>fluence on how easily the trailer might roll<br />
over. Trailers roll<strong>in</strong>g over on highways cause a lot of traffic jams <strong>and</strong> accidents.<br />
So choices cover<strong>in</strong>g structural reliability are ethically relevant.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the operationalisation of a structurally reliable trailer, choices have to<br />
be made between different available material properties. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers could, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, use material properties established by Lloyd’s register or properties<br />
established by the CLC <strong>in</strong> co-operation with the CUR <strong>and</strong> the Rijkswaterstaat.<br />
Material properties like allowable stra<strong>in</strong> give upper limits <strong>for</strong> stra<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> a material.<br />
This allowable stra<strong>in</strong> should not be exceeded dur<strong>in</strong>g normal use because this may<br />
cause failure of the trailer.<br />
Besides decid<strong>in</strong>g on material properties choices had to be made on load<br />
scenarios. The load scenarios are used to simulate the loads that a trailer will be<br />
subjected to dur<strong>in</strong>g use. If the stra<strong>in</strong>s rema<strong>in</strong> below the allowable stra<strong>in</strong> under<br />
all load scenarios then the <strong>design</strong> suffices. If the allowable stra<strong>in</strong> is exceeded<br />
then other fibres should be used or more material should be added. Us<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ite<br />
element modell<strong>in</strong>g, the stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the material of the trailer were calculated<br />
under the load scenarios, one problem was that the load scenarios were not<br />
known <strong>for</strong> this case. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not know what the loads on the trailer<br />
would be when the trailer turned a corner or was brak<strong>in</strong>g when fully loaded with<br />
s<strong>and</strong>. The load scenarios were not known <strong>and</strong> the proposed load scenarios were<br />
adapted dur<strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>ite element modell<strong>in</strong>g. So when it became obvious that the<br />
allowable stra<strong>in</strong> was exceeded drastically under a load scenario, the load scenario<br />
was reduced <strong>and</strong> more fibres were added. In short, there was a lot of uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g the loads that the trailer would be subjected to dur<strong>in</strong>g use.<br />
Underestimat<strong>in</strong>g the load scenarios could lead to trailers that are not strong or<br />
stiff enough <strong>in</strong> actual use <strong>and</strong> this can cause failure of a loaded trailer dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
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use. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong>dicated that they used the f<strong>in</strong>ite element calculations to<br />
check the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> but, because the load scenarios were not known,<br />
check<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> was problematic. Try<strong>in</strong>g to check a <strong>design</strong> without hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
proper load scenarios raises ethical questions such as: how far can eng<strong>in</strong>eers go<br />
<strong>in</strong> adapt<strong>in</strong>g load scenarios? In the end the trailer was <strong>design</strong>ed to be at least as<br />
stiff as the exist<strong>in</strong>g alum<strong>in</strong>ium trailer. This choice implied that the stiffness of<br />
the exist<strong>in</strong>g trailer was good enough, but the eng<strong>in</strong>eers were not sure about this.<br />
The question rema<strong>in</strong>s: What can be concluded from f<strong>in</strong>ite element calculations<br />
if the load scenarios are not known? The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not really seem to have a<br />
problem with this. They would have preferred to have the load scenarios but,<br />
because these were not available, they used educated guesses.<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> the customer did not <strong>in</strong>clude traffic safety <strong>in</strong> the<br />
requirements. The customer thought that traffic safety measures should be added<br />
once the structure of the trailer was already <strong>design</strong>ed. The customer considered<br />
side-covers to be part of the image <strong>and</strong> not the structure. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not<br />
seem to have realised that when <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a structure they <strong>in</strong>fluenced traffic<br />
safety. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers decided where structural parts should be located <strong>and</strong> how<br />
stiff <strong>and</strong> strong they should be. Cars crash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a trailer can be prevented from<br />
slid<strong>in</strong>g under a trailer if the stiff <strong>and</strong> strong structural parts are located <strong>in</strong> a low<br />
position, preferably at the same height as a car safety cage. This is also related to<br />
crash compatibility (see chapter 4). In the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, pedestrians <strong>and</strong> cyclists<br />
die every year because they go under the wheels of trailers, especially if a trailer<br />
driver turns right <strong>and</strong> overlooks a cyclists st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g next to them. The structure of<br />
the trailer can be <strong>design</strong>ed to protect pedestrians <strong>and</strong> cyclists from go<strong>in</strong>g under<br />
the wheels if the structure parts cover the sides. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers considered that<br />
the government was responsible <strong>for</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g traffic safety. This disregard<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
traffic safety is ethically relevant. Legally it is not a problem that traffic safety was<br />
not an issue <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> process because <strong>in</strong> the end the trailer can<br />
be adjusted to comply with current legislation.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers ascribe responsibilities to themselves, the customer, the truck driver<br />
<strong>and</strong> the government. This ascription of responsibilities is ethically relevant. The<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers only wanted to take responsibility <strong>for</strong> per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g the customer’s<br />
assignment well. The customer was responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g the assignment<br />
<strong>and</strong> the requirements. Governments should <strong>for</strong>mulate regulations concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers <strong>and</strong> traffic safety. A truck driver should drive carefully. This<br />
ascription of responsibilities resembles Florman’s model presented <strong>in</strong> section<br />
2.2.2. One of the reasons that traffic safety was overlooked by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers was<br />
that they saw their responsibility as mak<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> that meets the customer’s<br />
requirements.<br />
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7.5.2 Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
There was much discussion <strong>and</strong> communication between the eng<strong>in</strong>eers. <strong>Ethical</strong><br />
questions <strong>for</strong>med part of the responsibilities of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers work<strong>in</strong>g on the<br />
trailer. The customer also had to make a lot of choices <strong>and</strong> is there<strong>for</strong>e also<br />
confronted with ethical <strong>issues</strong>.<br />
Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on ethical <strong>issues</strong> was done us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternal CLC norms <strong>and</strong><br />
ideas on good <strong>design</strong> practice, such as the operationalisation of safety <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>for</strong>m of a structurally reliable trailer. These <strong>in</strong>ternal norms <strong>in</strong>clude ideas, rules,<br />
guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>books about how to <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> calculate a structurally<br />
reliable structure. Examples of <strong>in</strong>ternal norms <strong>and</strong> ideas on good <strong>design</strong> practice<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude the safety factors that should be used, the limit <strong>and</strong> ultimate load,<br />
materials properties <strong>and</strong> what environmental <strong>in</strong>fluences should be accounted <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> the trailer <strong>design</strong> process. These ideas <strong>and</strong> norms were used <strong>in</strong> the case study<br />
<strong>design</strong> process.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>ternal norms <strong>and</strong> ideas on good <strong>design</strong> practice could be traced to the<br />
<strong>design</strong> experience of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> their education. A lot of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the CLC have the same educational background <strong>and</strong> parts of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal norms can be traced back directly to this background. Other parts of<br />
these norms can be traced to shared experience <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g with composites.<br />
The eng<strong>in</strong>eers used these <strong>in</strong>ternal norms without reflection as to whether or not<br />
these norms were complete.<br />
7.5.3 Regulative framework<br />
In this case only a few elements of a regulative framework were used. There is an<br />
extensive regulative framework <strong>for</strong> trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers. Trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers have to<br />
be certified <strong>and</strong> checked be<strong>for</strong>e they are allowed on the roads. In the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s,<br />
the “Rijksdienstwegverkeer”, the Dutch governmental organisation <strong>for</strong> traffic, has<br />
to certify trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers. Several European directives, amongst others<br />
96/53/EC, 97/27/EC <strong>and</strong> 2002/7/EC, which specify mass, dimensions, turn<strong>in</strong>g<br />
circle <strong>and</strong> manoeuvrability, perta<strong>in</strong> to transport with trailers <strong>in</strong> Europe. The rules<br />
<strong>for</strong> maximum dimensions of trailers <strong>and</strong> loads on axles were taken <strong>in</strong>to account<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. For example, axles should be able to support a load of 9<br />
tonnes. The 9 tonnes load is, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers, based on Dutch<br />
legislation. At one po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the requirements a reference was made to European<br />
regulation; the pneumatic spr<strong>in</strong>gs of the trailer should comply with European<br />
regulation. So given the complete regulative framework perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to trucks <strong>and</strong><br />
trailers, the eng<strong>in</strong>eers only abstracted some rules about maximum dimensions,<br />
axle loads <strong>and</strong> European rules regard<strong>in</strong>g pneumatic spr<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
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The eng<strong>in</strong>eers do not seem to know more about the regulative framework<br />
than these rules although the framework has more elements. This is comparable<br />
to the case of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g the bridge, described <strong>in</strong> chapter 6, us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
some rules from a work<strong>in</strong>g conditions framework without us<strong>in</strong>g the complete<br />
framework. Aga<strong>in</strong> it is an ethical question as to whether the eng<strong>in</strong>eers should<br />
have considered the regulative framework concern<strong>in</strong>g trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers.<br />
Probably the regulative framework is not completely applicable <strong>in</strong> this (radical)<br />
<strong>design</strong> of a composite trailer, but <strong>in</strong> completely disregard<strong>in</strong>g the regulative<br />
framework the requirements or operationalisations from the framework that<br />
could have been used, are also disregarded. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not try to figure<br />
out whether the regulative framework <strong>for</strong> trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers might have given<br />
them additional useful <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>for</strong> this <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
7.6 Acknowledgements<br />
I would like to thank Ruflo <strong>and</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eers at the CLC <strong>for</strong> their co-operation.<br />
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8 Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
In this chapter conclusions are drawn based on the four case-studies with regard<br />
to the work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses that were <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> chapter 3 <strong>in</strong> this chapter.<br />
These work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses were:<br />
1a) The k<strong>in</strong>ds of ethical <strong>issues</strong> faced by eng<strong>in</strong>eers depend on <strong>design</strong> type<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy.<br />
1b) The ways <strong>in</strong> which eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with these ethical <strong>issues</strong> depend on<br />
<strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> hierarchy.<br />
2a) In normal <strong>design</strong> processes a regulative framework is used by<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers to account <strong>for</strong> the decisions made on ethical <strong>issues</strong>.<br />
2b) This regulative framework fulfils all Grunwald’s requirements <strong>and</strong> is<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e a normative framework.<br />
The results from the cases are first summarized <strong>in</strong> section 8.1. Subsequently the<br />
empirical data with regard to work<strong>in</strong>g hypothesis 1a are discussed <strong>in</strong> section 8.2.<br />
It is argued that the empirical data only partly support this work<strong>in</strong>g hypothesis.<br />
Contrary to what was expected the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy does not seem to <strong>in</strong>fluence<br />
the k<strong>in</strong>ds of ethical <strong>issues</strong>. These <strong>issues</strong> only depend on <strong>design</strong> type. It will be<br />
shown that the empirical data only support a part of hypothesis 1b <strong>in</strong> section 8.3.<br />
The way eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong> depends on <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong> no<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence of <strong>design</strong> hierarchy was seen. It will also be argued that the empirical<br />
data are <strong>in</strong> accord with work<strong>in</strong>g hypothesis 2a. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers use a regulative<br />
framework to deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>. They do not use<br />
regulative frameworks <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong>. The regulative frameworks encountered<br />
<strong>in</strong> this thesis do not fulfil Grunwald’s requirements. So work<strong>in</strong>g hypothesis 2b is<br />
not confirmed by the empirical data. This will be argued <strong>in</strong> section 8.4. Until<br />
now, I have considered the <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation to be given fact <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> processes. I discuss this assumption <strong>in</strong> section 8.5 <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicate that the<br />
<strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation is not completely fixed <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers have ways to<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence the <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation. This is highly relevant from an<br />
ethical po<strong>in</strong>t of view because the problem def<strong>in</strong>ition determ<strong>in</strong>es the <strong>design</strong> type.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, an attempt is made to generalise the results from the cases <strong>in</strong> section<br />
8.6, this generalisation is done on empirical <strong>and</strong> conceptual grounds.<br />
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8.1 Summary of the results<br />
The results from the cases are summarised <strong>in</strong> tables 8.1 to 8.4. Short<br />
descriptions of the ethical <strong>issues</strong> are given <strong>in</strong> the first column. The ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
mentioned here were sometimes spontaneously mentioned by eng<strong>in</strong>eers, like<br />
safety <strong>in</strong> the DutchEVO case. Other ethical <strong>issues</strong> like traffic safety <strong>in</strong> the trailer<br />
case were not spontaneously mentioned but were recognised to be ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
when this was po<strong>in</strong>ted out to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> the presentations I gave.<br />
I have categorized the ethically relevant <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> the second column. The<br />
categories were not def<strong>in</strong>ed be<strong>for</strong>e the empirical studies were done but came out<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the studies. Three of them can be related to actions <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes<br />
that can be ethically relevant, i.e. follow<strong>in</strong>g Van de Poel: the <strong>for</strong>mulation <strong>and</strong><br />
operationalisation of requirements <strong>and</strong> the assessment of trade-offs between<br />
<strong>design</strong> requirements (see section 2.1). Most ethical <strong>issues</strong> were related to the<br />
operationalisation of requirements <strong>and</strong> the mak<strong>in</strong>g of trade-offs. In addition to<br />
this, some problems concern<strong>in</strong>g the division or ascription of responsibilities<br />
were identified. The ethical <strong>issues</strong> could be divided <strong>in</strong>to five categories. There<br />
were two k<strong>in</strong>ds of operationalisations made. Some operationalisations only<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved a choice between given options, <strong>for</strong> example the choice to work with the<br />
regulative framework or a choice between different codes. In other cases of<br />
operationalisations, these options were not given <strong>and</strong> a complete<br />
operationalisation had to be made. The latter <strong>for</strong>m of operationalisation is more<br />
ill-structured. In the follow<strong>in</strong>g, I refer to the operationalisation of requirements<br />
by choos<strong>in</strong>g between given options as “operationalisation I”; the ill-structured<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d of operationalisation is referred to as “operationalisation II”. There is a<br />
category of ethical <strong>issues</strong> related to the mak<strong>in</strong>g of trade-offs, plus a category of<br />
ethical <strong>issues</strong> related to the division <strong>and</strong> ascription of responsibilities. There is<br />
also a category of ethical <strong>issues</strong> related to the <strong>for</strong>mulation of requirements. To<br />
summarise, these five categories will be referred to as: operationalisation I,<br />
operationalisation II, mak<strong>in</strong>g trade-offs, division or ascription of responsibilities<br />
<strong>and</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mulation of requirements.<br />
The approaches used to obta<strong>in</strong> arguments <strong>and</strong> make a decision concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the ethical issue are described <strong>in</strong> the third column. The persons <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the<br />
solution <strong>and</strong> decision approaches <strong>for</strong> the ethical <strong>issues</strong> are listed <strong>in</strong> the last<br />
column.<br />
154
Table 8.1: Summary of the DutchEVO case-study.<br />
Radical, high level <strong>design</strong><br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong><br />
questions <strong>and</strong><br />
problems<br />
Driver should feel<br />
vulnerable, <strong>design</strong><br />
team chooses not<br />
to <strong>in</strong>clude all k<strong>in</strong>ds<br />
of safety systems.<br />
A light car always<br />
has a disadvantage<br />
<strong>in</strong> a collision with<br />
a heavier car but it<br />
is more<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able.<br />
It is not possible to<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude all exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
passive <strong>and</strong> active<br />
safety systems <strong>in</strong> a<br />
light car.<br />
A susta<strong>in</strong>able car<br />
is a very light car.<br />
A susta<strong>in</strong>able car<br />
is a lightweight car<br />
even if it is<br />
difficult to recycle<br />
The DutchEVO<br />
should be<br />
emotionally<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able.<br />
K<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>issues</strong> Solution <strong>and</strong><br />
decision approaches<br />
Operationalisation II of<br />
safety<br />
Trade-offs between safety<br />
<strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
Trade-offs between safety<br />
<strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
Operationalisation II of<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
Operationalisation II of<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
Operationalisation II of<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability, friction<br />
with other parts of<br />
operationalisation of<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability.<br />
Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
Rejection of exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
regulative framework<br />
based on personal<br />
experience. This<br />
became an <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
<strong>design</strong> team norm.<br />
Some limited<br />
literature research.<br />
Personal <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong><br />
experience.<br />
Discussions,<br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
<strong>design</strong> team norm.<br />
Literature research,<br />
discussions, ideas on<br />
recycl<strong>in</strong>g from PhD<br />
students on recycl<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
<strong>design</strong> team norm.<br />
Emotional<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability is based<br />
on literature about<br />
<strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> personal<br />
experience. Fun-todrive<br />
became an<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>design</strong> team<br />
norm.<br />
Decision<br />
makers<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
155
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
Table 8.2: Summary of the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment case-study.<br />
Normal, middle to low level <strong>design</strong><br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong>, K<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>issues</strong> Solution <strong>and</strong><br />
questions <strong>and</strong><br />
decision<br />
problems<br />
approaches<br />
Assumption:<br />
Operationalisation Approval by<br />
<strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
legislation <strong>and</strong> codes<br />
leads to safe <strong>and</strong> good<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallations.<br />
I of requirements Notified Body.<br />
Which code will be<br />
used <strong>in</strong> this <strong>design</strong><br />
process to make a<br />
good <strong>and</strong> safe <strong>design</strong>?<br />
What load <strong>and</strong><br />
accident scenarios<br />
need to be accounted<br />
<strong>for</strong>?<br />
Deviation from code<br />
allowed?<br />
Inconsistencies<br />
between customer<br />
requirements, codes<br />
<strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />
156<br />
Operationalisation<br />
I of requirements<br />
Operationalisation<br />
II of safety<br />
Operationalisation<br />
I of requirements<br />
Choos<strong>in</strong>g between<br />
allowable codes<br />
from regulative<br />
framework.<br />
Experience,<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal company<br />
rules, customer<br />
rules, seek advice<br />
from Notified Body<br />
Use alternative<br />
ways specified <strong>in</strong><br />
regulative<br />
framework <strong>and</strong>/or<br />
confer with<br />
Notified Body.<br />
Mak<strong>in</strong>g trade-offs Discuss with<br />
customer about his<br />
requirements <strong>and</strong>/<br />
or ask Notified<br />
Body what tradeoffs<br />
they accept.<br />
Decision makers<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved<br />
Organisations<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
regulative<br />
framework, e.g.<br />
Notified Body,<br />
European Union,<br />
governments,<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ardisation<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutes<br />
Customer or<br />
customer <strong>and</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company<br />
Stress eng<strong>in</strong>eer,<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company,<br />
(customer, Notified<br />
Body)<br />
Job eng<strong>in</strong>eer, stress<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>and</strong><br />
materials eng<strong>in</strong>eer,<br />
customer, Notified<br />
Body<br />
Customer,<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company, Notified<br />
Body
Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
Table 8.2 cont<strong>in</strong>ued Summary of the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment case-study.<br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong>,<br />
questions <strong>and</strong><br />
problems<br />
Can the details on the<br />
draw<strong>in</strong>g be produced<br />
without too much<br />
difficulty or danger <strong>for</strong><br />
people on the<br />
construction site?<br />
K<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>issues</strong> Solution <strong>and</strong><br />
decision<br />
approaches<br />
Division or<br />
ascription of<br />
responsibility<br />
between<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company <strong>and</strong><br />
contractor.<br />
Related to type of<br />
contract, less<br />
likely <strong>in</strong> turn-key<br />
contract.<br />
Discussion on<br />
assigned<br />
responsibilities of<br />
customer,<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company <strong>and</strong><br />
contractor.<br />
Table 8.3: Summary of the bridge case-study.<br />
Normal, high to middle level <strong>design</strong><br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> K<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>issues</strong> Solution <strong>and</strong> decision<br />
questions <strong>and</strong><br />
problems<br />
approaches<br />
Assumption:<br />
<strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g by<br />
legislation <strong>and</strong><br />
codes leads to<br />
safe bridges.<br />
Choice between<br />
European code<br />
<strong>and</strong> NEN code<br />
Operationalisation Approval <strong>for</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
I of requirements permission, no disasters<br />
have occurred with<br />
bridges built accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
codes.<br />
Decision makers<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved<br />
Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>er,<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company,<br />
contractor, customer<br />
Decision makers<br />
Organisations<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
regulative framework,<br />
permission issu<strong>in</strong>g<br />
organisations,<br />
European Union,<br />
Governments,<br />
St<strong>and</strong>ardisation<br />
Institutes<br />
Operationalisation Fatigue loads better Customer will make<br />
I of requirements predicted <strong>in</strong> European choice based on advice<br />
code. Bridge probably not<br />
more expensive us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
European code. Less<br />
experience with European<br />
code, calculations will take<br />
more time.<br />
from IBA<br />
157
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
158<br />
Table 8.3 cont<strong>in</strong>ued Summary of the bridge case-study.<br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong><br />
questions <strong>and</strong><br />
problems<br />
K<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>issues</strong> Solution <strong>and</strong> decision<br />
approaches<br />
Decision makers<br />
A choice Operationalisation If available <strong>in</strong>terpretations Concrete eng<strong>in</strong>eers will<br />
between types of I of structural of the regulative<br />
make choice. The<br />
codes <strong>for</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> requirements. framework address<strong>in</strong>g build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>spection can<br />
specific parts of<br />
this choice provided by check this choice be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
the bridge.<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g societies <strong>and</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g permit is<br />
governmental<br />
organisations issu<strong>in</strong>g<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g permits.<br />
Experience <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
ideas with<strong>in</strong> IBA.<br />
issued.<br />
What should the Operationalisation IBA eng<strong>in</strong>eers do not Health <strong>and</strong> safety<br />
health <strong>and</strong> safety II of the<br />
discuss this or make an coord<strong>in</strong>ator <strong>design</strong>,<br />
plan look like, requirement to explicit choice; they eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
should the make a health <strong>and</strong> comply with legal<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers safety plan. requirement by list<strong>in</strong>g<br />
change the<br />
risks <strong>in</strong> a health <strong>and</strong> safety<br />
<strong>design</strong> to prevent<br />
risks dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
construction?<br />
plan.<br />
What misuse Operationalisation Experience with other All eng<strong>in</strong>eers especially<br />
should be II of safety. bridges <strong>and</strong> comments those <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g the<br />
prevented, how?<br />
from Rijkswaterstaat steel arches.<br />
given <strong>in</strong> this <strong>and</strong> other Rijkswaterstaat Civil<br />
projects.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g Division<br />
Table 8.4: Summary of the trailer case-study.<br />
Radical, middle level <strong>design</strong><br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> K<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>issues</strong> Solution <strong>and</strong><br />
questions <strong>and</strong><br />
problems<br />
decision approaches<br />
Neglect of traffic<br />
safety dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
process.<br />
Formulation of<br />
requirements .<br />
Decision makers<br />
Internal <strong>design</strong> team Eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong><br />
norms <strong>and</strong> customer customer<br />
norms do not <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
traffic safety.
Table 8.4: cont<strong>in</strong>ued Summary of the trailer case-study.<br />
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong><br />
questions <strong>and</strong><br />
problems<br />
A safe trailer is<br />
structurally reliable.<br />
What load scenarios,<br />
<strong>and</strong> material<br />
properties should be<br />
used?<br />
Simultaneously<br />
chang<strong>in</strong>g load<br />
scenarios <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ite element<br />
calculations.<br />
Ascription of<br />
responsibilities<br />
especially to the<br />
customer <strong>and</strong><br />
government.<br />
K<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>issues</strong> Solution <strong>and</strong><br />
decision approaches<br />
Operationalisation II of<br />
safety.<br />
Operationalisation II of<br />
structural reliability,<br />
<strong>and</strong> thereby further<br />
operationalisation II of<br />
safety.<br />
Operationalisation II of<br />
structural reliability,<br />
<strong>and</strong> thereby further<br />
operationalisation II of<br />
safety.<br />
Division or ascription<br />
of responsibilities.<br />
8.2 <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> hierarchy<br />
Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
Internal <strong>design</strong> team<br />
norms <strong>and</strong> customer<br />
norms.<br />
Internal <strong>design</strong> team<br />
norms.<br />
Internal <strong>design</strong> team<br />
norms.<br />
Internal <strong>design</strong> team<br />
norms <strong>in</strong>clude an<br />
assessment of<br />
responsibilities <strong>in</strong><br />
contract.<br />
Decision makers<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong><br />
customer<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong><br />
customer<br />
The work<strong>in</strong>g hypothesis 1a about whether the k<strong>in</strong>ds of ethical <strong>issues</strong> depend on<br />
the <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> hierarchy will be assessed <strong>in</strong> this section. The ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> the four cases are summarised <strong>in</strong> tables 8.1 to 8.4. Based on these tables it can<br />
be concluded that <strong>in</strong> both normal <strong>and</strong> radical <strong>design</strong> most ethical <strong>issues</strong> are of<br />
the operationalisation I <strong>and</strong> II k<strong>in</strong>d. Operationalisation I k<strong>in</strong>d of ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
were encountered more often than operationalisation II k<strong>in</strong>d of ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
the normal <strong>design</strong> processes. From tables 8.2 <strong>and</strong> 8.3, it can be seen that <strong>in</strong> the<br />
normal <strong>design</strong> cases, pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>and</strong> the bridge, more than half of<br />
the ethical <strong>issues</strong> were of the operationalisation I k<strong>in</strong>d. Operationalisation I k<strong>in</strong>d<br />
of ethical <strong>issues</strong> were not encountered <strong>in</strong> the radical <strong>design</strong>s, lightweight car <strong>and</strong><br />
light open trailer. So, although ethical <strong>issues</strong> concern<strong>in</strong>g the operationalisation<br />
of requirements can be found <strong>in</strong> all <strong>design</strong> processes, there is a difference <strong>in</strong> the<br />
nature of the operationalisation problems between normal <strong>and</strong> radical <strong>design</strong><br />
processes.<br />
159
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
A clear relation between the k<strong>in</strong>d of ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy<br />
cannot be seen <strong>in</strong> these cases. Problems related to the division of responsibilities<br />
seem to occur near the boundaries between companies, i.e. customer,<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> construction companies. This is more related to the <strong>design</strong><br />
phase of the <strong>design</strong> process than to the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy. If a <strong>design</strong> is made <strong>for</strong><br />
a customer then responsibilities have to be divided between the customer <strong>and</strong><br />
the <strong>design</strong> team <strong>in</strong> the first phase of the <strong>design</strong> process. The first phase of the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process is the <strong>for</strong>mulation of the <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>and</strong> the requirements.<br />
In the trailer case, <strong>for</strong> example, the eng<strong>in</strong>eers of the <strong>design</strong> team ascribed certa<strong>in</strong><br />
responsibilities to the customer. The customer was, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the eng<strong>in</strong>eers,<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the relevant requirements <strong>and</strong> the customer accepted<br />
this responsibility. Problems with the division of responsibilities can be<br />
discerned <strong>in</strong> the last phase of the <strong>design</strong> process, the detail<strong>in</strong>g or tender<br />
specification phase, especially if another company has to construct the <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers mentioned <strong>in</strong> the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment case that there were<br />
sometimes problems with the division of responsibilities <strong>for</strong> details of the<br />
<strong>design</strong>. Some details were not specified enough or were specified <strong>in</strong> such a way<br />
that they could not be made. Problems related to the division of responsibility<br />
were not visible, <strong>in</strong> the bridge case but the eng<strong>in</strong>eers expected some problems<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g the division of responsibilities to arise when they prepared tender<strong>in</strong>g<br />
specifications <strong>and</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g construction.<br />
The overall conclusion is that the empirical evidence strongly supports part of<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g hypothesis 1a. The k<strong>in</strong>ds of ethical <strong>issues</strong> encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><br />
processes <strong>in</strong>deed depend on the <strong>design</strong> type. There was no relationship found<br />
between the k<strong>in</strong>d of ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>design</strong> hierarchy.<br />
8.3 Approaches to resolve ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> hierarchy<br />
There is a visible relationship between the <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> the solution <strong>and</strong><br />
decision approaches used to decide the ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> the cases. In normal<br />
<strong>design</strong> most operationalisations <strong>and</strong> trade-offs were made us<strong>in</strong>g a regulative<br />
framework. A regulative framework was used to structure the operationalisation<br />
of requirements, such a framework provides some of the operationalisations <strong>and</strong><br />
lays down m<strong>in</strong>imal requirements. Other operationalisations were not completely<br />
specified by a regulative framework but these operationalisations were limited to<br />
a choice between given options. A regulative framework was also used to provide<br />
a strategy <strong>for</strong> ask<strong>in</strong>g advice from certify<strong>in</strong>g organisations. It can be seen from<br />
tables 8.1 to 8.4 that the approach used to deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> normal<br />
<strong>design</strong> was <strong>in</strong> more than half of the <strong>issues</strong>, to refer to a regulative framework, or<br />
160
Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
to ask advice from a certify<strong>in</strong>g organisation. Thus <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>s there were<br />
fewer operationalisations made from scratch. The availability of a regulative<br />
framework did not mean that all of the ethical <strong>issues</strong> could be decided on us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
such a framework. Some subjects were not covered by the regulative framework.<br />
For example, <strong>in</strong> the bridge case the prevention of misuse of the bridge was not<br />
part of the regulative framework, while <strong>in</strong> the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment case the<br />
regulative framework did not provide rules <strong>for</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g load <strong>and</strong> accident<br />
scenarios. The Notified Body could give advice on load <strong>and</strong> accident scenarios<br />
but it was not allowed to check accident scenarios. When a regulative framework<br />
did not give guidance <strong>and</strong> rules on a subject the eng<strong>in</strong>eers fell back to rely<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
company rules, their own <strong>design</strong> experience or seek<strong>in</strong>g advice from an<br />
organization that had a lot of experience with the subject. So <strong>in</strong> the presented<br />
cases the regulative framework was complemented with comply<strong>in</strong>g to company<br />
rules, us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> seek<strong>in</strong>g expert advice.<br />
Only a few references were made to regulative frameworks or ideas from the<br />
regulative framework were rejected <strong>in</strong> the radical <strong>design</strong> cases. In these cases the<br />
approaches <strong>for</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>g with ethical <strong>issues</strong> were to rely on personal or <strong>design</strong><br />
experience <strong>and</strong>/or to discuss such <strong>issues</strong> with the customer.<br />
The regulative framework perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to car safety was rejected <strong>in</strong> the<br />
DutchEVO lightweight car case <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the trailer case the regulative framework<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g trucks <strong>and</strong> trailers was only used to obta<strong>in</strong> maximum dimensions,<br />
mass <strong>and</strong> pneumatic spr<strong>in</strong>gs. Operationalisations of ethical <strong>issues</strong> were made<br />
based on <strong>in</strong>ternal norms exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the company <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g the trailer. These<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal norms were also of help <strong>in</strong> decid<strong>in</strong>g what trade-offs were deemed<br />
acceptable by the <strong>design</strong> team. The <strong>in</strong>ternal norms consisted of ideas, rules <strong>and</strong><br />
guidel<strong>in</strong>es as to what a good <strong>design</strong> is <strong>and</strong> how a <strong>design</strong> should be made. Such<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal norms are shared by a <strong>design</strong> team, but can also be shared by (the<br />
department of) an organisation <strong>in</strong> which the <strong>design</strong> team works. In the radical<br />
<strong>design</strong> cases, <strong>in</strong>ternal norms were developed based on <strong>design</strong> experience,<br />
educational background <strong>and</strong> personal experience. In addition to these <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
norms, customer norms can be used <strong>in</strong> operationalisations <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the mak<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
trade-offs.<br />
In the trailer case, a lot of discussions was devoted to what load scenarios<br />
should be used to test the reliability of the trailer. These load scenarios were part<br />
of the operationalisation of the reliability of the trailer, <strong>and</strong> as <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong><br />
chapter 7, safety was equated with reliability. The department of the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
company <strong>in</strong> which the eng<strong>in</strong>eers worked specialised <strong>in</strong> lightweight composite<br />
<strong>design</strong>. Internal norms <strong>and</strong> ideas on good <strong>design</strong> practice existed with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
department <strong>and</strong> were based upon the department’s <strong>design</strong> experience with<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
composites <strong>and</strong> on the fact that most of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers had graduated <strong>in</strong><br />
aerospace eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers had prior experience <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g with<br />
composites, thus dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>for</strong>mulation <strong>and</strong> operationalisation of requirements<br />
the eng<strong>in</strong>eers used their own experience coupled with the <strong>in</strong>ternal norms <strong>and</strong><br />
ideas on good <strong>design</strong> practice of the department. The customer had a lot of<br />
experience with the production of trailers <strong>and</strong> with how trailers are used <strong>in</strong><br />
practice. The customer‘s experience was also used dur<strong>in</strong>g the operationalisation<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulation of requirements.<br />
In the DutchEVO lightweight car case there were few if any shared <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
norms <strong>and</strong> ideas on good <strong>design</strong> practice when the <strong>design</strong> process started.<br />
Internal norms <strong>and</strong> ideas on good <strong>design</strong> practice evolved as the <strong>design</strong> evolved.<br />
In the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>design</strong> process it was decided that a lightweight<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able car would be <strong>design</strong>ed. After a while it became an <strong>in</strong>ternal norm<br />
that, when choos<strong>in</strong>g between different options, the mass of the car should be<br />
taken as the decisive factor. This norm developed dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process. It<br />
should be noted that the eng<strong>in</strong>eers were work<strong>in</strong>g with each other <strong>for</strong> the first<br />
time <strong>and</strong> most of the <strong>design</strong> team members had very limited <strong>design</strong> experience.<br />
The organisation, with<strong>in</strong> which the <strong>design</strong> team worked, Delft University of<br />
Technology, consists of a number of different faculties <strong>and</strong> departments <strong>and</strong> few<br />
if any shared <strong>in</strong>ternal norms exist with<strong>in</strong> the university at least not at this level of<br />
<strong>design</strong>. So the <strong>design</strong> team could not refer to such norms. It can be concluded<br />
that <strong>in</strong> the DutchEVO lightweight car case norms on good <strong>design</strong> practice were<br />
developed simultaneously with the <strong>design</strong>.<br />
The first conclusion is that work<strong>in</strong>g hypothesis 1b is only partly supported by the<br />
four cases. The way eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong> does depend on <strong>design</strong><br />
type but no <strong>in</strong>fluence of <strong>design</strong> hierarchy on the solution <strong>and</strong> decision strategy<br />
was seen. The second conclusion is that work<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses 2a is conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
underp<strong>in</strong>ned by the empirical evidence. In the normal <strong>design</strong> cases, the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers referred to the regulative framework to account <strong>for</strong> most of the ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong>. The regulative framework, however, did not provide rules <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />
to account <strong>for</strong> every ethical issue. Some decisions <strong>in</strong> the normal <strong>design</strong><br />
processes were made based on <strong>design</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> company rules. In the<br />
radical <strong>design</strong> cases decisions were made based on <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>design</strong> team norms<br />
<strong>and</strong>, if available, customer norms.<br />
8.3.1 Decision makers <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> type <strong>and</strong> hierarchy<br />
At this po<strong>in</strong>t I want to focus on who is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the solution <strong>and</strong> decision<br />
approaches, as these actors can <strong>in</strong>fluence the decision that is made. First there is<br />
the question of which eng<strong>in</strong>eer(s) deal with the ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> do they do this<br />
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Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividually or collectively. Second there may be a customer that is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong><br />
decid<strong>in</strong>g on some ethical <strong>issues</strong>. Third, other organisations might be <strong>in</strong>cluded or<br />
asked <strong>for</strong> advice, <strong>for</strong> example certify<strong>in</strong>g organisations.<br />
In the case-studies a difference could be seen between radical <strong>and</strong> normal<br />
<strong>design</strong> processes <strong>in</strong> the organisation of the <strong>design</strong> processes. In the normal<br />
<strong>design</strong> processes there was more division of labour. Individual eng<strong>in</strong>eers (or<br />
small groups) <strong>design</strong>ed a part. Most of the ethical <strong>issues</strong> that came up <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g that part were <strong>in</strong>itially resolved by the <strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eers. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eers were experienced <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> some situations they could rely on<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal company rules. If the problem was especially difficult or might<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence other parts of the <strong>design</strong> then the eng<strong>in</strong>eers discussed the problem<br />
with the job eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> / or with the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g the other parts.<br />
With<strong>in</strong> the IBA the eng<strong>in</strong>eers would ask eng<strong>in</strong>eers who had the same role <strong>in</strong><br />
another <strong>design</strong> project to check their <strong>design</strong>. In the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment case<br />
this was not possible because some customers did not want the eng<strong>in</strong>eers to<br />
work on projects <strong>for</strong> their competitors. Decisions to consult the customer or the<br />
certify<strong>in</strong>g organisation were always discussed with the job eng<strong>in</strong>eer or project<br />
manager. Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> processes can, there<strong>for</strong>e, be<br />
characterised as <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>and</strong> hierarchical. This does not mean that there was<br />
no communication between eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> the normal <strong>design</strong> process but the<br />
division of labour was very clear <strong>and</strong> every one had a clearly def<strong>in</strong>ed task <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process. In contrast to <strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eers be<strong>in</strong>g confronted with ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>, ethical <strong>issues</strong> were discussed <strong>and</strong> decided on<br />
collectively <strong>in</strong> the radical <strong>design</strong> processes. Different <strong>design</strong> team members had<br />
different tasks <strong>in</strong> the two radical <strong>design</strong> processes that were studied but there<br />
was a lot of communication between members. The ethical <strong>issues</strong> concerned<br />
more than just one eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a part so the ethical <strong>issues</strong> were decided<br />
on by the whole <strong>design</strong> team. In the DutchEVO lightweight car case, the master<br />
<strong>and</strong> bachelor students had to make a <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> a small part of the car, <strong>for</strong><br />
example the drive tra<strong>in</strong> or suspension. These students made prelim<strong>in</strong>ary choices<br />
<strong>in</strong> their work. These prelim<strong>in</strong>ary choices <strong>and</strong> the argumentation <strong>for</strong> them were<br />
presented to the whole <strong>design</strong> team. After the presentations, typically<br />
discussions followed <strong>and</strong> then def<strong>in</strong>itive decisions were made. So although some<br />
decisions were first taken by one or two students, the whole <strong>design</strong> team was<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> discussions on these decisions <strong>and</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>al decisions<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g the lightweight car <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Whether the <strong>design</strong> is made <strong>for</strong> a customer or not is important <strong>for</strong> who<br />
decides on ethical <strong>issues</strong>. There is little difference between the role of a customer<br />
<strong>in</strong> either a radical or normal <strong>design</strong> process. If the <strong>design</strong> is made <strong>for</strong> a customer<br />
then the customer plays an important role. In three of the case-studies, the<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
customer had a <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g some requirements<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e hir<strong>in</strong>g an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company to make the <strong>design</strong>. This <strong>design</strong> problem<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulation may be changed dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> but only <strong>in</strong> co-operation with the<br />
customer. In the case-studies some decisions, especially those related to what<br />
code to use <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>, were made by the customer. In the bridge case,<br />
the <strong>design</strong> team advised the customer with respect to choos<strong>in</strong>g between the NEN<br />
<strong>and</strong> European codes. In the pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment case, the customer could<br />
choose between several European codes if the <strong>in</strong>stallation was to be built <strong>in</strong> the<br />
EU. In the trailer case, the <strong>for</strong>mulation of requirements <strong>and</strong> the first<br />
operationalisation of those requirements were done <strong>in</strong> co-operation with the<br />
customer. Further operationalisations that required more specialist knowledge<br />
were done by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers.<br />
Organisations that have to issue permits or certify the <strong>design</strong> may be <strong>in</strong>volved<br />
<strong>in</strong> the normal <strong>design</strong> processes. Advice could be sought from these<br />
organisations. In the normal <strong>design</strong> cases, the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> solv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
approaches there<strong>for</strong>e <strong>in</strong>cluded eng<strong>in</strong>eers, customer(s) <strong>and</strong> certify<strong>in</strong>g<br />
organisations. The certify<strong>in</strong>g organisations were not <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the radical<br />
<strong>design</strong> processes. It should be realised, however, that if a radical <strong>design</strong> is to be<br />
produced <strong>and</strong> sold then it has to obta<strong>in</strong> a CE mark. So, <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong><br />
processes, certify<strong>in</strong>g organisations may play a role <strong>in</strong> the last phases of a <strong>design</strong><br />
processes. The radical <strong>design</strong>s studied <strong>for</strong> this research were not <strong>in</strong> the last<br />
phases. The lightweight car of the DutchEVO project was not <strong>design</strong>ed to<br />
produce a production model car. The trailer could have been produced <strong>and</strong> sold<br />
but the <strong>design</strong> process was stopped by the customer after the feasibility <strong>and</strong><br />
prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>design</strong> phase.<br />
The <strong>design</strong> processes were organised <strong>in</strong> the normal <strong>design</strong> cases <strong>in</strong> such a way<br />
that <strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eers were confronted with ethical <strong>issues</strong> depend<strong>in</strong>g on their<br />
role <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. In a normal <strong>design</strong> case the ethical <strong>issues</strong> could be<br />
decided on by an <strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a part of the product. Decisions<br />
on ethical <strong>issues</strong> were made collectively <strong>in</strong> the radical <strong>design</strong>s. The <strong>design</strong> team<br />
discussed the ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong>, although a s<strong>in</strong>gle eng<strong>in</strong>eer might have prepared<br />
the discussion, the decision was ultimately made by the <strong>design</strong> team. In the<br />
cases where a <strong>design</strong> was made <strong>for</strong> a customer, the customer was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong><br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g decisions on some of the ethical <strong>issues</strong>, while certify<strong>in</strong>g organisation<br />
could be asked <strong>for</strong> advice <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> cases.<br />
164
8.4 Regulative frameworks<br />
Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
I address work<strong>in</strong>g hypothesis 2b <strong>in</strong> this section. Grunwald has proposed a<br />
number of requirements that a regulative framework must meet be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers can be justified <strong>in</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the framework without further<br />
ethical reflection. Such a normative framework can thus be seen as provid<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
limits with<strong>in</strong> which eng<strong>in</strong>eers can do their work. A normative framework is<br />
politically <strong>and</strong> socially sanctioned, <strong>and</strong> should, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Grunwald, be<br />
pragmatically complete, locally consistent, unambiguous, accepted <strong>and</strong> observed.<br />
I have already established whether the regulative frameworks could be<br />
considered normative frameworks <strong>in</strong> the last sections of the empirical chapters. I<br />
concluded that, <strong>in</strong> the case-studies used <strong>for</strong> this research, Grunwald’s<br />
requirements were only partly met. A list of ethical <strong>issues</strong> related to problems<br />
with the regulative frameworks, based on Grunwald’s requirements is given <strong>in</strong><br />
table 8.5.<br />
Table 8.5: <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> problems with the regulative framework.<br />
Product <strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> questions K<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>issues</strong> Relation with problems of the<br />
<strong>and</strong> problems<br />
regulative framework<br />
Pip<strong>in</strong>g Assumption: <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g Operationalisation I Regulative framework<br />
<strong>and</strong> by legislation <strong>and</strong> codes of requirements available but it is not accepted<br />
Equip- leads to safe <strong>and</strong> good<br />
by some groups <strong>for</strong> example<br />
ment <strong>in</strong>stallations.<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallations neighbours <strong>and</strong><br />
environmental groups.<br />
Which code will be used Operationalisation I Regulative framework<br />
<strong>in</strong> this <strong>design</strong> process to<br />
make a good <strong>and</strong> safe<br />
<strong>design</strong>?<br />
of requirements pragmatically <strong>in</strong>complete.<br />
What load <strong>and</strong> accident Operationalisation Regulative framework<br />
scenarios need to be<br />
accounted <strong>for</strong>?<br />
II of safety pragmatically <strong>in</strong>complete.<br />
Deviation from code Operationalisation I Regulative framework allows<br />
allowed?<br />
of requirements <strong>for</strong> deviation, ambiguous<br />
regulative framework.<br />
Inconsistencies between<br />
customer requirements,<br />
codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />
Mak<strong>in</strong>g trade-offs Some <strong>in</strong>consistency <strong>in</strong><br />
regulative framework, or<br />
<strong>in</strong>consistencies between<br />
regulative framework <strong>and</strong><br />
customer requirements.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
Bridge Assumption: <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
by legislation <strong>and</strong> codes<br />
leads to safe bridges.<br />
166<br />
Choice between<br />
European code <strong>and</strong> NEN<br />
code.<br />
A choice between types<br />
of codes <strong>for</strong> certa<strong>in</strong><br />
specific parts of the<br />
bridge.<br />
What should the health<br />
<strong>and</strong> safety plan look like,<br />
should the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
change the <strong>design</strong> to<br />
prevent risks dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
construction?<br />
What misuse should be<br />
prevented <strong>and</strong> how?<br />
Operationalisation<br />
I of requirements<br />
Operationalisation<br />
I of requirements<br />
Operationalisation<br />
I of structural<br />
requirements<br />
Operationalisation<br />
II of requirement<br />
to make a health<br />
<strong>and</strong> safety plan<br />
Operationalisation<br />
II of safety<br />
Regulative framework<br />
available no signs of not<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g accepted, some<br />
ambiguities, not<br />
pragmatically complete.<br />
Temporarily ambiguity <strong>in</strong><br />
regulative framework.<br />
Inconsistency <strong>in</strong> the<br />
regulative framework.<br />
Work with complete health<br />
<strong>and</strong> safety regulative<br />
framework dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
construction or not.<br />
Regulative framework does<br />
not <strong>in</strong>clude rules about<br />
prevention of misuse of<br />
bridges, there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
<strong>in</strong>complete.<br />
The regulative frameworks used <strong>in</strong> the case-studies do not meet Grunwald’s<br />
requirements but they can provide ways of deal<strong>in</strong>g with problems of ambiguity,<br />
<strong>in</strong>consistency <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>completeness. It might there<strong>for</strong>e be possible to make<br />
regulative frameworks more pragmatically complete, locally consistent <strong>and</strong><br />
unambiguous by <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a few new elements.<br />
Some problems of ambiguity <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>consistency can be dealt with with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
regulative frameworks. Regulative frameworks are hierarchical; not all elements<br />
carry the same weight. Legislation is at a higher level than codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />
Sometimes the framework provides ways of solv<strong>in</strong>g conflicts between elements,<br />
by mak<strong>in</strong>g it possible to use an element at a higher level to solve the conflict. The<br />
regulative framework can be <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> a way that leaves eng<strong>in</strong>eers with the<br />
freedom to not follow detailed prescriptive rules <strong>in</strong> exceptional cases. This<br />
possibility is available <strong>in</strong> most exist<strong>in</strong>g regulative frameworks because the<br />
detailed prescriptive elements like codes are not legally en<strong>for</strong>ced. When<br />
<strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g, eng<strong>in</strong>eers together with the customer <strong>and</strong> certify<strong>in</strong>g organisations<br />
can decide not to use codes <strong>in</strong>stead they can choose to use an alternative way to
Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
<strong>design</strong> a product. Some regulative frameworks specify <strong>for</strong> example organisations<br />
that should check the <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> certify it. In these frameworks a product is<br />
legally allowed to be sold <strong>and</strong> used only if it is certified. The certify<strong>in</strong>g<br />
organisations can help eng<strong>in</strong>eers when they are confronted with <strong>in</strong>consistencies<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> conflict between elements of the framework or bl<strong>in</strong>d spots. Certify<strong>in</strong>g<br />
organisations can <strong>for</strong> example <strong>in</strong>dicate which of the conflict<strong>in</strong>g elements can be<br />
ignored or how a trade-off is to be made; this allows ambiguity <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>consistency<br />
to be dealt with to a certa<strong>in</strong> extent with<strong>in</strong> the framework.<br />
One way <strong>in</strong> which eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g societies can help to reduce the ambiguity <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>completeness of regulative frameworks is to provide further <strong>in</strong>terpretations<br />
<strong>and</strong> elaboration of codes, st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> legislation. Ideas on good <strong>design</strong><br />
practice evolve <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g practice <strong>and</strong> are taught <strong>in</strong> education. These ideas<br />
can be used to help to make a regulative framework less ambiguous <strong>and</strong> less<br />
<strong>in</strong>complete over time.<br />
The above discussion <strong>in</strong>dicates that it might be relatively easy to make<br />
regulative frameworks more locally consistent, pragmatically complete <strong>and</strong><br />
unambiguous <strong>and</strong> that some of this can be done by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers, eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
societies <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ardisation organisations. However, from a moral po<strong>in</strong>t of<br />
view, Grunwald’s requirement <strong>for</strong> acceptance seems to be the most important<br />
because acceptance legitimises a framework. Acceptance of a framework is<br />
related to trust (see section 2.3.3). Eng<strong>in</strong>eers cannot make the public accept a<br />
regulative framework. There<strong>for</strong>e, the most important problem concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
regulative frameworks is that it is not clear whether they are accepted. I will<br />
come back on the problems regard<strong>in</strong>g the acceptance of regulative frameworks<br />
<strong>in</strong> chapter 9.<br />
8.5 Design problem <strong>for</strong>mulation<br />
Until now, I have considered the <strong>design</strong> problem def<strong>in</strong>ition as someth<strong>in</strong>g that is<br />
not part of but prelim<strong>in</strong>ary to the <strong>design</strong> process. At this po<strong>in</strong>t I want to make<br />
some comments on the ethical relevance of the <strong>design</strong> problem def<strong>in</strong>ition. 1<br />
I will first discuss why the <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation is ethically relevant.<br />
In a <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation a choice is made between a normal or a radical<br />
<strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> between a high level or a lower level <strong>design</strong>. 2 Requirements <strong>in</strong> the<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1 I will, however, not address the question as to whether eng<strong>in</strong>eers should, from a moral po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
of view, refuse to <strong>design</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> products. Questions regard<strong>in</strong>g the moral desirability of<br />
products are <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g but outside the scope of this thesis. These questions should be<br />
addressed by more stakeholders than only eng<strong>in</strong>eers, amongst others governments, non-<br />
governmental organizations <strong>and</strong> the public.<br />
2 Of course the <strong>design</strong> type can change dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process. A radical <strong>design</strong> process may<br />
become more normal because a lot of normal parts are <strong>in</strong>cluded or because the <strong>in</strong>itial radical<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation can refer to the work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> the normal<br />
configuration <strong>and</strong> thereby imply a normal <strong>design</strong> without explicitly ask<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a<br />
normal <strong>design</strong>. The choice between radical <strong>and</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> is ethically<br />
relevant. The <strong>design</strong> type <strong>in</strong>fluences the k<strong>in</strong>d of ethical questions that need to be<br />
answered <strong>and</strong> the way these are answered dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process. A<br />
regulative framework might be available <strong>for</strong> a normal <strong>design</strong> process, there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
more operationalisation I k<strong>in</strong>d of problems can be expected. More<br />
operationalisation II k<strong>in</strong>d of problems have to be solved <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong>. There<br />
might be ethical reasons <strong>for</strong> choos<strong>in</strong>g a radical <strong>design</strong>. For example, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
DutchEVO lightweight car case the wish to produce a more susta<strong>in</strong>able car made<br />
the <strong>design</strong> process a radical <strong>design</strong>. A downside of radical <strong>design</strong> is that it<br />
usually implies a larger degree of uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty or ignorance than normal <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Radical <strong>design</strong>s are probably more prone to risks <strong>and</strong> un<strong>in</strong>tended effects than<br />
normal <strong>design</strong>s [Van de Poel <strong>and</strong> Van Gorp, 2006]. This uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty may be a<br />
good reason to choose <strong>for</strong> a normal <strong>design</strong>. The <strong>in</strong>fluence on the k<strong>in</strong>d of ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eer must face, the possibility of better meet<strong>in</strong>g ethically relevant<br />
requirements <strong>in</strong> a radical <strong>design</strong> process, <strong>and</strong> the additional uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>in</strong><br />
radical <strong>design</strong> make the choice between radical <strong>and</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> ethically<br />
relevant. There<strong>for</strong>e, eng<strong>in</strong>eers should reflect on the <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation.<br />
If a <strong>design</strong> team <strong>for</strong>mulates the <strong>design</strong> problem then the <strong>design</strong> team can<br />
<strong>and</strong> should take <strong>in</strong>to account all the moral reasons <strong>for</strong> <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st normal <strong>and</strong><br />
radical <strong>design</strong>. The <strong>design</strong> team should establish whether there are signs, <strong>for</strong><br />
example <strong>in</strong> the media, that the regulative framework <strong>for</strong> the product is contested.<br />
If such signs are visible then this provides a moral reason aga<strong>in</strong>st us<strong>in</strong>g (part of)<br />
the regulative framework <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g a more radical <strong>design</strong>. This<br />
consideration should be weighted aga<strong>in</strong>st the fact that a more radical <strong>design</strong> will<br />
lead to more uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>and</strong> ignorance regard<strong>in</strong>g the actual effects of a radical<br />
<strong>design</strong>.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers sometimes believe that if a customer has def<strong>in</strong>ed the <strong>design</strong><br />
problem they have no, or only little, <strong>in</strong>fluence on the <strong>for</strong>mulation of the <strong>design</strong><br />
problem. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this po<strong>in</strong>t of view, eng<strong>in</strong>eers are hired to make a <strong>design</strong> to<br />
solve a certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> problem, not to re<strong>for</strong>mulate the <strong>design</strong> problem. So even if<br />
there are strong moral reasons to make a radical <strong>in</strong>stead of a normal <strong>design</strong> (or<br />
vice versa) eng<strong>in</strong>eers cannot change the <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation. This claim<br />
overlooks the fact that the customer is hir<strong>in</strong>g the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>for</strong> its<br />
knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience. The customer usually hires eng<strong>in</strong>eers to make a<br />
<strong>design</strong> because he or she lacks the knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience to make the<br />
168<br />
<strong>design</strong> process turns out to be too difficult. A normal <strong>design</strong> process can become more radical<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process if, <strong>for</strong> example, dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process another material is chosen<br />
then was planned earlier.
Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
<strong>design</strong>. It would be strange to hire eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>for</strong> their knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience<br />
<strong>and</strong> then refuse to take on board any suggestions made by these eng<strong>in</strong>eers. So<br />
although eng<strong>in</strong>eers are hired to make a <strong>design</strong> to solve a <strong>design</strong> problem<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulated by a customer this does not mean that it is impossible to change the<br />
<strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation from normal to radical <strong>design</strong> or vice versa.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers can discuss the <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation with their customer at<br />
the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>design</strong> process or even be<strong>for</strong>e that dur<strong>in</strong>g contract<br />
negotiations between the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g company <strong>and</strong> the customer.<br />
To conclude, <strong>design</strong> problem <strong>for</strong>mulation is ethically relevant because it is<br />
decisive <strong>for</strong> the type of <strong>design</strong> chosen. Radical <strong>design</strong> can <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> cases lead to<br />
better <strong>design</strong>s with regard to ethical <strong>issues</strong> like safety or susta<strong>in</strong>ability, than a<br />
normal <strong>design</strong> might. Radical <strong>design</strong>, however, also leads to more uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers should reflect on the <strong>design</strong> problem def<strong>in</strong>ition, even <strong>in</strong> cases where a<br />
<strong>design</strong> is made <strong>for</strong> a customer.<br />
8.6 Generalisation of the conclusions<br />
The availability <strong>and</strong> applicability of regulative frameworks <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>and</strong> radical<br />
<strong>design</strong> will be analysed to generalise the results from the case-studies. In this<br />
analysis I will make use of conceptual <strong>and</strong> empirical considerations.<br />
First, I will use the def<strong>in</strong>ition of radical <strong>design</strong> (see section 2.3.1) to <strong>in</strong>dicate why<br />
exist<strong>in</strong>g regulative frameworks are not or only partially applicable <strong>in</strong> radical<br />
<strong>design</strong>. I will dist<strong>in</strong>guish three ways <strong>in</strong> which (parts of) the regulative<br />
frameworks are not applicable.<br />
(1) In some radical <strong>design</strong>s the work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple is not changed, however, the<br />
normal configuration is changed, <strong>for</strong> example if another material is used.<br />
Design<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a different material commonly changes the normal<br />
configuration because the material properties of the new material are<br />
different. For example, the new material might be stiffer but per<strong>for</strong>m less<br />
well under fatigue load<strong>in</strong>g. In some of these cases some of the concepts used<br />
<strong>in</strong> elements of a regulative framework can loose their mean<strong>in</strong>g. For example,<br />
when a <strong>design</strong> that is usually made <strong>in</strong> homogeneous metals is now made <strong>in</strong><br />
composite materials some of the material properties cannot be determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong><br />
the ways prescribed by the framework. With composite materials stresses will<br />
vary <strong>in</strong> the different parts constitut<strong>in</strong>g the composite (see note 5 on page 136).<br />
The notion “the stress <strong>in</strong> the material” as stated <strong>in</strong> regulative frameworks has<br />
lost its mean<strong>in</strong>g because the different parts of a composite will be subjected<br />
to different stresses <strong>and</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g of “the stress <strong>in</strong> the material” thus becomes<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
mean<strong>in</strong>gless. The consequence of this is that all guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> calculation<br />
rules of a regulative framework referr<strong>in</strong>g to stresses are <strong>in</strong>applicable <strong>for</strong> a<br />
product made <strong>in</strong> composites.<br />
(2) In a radical <strong>design</strong> where the work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> the normal configuration<br />
have been changed or are new, elements of the exist<strong>in</strong>g regulative<br />
frameworks may lead to contradictions. Some of the goals of the regulative<br />
frameworks might still be relevant. For example, one goal of a regulative<br />
framework is to produce a safe product, but elements of the framework that<br />
should lead to safe <strong>design</strong>s can come <strong>in</strong>to conflict with the goals of the radical<br />
<strong>design</strong> project. For example, <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g an automatically guided vehicle us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the exist<strong>in</strong>g regulative framework on traffic would lead to contradictions <strong>and</strong><br />
strange situations. In the current regulative framework perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to traffic a<br />
vehicle should always have a driver but the goal of <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g an automatically<br />
guided vehicle is to <strong>design</strong> a vehicle that can move safely without a driver. 3 Of<br />
course one goal of the traffic regulative framework is to achieve safe vehicles<br />
<strong>and</strong> safe traffic flow <strong>and</strong> this higher level goal is still relevant <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of<br />
automatically guided vehicles. So the rationale beh<strong>in</strong>d the regulative<br />
framework is still important but most legislation <strong>and</strong> codes conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the<br />
traffic regulative framework will not be applicable <strong>in</strong> the case of an<br />
automatically guided vehicle.<br />
(3) Radical <strong>design</strong>s can also be radical at a functional level. An explicit choice can<br />
be made at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of a <strong>design</strong> process to change the usual idea of a<br />
good product of this product type or to <strong>in</strong>troduce a new product type. This<br />
means sett<strong>in</strong>g different criteria <strong>for</strong> a product or chang<strong>in</strong>g the relative<br />
importance of criteria. It can be that the regulative framework or parts of it<br />
perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to such a product are explicitly rejected or that there is no relevant<br />
regulative framework <strong>for</strong> the new product. If a choice is made to make a<br />
functional radical <strong>design</strong> then, from the start of the project it is not clear what<br />
parts of the normal configuration or work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple will be used <strong>and</strong> what<br />
parts will not be used, there may be no normal configuration <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple available to use <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong>.<br />
From the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g it may be concluded that a regulative framework may be<br />
available <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong>s but that it will be rejected or not (completely)<br />
applicable. Only <strong>in</strong> the first <strong>in</strong>stance of radical <strong>design</strong>, can eng<strong>in</strong>eers still use<br />
parts of the current regulative framework. This would mean that <strong>in</strong> general a<br />
regulative framework cannot or can only partly be used <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong>s to<br />
decide on ethical <strong>issues</strong>. This has two consequences. First, the ethical <strong>issues</strong> that<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
3 Because Dutch legislation requires vehicles <strong>in</strong> public space to have a driver, special social<br />
arrangements need to be made to carry out tests with automatically guided vehicles.<br />
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Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers have to face when mak<strong>in</strong>g a radical <strong>design</strong> will be more of the<br />
operationalisation II k<strong>in</strong>d than of the operationalisation I k<strong>in</strong>d. There are few or<br />
no options given by the current regulative framework as to what choices can be<br />
made regard<strong>in</strong>g operationalisations. When mak<strong>in</strong>g trade-offs <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong><br />
work it is often impossible to refer to m<strong>in</strong>imal requirements given <strong>in</strong> a<br />
regulative framework. Second, because eng<strong>in</strong>eers cannot refer to regulative<br />
frameworks when work<strong>in</strong>g on a radical <strong>design</strong> they will, <strong>in</strong> general, refer more to<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>design</strong> team norms. If there are no pre-exist<strong>in</strong>g norms then norms will<br />
be developed dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong> process, the <strong>design</strong> teams members will use<br />
their education, <strong>design</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> personal experience to develop <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
<strong>design</strong> team norms.<br />
I will now give some empirical data as to why regulative frameworks can be<br />
expected to exist <strong>for</strong> most products <strong>and</strong> processes <strong>and</strong>, hence are available <strong>for</strong><br />
most normal <strong>design</strong> processes. Noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the def<strong>in</strong>ition of normal <strong>design</strong> given<br />
<strong>in</strong> section 2.3.1 <strong>in</strong>dicates that a regulative framework is necessary <strong>for</strong> a <strong>design</strong> to<br />
be a normal <strong>design</strong>. It is possible to imag<strong>in</strong>e a normal <strong>design</strong> without a<br />
regulative framework. Examples of normal <strong>design</strong>s made without a regulative<br />
framework can be found <strong>in</strong> history. Pressure vessels <strong>for</strong> steam eng<strong>in</strong>es existed<br />
<strong>and</strong> a normal configuration <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple were established long be<strong>for</strong>e a<br />
regulative framework was <strong>for</strong>mulated. 4<br />
In practice, however, it can be expected that a regulative framework exists <strong>for</strong><br />
most normal <strong>design</strong>s. In the European Union, the ma<strong>in</strong> goal of st<strong>and</strong>ardisation<br />
is to ensure a free market <strong>and</strong> to remove technical barriers <strong>for</strong> trade with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
EU [European Committee, 1999]. Besides the goal of support<strong>in</strong>g a free market,<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ardisation ‘promotes safety, allows <strong>in</strong>teroperability of products, systems<br />
<strong>and</strong> services, <strong>and</strong> promotes common technical underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g’ [www.cenorm.be].<br />
The “New Approach” has been <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> 1985 to make free trade possible<br />
with<strong>in</strong> the EU, be<strong>for</strong>e this specific products had to be approved. This was very<br />
time consum<strong>in</strong>g, because a consensus between different countries on every<br />
product had to be obta<strong>in</strong>ed. Under the New Approach, general <strong>and</strong> goal oriented<br />
requirements were <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>for</strong> product groups like mach<strong>in</strong>ery, pressure<br />
vessels <strong>and</strong> toys [www.evd.nl]. 5 If products or product types comply with the<br />
general requirements written down <strong>in</strong> EU directives, then they obta<strong>in</strong> a CE<br />
mark. Products that have obta<strong>in</strong>ed a CE mark are allowed to enter the EU<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
4 The first version of a boiler code was issued <strong>in</strong> France <strong>in</strong> 1823. Regulative frameworks <strong>for</strong><br />
boilers were developed later <strong>in</strong> other countries, <strong>for</strong> example 1838 <strong>in</strong> the US [Burke, 1966]<br />
5 The pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of the New Approach are not followed <strong>in</strong> sectors where there was advanced EC<br />
regulation be<strong>for</strong>e the New Approach was <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> 1985. Examples of these sectors <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
pharmaceutical products, chemical products <strong>and</strong> motorized vehicles [European Committee,<br />
1999].<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
market. The New Approach comb<strong>in</strong>ed with the goal of a free EU market implies<br />
that all products will have to be covered by an EU directive eventually.<br />
There are <strong>in</strong>deed various EU directives <strong>for</strong> a broad range of products among<br />
which:<br />
•Mach<strong>in</strong>ery 98/37/EC, covers all mach<strong>in</strong>ery with mov<strong>in</strong>g parts except the<br />
mach<strong>in</strong>es that are covered by separate directives<br />
•Low voltage equipment Directive 73/23/EC, covers all equipment with a<br />
voltage between 50 <strong>and</strong> 1000 DC <strong>and</strong> 75 <strong>and</strong> 1500 AC with some<br />
exceptions that are covered by other directives<br />
•Lifts 95/16/EC<br />
•Active Implantable Medical Devices 90/385/EC<br />
•Toys 88/378/EC<br />
EU directives have to be implemented <strong>in</strong> national law. It is, there<strong>for</strong>e, certa<strong>in</strong><br />
that all EU countries will have national laws implement<strong>in</strong>g the above directives.<br />
All these directives refer to harmonised EU codes. If these codes, or national<br />
codes if these harmonised codes are not available yet, are followed <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><br />
processes then compliance with the directive can be assumed. The European<br />
Committee <strong>for</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ardization (CEN) is responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
harmonised codes. CEN has committees <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g harmonised codes on<br />
subjects rang<strong>in</strong>g from chemistry to food, consumer products, construction,<br />
transport <strong>and</strong> packag<strong>in</strong>g [www.cenorm.be/cenorm/<strong>in</strong>dex.htm]. These are only<br />
the EU codes. Every EU country also has its national codes <strong>for</strong> the subjects that<br />
are not yet implemented <strong>in</strong> EU codes. So it is reasonable to expect that EU<br />
directives, national legislation <strong>and</strong> codes exist <strong>for</strong> many products. This means<br />
that on empirical grounds it can be concluded that <strong>in</strong> general <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong><br />
some <strong>for</strong>m of regulative framework is available.<br />
The availability of a regulative framework does not have to mean that all<br />
elements of it are used <strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong> process. It is not legally required that<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>design</strong> by codes. Designs, however, have to be certified <strong>and</strong> checked<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the products can obta<strong>in</strong> a CE mark. Design<strong>in</strong>g by the codes is a way to<br />
comply with the EU directives <strong>and</strong> to obta<strong>in</strong> the CE mark. Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
companies are free to use other <strong>design</strong> methods but they then have to supply the<br />
relevant Notified Body with proof of con<strong>for</strong>mity to EU directives. This is more<br />
difficult than <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g by codes <strong>and</strong> is not easily done. Besides this difficulty,<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers adhere to codes because they th<strong>in</strong>k that us<strong>in</strong>g the codes is a way to<br />
make good <strong>and</strong> safe <strong>design</strong>s. Experience has been ga<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to codes <strong>and</strong> some of the codes will have been adapted <strong>and</strong> changed over<br />
decades. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers do no lightly take the decision to deflect from the codes.<br />
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Conclusions of the empirical study<br />
It can be concluded from the conceptual <strong>and</strong> empirical considerations discussed<br />
above that <strong>in</strong> general the way that eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong> depends on<br />
the <strong>design</strong> type. In normal <strong>design</strong> a regulative framework will usually be<br />
available to provide operationalisations of requirements <strong>and</strong> gives some<br />
guidel<strong>in</strong>es as to what trade-offs are legally allowed. This regulative framework<br />
will be used to decide on ethical <strong>issues</strong>. In radical <strong>design</strong> the regulative<br />
framework will not be or only partly be used to make decisions on ethical <strong>issues</strong>.<br />
Hypothesis 2b: the regulative framework fulfils all Grunwald’s requirements <strong>and</strong><br />
is there<strong>for</strong>e a normative framework, is not supported by the empirical evidence.<br />
In this research at least three commonly used regulative frameworks, those <strong>for</strong><br />
the construction of bridges, of pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> car <strong>design</strong>, did not<br />
meet Grunwald’s requirements. Generally speak<strong>in</strong>g, the follow<strong>in</strong>g problems<br />
may be expected <strong>in</strong> regulative frameworks.<br />
(1) There will be a problem concern<strong>in</strong>g acceptance; it is not easy to establish<br />
whether all the affected actors accept the regulative framework.<br />
(2) EU directives under the New Approach are <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> a goal-oriented<br />
manner <strong>for</strong> product groups [www.newapproach.org]. When def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
regulations <strong>for</strong> product groups <strong>in</strong>stead of <strong>for</strong> specific products, it may be<br />
necessary to be a bit vague <strong>and</strong> ambiguous. This vagueness <strong>and</strong> ambiguity<br />
can be used to help make the directive applicable <strong>for</strong> a broad range of<br />
products. So it is very likely that there will always be some ambiguity <strong>in</strong><br />
regulative frameworks based on EU directives.<br />
(3) Regulative frameworks usually leave decisions to be made by the <strong>design</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> are there<strong>for</strong>e not pragmatically complete. It is impossible to<br />
prescribe every little detail of a <strong>design</strong> even if this was the idea beh<strong>in</strong>d the EU<br />
directives.<br />
On these grounds it can be expected that <strong>in</strong> general, although a regulative<br />
framework will be available <strong>for</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>s, such a framework will probably<br />
not meet Grunwald’s requirements.<br />
173
9 Towards warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
In previous chapters, I have taken a descriptive stance towards eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>design</strong> practice. I have described how eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with ethical <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> processes <strong>and</strong> related this to Vicenti’s dist<strong>in</strong>ction between radical <strong>and</strong><br />
normal <strong>design</strong>. In this chapter I will make a tentative analysis of what moral<br />
responsibility is required from eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> processes. This analysis will<br />
be based on the trust relationship between the public <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> the<br />
descriptions of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g practice given <strong>in</strong> chapters 4 to 8. I have <strong>for</strong>mulated<br />
the hypothesis, <strong>in</strong> section 2.3.3, that trust <strong>in</strong> the eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> is<br />
warranted if the eng<strong>in</strong>eers (1) have good <strong>in</strong>tentions (2) are competent <strong>and</strong> work<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to the relevant regulative framework <strong>and</strong> (3) the regulative framework<br />
is adequate, e.g. it complies to Grunwald’s requirements. Note that these<br />
conditions are conditions <strong>for</strong> warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers. It rema<strong>in</strong>s a question<br />
as to whether the public actually trusts eng<strong>in</strong>eers even if these conditions are<br />
met. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Baier one cannot <strong>for</strong>ce another to trust someone [Baier, 1996].<br />
So even if the above conditions are met the public can still be hesitant when it<br />
comes to trust<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers. If however, the public trusts the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
to make a <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> these conditions are met then the trust is assumed to be<br />
warranted.<br />
In the follow<strong>in</strong>g I will assume that eng<strong>in</strong>eers act with goodwill towards<br />
society <strong>and</strong> the public dur<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> process. This goodwill <strong>in</strong>cludes that<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers use a regulative framework if available, applicable <strong>and</strong> adequate. With<br />
regard to the required competence of eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> the adequacy of regulative<br />
frameworks, I will dist<strong>in</strong>guish between radical <strong>and</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>. A start will be<br />
made with <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g conditions <strong>for</strong> warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
normal <strong>design</strong>s <strong>in</strong> section 9.1. The same will be done <strong>for</strong> radical <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
section 9.2.<br />
9.1 Normal <strong>design</strong><br />
Trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers that make normal <strong>design</strong>s can be partly <strong>in</strong>stitutions-based<br />
(see section 2.3.3). The results of the cases show that eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong>deed use<br />
regulative frameworks <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> that regulative frameworks can be<br />
expected to exist <strong>for</strong> most products. Trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g normal <strong>design</strong>s is<br />
assumed to be warranted if eng<strong>in</strong>eers are (1) competent <strong>in</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g the regulative<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
framework <strong>and</strong> (2) the regulative framework is adequate. The condition of<br />
competence of eng<strong>in</strong>eers will be further elaborated on <strong>in</strong> section 9.1.1. Whether<br />
a regulative framework meet<strong>in</strong>g Grunwald’s requirements may <strong>in</strong>deed provide a<br />
basis <strong>for</strong> warranted trust will be discussed <strong>in</strong> section 9.1.2.<br />
9.1.1 Required competence of eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong><br />
The competences that eng<strong>in</strong>eers should have <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> processes are<br />
mostly technical, although some social skills are necessary to help ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the<br />
regulative framework.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers should:<br />
• know how to use the regulative framework<br />
• know the limits of the applicability of the regulative framework<br />
• help to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> adapt the regulative framework<br />
I will expla<strong>in</strong> more about these three competencies below.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers should know how to use the rules <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es from the regulative<br />
framework. They should know how the required calculations are made <strong>and</strong> what<br />
the concepts mean. This requires technical knowledge <strong>and</strong> skills from the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers.<br />
In requir<strong>in</strong>g that eng<strong>in</strong>eers work accord<strong>in</strong>g to regulative frameworks, the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers are not required to follow the regulative framework at all cost <strong>in</strong> all<br />
cases. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers should know <strong>for</strong> which cases the regulative framework can be<br />
used <strong>and</strong> those <strong>for</strong> which it cannot, that is, they should know the limitations of<br />
the regulative framework. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers are only required to use a regulative<br />
framework if it is applicable <strong>and</strong> adequate. I will go <strong>in</strong>to requirements <strong>for</strong><br />
adequacy <strong>in</strong> the next section. Here I only want to <strong>in</strong>dicate that eng<strong>in</strong>eers should<br />
decide be<strong>for</strong>e us<strong>in</strong>g a regulative framework whether it is applicable to the case at<br />
h<strong>and</strong>. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers need to know the difference between radical <strong>and</strong> normal <strong>design</strong><br />
to judge whether a regulative framework is applicable. In normal <strong>design</strong> a<br />
regulative framework is usually applicable, <strong>for</strong> most radical <strong>design</strong>s it is not (see<br />
section 8.6). The divide between radical <strong>and</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> is not clear-cut,<br />
<strong>design</strong> can be more or less normal or radical. In cases where the <strong>design</strong> is not<br />
completely normal <strong>design</strong> nor very radical <strong>design</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers should not use the<br />
relevant regulative framework without carefully <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g which elements of<br />
the framework are applicable <strong>and</strong> which elements are not.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers might sometimes encounter difficulties <strong>in</strong> apply<strong>in</strong>g elements of a<br />
regulative framework. If trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers is to be warranted trust then<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers have a duty to help adapt <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the frameworks. Be<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
competent eng<strong>in</strong>eer with goodwill towards society <strong>in</strong>cludes warn<strong>in</strong>g the people<br />
who trust you that the current rules <strong>and</strong> regulations can lead to problems or<br />
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Towards warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
unwanted side effects. In trust<strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eers the public expects eng<strong>in</strong>eers to use<br />
their skills <strong>and</strong> experience. If you br<strong>in</strong>g your car to the garage because one of the<br />
w<strong>in</strong>dows is broken, you would want the car mechanics to <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m you if they saw<br />
some other problems with your car, <strong>for</strong> example worn tires. You probably would<br />
not want them to change the tires without ask<strong>in</strong>g you if they should, but you<br />
would like to be warned. In this example it also depends on what discretion <strong>and</strong><br />
the assignment you gave the garage. If you asked the car mechanics to<br />
thoroughly service your car then you would expect them to check everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
repair it, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g replac<strong>in</strong>g the worn tires. In a similar way, eng<strong>in</strong>eers are<br />
required to use regulative frameworks <strong>and</strong> to warn the appropriate organisations<br />
if they encounter problems. Individual eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> teams have the<br />
responsibility to report problems or difficulties to whoever has <strong>for</strong>mulated the<br />
specific part of the framework. However, <strong>in</strong>dividual eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> teams<br />
do not have the responsibility to, nor are they allowed to, change complete<br />
regulative frameworks. For example, if an eng<strong>in</strong>eer encounters problems with a<br />
code then he or she should contact the commission that has <strong>for</strong>mulated the<br />
code, he or she cannot decide to change the code. New versions of codes appear<br />
regularly <strong>and</strong> the comments of eng<strong>in</strong>eers who have experience with the previous<br />
versions are <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the new versions. This means that know<strong>in</strong>g how to<br />
use a framework is not enough: eng<strong>in</strong>eers also need to know how a regulative<br />
framework is <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>and</strong> know which organisations <strong>for</strong>mulate which part so<br />
they can report their experiences to the correct authority <strong>for</strong> changes to be made<br />
if deemed necessary by that authority.<br />
9.1.2 Grunwald’s requirements reconsidered<br />
Based on Baier’s notion of trust, I have <strong>for</strong>mulated a hypothesis on the<br />
conditions <strong>for</strong> warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g normal <strong>design</strong>s. One of the<br />
conditions <strong>for</strong> warranted trust is that the regulative frameworks are adequate.<br />
This means that the requirements <strong>for</strong> an adequate regulative framework need to<br />
be <strong>in</strong> correspondence with the notion of trust. So an adequate regulative<br />
framework should help to protect the th<strong>in</strong>gs that affected actors value. Until now<br />
I have accepted Grunwald’s requirements on normative frameworks as<br />
requirements <strong>for</strong> an adequate regulative framework. There are, however, some<br />
problems concern<strong>in</strong>g Grunwald’s requirements that may affect whether the<br />
normative framework can be considered a basis <strong>for</strong> warranted trust. I will look at<br />
five problems, three problems concern<strong>in</strong>g the requirement of acceptance <strong>and</strong><br />
two related to the requirements that a normative framework should be<br />
pragmatically complete <strong>and</strong> unambiguous.<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
The first problem with regard to acceptance is that it rema<strong>in</strong>s unclear <strong>in</strong><br />
Grunwald’s ideas how acceptance by actors has to be established. Can<br />
acceptance be assumed until actors actually state that they th<strong>in</strong>k that the<br />
framework is unacceptable? This might be very practical from the po<strong>in</strong>t of view<br />
of eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> other people <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the elements of the<br />
framework because they only need to be open to the signals of actors who do not<br />
accept the framework. Until the moment that there are these k<strong>in</strong>ds of signals<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers can use the regulative framework. An example of actors voic<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
objections about a regulative framework, taken from the media, was given <strong>in</strong> the<br />
pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment case with respect to the regulative framework concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
chemical <strong>in</strong>stallations. If the above assumption of acceptance should not be<br />
made then the people def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a framework should seek active acceptance of any<br />
actors affected by a framework. This would require a change <strong>in</strong> the procedures<br />
used to def<strong>in</strong>e elements of a framework. A regulative framework <strong>in</strong> the EU partly<br />
consists of legislation that is <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>and</strong> voted on with<strong>in</strong> the European<br />
Commission <strong>and</strong> European Parliament or national parliaments. People with<strong>in</strong><br />
society have, by vot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> their representatives, a small <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>direct <strong>in</strong>fluence on<br />
the legislation conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> regulative frameworks. Other elements of the<br />
regulative framework like codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards are <strong>for</strong>mulated without any direct<br />
or <strong>in</strong>direct <strong>in</strong>fluence of the actors that might possibly be affected by the<br />
technology. In some countries there are special governmental agencies that<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulate technical codes. In other countries codes are <strong>for</strong>mulated by <strong>in</strong>dustrial<br />
organisations (see section 5.2.2). Ideas on the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of codes <strong>and</strong> good<br />
<strong>design</strong> practice are usually learned <strong>in</strong> practice or dur<strong>in</strong>g education, so these ideas<br />
may be harder <strong>for</strong> people outside eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>fluence. One way or another,<br />
active acceptance of the whole regulative framework by all possibly affected<br />
actors requires a different procedure <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g the elements of a regulative<br />
framework than used at present or an explicit step of accept<strong>in</strong>g the regulative<br />
framework after the <strong>for</strong>mulation of the framework.<br />
The second problem with regard to the requirement that a normative<br />
framework should be accepted is that a regulative or normative framework is not<br />
static. A framework will change over time so it is not enough to accept a<br />
framework once. If the active acceptance of all the actors <strong>in</strong>volved is required<br />
then this should lead to some k<strong>in</strong>d of cont<strong>in</strong>uous, active acceptance process. One<br />
way to assure the acceptance of cont<strong>in</strong>uously adapted <strong>and</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g regulative<br />
frameworks is to implement a participatory process <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
adapt<strong>in</strong>g such frameworks. I will not go <strong>in</strong>to the problems of implement<strong>in</strong>g such<br />
an approach, or discuss the opportunities <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g participatory methods<br />
used <strong>in</strong> technology development, but requir<strong>in</strong>g the active acceptance of<br />
regulative frameworks could result <strong>in</strong> some k<strong>in</strong>d of participatory process (<strong>for</strong><br />
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Towards warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
some case-studies on participatory methods <strong>in</strong> Europe <strong>and</strong> problems with these<br />
methods see [Klüver, Nentwich <strong>and</strong> others, 2000] <strong>and</strong>, <strong>for</strong> a more general<br />
discussion on democratization of technology see [Kle<strong>in</strong>man, 2000]).<br />
A third problem with regard to acceptance can be that acceptance of the<br />
regulative framework is not sufficient <strong>for</strong> warranted trust. The requirement of<br />
acceptance seems to imply that an accepted normative framework is also<br />
ethically acceptable. This implication is questionable because it appears to be<br />
based on a naturalistic fallacy: that practices are accepted does not imply that<br />
they are acceptable (see [Moore 1903/1988]). The question then becomes<br />
whether acceptance by the affected actors is sufficient <strong>for</strong> warranted trust or that<br />
the regulative framework should also be ethically acceptable. There might be<br />
normative frameworks that are accepted by the affected actors but that can be<br />
shown to be ethically unacceptable. One could th<strong>in</strong>k of a situation <strong>in</strong> which poor<br />
people accept poor work<strong>in</strong>g conditions because do<strong>in</strong>g this dangerous work <strong>in</strong><br />
unhealthy conditions is their only opportunity to support their families. The fact<br />
that someone seems to accept or says that he or she accepts a regulative<br />
framework is there<strong>for</strong>e probably not sufficient <strong>for</strong> warranted trust because this<br />
does not guarantee that the accept<strong>in</strong>g person’s values are properly taken <strong>in</strong>to<br />
consideration. Conditions or procedures might be proposed under which given<br />
acceptance is sufficient <strong>for</strong> warranted trust. The question then becomes: What is<br />
the basis of these conditions <strong>and</strong> procedures? One way or another such<br />
conditions <strong>and</strong> procedures seem to be connected to an idea of ethical<br />
acceptability <strong>in</strong>stead of mere acceptance.<br />
As said above there are also problems concern<strong>in</strong>g the requirement <strong>for</strong> a<br />
pragmatically complete <strong>and</strong> unambiguous normative framework.<br />
The first problem is that it is not clear how “pragmatically complete” <strong>and</strong><br />
“unambiguous” a normative framework should be. It is impractical, if not<br />
impossible, to prescribe every little detail <strong>in</strong> a regulative framework. The more<br />
detailed <strong>and</strong> prescriptive a regulative framework is, the fewer situations it will<br />
cover. It is very difficult to <strong>for</strong>mulate rules that cover a range of situations <strong>and</strong><br />
that are not ambiguous or do not need further <strong>in</strong>terpretation. This problem,<br />
amongst others, has led some philosophers to claim that it is impossible <strong>and</strong><br />
undesirable to <strong>for</strong>mulate universal pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>in</strong> ethics. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to these<br />
philosophers, context <strong>and</strong> situation specific features should play a role <strong>in</strong> moral<br />
deliberation (see <strong>for</strong> example [Dancy, 2004]). Thus, <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g a regulative<br />
framework that is really complete <strong>and</strong> unambiguous is impractical <strong>and</strong> perhaps<br />
even impossible or undesirable.<br />
The second problem is that a balance needs to be found between complete<br />
<strong>and</strong> unambiguous frameworks <strong>and</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g some freedom <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers to<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
make decisions. Very detailed prescriptive regulative frameworks might lead to<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers just liv<strong>in</strong>g by the book <strong>in</strong>stead of rely<strong>in</strong>g on their eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
judgment <strong>and</strong> experience [Pater <strong>and</strong> Van Gils, 2003]. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to philosophers<br />
some autonomy <strong>and</strong> freedom is necessary to act as a moral actor. Some moral<br />
<strong>and</strong> professional autonomy may be necessary <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers to behave morally<br />
<strong>and</strong> professionally, <strong>and</strong> to be trustworthy eng<strong>in</strong>eers (see <strong>for</strong> example [Ladd,<br />
1991]). Moreover try<strong>in</strong>g to prescribe every little detail <strong>in</strong> a normative framework<br />
is at odds with the very idea of trust. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Baier, the trustee has some<br />
discretion <strong>in</strong> what to do to take care of what the trust<strong>in</strong>g person values (see<br />
section 2.3.3). This discretion is, <strong>in</strong> cases of normal <strong>design</strong>, limited by the<br />
regulative framework but when try<strong>in</strong>g to def<strong>in</strong>e a really complete <strong>and</strong><br />
unambiguous framework this discretion might disappear. Some eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
<strong>in</strong>terviewed <strong>for</strong> the case-studies felt empowered by a regulative framework <strong>and</strong><br />
especially by some of the more detailed prescriptive elements concern<strong>in</strong>g safety.<br />
If some m<strong>in</strong>imal safety requirements of a regulative framework are <strong>for</strong>mulated<br />
unambiguously <strong>and</strong> given <strong>in</strong> detail then a customer can easily be persuaded to<br />
follow these requirements. If a customer refuses to allow an eng<strong>in</strong>eer to follow<br />
the m<strong>in</strong>imal safety requirements then their <strong>design</strong> will not be certified. If a<br />
regulative framework does not <strong>in</strong>clude such detailed, m<strong>in</strong>imal safety<br />
requirements then the eng<strong>in</strong>eer has to persuade the customer to take some<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imal safety requirements <strong>in</strong>to account without the backup of certify<strong>in</strong>g<br />
organisations or legal pressure. There<strong>for</strong>e a balance needs to be found between<br />
giv<strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eers the discretion to act professionally <strong>and</strong> morally, <strong>and</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
them enough detailed prescriptive rules that they feel empowered towards their<br />
customers.<br />
To conclude, trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g normal <strong>design</strong>s is warranted if:<br />
• the eng<strong>in</strong>eers are competent. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers are responsible <strong>for</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
competent <strong>and</strong> this mostly concerns be<strong>in</strong>g technically competent <strong>in</strong><br />
normal <strong>design</strong>.<br />
• the regulative frameworks used <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> are adequate.<br />
Requirements <strong>for</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the adequacy of regulative frameworks<br />
still have to be developed tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account the problems with<br />
Grunwald’s requirements <strong>for</strong> normative frameworks.<br />
These two conditions are necessary but not sufficient conditions <strong>for</strong> trust. If<br />
these conditions are fulfilled <strong>and</strong> the public trusts the eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> a<br />
<strong>design</strong> project then this trust is warranted. The public cannot be <strong>for</strong>ced to trust<br />
the eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g normal <strong>design</strong>s, even if the eng<strong>in</strong>eers are competent <strong>and</strong><br />
the regulative framework is adequate.<br />
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9.2 Radical <strong>design</strong><br />
Towards warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
The results of the case-studies <strong>in</strong>dicate that eng<strong>in</strong>eers do not use regulative<br />
frameworks <strong>for</strong> radical <strong>design</strong>s or that they only use some parts of a regulative<br />
framework. There<strong>for</strong>e, trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g radical <strong>design</strong>s cannot be<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions-based. I return to Baier’s characterisation of trust to <strong>for</strong>mulate<br />
conditions <strong>for</strong> warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g radical <strong>design</strong>s: ‘A trusts B<br />
with valued th<strong>in</strong>g C’ [Baier, 1986, 236]. In this characterisation it is not obvious<br />
what “valued th<strong>in</strong>g C” can refer to. In fact, Baier herself acknowledges that<br />
‘[see<strong>in</strong>g trust as a three way predicate] will <strong>in</strong>volve some distortion <strong>and</strong><br />
regimentation of some cases, where we may have to stra<strong>in</strong> to discern any<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ite c<strong>and</strong>idate <strong>for</strong> C..’ [Baier, 1986, 236]. She uses the example that when<br />
one is <strong>in</strong> a library one trusts other people with one’s peace <strong>and</strong> safety there<br />
[Baier, 1986, 238]. In this example Baier considers ‘one’s peace <strong>and</strong> safety’ to be<br />
the “valued th<strong>in</strong>g C” that is entrusted to another person. In l<strong>in</strong>e with Baier I will<br />
use the characterisation of trust loosely <strong>and</strong> read <strong>for</strong> “valued th<strong>in</strong>g C” “th<strong>in</strong>gs the<br />
trust<strong>in</strong>g person values”. A way to characterise trust would then be: affected<br />
actors trust eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g a radical <strong>design</strong> with th<strong>in</strong>gs they value.<br />
It is not obvious what th<strong>in</strong>gs affected actors will value <strong>and</strong> should there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
be protected or promoted by the eng<strong>in</strong>eers, nor is it obvious how eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
should do this. If someone trusts their neighbour to take care of their house<br />
while on holiday it is clearer what the trust<strong>in</strong>g person is expect<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
neighbour to do. The neighbour should watch the house, take up the mail <strong>and</strong><br />
water the plants. In radical <strong>design</strong> it is not clear what valued th<strong>in</strong>gs should be<br />
taken care of. Not everyth<strong>in</strong>g that people value is relevant <strong>for</strong> the radical <strong>design</strong><br />
process of a product. Some people value Mozart’s music, other people value<br />
heavy metal music, but what music people value is not relevant <strong>for</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of<br />
all products. Musical preference might be relevant <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of a radically<br />
new audio device but not <strong>in</strong> the radical <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> a trailer. Because it is not<br />
obvious what affected actors value with regard to a radical <strong>design</strong> of a product,<br />
the conditions <strong>for</strong> warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g radical <strong>design</strong>s appear to<br />
be:<br />
• the eng<strong>in</strong>eers should know or learn what the affected actors value<br />
relative to the product that is be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>ed.<br />
• the eng<strong>in</strong>eers should try, as well as they can, to take care of these valued<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> their radical <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Some elements of the framework can often still be used <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong>s <strong>in</strong><br />
which only the normal configuration is changed (see section 8.6). Us<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
elements of an adequate regulative framework that can still be used, can be seen<br />
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as a way to help eng<strong>in</strong>eers to take <strong>in</strong>to account what the affected actors value. In<br />
a regulative framework, rules <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es are given to prevent certa<strong>in</strong><br />
problems. Perhaps these rules or guidel<strong>in</strong>es cannot be used completely, but it<br />
may be useful to know what problems have been encountered dur<strong>in</strong>g normal<br />
<strong>design</strong>. Some of these problems might also be relevant <strong>in</strong> the proposed radical<br />
<strong>design</strong>. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers can use a regulative framework to generate ideas especially <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong>s <strong>in</strong> which the radicalness of the <strong>design</strong> is only due to changes <strong>in</strong> the<br />
normal configuration.<br />
If the <strong>design</strong> is radical because the functionality <strong>and</strong>/or the operational<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple are different from those <strong>in</strong> the normal <strong>design</strong>s then this strategy of<br />
look<strong>in</strong>g at exist<strong>in</strong>g regulative frameworks <strong>for</strong> ideas as to what the affected actors<br />
might value, <strong>and</strong> what possible problems should be prevented, will not work. If<br />
an adequate regulative framework cannot be used to get ideas because the<br />
operational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong>/ or functionality are different then the eng<strong>in</strong>eers need<br />
to identify what the affected actors value. If eng<strong>in</strong>eers know what the affected<br />
actors value, then they must have the technical competence to <strong>in</strong>corporate this <strong>in</strong><br />
the <strong>design</strong> of the product. Identify<strong>in</strong>g what the affected actors value also requires<br />
other competences. In the follow<strong>in</strong>g section I make a start with develop<strong>in</strong>g ideas<br />
about how eng<strong>in</strong>eers can know, or learn, what the affected actors might value<br />
with regard to the <strong>design</strong> of a product.<br />
9.2.1 Identify<strong>in</strong>g what affected actors value<br />
A number of different ways to identify what affected actors value can be<br />
proposed. One option might be to ask all the possibly affected actors what they<br />
value with regard to the product that will be <strong>design</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> to make a list of all the<br />
answers from the possibly affected actors. However, this would be impossible.<br />
First, not all effects <strong>and</strong> side-effects of a <strong>design</strong> will be known dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>design</strong><br />
process, especially <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong> processes. If the possible side-effects are<br />
unknown it is impossible to list all the affected actors. Second, it might be very<br />
difficult <strong>for</strong> people to list all the th<strong>in</strong>gs they value relative to the <strong>design</strong> when<br />
asked. Sometimes you become aware that you value someth<strong>in</strong>g once it becomes<br />
threatened, a radical <strong>design</strong> may prove to threaten someth<strong>in</strong>g previously<br />
considered safe. It will be very difficult to make a complete list of what you th<strong>in</strong>k<br />
is valuable with regard to a new product <strong>and</strong> this will be impossible if the<br />
possible <strong>and</strong> actual side-effects of a <strong>design</strong> are not known. It is there<strong>for</strong>e not<br />
possible empirically to obta<strong>in</strong> a complete list of what affected actors value with<br />
regard to a product.<br />
Ef<strong>for</strong>ts have been made to broaden technology development <strong>and</strong> take more<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ts of view <strong>in</strong>to account dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> development processes: an<br />
example is Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA) [Schot <strong>and</strong> Rip, 1997]. It<br />
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seems that CTA requires that affected actors should be <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong><br />
process, examples of CTA projects <strong>in</strong>clude mostly large scale technology<br />
development projects like biotechnology or the Digital City Amsterdam project<br />
[Schot <strong>and</strong> Rip, 1997]. In such large projects it is feasible to <strong>in</strong>vite actors to<br />
participate. However, the problem rema<strong>in</strong>s that there is no clear overview of<br />
what the side-effects <strong>and</strong> consequences of the new technology development will<br />
be, <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e it is not clear who the affected actors are go<strong>in</strong>g to be. So,<br />
technology development can be broadened by <strong>in</strong>vit<strong>in</strong>g actors to participate but it<br />
will rema<strong>in</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong> as to which actors will be affected by a technology<br />
development. This might mean that every actor should be represented <strong>in</strong> one<br />
way or another <strong>in</strong> the CTA procedure. In cases where new <strong>and</strong> controversial<br />
technologies are developed like biotechnology <strong>and</strong> nanotechnology, most of the<br />
public debate centres around which values are at stake, given the empirical<br />
uncerta<strong>in</strong>ties on what possibilities nanotechnology <strong>and</strong> biotechnology will<br />
provide <strong>in</strong> the future. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers cannot know what the affected actors value with<br />
regard to these new technologies because the possibly affected actors might not<br />
know this themselves, <strong>in</strong> such cases there will be a lot of discussion between<br />
groups of possibly affected actors as to what values are at stake. In these cases of<br />
very radical <strong>design</strong> it may be necessary to use CTA or <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med consent<br />
procedures (see <strong>for</strong> example [Shrader-Frechette 2002]). I will not elaborate on<br />
these procedures, I only want to <strong>in</strong>dicate that <strong>in</strong> cases <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g the development<br />
of new technologies warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers may require the active<br />
participation of society <strong>in</strong> one way or another.<br />
In the radical <strong>design</strong> processes that I have described, some consensus might<br />
be expected between the affected actors on what values are at stake <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong><br />
of a product. The radical <strong>design</strong>s featured <strong>in</strong> the case-studies are radical <strong>design</strong>s<br />
of products that already existed. There is knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience with<strong>in</strong><br />
society on the positive <strong>and</strong> negative consequences of the product type. It is to a<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> extent clear what th<strong>in</strong>gs, that affected actors value, are at stake <strong>in</strong> these<br />
radical <strong>design</strong> processes, although the affected actors may prioritise them<br />
differently. It would be impossible from a practical po<strong>in</strong>t of view to <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
(representatives of) all the affected actors <strong>in</strong> all small scale radical <strong>design</strong><br />
processes such as the DutchEVO project or the trailer <strong>design</strong> project. There<strong>for</strong>e,<br />
I will propose a way that can be used to allow eng<strong>in</strong>eers to identify what affected<br />
actors value without hav<strong>in</strong>g to ask the affected actors actively to participate <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>design</strong> process.<br />
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Identify<strong>in</strong>g what affected actors value with regard to the <strong>design</strong> of a product<br />
requires a degree of moral imag<strong>in</strong>ation from the eng<strong>in</strong>eers. 1 Different proposals<br />
have been made to enhance the moral imag<strong>in</strong>ation of people by read<strong>in</strong>g<br />
literature or enjoy<strong>in</strong>g art; I will not discuss this further (<strong>for</strong> a discussion on the<br />
importance of moral imag<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> ways to develop it, see <strong>for</strong> example<br />
[Nussbaum, 2001] <strong>and</strong> [Murdoch, 1997]). My proposal is that eng<strong>in</strong>eers should<br />
use their personal experience to identify what affected actors might value. The<br />
strength of my proposal is that eng<strong>in</strong>eers already use their personal experience<br />
<strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong> processes, as has been concluded <strong>for</strong> the case-studies on radical<br />
<strong>design</strong>. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers have personal experience <strong>and</strong> they use it dur<strong>in</strong>g a radical<br />
<strong>design</strong> process, they only need to use this personal experience <strong>in</strong> a systematic<br />
way.<br />
The cases of radical <strong>design</strong> described <strong>in</strong> chapters 4 <strong>and</strong> 7 have shown that<br />
decisions on ethical <strong>issues</strong> were made based on <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>design</strong> team norms.<br />
These <strong>in</strong>ternal norms were based upon the education that the eng<strong>in</strong>eers had<br />
had, their <strong>design</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> sometimes their personal experience. Rely<strong>in</strong>g<br />
solely on <strong>in</strong>ternal norms of the <strong>design</strong> team can lead to bl<strong>in</strong>d spots regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
values that the affected actors have, as can be seen <strong>in</strong> the trailer case. Traffic<br />
safety was not taken <strong>in</strong>to account <strong>in</strong> the structural <strong>design</strong> of the trailer. The<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers were not used to account<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> traffic safety; they only felt<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a safe, as <strong>in</strong> structurally reliable, light trailer. In this<br />
trailer case, the eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not take their personal experience systematically<br />
<strong>in</strong>to account. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers did use their <strong>design</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> they called on<br />
their education, but personal experience was only used if it was personal <strong>design</strong><br />
experience. Even though one of the eng<strong>in</strong>eers had personal experience with<br />
driv<strong>in</strong>g trucks, references to personal experience outside that of eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>design</strong> were rarely made. In the DutchEVO project, personal experience with<br />
cars was mentioned very often. The project leader used his personal experience<br />
as a parent to try <strong>and</strong> see what other parents would f<strong>in</strong>d acceptable <strong>in</strong> a<br />
lightweight family car. In discussions on the idea of mak<strong>in</strong>g the driver feel<br />
vulnerable, the project leader <strong>in</strong>dicated that the driver should not feel too<br />
vulnerable because a driver would never put his or her children <strong>in</strong> the back of a<br />
family car that gave the impression of be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a cardboard car. If eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
<strong>design</strong> very different types of products they will not have a lot of <strong>design</strong><br />
experience with a particular product to use when mak<strong>in</strong>g a radical <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Tak<strong>in</strong>g the personal experience of eng<strong>in</strong>eers systematically <strong>in</strong>to account could<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1 See also Patricia Werhane’s book on moral imag<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> management decisions. She<br />
argues that identify<strong>in</strong>g different perspectives is necessary <strong>for</strong> good management decision<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g [Werhane, 1999, 66-67 <strong>and</strong> 114-115]<br />
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help broaden the <strong>in</strong>ternal norms with<strong>in</strong> a <strong>design</strong> team to <strong>in</strong>clude what affected<br />
actors value.<br />
Us<strong>in</strong>g personal experience can be a tool <strong>for</strong> identify<strong>in</strong>g the perspectives that<br />
other actors have <strong>and</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>gs that affected actors value. If eng<strong>in</strong>eers would<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k about the different social roles they have, outside their <strong>design</strong> role, then<br />
they should be able to get ideas about what affected actors value. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
might even get ideas as to what operationalisations <strong>and</strong> trade-offs other actors<br />
will f<strong>in</strong>d acceptable if they would consider what they themselves deem valuable<br />
as a parent or citizen. For example, what would I want from a car if I was driv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> it with my children on the backseats? Or what would I want the car to be like<br />
when I’m walk<strong>in</strong>g or cycl<strong>in</strong>g on the streets <strong>and</strong> the car is driven by someone<br />
else?<br />
A similar idea can be found <strong>in</strong> MacIntyre’s moral philosophy. 2 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
MacIntyre people should reflect on the evaluative st<strong>and</strong>ards of the different<br />
practices they participate <strong>in</strong>. MacIntyre def<strong>in</strong>es practices as follows:<br />
‘By ‘practice’ I am go<strong>in</strong>g to mean any coherent <strong>and</strong> complex <strong>for</strong>m of<br />
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal to that <strong>for</strong>m of activity are realised <strong>in</strong> the course of try<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
achieve those st<strong>and</strong>ards of excellence which are appropriate to, <strong>and</strong><br />
partially def<strong>in</strong>itive of, that <strong>for</strong>m of activity, with the result that human<br />
powers to achieve excellence, <strong>and</strong> human conceptions of the ends <strong>and</strong><br />
goods <strong>in</strong>volved are systematically extended.’[MacIntyre, 1981, 187]<br />
Examples that MacIntyre gives of practices are, amongst others, chess,<br />
friendship <strong>and</strong> parenthood. MacIntyre dist<strong>in</strong>guishes between <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong><br />
practices. Institutions are the <strong>for</strong>mal embedd<strong>in</strong>g of practices; <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
distribute power <strong>and</strong> resources. St<strong>and</strong>ards of excellence are developed with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
practice <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>teraction between the practitioners. The <strong>in</strong>ternal norms of <strong>design</strong><br />
teams can be seen as st<strong>and</strong>ards of excellence; they def<strong>in</strong>e what a good <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
this practice is, what responsibilities the eng<strong>in</strong>eers ascribe to themselves <strong>and</strong><br />
what character traits are valued <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> team.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to MacIntyre, every person should strive to atta<strong>in</strong> the good life <strong>for</strong><br />
him or her. The quest <strong>for</strong> the good life is fed by conflicts between the evaluative<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ards of the different practices one participates <strong>in</strong>. Try<strong>in</strong>g to resolve these<br />
conflicts helps the quest <strong>for</strong> a good life [MacIntyre, 1981]. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
MacIntyre a person should try to comb<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> harmonise all evaluative<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> practices he or she takes part <strong>in</strong>. MacIntyre sees the quest <strong>for</strong> the<br />
good life <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e the harmonisation of evaluative st<strong>and</strong>ards of practices<br />
one participates <strong>in</strong> as a moral obligation. I will not go that far: I see the reflection<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
2<br />
This idea is based on “Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g moral responsibility <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> of trailers” [Van der<br />
Burg <strong>and</strong> Van Gorp, 2005].<br />
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on the different evaluative st<strong>and</strong>ards of the practices an eng<strong>in</strong>eer participates <strong>in</strong><br />
only as a tool to identify what other actors affected by the <strong>design</strong> might value.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers need to do this <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong> processes because they need to take<br />
<strong>in</strong>to account what the public values <strong>for</strong> the public to have warranted trust <strong>in</strong><br />
them. Questions an eng<strong>in</strong>eer should ask him/herself are: What would I th<strong>in</strong>k is<br />
important <strong>in</strong> the safety of this product if I were a byst<strong>and</strong>er? For example, when<br />
<strong>design</strong><strong>in</strong>g a radically new chemical <strong>in</strong>stallation, eng<strong>in</strong>eers should ask<br />
themselves: What would I consider acceptable if I <strong>and</strong> my family were liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
the neighbourhood? Ask<strong>in</strong>g themselves such questions dur<strong>in</strong>g a radical <strong>design</strong><br />
process should help eng<strong>in</strong>eers to reflect on operationalisations of ethical <strong>issues</strong><br />
like safety <strong>and</strong> the trade-offs made between ethical <strong>issues</strong> or other <strong>issues</strong>.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer us<strong>in</strong>g their personal experience is not a guarantee that all th<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
valued by the affected actors will be taken <strong>in</strong>to account but it is a way to <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
more values <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> process. What eng<strong>in</strong>eers can identify as th<strong>in</strong>gs that<br />
affected actors value will ultimately depend on the sort of lives the eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
tak<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> team live. This has implications <strong>for</strong> what is desirable<br />
with respect to the composition of a <strong>design</strong> team. To <strong>in</strong>crease the chance that a<br />
<strong>design</strong> team will be able to identify what affected actors value, it should <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers with different personal life styles <strong>and</strong> backgrounds. These different<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers will all have access to different personal experiences thus diverse<br />
<strong>design</strong> teams are desirable.<br />
To conclude, the above means that besides hav<strong>in</strong>g technical competence,<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers work<strong>in</strong>g on radical <strong>design</strong>s should know what affected actors value<br />
with regard to the product that is be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong>ed. One way to identify what<br />
affected actors value is to use one’s personal experience. If eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
systematically use their personal experience, <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k about what they would<br />
value concern<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> of a product if they were the users or byst<strong>and</strong>ers then<br />
this reflection can be used to broaden the <strong>in</strong>ternal norms of a <strong>design</strong> team.<br />
9.3 Further research<br />
Further research on the <strong>for</strong>mulation of the requirements that an adequate<br />
regulative framework should meet is needed. An adequate regulative framework<br />
<strong>and</strong> technically competent eng<strong>in</strong>eers are proposed conditions <strong>for</strong> warranted trust<br />
<strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g normal <strong>design</strong>s. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers can use such a framework <strong>in</strong><br />
their normal <strong>design</strong> practice <strong>and</strong> have some reason to believe that the <strong>design</strong>s<br />
they make are acceptable. Broader questions regard<strong>in</strong>g the acceptance of the<br />
framework <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong>s made us<strong>in</strong>g the framework would have already been<br />
solved because the framework meets the adequacy requirements.<br />
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It will not be easy to <strong>for</strong>mulate these requirements. An argument can be<br />
given <strong>for</strong> detailed rule-based prescriptive frameworks while another argument<br />
can be given <strong>for</strong> avoid<strong>in</strong>g detailed rule-based frameworks. In the European<br />
Union there is a trend towards regulation stat<strong>in</strong>g only a goal that should be<br />
atta<strong>in</strong>ed or procedures that should be followed. Questions like whether a good<br />
procedure always leads to good results can be posed. Research <strong>in</strong>to what<br />
requirements a regulative framework should meet needs to <strong>in</strong>volve <strong>in</strong>sights<br />
taken from diverse fields such as moral philosophy, eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics, the<br />
experience of eng<strong>in</strong>eers; even aspects of sociology of law <strong>and</strong> policy research can<br />
be used to ga<strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g ideas. Moral philosophy <strong>and</strong> professional ethics<br />
can give <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to what actors should be <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mulation of<br />
regulative frameworks <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the freedom that is necessary <strong>for</strong><br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers to act professionally <strong>and</strong> morally. Sociology of law can be used to give<br />
<strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to different <strong>for</strong>ms of self-regulation by professionals. Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
practice can help to establish what k<strong>in</strong>ds of rules are applicable <strong>and</strong> those that<br />
can be used to empower eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> practice. Part of the<br />
requirements will probably be procedural, these should answer the question of<br />
which actors should be <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> what way when <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g regulative<br />
frameworks. Some of the requirements will most likely be <strong>for</strong>mal, <strong>for</strong> example<br />
the regulative framework should be consistent.<br />
9.4 Recommendations <strong>for</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g education<br />
It is hoped that the results of this thesis will have an <strong>in</strong>fluence on the education<br />
that eng<strong>in</strong>eers receive, it is certa<strong>in</strong>ly the case that they should have an <strong>in</strong>fluence.<br />
First, eng<strong>in</strong>eers should be taught to underst<strong>and</strong> the varieties <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong><br />
processes <strong>and</strong> the implications of this <strong>for</strong> the way <strong>in</strong> which they must deal with<br />
ethically relevant <strong>issues</strong>. It is also important that eng<strong>in</strong>eers underst<strong>and</strong> the<br />
relationship between normal <strong>and</strong> radical <strong>design</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>complete knowledge. The<br />
uncerta<strong>in</strong>ties <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>complete knowledge are larger <strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong>. The<br />
difference between normal <strong>and</strong> radical <strong>design</strong> could be expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics courses, <strong>for</strong> example dur<strong>in</strong>g sessions where problems<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g risks <strong>and</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong>ties <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g are discussed, or <strong>in</strong> chapters of<br />
books where these <strong>issues</strong> could be deliberately <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>and</strong> discussed.<br />
Second, attention should be paid <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g education to the regulative<br />
frameworks that exist <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers should learn who <strong>for</strong>mulates<br />
which parts of the regulative frameworks <strong>and</strong> what their responsibility is <strong>in</strong> this.<br />
In the case-studies used <strong>for</strong> this research, experienced eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not always<br />
know the frameworks with<strong>in</strong> which they worked <strong>and</strong> did not always know to<br />
whom problems should be reported. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>in</strong> the IJburg bridge case<br />
187
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
admitted that it had taken them about 5 years to figure out the regulative<br />
framework <strong>and</strong> the relationships between elements of it; also <strong>in</strong> the bridge case,<br />
the eng<strong>in</strong>eers did not know the regulative framework perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to health <strong>and</strong><br />
safety at construction sites. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers only knew that they had to make a<br />
health <strong>and</strong> safety plan, but they did not know <strong>for</strong> example, whether there were<br />
limits to the mass someone is allowed to lift repeatedly on a build<strong>in</strong>g site. These<br />
examples show that it is problematic to assume that eng<strong>in</strong>eers will learn about<br />
regulative frameworks <strong>in</strong> <strong>design</strong> practice. Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g students should learn the<br />
basics of regulative frameworks: the elements they consist of, the relationships<br />
between these elements <strong>and</strong> the responsible organisations that <strong>for</strong>mulate these<br />
elements. This does not mean that eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g students should learn the<br />
content of all the regulative frameworks that they might encounter <strong>in</strong> their later<br />
professional life. If eng<strong>in</strong>eers have a basic knowledge of regulative frameworks<br />
then they are capable of discern<strong>in</strong>g particular details of the specific regulative<br />
frameworks they encounter <strong>in</strong> their jobs. Without such basic knowledge<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers will have difficulty establish<strong>in</strong>g what regulations perta<strong>in</strong> to their<br />
<strong>design</strong> processes <strong>and</strong> they cannot take up their responsibility <strong>for</strong> adapt<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
frameworks. The eng<strong>in</strong>eers need this knowledge <strong>for</strong> the public to have<br />
warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g normal <strong>design</strong>s. In my op<strong>in</strong>ion there is no<br />
need <strong>for</strong> a separate course on regulative frameworks. The general outl<strong>in</strong>e of<br />
regulative frameworks could be discussed <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g ethics courses <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>design</strong> courses. Design assignments <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong> are apt to require<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g students to <strong>design</strong> a product <strong>and</strong> to f<strong>in</strong>d the relevant regulative<br />
frameworks <strong>and</strong> use these <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong>. As I experienced <strong>in</strong> do<strong>in</strong>g the casestudies,<br />
it can be difficult <strong>and</strong> time consum<strong>in</strong>g to list all the relevant EU<br />
directives, national legislation, codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to a product (see<br />
sections 5.2, 6.3 <strong>and</strong> 8.6). EU directives are often amended <strong>and</strong> commonly refer<br />
to other EU directives. Search<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> codes is difficult because codes are not<br />
freely available. Delft University of Technology library has to pay <strong>for</strong> access to<br />
such codes <strong>and</strong>, while the Dutch NEN codes <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards are accessible, most<br />
of the American, German or British codes are not. So there are difficulties to be<br />
overcome when describ<strong>in</strong>g a regulative framework that is relevant <strong>for</strong> a product<br />
<strong>design</strong> but if eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g students have had to do this once dur<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
education then it will be easier <strong>for</strong> them to f<strong>in</strong>d, use <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong> regulative<br />
frameworks <strong>in</strong> their professional lives. For example, an eng<strong>in</strong>eer who has<br />
knowledge about regulative frameworks can see the importance of a <strong>design</strong><br />
requirement to <strong>design</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to a certa<strong>in</strong> code, while eng<strong>in</strong>eers who do not<br />
have this knowledge may not realise that if they deviate from the code that they<br />
carry the burden of proof concern<strong>in</strong>g compliance with EU directives.<br />
188
Towards warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
Third, it is important that eng<strong>in</strong>eers are able to reflect on different<br />
operationalisations of requirements <strong>and</strong> the values underly<strong>in</strong>g them particularly<br />
<strong>in</strong> radical <strong>design</strong>. This means that eng<strong>in</strong>eers should be educated to know that <strong>for</strong><br />
example, safety is not an obvious <strong>and</strong> unambiguous concept, the term safety<br />
refers to several conceptions of moral value <strong>and</strong> can be operationalised <strong>in</strong><br />
different ways (see sections 4.3 <strong>and</strong> 7.3). Eng<strong>in</strong>eers can learn this by us<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
personal experience systematically dur<strong>in</strong>g reflection on the <strong>design</strong> process.<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g education should <strong>in</strong>clude the stimulation of a student’s moral<br />
imag<strong>in</strong>ation. Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g students should reflect on the different<br />
operationalisations <strong>and</strong> trade-offs made dur<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>design</strong> process <strong>and</strong> use these<br />
skills <strong>in</strong> practice when they carry out assignments.<br />
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197
Samenvatt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Ethische aspecten <strong>in</strong> ontwerpprocessen; veiligheid en duurzaamheid<br />
In dit proefschrift staan ethische vragen centraal die zich voordoen <strong>in</strong> technische<br />
ontwerpprocessen. De onderzoeksvraag is de volgende:<br />
Wat voor ethische problemen komen er <strong>in</strong> technische ontwerpprocessen voor<br />
en hoe gaan <strong>in</strong>genieurs hier mee om?<br />
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden is het noodzakelijk om <strong>in</strong> de praktijk te gaan<br />
kijken welke ethisch problemen zich voordoen en hoe <strong>in</strong>genieurs besliss<strong>in</strong>gen<br />
nemen over ethische aspecten en welke argumenten ze daarbij gebruiken.<br />
Beschrijv<strong>in</strong>gen van de <strong>in</strong>genieurspraktijk die verkregen zijn <strong>in</strong> dit onderzoek<br />
moeten een bijdrage leveren aan discussies over de morele verantwoordelijkheid<br />
van <strong>in</strong>genieurs.<br />
Er is <strong>in</strong> literatuur over ontwerpprocessen nog niet echt systematisch<br />
a<strong>and</strong>acht besteed aan ethische aspecten van ontwerpprocessen. In de<br />
<strong>in</strong>genieursethiek is niet veel onderzoek naar ontwerpprocessen gedaan, terwijl<br />
toch veel <strong>in</strong>genieurs ontwerpen. Op basis van een literatuurstudie naar de aard<br />
van ontwerpprocessen concludeer ik <strong>in</strong> hoofdstuk 2 dat ontwerpprocessen<br />
gezien kunnen worden als: ‘georganiseerde sociale processen waar<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong> of<br />
meer slecht gestructureerde technische problemen opgelost worden’. Als<br />
ontwerpprocessen op die manier gekarakteriseerd worden dan betekent dat, dat<br />
men om een beschrijv<strong>in</strong>g te maken van een ontwerpproces niet kan volstaan<br />
met een rationele reconstructie aan de h<strong>and</strong> van de ontwerpeisen en een<br />
beschrijv<strong>in</strong>g van het uite<strong>in</strong>delijke ontwerp. Er is onder <strong>and</strong>ere <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>matie nodig<br />
over de organisatie van het ontwerpteam, over de manier waarop besliss<strong>in</strong>gen<br />
genomen worden en over het ontwerpprobleem. In dit onderzoek werd deze<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>matie verkregen door het doen van casestudies.<br />
De keuze van de case-studies werd sterk bepaald door de verwacht<strong>in</strong>g dat er<br />
<strong>in</strong> verschillende ontwerpprocessen verschillende ethische problemen<br />
voorkomen. Voor het karakteriseren van ontwerpprocessen is gebruik gemaakt<br />
van ideeën van Vicenti. V<strong>in</strong>centi heeft de begrippen “ontwerphiërarchie” en<br />
“ontwerptype” geïntroduceerd om ontwerpen te kunnen karakteriseren. Het<br />
ontwerptype kan variëren van radicaal tot normaal. In een normaal ontwerp zijn<br />
zowel het werkende pr<strong>in</strong>cipe (hoe het product functioneert) als de normale<br />
configuratie (hoe het product eruit ziet) bekend. In een radicaal ontwerp zijn<br />
deze niet bekend of worden de besta<strong>and</strong>e configuratie en het werkend pr<strong>in</strong>cipe<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
niet gebruikt. Dit onderscheid is vooral gericht op de werk<strong>in</strong>g en structuur van<br />
een product. Ook functioneel kan een ontwerpproces radicaal zijn. In een<br />
functioneel radicaal ontwerpproces worden <strong>and</strong>ere eisen gesteld dan <strong>in</strong> normale<br />
processen of is de prioriteit van de eisen <strong>and</strong>ers, bijvoorbeeld <strong>in</strong> het functioneel<br />
radicaal ontwerpproces van een auto die de geluidsbarrière moet doorbreken.<br />
Snelheid is normaal gesproken wel een vereiste van een auto maar <strong>in</strong> dit geval is<br />
deze eis het belangrijkste. Door de eis om met de auto de geluidsbarrière te<br />
kunnen doorbreken is het ook niet duidelijk bij aanvang van het ontwerpproces<br />
welke onderdelen van werkend pr<strong>in</strong>cipe en normale configuratie nog gebruikt<br />
kunnen worden. Radicaal <strong>in</strong> functionele z<strong>in</strong> kan dus leiden tot radicaal <strong>in</strong><br />
werk<strong>in</strong>g en structurele z<strong>in</strong>.<br />
De ontwerphiërarchie verwijst naar de verschillende niveaus van een<br />
product waarop een ontwerp probleem ge<strong>for</strong>muleerd kan zijn. Hoog <strong>in</strong> de<br />
hiërarchie is het ontwerp van een heel product. Laag <strong>in</strong> de hiërarchie is de<br />
detailler<strong>in</strong>g van een onderdeeltje.<br />
Volgens V<strong>in</strong>centi zijn er lager <strong>in</strong> de ontwerphiërarchie meer<br />
r<strong>and</strong>voorwaarden. Deze r<strong>and</strong>voorwaarden, bijvoorbeeld over dimensies, worden<br />
opgelegd door besliss<strong>in</strong>gen die hoger <strong>in</strong> de ontwerphiërarchie genomen zijn. In<br />
een normaal ontwerp zijn er volgens V<strong>in</strong>centi meer externe r<strong>and</strong>voorwaarden<br />
dan <strong>in</strong> een radicaal ontwerp. R<strong>and</strong>voorwaarden kunnen gerelateerd zijn aan het<br />
werkend pr<strong>in</strong>cipe en de normale configuratie maar ook aan wet- en regelgev<strong>in</strong>g<br />
die voor een product gelden.<br />
In dit proefschrift is de term regulatief raamwerk geïntroduceerd om het<br />
geheel aan wet- en regelgev<strong>in</strong>g voor een product aan te geven. Het regulatief<br />
raamwerk bestaat uit wetgev<strong>in</strong>g (EU en nationaal), technische normen,<br />
st<strong>and</strong>aarden, <strong>in</strong>spectie en controle. Ook <strong>in</strong>terpretaties van de wetgev<strong>in</strong>g en<br />
normen en st<strong>and</strong>aarden gegeven door professionele organisaties of de<br />
<strong>in</strong>specterende <strong>in</strong>stanties behoren tot het regulatief raamwerk.<br />
Het regulatief raamwerk kan gerelateerd worden aan ideeën van Grunwald.<br />
Grunwald heeft <strong>in</strong> een artikel gesteld dat <strong>in</strong> “gewone” techniekontwikkel<strong>in</strong>g er<br />
een normatief raamwerk bestaat. Dit normatieve raamwerk is m<strong>in</strong> of meer een<br />
regulatief raamwerk dat aan bepaalde eisen voldoet. Het normatief raamwerk<br />
moet pragmatisch compleet, lokaal consistent, niet ambigu en geaccepteerd zijn<br />
bovendien moet het gevolgd worden. Als er een dergelijk normatief raamwerk is,<br />
dan moeten <strong>in</strong>genieurs dit raamwerk volgen tijdens techniekontwikkel<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Ethische reflectie door <strong>in</strong>genieurs is dan volgens Grunwald niet nodig of<br />
gewenst.<br />
200<br />
Op basis van deze ideeën zijn de volgende werkhypotheses opgesteld:
Samenvatt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
1a. De soort ethische kwesties hangt af van ontwerptype en hiërarchie.<br />
1b. De manier waarop <strong>in</strong>genieurs omgaan met deze ethische<br />
onderwerpen hangt af van ontwerptype en hiërarchie.<br />
2a. In normaal ontwerp wordt een regulatief raamwerk gebruikt om<br />
besliss<strong>in</strong>gen te nemen over ethische kwesties.<br />
2b. Het regulatief raamwerk voldoet aan Grunwald’s eisen.<br />
Om te bekijken of de werkhypotheses gesteund worden door empirische data,<br />
zijn <strong>in</strong> dit onderzoek vier casestudies gedaan. Twee normale ontwerpprocessen,<br />
één hoog en één midden tot laag <strong>in</strong> de ontwerphiërarchie, en twee radicale<br />
ontwerpprocessen één hoog en één midden <strong>in</strong> de ontwerphiërarchie zijn<br />
bestudeerd. In tabel 1 staan de cases genoemd.<br />
Tabel 1: de vier bestudeerde ontwerpprocessen<br />
radicaal normaal<br />
Hoog niveau ontwerp DutchEVO een<br />
lichtgewicht duurzame<br />
stadsauto<br />
Brug<br />
Laag niveau ontwerp Een lichte open<br />
vrachtwagentrailer<br />
Pijpen en drukvaten voor<br />
de (petro) chemische<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustrie<br />
De eerste case is het DutchEVO project dat uitgevoerd werd aan de TU Delft<br />
door studenten, aio’s en stafleden. Het idee was om een duurzame lichtgewicht<br />
stadsauto te ontwerpen van maximaal 400 kg. Hiermee wilde het DutchEVO<br />
team laten zien wat er aan de TU Delft mogelijk was maar ook een discussie <strong>in</strong><br />
de maatschappij opstarten over auto’s. De belangrijkste ethische kwesties <strong>in</strong> de<br />
DutchEVO case waren de operationalisatie van de criteria veiligheid en<br />
duurzaamheid. De operationaliser<strong>in</strong>g van veiligheid zoals die gegeven wordt <strong>in</strong><br />
het regulatief raamwerk voor auto’s wilde het DutchEVO team niet gebruiken.<br />
Deze operationaliser<strong>in</strong>g leidt tot zware en stijve auto’s die wel <strong>in</strong>zittenden<br />
bescherm<strong>in</strong>g bieden maar gevaarlijk zijn voor mensen buiten de auto en veel<br />
br<strong>and</strong>stof verbruiken. Hieraan is gerelateerd dat een lichte auto altijd de grootste<br />
versnell<strong>in</strong>g krijgt <strong>in</strong> een bots<strong>in</strong>g met een zwaardere auto. Een auto van 400 kg<br />
krijgt dus altijd de grootste versnell<strong>in</strong>g, bovendien was het niet mogelijk om een<br />
auto te ontwerpen van 400 kg en daar<strong>in</strong> allerlei gebruikelijke<br />
veiligheidssystemen zoals Anti-lock Brak<strong>in</strong>g System en airbags <strong>in</strong> op te nemen.<br />
Het ontwerpteam wilde <strong>in</strong> plaats van een zware stijve auto vol met<br />
veiligheidssystemen een lichte auto maken die goed te manoeuvreren is maar<br />
waar mensen zich wat kwetsbaar <strong>in</strong> zullen voelen. Volgens het ontwerpteam<br />
gaan mensen als ze zich kwetsbaar voelen voorzichtiger en veiliger rijden. Het<br />
201
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
operationaliseren van het criterium duurzaamheid werd gedaan op de volgende<br />
wijze. Een duurzame auto is een auto waarvan het energieverbruik <strong>in</strong> de hele<br />
levenscyclus laag is. De meeste energie wordt verbruikt <strong>in</strong> de gebruiksfase. Het<br />
br<strong>and</strong>stofgebruik tijdens het rijden wordt deels bepaald door het gewicht maar<br />
ook door de aërodynamica en rolweerst<strong>and</strong>. Een auto met een laag gewicht is<br />
duurzaam omdat deze zu<strong>in</strong>ig rijdt. Uite<strong>in</strong>delijk is het duurzaamheidcriterium<br />
dus geoperationaliseerd als een auto met een maximaal gewicht van 400 kg.<br />
Buiten het lage gewicht werd er ook geëist dat de auto emotioneel duurzaam<br />
moest zijn. Emotionele duurzaamheid betekende volgens het ontwerpteam dat<br />
het gebruik van de auto meerwaarde moet geven buiten alleen het vervoer van de<br />
ene naar de <strong>and</strong>ere plek. Het gebruik van de auto moet leuk zijn en er moet een<br />
b<strong>and</strong> ontstaan tussen de auto en de bezitter. Deze operationalisatie van<br />
duurzaamheid kan tot tegenstrijdigheden leiden. Zo leidt het gebruik van<br />
lichtgewicht materialen tot een slechte recyclebaarheid van de auto. Bovendien is<br />
het niet duidelijk dat een leuke stadsauto, hoe lichtgewicht ook, duurzaam kan<br />
zijn. In steden <strong>in</strong> Europa zijn er vaak <strong>and</strong>ere en meer energiezu<strong>in</strong>ige manieren<br />
om je te verplaatsen zoals per openbaar vervoer of per fiets.<br />
De operationalisatie van veiligheid en duurzaamheid en de trade-offs hier<br />
tussen werden gemaakt op basis van <strong>in</strong>terne ontwerpteam normen. De mensen<br />
<strong>in</strong> het ontwerpteam werkten voor het eerst samen en de <strong>in</strong>terne normen<br />
ontstonden tegelijkertijd met het ontwerp. De <strong>in</strong>terne normen waren gebaseerd<br />
op de opleid<strong>in</strong>g van de mensen <strong>in</strong> het ontwerpteam, de ontwerpervar<strong>in</strong>g (veel<br />
studenten dus er was maar we<strong>in</strong>ig ontwerpervar<strong>in</strong>g) en de persoonlijke ervar<strong>in</strong>g<br />
van de mensen <strong>in</strong> het ontwerpteam.<br />
De tweede case gaat over de ethische kwesties die spelen bij het ontwerp van<br />
drukvaten en pijpleid<strong>in</strong>gen. Deze zijn met name gerelateerd aan de veiligheid<br />
van de (petro) chemische <strong>in</strong>stallatie. Het ontwerp van drukvaten en pijpleid<strong>in</strong>gen<br />
was <strong>in</strong> dit geval normaal ontwerp. In het ontwerp van <strong>in</strong>stallaties wordt gebruik<br />
gemaakt van een regulatief raamwerk besta<strong>and</strong>e uit Europese en nationale<br />
wetgev<strong>in</strong>g, normen en st<strong>and</strong>aarden. Bovendien moest het ontwerp gecertificeerd<br />
worden. Ingenieurs denken dat het volgen van het regulatief raamwerk een<br />
goede manier is om veilige <strong>in</strong>stallaties te ontwerpen. Toch zijn niet alle ethische<br />
kwesties geregeld <strong>in</strong> het regulatief raamwerk. Zo zijn er geen regels voor het<br />
opstellen van belast<strong>in</strong>gscenario’s en ongevalscenario’s <strong>in</strong> het regulatief<br />
raamwerk opgenomen. De stress eng<strong>in</strong>eer moet hierover besliss<strong>in</strong>gen nemen.<br />
De certificerende organisaties, waaronder Lloyd’s Register Stoomwezen, mogen<br />
de risicoanalyse die gemaakt moet worden door het ontwerpbureau officieel niet<br />
beoordelen. Buiten deze ethische kwesties speelt er soms nog een vraag over de<br />
verantwoordelijkheidsverdel<strong>in</strong>g tussen ontwerpbureau en constructiebedrijf.<br />
202
Samenvatt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Sommige details worden door het ontwerpbureau niet helemaal <strong>in</strong>gevuld omdat<br />
het constructiebedrijf tijdens de constructie wat vrijheid moet hebben <strong>in</strong> de<br />
constructiemethode. Dit kan het ontwerpbureau er toe verleiden om de moeilijke<br />
details maar niet <strong>in</strong> te vullen.<br />
Volgens de geïnterviewde <strong>in</strong>genieurs ontstaat er <strong>in</strong> Nederl<strong>and</strong> mogelijk een<br />
probleem omdat de kennis over het ontwerpen van een veilige <strong>in</strong>stallatie<br />
afneemt. Ontwerpbureaus hebben <strong>in</strong> de jaren negentig ervaren <strong>in</strong>genieurs<br />
ontslagen. Chemische bedrijven hebben hun <strong>in</strong>genieursafdel<strong>in</strong>g gesloten.<br />
Stoomwezen, dat tot de <strong>in</strong>voer<strong>in</strong>g van de Europese Richtlijn voor Drukvaten de<br />
enige certificerende <strong>in</strong>stantie was <strong>in</strong> Nederl<strong>and</strong>, heeft gedurende een lange tijd<br />
een vacaturestop gehad en op dit moment gaan daar ervaren <strong>in</strong>specteurs met<br />
pensioen terwijl de jongere <strong>in</strong>specteurs nog niet genoeg ervar<strong>in</strong>g hebben. Deze<br />
situatie kan ertoe leiden dat er uite<strong>in</strong>delijk te we<strong>in</strong>ig kennis is om een veilig<br />
ontwerp te maken.<br />
De derde case is het constructieve voorontwerp van een brug over het<br />
Amsterdam-Rijnkanaal. Het Ingenieursbureau van de Gemeente Amsterdam<br />
(IBA) maakte dit voorontwerp. Het architectonische ontwerp en het pakket van<br />
eisen waren al eerder opgesteld door de architect en door een <strong>and</strong>ere<br />
gemeentelijk dienst <strong>in</strong> samenwerk<strong>in</strong>g met IBA. Het was een normaal ontwerp<br />
van een boogbrug; het werkend pr<strong>in</strong>cipe en de normale configuratie werden<br />
gebruikt. Er speelden ethische vragen rondom de operationaliser<strong>in</strong>g van<br />
veiligheid en duurzaamheid en afweg<strong>in</strong>gen die gemaakt moesten worden tussen<br />
veiligheid en architectonische vorm. Het g<strong>in</strong>g bij de brug niet alleen om de<br />
veiligheid tijdens het gebruik maar ook om de veiligheid tijdens de constructie<br />
en het voorkomen van h<strong>in</strong>der aan schepen. Voor de veiligheid tijdens het<br />
gebruik bestaat een regulatief raamwerk gebaseerd op het Bouwbesluit. Dit<br />
raamwerk is uitgebreid maar niet compleet. Er is bijvoorbeeld niets opgenomen<br />
over het voorkomen van misbruik. Mensen op de brug kunnen d<strong>in</strong>gen naar<br />
beneden gooien op schepen en omdat de bogen niet steil zijn kunnen mensen<br />
zelfs proberen over de bogen naar boven te lopen. Over het voorkomen hiervan<br />
zijn geen richtlijnen opgenomen <strong>in</strong> het regulatieve raamwerk. Op het moment<br />
dat de <strong>in</strong>genieurs <strong>in</strong> een later stadium zouden beslissen om de bogen af te<br />
schermen met een hek, zou dat mogelijk kunnen leiden tot problemen met de<br />
architect omdat die zijn architectonisch ontwerp aangetast ziet worden door<br />
hekken. Een <strong>and</strong>ere ethische keuze was dat er gekozen moest worden tussen de<br />
Europese normen en de NEN normen. Het regulatief raamwerk is dus wat<br />
ambigu. Er komt op dit moment een voorlopige versie van een nieuwe Europese<br />
code voor bruggen uit. Deze code zal uite<strong>in</strong>delijk de oude Nederl<strong>and</strong>se NEN<br />
normen gaan vervangen maar gedurende een bepaalde tijd mag er een keuze<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
gemaakt worden tussen de oude NEN en de nieuwe Europese code. In dit<br />
ontwerpproces moesten de <strong>in</strong>genieurs hun klant adviseren over de keuze tussen<br />
NEN normen en de Europese code. De NEN normen onderschatten de<br />
vermoei<strong>in</strong>gsbelast<strong>in</strong>gen maar de <strong>in</strong>genieurs hadden wel veel ervar<strong>in</strong>g met de<br />
NEN normen terwijl ze de nieuwe Europese code niet kenden. Uite<strong>in</strong>delijk<br />
adviseerden de <strong>in</strong>genieurs om de nieuwe Europese code te gaan gebruiken <strong>in</strong><br />
het def<strong>in</strong>itieve ontwerp.<br />
De <strong>in</strong>genieurs moesten tijdens dit voorontwerp al een Veiligheids- en<br />
Gezondsheidsplan opstellen. Het Veiligheids- en Gezondheidsplan vereist dat<br />
risico’s voor mensen op de bouw <strong>in</strong> een lijst opgenomen zijn en dat waar<br />
mogelijk de risico’s verm<strong>in</strong>derd worden. Deze eis werd procedureel opgevat en<br />
een lijst werd gemaakt met risico’s voor mensen op de bouwplaats. Het<br />
verm<strong>in</strong>deren van deze risico’s werd doorgeschoven naar latere ontwerpfases of<br />
naar de aannemer. Er werd dus wel een Veiligheids- en Gezondheidsplan<br />
opgesteld maar dit had geen <strong>in</strong>vloed op het voorontwerp. Op basis hiervan zijn<br />
geen ontwerpver<strong>and</strong>er<strong>in</strong>gen aangebracht. De <strong>in</strong>genieurs kenden ook alleen maar<br />
de eis om het plan op te stellen; de rest van het regulatieve raamwerk over<br />
veiligheid tijdens de bouw was hen onbekend. Als de arbeidsomst<strong>and</strong>igheden<br />
van bouwvakkers echt meegenomen zouden moeten worden <strong>in</strong> het ontwerp dan<br />
was alleen het eisen van een lijst met risico’s waarschijnlijk niet genoeg. Het is<br />
een morele vraag of <strong>in</strong>genieurs niet alleen de lijst zouden moeten maken, maar<br />
ook het ontwerp aanpassen zodat de risico’s voor bouwvakkers m<strong>in</strong>der worden.<br />
De vierde case is het voorontwerp en de haalbaarheidsstudie van een<br />
lichtgewicht open vrachtwagen trailer. Het voorontwerp werd gemaakt voor een<br />
kle<strong>in</strong> trailerbedrijf dat zich richt op <strong>in</strong>novaties b<strong>in</strong>nen trailerproductie. Het is<br />
een radicaal ontwerp omdat het materiaal waarvan de trailer gemaakt moest<br />
worden, composieten, nog niet vaak gebruikt was voor trailers. Bovendien werd<br />
de trailer uitgerust met een nieuw laad- en lossysteem. De normale configuratie<br />
werd dus ver<strong>and</strong>erd. De trailer moest wel aan een normale truck gekoppeld<br />
kunnen worden. In deze case waren de belangrijkste ethische kwesties<br />
gerelateerd aan de operationalisatie van veiligheid en het toeschrijven van<br />
verantwoordelijkheden. De ethische kwesties die een rol speelden <strong>in</strong> de<br />
operationalisatie van veiligheid waren de volgende.<br />
Ten eerste operationaliseerden de <strong>in</strong>genieurs een veilige trailer als een<br />
constructief betrouwbare trailer. Dat de trailer onderdeel zou gaan uitmaken van<br />
het verkeer en gevaarlijk zou kunnen zijn voor <strong>and</strong>ere weggebruikers namen de<br />
<strong>in</strong>genieurs niet mee. Terwijl de <strong>in</strong>genieurs bij het maken van het voorontwerp<br />
wel besliss<strong>in</strong>gen namen over waar stijve constructie onderdelen moesten komen<br />
<strong>in</strong> de trailer, werden verkeersveiligheid en botscompatibiliteit van de trailer<br />
204
Samenvatt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
buiten beschouw<strong>in</strong>g gelaten. Het beslissen waar stijve constructiedelen komen<br />
bepaalt tevens waar <strong>and</strong>ere auto’s of fietsers of voetgangers tegen aan botsen<br />
tijdens een ongeluk.<br />
Ten tweede werden om de constructieve betrouwbaarheid van de trailer vast<br />
te stellen, belast<strong>in</strong>gscenario’s en materiaaleigenschappen van composieten<br />
gebruikt. Er zijn verschillende waardes voor de maximale rek waaraan een<br />
composiet mag worden blootgesteld. Deze waardes houden reken<strong>in</strong>g met<br />
bepaalde <strong>in</strong>vloeden van de omgev<strong>in</strong>g op het composiet en er zijn ook<br />
veiligheidsfactoren <strong>in</strong> verwerkt. Er moest <strong>in</strong> dit ontwerp een keuze gemaakt<br />
worden tussen de door verschillende organisaties voorgestelde maximale rekken.<br />
Bovendien moesten er belast<strong>in</strong>gscenario’s opgesteld worden voor de<br />
bereken<strong>in</strong>gen. In een belast<strong>in</strong>gscenario wordt aangegeven welke krachten er<br />
wanneer op de trailer zullen werken tijdens gebruik. Deze belast<strong>in</strong>gscenario’s,<br />
voor bijvoorbeeld het rijden met een met z<strong>and</strong> volgeladen trailer, waren niet<br />
bekend. De belast<strong>in</strong>gscenario’s en het ontwerp werden tegelijkertijd aangepast<br />
<strong>in</strong> de bereken<strong>in</strong>gen. Dit is een ethische kwestie omdat deze bereken<strong>in</strong>gen<br />
uite<strong>in</strong>delijk bepalen b<strong>in</strong>nen welke grenzen de trailer heel blijft. Als de trailer<br />
zwaarder belast wordt dan kan hij kapot gaan met alle gevolgen v<strong>and</strong>ien.<br />
Ten derde schreven de <strong>in</strong>genieurs de verantwoordelijkheid voor de<br />
verkeersveiligheid toe aan de overheid en de chauffeurs. De<br />
verantwoordelijkheid voor het opstellen van de eisen schreven ze toe aan de<br />
klant. De overheid moet <strong>in</strong> hun ogen zorgen voor goede regelgev<strong>in</strong>g en de<br />
chauffeur moet voorzichtig rijden. De klant moet zorgen voor het stellen en<br />
eventueel aanpassen van de vereisten.<br />
Besliss<strong>in</strong>gen over ethische kwesties zoals de constructieve betrouwbaarheid<br />
werden genomen op basis van <strong>in</strong>terne normen. Deze <strong>in</strong>terne normen zijn<br />
gebaseerd op de opleid<strong>in</strong>g die de <strong>in</strong>genieurs hebben -meer dan de helft van de<br />
<strong>in</strong>genieurs <strong>in</strong> het <strong>in</strong>genieursbureau heeft Lucht- en Ruimtevaart gestudeerd-<br />
maar ook op de eerdere ontwerpervar<strong>in</strong>gen en persoonlijke ervar<strong>in</strong>gen.<br />
Op basis van de vier cases trek ik de volgende conclusies met betrekk<strong>in</strong>g tot de<br />
werkhypotheses:<br />
- Werkhypothese 1a wordt gedeeltelijk ondersteund door de cases: Hoewel<br />
op een heel algemeen niveau de ethische problemen <strong>in</strong> een radicaal en<br />
een normaal ontwerp meest gezien kunnen worden als problemen<br />
rondom operationalisatie van veiligheid of duurzaamheid, het maken van<br />
trade-offs of het toeschrijven en verdelen van verantwoordelijkheid, is er<br />
toch wel een verschil te zien. In de normale ontwerpen waren de meeste<br />
operationalisatie problemen <strong>in</strong> de vorm van een keuze tussen gegeven<br />
alternatieven. In de radicale ontwerp cases kwam deze vorm van<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
206<br />
operationaliseren niet voor, maar moesten alle operationaliser<strong>in</strong>gen nog<br />
helemaal uitgewerkt worden.<br />
- Werkhypothese 1b wordt ook gedeeltelijk ondersteunde door de cases: De<br />
manier waarop <strong>in</strong>genieurs omgaan met de ethische problemen hangt af<br />
van het ontwerptype. In de normale ontwerp cases gaf het regulatief<br />
raamwerk soms alternatieven waartussen gekozen moest worden en als er<br />
geen alternatieven gegeven waren dan was het altijd nog mogelijk om met<br />
de certificerende <strong>in</strong>stantie te overleggen. In de radicale ontwerp cases<br />
werden besliss<strong>in</strong>gen over ethische kwesties gemaakt op basis van <strong>in</strong>terne<br />
ontwerpteam normen. Deze normen waren gebaseerd op de<br />
ontwerpervar<strong>in</strong>g, de opleid<strong>in</strong>g en de persoonlijke ervar<strong>in</strong>g van de<br />
ontwerpteamleden.<br />
- Werkhypothese 2a wordt ondersteund door de cases: In de normale<br />
ontwerpen werd, waar mogelijk, het regulatief raamwerk gebruikt om<br />
besliss<strong>in</strong>gen te nemen over ethische kwesties.<br />
- Werkhypothese 2b wordt door de cases weerlegd: De regulatieve<br />
raamwerken <strong>in</strong> de cases voldeden niet aan Grunwalds eisen. Het<br />
regulatief raamwerk <strong>in</strong> de pijpleid<strong>in</strong>gen en drukvaten case wordt niet<br />
geaccepteerd door alle relevante actoren. Het regulatief raamwerk voor<br />
veiligheid tijdens het gebruik van een brug is niet pragmatisch compleet<br />
en bovendien ambigu.<br />
Deze conclusies uit de cases kunnen op empirische en conceptuele gronden<br />
gegeneraliseerd worden. Op empirische gronden kan men verwachten dat voor<br />
de meeste producten <strong>in</strong>derdaad een regulatief raamwerk bestaat. Uit de<br />
doelstell<strong>in</strong>g van de Europese Unie, namelijk een vrije markt voor personen en<br />
goederen, kan afgeleid worden dat het de bedoel<strong>in</strong>g is om zoveel mogelijk<br />
producten onder Europese Richtlijnen te laten vallen. Alleen producten die<br />
onder Europese Richtlijnen vallen krijgen een CE marker<strong>in</strong>g en mogen daarmee<br />
<strong>in</strong> heel de EU op de markt gebracht worden. Deze richtlijnen verwijzen vaak<br />
weer naar normen en st<strong>and</strong>aarden. Het is dus aannemelijk dat voor de meeste<br />
producten een regulatief raamwerk bestaat. Omdat producten gecertificeerd<br />
moeten worden en het volgen van het complete regulatieve raamwerk de<br />
gemakkelijkste manier is om aan te tonen dat een product voldoet aan de<br />
gestelde eisen, zal over het algemeen dan ook een regulatief raamwerk<br />
daadwerkelijk gebruikt worden <strong>in</strong> normale ontwerpprocessen. Er kan echter niet<br />
vanuit gegaan worden dat de regulatieve raamwerken voldoen aan Grunwalds<br />
eisen voor een normatief raamwerk.<br />
Op conceptuele gronden kan aannemelijk gemaakt worden dat <strong>in</strong> een<br />
radicaal ontwerp regulatieve raamwerken niet of slechts gedeeltelijk toepasbaar
Samenvatt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
zijn. Als alleen de normale configuratie <strong>and</strong>ers wordt, bijvoorbeeld door een<br />
<strong>and</strong>er materiaal te gebruiken, dan zijn bepaalde delen van het regulatieve<br />
raamwerk niet toepasbaar. Als composieten gebruikt worden <strong>in</strong> plaats van<br />
metalen dan zijn alle delen uit het regulatieve raamwerk waar<strong>in</strong> gesproken wordt<br />
over de spann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> het materiaal niet meer toepasbaar. Als de normale<br />
configuratie en het werkend pr<strong>in</strong>cipe <strong>and</strong>ers zijn dan kunnen de meeste delen<br />
van het raamwerk niet meer toegepast worden, hoewel het hoger gelegen doel<br />
van het regulatief raamwerk nog wel relevant is. Een voorbeeld is het ontwerp<br />
van automatisch geleide voertuigen.Volgens het regulatief raamwerk moet elk<br />
voertuig een bestuurder hebben. Dit wordt vereist om zo het verkeer veilig te<br />
maken. Veilig verkeer is nog wel relevant voor automatisch geleide voertuigen<br />
maar het vereisen van een bestuurder is tegenstrijdig met het doel van<br />
automatisch geleide voertuigen. Omdat <strong>in</strong> een radicaal ontwerp er m<strong>in</strong>der of<br />
helemaal niet teruggevallen kan worden op regulatieve raamwerken zullen meer<br />
ethische besliss<strong>in</strong>gen genomen worden op basis van <strong>in</strong>terne ontwerpteam<br />
normen.<br />
In het laatste hoofdstuk worden deze conclusies gebruikt om een beg<strong>in</strong> te<br />
maken met een discussie over wat de <strong>in</strong>vloed van het ontwerptype en de<br />
aanwezigheid van een regulatief raamwerk is op de vertrouwensrelatie tussen de<br />
maatschappij en <strong>in</strong>genieurs. Ik maak hierbij gebruik van de analyse van<br />
vertrouwen van Annette Baier. Volgens Baier is vertrouwen een ternaire relatie:<br />
persoon A vertrouwt persoon B met gewaardeerd d<strong>in</strong>g C. Baier stelt dat<br />
vertrouwen een speciaal soort afhankelijkheidsrelatie is: je bent afhankelijk van<br />
iem<strong>and</strong>s welwillendheid ten opzichte van jou. Op basis van deze ideeën heb ik <strong>in</strong><br />
hoofdstuk 2 gesteld dat vertrouwen <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>genieurs gerechtvaardigd is als<br />
<strong>in</strong>genieurs (1) welwillend zijn ten opzichte van de maatschappij (2) ze competent<br />
zijn en het regulatieve raamwerk gebruiken en (3) het regulatief raamwerk<br />
adequaat is en voldoet aan Grunwalds eisen. In hoofdstuk 9 neem ik aan dat<br />
<strong>in</strong>genieurs welwillend zijn ten opzichte van de maatschappij omdat vertrouwen<br />
<strong>in</strong> mensen die kwaadwillend zijn nooit gerechtvaardigd is.<br />
De condities voor gerechtvaardigd vertrouwen <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>genieurs betekenen <strong>in</strong><br />
het geval van normaal ontwerp dat <strong>in</strong>genieurs technisch competent moeten zijn.<br />
Ingenieurs moeten het regulatief raamwerk en de grenzen ervan kennen, maar<br />
ook moeten ze weten welke organisaties welke onderdelen van het raamwerk<br />
<strong>for</strong>muleren. Als <strong>in</strong>genieurs vertrouwd worden om normale ontwerpen te maken<br />
volgens het raamwerk dan horen ze ook de problemen die ze onderv<strong>in</strong>den met<br />
het toepassen van onderdelen van het regulatief raamwerk door te geven aan de<br />
organisaties die de betreffende onderdelen ge<strong>for</strong>muleerd hebben. Technische<br />
competentie van <strong>in</strong>genieurs is niet voldoende, het regulatief raamwerk moet ook<br />
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<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
adequaat zijn. Tot nu toe heb ik Grunwalds eisen voor een normatief raamwerk<br />
gezien als eisen aan een adequaat raamwerk. Er zijn echter problemen met deze<br />
eisen die het normatief raamwerk als basis voor vertrouwen <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>genieurs die<br />
normaal ontwerpen aantasten. Grunwald zegt over de eis dat het raamwerk<br />
geaccepteerd moet zijn, dat acceptatie breder moet zijn dan door alleen<br />
<strong>in</strong>genieurs: alle betrokken partijen moeten het raamwerk accepteren. Maar<br />
betekent dit dat alle partijen actief moeten aangeven dat ze het raamwerk<br />
accepteren of mag er vanuit gegaan worden dat een raamwerk geaccepteerd is<br />
totdat er berichten over het tegendeel verschijnen <strong>in</strong> de media? Grunwald is hier<br />
niet duidelijk over. Bovendien kan uit het feit dat een raamwerk geaccepteerd is<br />
niet geconcludeerd worden dat het ook acceptabel is, dat zou een naturalistische<br />
drogredener<strong>in</strong>g zijn. Ook de eisen pragmatisch compleet en niet ambigue zijn<br />
problematisch. Een raamwerk waar<strong>in</strong> geprobeerd wordt alles <strong>in</strong> detail voor te<br />
schrijven laat geen ruimte voor context en situatie specifieke overweg<strong>in</strong>gen en is<br />
daardoor heel beperkt toepasbaar. Bovendien hebben <strong>in</strong>genieurs ook wat vrijheid<br />
nodig om professioneel en moreel te h<strong>and</strong>elen. Aan de <strong>and</strong>ere kant geeft een<br />
gedetailleerd voorschrijvend raamwerk <strong>in</strong>genieurs wel macht ten opzichte van<br />
een klant: aan bepaalde m<strong>in</strong>imum eisen moet voldaan worden <strong>and</strong>ers wordt het<br />
ontwerp niet goedgekeurd. Om de eisen vast te stellen waaraan een adequaat<br />
regulatief raamwerk moet voldoen zodat de maatschappij gerechtvaardigd<br />
vertrouwen kan hebben <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>genieurs die normaal ontwerpen moet nog<br />
uitgebreid onderzoek gedaan worden.<br />
Zoals uit dit onderzoek blijkt worden besta<strong>and</strong>e regulatieve raamwerken niet<br />
of maar gedeeltelijk toegepast <strong>in</strong> radicaal ontwerp. Vertrouwen <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>genieurs die<br />
radicale ontwerpen maken kan dus niet gebaseerd worden op het gebruik van<br />
regulatieve raamwerken. Voor de voorwaarden voor gerechtvaardigd vertrouwen<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>genieurs die radicaal ontwerpen val ik terug op de analyse die Baier gegeven<br />
heeft. Ingenieurs moeten de zaken die mensen, die mogelijke gevolgen<br />
onderv<strong>in</strong>den, waarderen beschermen <strong>in</strong> het ontwerp. De voorwaarden voor<br />
gerechtvaardigd vertrouwen <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>genieurs die radicale ontwerpen maken worden<br />
dan:<br />
- Ingenieurs moeten weten wat de mensen die gevolgen van het te<br />
ontwerpen product onderv<strong>in</strong>den waarderen met betrekk<strong>in</strong>g tot het te<br />
ontwerpen product<br />
- Ingenieurs moeten deze gewaardeerde zaken beschermen.<br />
Het is onmogelijk om empirisch vast te stellen wat mensen die mogelijke<br />
gevolgen onderv<strong>in</strong>den waarderen. In radicaal ontwerp zijn niet alle<br />
neveneffecten bekend, dus het vaststellen van alle mensen die gevolgen<br />
onderv<strong>in</strong>den is al niet mogelijk. Een manier voor <strong>in</strong>genieurs om te weten te<br />
komen wat <strong>and</strong>ere mensen waardevol v<strong>in</strong>den, kan zijn om te kijken naar wat zij<br />
208
Samenvatt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
zelf waardevol v<strong>in</strong>den <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong>ere sociale rollen die ze vervullen. Een vraag die<br />
<strong>in</strong>genieurs zichzelf bijvoorbeeld kunnen stellen is: “Wat zou ik belangrijk v<strong>in</strong>den<br />
<strong>in</strong> dit ontwerp van een <strong>in</strong>stallatie op het moment dat deze <strong>in</strong> mijn buurt<br />
gebouwd zou worden?”. Het gebruik van persoonlijke ervar<strong>in</strong>g door <strong>in</strong>genieurs<br />
is geen garantie dat alle zaken die mensen waarderen ook erkend worden, maar<br />
kan wel leiden tot een verbred<strong>in</strong>g van de waarden die meegenomen worden <strong>in</strong><br />
het ontwerpproces. Om de kans op bl<strong>in</strong>de vlekken zo kle<strong>in</strong> mogelijk te maken<br />
zouden ontwerpteams divers moeten zijn. Een ontwerpteam zou moeten<br />
bestaan uit <strong>in</strong>genieurs met verschillende levens en achtergronden. Op die<br />
manier is de kans het grootst dat het ontwerpteam als geheel alle zaken die<br />
mensen waarderen die de gevolgen onderv<strong>in</strong>den kan herkennen.<br />
Anke Christ<strong>in</strong>e van Gorp, november 2005, Technische Universiteit Delft<br />
209
Appendix 1<br />
All <strong>in</strong>terview transcriptions were approved by the <strong>in</strong>terviewees.<br />
All observation notes <strong>and</strong> tapes are transcribed but these were not given to the<br />
<strong>design</strong> teams <strong>for</strong> approval.<br />
Chapter 4 DutchEVO<br />
Interviews<br />
E. van Grondelle, projectleader, Delft Unviersity of Technology, 6 June 2001<br />
N. Gerrits, BSc student, HTS Autotechniek Arnhem, 29 May 2001<br />
J. de Kanter, PhD student, Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, Delft University of<br />
Technology, 31 May 2001<br />
P. van Nieuwkoop, PhD student, Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, Delft University of<br />
Technology, 31 May 2001<br />
R. Porcelijn, Industrial <strong>design</strong>er, 7 July 2000 <strong>and</strong> 14 March 2001<br />
M. Ribbers, BSc student, HTS Autotechniek Arnhem, 28 May 2001<br />
N. Gerrits, BSc student, HTS Autotechniek Arnhem, 29 May 2001<br />
R.van Rossum, MSc student, Aerospace eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, Delft University of<br />
Technology, 8 June 2001<br />
A. van Schaik, PhD student, Recycl<strong>in</strong>g, Civil Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Geosciences, Delft<br />
University of Technology, 3 July 2001<br />
G. Sterks, MSc student, Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, Delft University of Technology,<br />
21 February 2001<br />
H. Welten, MSc student, Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, Delft University of<br />
Technology, 1 June 2001<br />
Observations<br />
Design meet<strong>in</strong>gs (some lasted only 30 m<strong>in</strong>utes others about 2 hours)<br />
19, 20 <strong>and</strong> 21 July 2000 <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs throughout the day<br />
8 August 2000, 20 September 2000, 4 October 2000, 25 January 2001<br />
(graduation presentation <strong>and</strong> discussion G. Sterks), 21 February 2001, 14 March<br />
2001, 28 March 2001, 29 March 2001, 11 April 2001, 25 April 2001, 2 May<br />
2001, 9 May 2001<br />
Project meet<strong>in</strong>gs (project meet<strong>in</strong>gs lasted about 2 hours)<br />
1 August 2000, 7 September 2000, 11 October 2000, 6 December 2000, 10<br />
January 2001, 1 February 2001, 1 <strong>and</strong> 2 March 2001 (project excursion to<br />
companies) 21 February 2001, 11 April 2001<br />
211
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
Presentation <strong>and</strong> discussion: 11 July 2001. Attended by J. de Kanter, E. van<br />
Grondelle, P. van Nieuwkoop, R. van Rossum, N. Gerrits, J. Jacobs, J.<br />
Spoormaker <strong>and</strong> A. Vlot<br />
For the reconstruction of the <strong>design</strong> process be<strong>for</strong>e I started the observations I<br />
relied on the DutchEVO archive.<br />
Chapter 5 Pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Equipment<br />
Interviews<br />
J. van Duijvenbode, Pip<strong>in</strong>g Designer, Jacobs Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, 3 April 2002<br />
H. van Ge<strong>in</strong>, Stress Eng<strong>in</strong>eer Jacobs Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, 3 April 2002<br />
J. de Jong, Materials Eng<strong>in</strong>eer, Jacobs Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, 3 April 2002<br />
N. van Leeuwen, Manager of Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g Jacobs Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, 21 March 2002<br />
R. Steur, Discipl<strong>in</strong>e Supervisor, Jacobs Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, 3 April 2002<br />
A. de Wit, Job Eng<strong>in</strong>eer, Jacobs Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, 3 April 2002<br />
A. van Hoynck van Papendrecht, Senior Design Appraisal Eng<strong>in</strong>eer, Lloyd’s<br />
Register, 23 May 2002.<br />
N. Kuipers, PhD student Materials Science <strong>and</strong> Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g Delft Univeristy of<br />
Technology, <strong>for</strong>mer Specialist at Akzo Nobel Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, 4 April 2002.<br />
G. Küpers, consultant<strong>in</strong>g eng<strong>in</strong>eer, 20 February 2002<br />
Background <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on problems <strong>in</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> pressure equipment <strong>design</strong><br />
from the <strong>in</strong>ternet <strong>for</strong>um: eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g tips <strong>for</strong>um [www.eng-tips.com].<br />
Discussion on this <strong>for</strong>um were followed from Dec 2001 to March 2002.<br />
Chapter 6 Bridge<br />
Interviews<br />
M. Aalste<strong>in</strong>, Design leader <strong>and</strong> Eng<strong>in</strong>eer Steel, IBA, 30 March 2004<br />
J van der Elsken, Eng<strong>in</strong>eer Concrete, IBA, 30 March 20004<br />
E. Hemmelder, Project Leader, IBA, 31 October 2003.<br />
H. van Kleef, Eng<strong>in</strong>eer Steel, IBA, 5 April 2004.<br />
S. Molleman, health <strong>and</strong> safety <strong>and</strong> Build<strong>in</strong>g Site Eng<strong>in</strong>eer, IBA, 29 March 2001<br />
W. Quist, Architect, 27 April 2004<br />
G. Wurth, Consultant Civil Constructions, IBA, 28 January 2003<br />
Short <strong>in</strong>terview by telephone with R. Dayala, IBA, 20 April 2004<br />
212
Appendix 1<br />
Observations<br />
Design meet<strong>in</strong>gs lasted about 2 hours. The follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs were<br />
observed: 3 February, 17 February, 1 March, 2 March, 15 March, 30 March <strong>and</strong> 13<br />
April 2004<br />
Presentation <strong>and</strong> discussion: 10 June 2004. Attended by E. Hemmelder, M.<br />
Aalste<strong>in</strong>, H. van Kleef, R. Segwob<strong>in</strong>d, J. Swier <strong>and</strong> F. van der Pol<br />
Chapter 7 Trailer<br />
Interviews<br />
P. de Haan, Eng<strong>in</strong>eer CLC, 4 June 2003<br />
P. Knapen, Ruflor, 20 November 2003<br />
L. Tromp, Eng<strong>in</strong>eer CLC, 18 March <strong>and</strong> 18 June 2003<br />
Observations<br />
Meet<strong>in</strong>gs with customer: 24 March, 7 May <strong>and</strong> 12 August 2003<br />
Meet<strong>in</strong>gs without customer, these meet<strong>in</strong>gs lasted between 1 hour <strong>and</strong> a whole<br />
day: 18 March, 25 March, 4 April, 8 April, 10 April, 15 April, 17 April, 25 April, 2<br />
May <strong>and</strong> 6 May 2003<br />
Presentation <strong>and</strong> Discussion: 28 August 2003. Attended by L. Tromp, P. de<br />
Haan, G. van der Weijde, A. Verheus, A. Beukers, D. Tiemens, R. Brouwer, M.<br />
Gan, R. Janssen <strong>and</strong> H. van Schie<br />
213
Appendix 2<br />
Members of the DutchEVO <strong>design</strong> team. 1<br />
Thomas: project leader, worked 14 hours a week <strong>for</strong> DutchEVO, had a degree <strong>in</strong><br />
Industrial Product Design from the Artschool Den Haag, had a degree <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation technology, <strong>and</strong> an MBA <strong>in</strong> Management of Automobile Design.<br />
He has worked <strong>for</strong> an <strong>in</strong>dustrial <strong>design</strong> bureau <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> a large company <strong>in</strong> the<br />
US as an advisor <strong>for</strong> styl<strong>in</strong>g departments <strong>in</strong> automotive <strong>in</strong>dustry where he<br />
advised on <strong>design</strong> processes <strong>and</strong> the use of ICT. He has worked freelance <strong>for</strong><br />
over 6 years, sometimes as a car <strong>design</strong>er himself, sometimes teach<strong>in</strong>g car<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eers. He is married <strong>and</strong> has two young children. He jo<strong>in</strong>ed the DutchEVO<br />
project at the end of 1999.<br />
Pete: head <strong>design</strong>er, studied Industrial Design at Delft University of Technology.<br />
He had done an <strong>in</strong>ternship at a car <strong>design</strong> studio <strong>in</strong> Italy. Pete was one of the<br />
members that had started the project, he worked 2 days a week <strong>for</strong> DutchEVO.<br />
He stopped work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> DutchEVO <strong>in</strong> June 2001.<br />
Michael: Industrial <strong>design</strong>er, he was hired to <strong>design</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terior but quitted <strong>in</strong><br />
November 2000.<br />
Scot: Industrial <strong>design</strong>er <strong>and</strong> cultural scientist worked a few months beg<strong>in</strong> 2001<br />
<strong>for</strong> DutchEVO on age<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>design</strong>.<br />
Jack: Industrial <strong>design</strong>er <strong>and</strong> mechanical eng<strong>in</strong>eer, he worked one day a week<br />
<strong>for</strong> the university, teach<strong>in</strong>g Vision <strong>in</strong> product <strong>design</strong> at Industrial Design, Delft<br />
University of Technology. He was an advisor <strong>and</strong> sometimes followed meet<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
<strong>and</strong> gave advice. He was reluctant to take any responsibility <strong>for</strong> the DutchEVO<br />
project.<br />
Dave: A PhD student when the project started, his appo<strong>in</strong>tment changed to that<br />
of Universitair Docent (Lecturer) aeroplane materials <strong>and</strong> <strong>design</strong> <strong>in</strong> October<br />
1999. He had a M.Sc. <strong>in</strong> Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. He supervised a lot of students<br />
do<strong>in</strong>g their master’s thesis some with<strong>in</strong> DutchEVO other students outside<br />
——————————————————————————————————<br />
1 The names are altered.<br />
215
<strong>Ethical</strong> <strong>issues</strong> <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>design</strong><br />
DutchEVO but with overlapp<strong>in</strong>g subjects. He still <strong>in</strong>tended to f<strong>in</strong>ish his PhD<br />
project on materials <strong>for</strong> crash safety.<br />
Ed: A PhD student <strong>in</strong> Aerospace eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. He was do<strong>in</strong>g research on the<br />
jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of alum<strong>in</strong>ium <strong>and</strong> choos<strong>in</strong>g between several jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g techniques.<br />
DutchEVO was a case-study <strong>for</strong> him, he supervised Charlie <strong>and</strong> William together<br />
with Dave.<br />
Charlie: Student Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g did his master’s thesis on the load<br />
bear<strong>in</strong>g understructure of the DutchEVO. He was supervised by Dave <strong>and</strong> Ed.<br />
He worked on his master’s thesis until January 2001.<br />
Josef en Jeff: Students from the HTS Autotechniek <strong>in</strong> Arnhem, did their end<br />
project <strong>for</strong> DutchEVO. They assessed different drivel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong> suitability <strong>in</strong> the<br />
DutchEVO. They were supervised by Dave <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ished their work November<br />
2000.<br />
George en Jill: Students from the HTS Autotechniek <strong>in</strong> Arnhem, did their end<br />
project <strong>for</strong> DutchEVO. They made a concept <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> the suspension of the<br />
DutchEVO. They were supervised by Thomas <strong>and</strong> a professor <strong>in</strong> car dynamics,<br />
they graduated <strong>in</strong> May 2001.<br />
Mark: Student Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g do<strong>in</strong>g his master’s thesis <strong>in</strong><br />
aerodynamics, he advised the DutchEVO team on the aerodynamics. His first<br />
supervisor was someone specialised <strong>in</strong> aerodynamics from Aerospace<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> his second supervisor was Dave. He worked on his master<br />
thesis from July 2000 until August 2001.<br />
William: Student Aerospace Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g do<strong>in</strong>g his master’s thesis <strong>in</strong> the<br />
DutchEVO project, he made a concept <strong>design</strong> <strong>for</strong> the upper structure of the car.<br />
He started beg<strong>in</strong> 2001 <strong>and</strong> was supervised by Dave <strong>and</strong> Ed.<br />
Kat<strong>in</strong>ka <strong>and</strong> Alex<strong>and</strong>er: Russian Postdoc <strong>and</strong> PhD-student look<strong>in</strong>g at the<br />
development of a computer program to optimize material use. DutchEVO was a<br />
case-study <strong>for</strong> them. They should decide on (biodegradable) materials <strong>for</strong> nonloaded<br />
side panels (Alex<strong>and</strong>er) <strong>and</strong> material <strong>for</strong> the rocker (Kat<strong>in</strong>ka). Official<br />
members of the team, unofficially they did not participate much <strong>in</strong> the <strong>design</strong> as<br />
well as <strong>in</strong> social activities. Alex<strong>and</strong>er succeeded another Russian PhD student<br />
Natasha, who was <strong>for</strong>ced to stop after a year, he started Dec 2000.<br />
216
Appendix 2<br />
Ryan: Industrial <strong>design</strong>er, who looked at drivel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> fuel, worked <strong>for</strong> a few<br />
months <strong>for</strong> the project <strong>and</strong> quitted October 2000. He had car rac<strong>in</strong>g as a hobby.<br />
John: Student from Mechanical Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g who did a lot of simulations <strong>for</strong><br />
vehicle dynamic behaviour (<strong>in</strong> July 2000 to December 2000). He did not f<strong>in</strong>ish<br />
a report there<strong>for</strong>e mak<strong>in</strong>g his results almost <strong>in</strong>accessible to other team<br />
members. If the results were promis<strong>in</strong>g he would have been allowed to do his<br />
master’s thesis on the dynamic behaviour of the DuchtEVO with a supervis<strong>in</strong>g<br />
professor <strong>and</strong> a supervisor. This did not happen <strong>and</strong> he quietly left the team after<br />
a short presentation of his results.<br />
Susan <strong>and</strong> Ann: Both PhD student from Applied Earth Science study<strong>in</strong>g<br />
recycl<strong>in</strong>g. They were not part of the <strong>design</strong> team but were (sometimes) present at<br />
project meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> did have some <strong>in</strong>put <strong>and</strong> gave advice. They were <strong>in</strong>volved<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the whole period that I have followed DutchEVO.<br />
217
Dankwoord<br />
En dan is het e<strong>in</strong>delijk tijd om het dankwoord te schrijven…….<br />
Ik wil allereerst mijn promotoren Peter Kroes en Jeroen van den Hoven<br />
bedanken voor hun begeleid<strong>in</strong>g. Peter bedankt dat je me deze kans gegeven hebt<br />
om als <strong>in</strong>genieur zonder noemenswaardige achtergrond <strong>in</strong> de ethiek een<br />
proefschrift <strong>in</strong> de ethiek en techniek te schrijven. Je hebt me met veel geduld<br />
wetenschappelijk en filosofisch leren schrijven. Jeroen, jammer dat je er pas zo<br />
laat bij bent betrokken, maar ik heb toch veel gehad aan je commentaar en<br />
ideeën. Mijn twee dagelijks begeleiders, Henk Z<strong>and</strong>voort en Ibo van de Poel,<br />
zijn onmisbaar geweest. Zonder hen had ik het voor mij nieuwe vakgebied niet<br />
eigen kunnen maken. Henk, bedankt voor al het commentaar en de steun die je<br />
gegeven hebt. Samen met Ibo heb ik twee artikelen geschreven en daar heb ik<br />
heel veel van geleerd. Ibo, je hebt me geholpen mijn ideeën te verbeteren en<br />
goed te <strong>for</strong>muleren. Ik ben heel vaak je kamer b<strong>in</strong>nen gelopen om een idee uit te<br />
proberen of gewoon even te praten; bedankt dat ik dan welkom was.<br />
Theo van Willigenburg wil ik bedanken voor alle goede ideeën die hij mij<br />
gegeven heeft toen hij <strong>in</strong> mijn begeleid<strong>in</strong>gscommissie zat.<br />
Mir<strong>and</strong>a, thank you <strong>for</strong> the correction of my thesis <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> all your advice on<br />
English writ<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Ik wil ook al mijn collega’s bij de sectie Filosofie bedanken, ze hebben mijn<br />
promotie buiten een leerzame ook een gezellige tijd gemaakt. Sab<strong>in</strong>e, je bent de<br />
beste kamergenote die ik me kan wensen. We hebben het heel gezellig gehad en<br />
je stond altijd klaar mij iets uit te leggen over ethiek. Verder wil ik Michiel<br />
bedanken, omdat hij mij zo goed opgevangen heeft toen ik begon met werken en<br />
nog de enige Aio was. Marcel, Jeroen, Lotte, Maarten en Noëmi jullie waren<br />
geweldige collega aio’s en ik vond onze besprek<strong>in</strong>gen en etentjes heel gezellig.<br />
Verder wil ik nogmaals de mensen uit de case-studies bedanken. Het was<br />
heel erg <strong>in</strong>teressant en leuk om mee te mogen lopen met ontwerpprocessen. Ik<br />
wil met name Jens, Elmer, Liesbeth, Peter, Piet, Erw<strong>in</strong> en Malcolm noemen;<br />
bedankt voor jullie tijd en steun.<br />
Mijn vrienden Joyce, Kar<strong>in</strong>, Erw<strong>in</strong>, Michiel en Marjole<strong>in</strong> wil ik bedanken<br />
voor hun steun. Rest mij nog mijn ouders en mijn tweel<strong>in</strong>gzus Bouke te<br />
bedanken, omdat ze er altijd voor me zijn. Bouke, ook bedankt voor alle boeken<br />
en artikelen die ik via jou uit de universiteitsbibliotheek van Utrecht geleend<br />
heb. Als laatste wil ik Thijs bedanken die letterlijk samen met mij heeft<br />
toegewerkt naar onze promoties.<br />
219
Curriculum Vitae<br />
Anke van Gorp was born <strong>in</strong> Tilburg on the 24 th of August 1975. From 1987 until<br />
her graduation <strong>in</strong> 1993 she attended St Odulphus Lyceum <strong>in</strong> Tilburg. After this<br />
she studied Materials Science <strong>and</strong> Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g at Delft University of<br />
Technology. She received her M.Sc <strong>in</strong> 1999 on a masters’ thesis about the<br />
fracture toughness of alum<strong>in</strong>ium metal matrix composites. After this she started<br />
her PhD research <strong>in</strong> the department of Philosophy, Faculty of Technology, Policy<br />
<strong>and</strong> Management at Delft University of Technology. She currently works as a<br />
researcher at the Tilburg Institute <strong>for</strong> Law, Technology <strong>and</strong> Society at Tilburg<br />
University.<br />
221
Simon Stev<strong>in</strong> (1548-1620)<br />
'Wonder en is gheen Wonder'<br />
This series <strong>in</strong> the philosophy of technology is named after the Dutch / Flemish natural<br />
philosopher, scientist <strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer Simon Stev<strong>in</strong>. He was an extraord<strong>in</strong>ary versatile<br />
person. He published, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, on arithmetic, account<strong>in</strong>g, geometry,<br />
mechanics, hydrostatics, astronomy, theory of measurement, civil eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, the theory<br />
of music, <strong>and</strong> civil citizenship. He wrote the very first treatise on logic <strong>in</strong> Dutch, which he<br />
considered to be a superior language <strong>for</strong> scientific purposes. The relation between theory<br />
<strong>and</strong> practice is a ma<strong>in</strong> topic <strong>in</strong> his work. In addition to his theoretical publications, he<br />
held a large number of patents, <strong>and</strong> was actively <strong>in</strong>volved as an eng<strong>in</strong>eer <strong>in</strong> the build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of w<strong>in</strong>dmills, harbours, <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong>tifications <strong>for</strong> the Dutch pr<strong>in</strong>ce Maurits. He is famous <strong>for</strong><br />
hav<strong>in</strong>g constructed large sail<strong>in</strong>g carriages.<br />
Little is known about his personal life. He was probably born <strong>in</strong> 1548 <strong>in</strong> Bruges (Fl<strong>and</strong>ers)<br />
<strong>and</strong> went to Leiden <strong>in</strong> 1581, where he took up his studies at the university two years later.<br />
His work was published between 1581 <strong>and</strong> 1617. He was an early defender of the<br />
Copernican worldview, which did not make him popular <strong>in</strong> religious circles. He died <strong>in</strong><br />
1620, but the exact date <strong>and</strong> the place of his burial are unknown. Philosophically he was a<br />
pragmatic rationalist <strong>for</strong> whom every phenomenon, however mysterious, ultimately had a<br />
scientific explanation. Hence his dictum 'Wonder is no Wonder', which he used on the<br />
cover of several of his own books.
Simon Stev<strong>in</strong> Series <strong>in</strong> the Philosophy of Technology<br />
Books <strong>and</strong> Dissertations<br />
Volume 1: Marcel Scheele, The Proper Use of Artefacts: A<br />
philosophical theory of the social constitution of artefact functions<br />
Volume 2: Anke van Gorp, <strong>Ethical</strong> Issues <strong>in</strong> Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g Design;<br />
Safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
Research Documents<br />
Peter Kroes <strong>and</strong> Anthonie Meijers (eds.), Philosophy of Technical<br />
Artifacts
Eng<strong>in</strong>eers have to make decisions concern<strong>in</strong>g ethical <strong>issues</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g technological<br />
<strong>design</strong> processes. In this thesis the k<strong>in</strong>ds of ethical <strong>issues</strong> that eng<strong>in</strong>eers encounter<br />
are described, together with the way eng<strong>in</strong>eers deal with them, with a focus on ethical<br />
<strong>issues</strong> related to safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Four <strong>design</strong> processes were studied,<br />
the <strong>design</strong> process <strong>for</strong> an ultra light car, <strong>for</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>for</strong> chemical<br />
<strong>in</strong>stallations, <strong>for</strong> a bridge <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> a lightweight open truck trailer. A difference can be<br />
seen between normal <strong>and</strong> radical <strong>design</strong>. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the normal <strong>design</strong> processes <strong>for</strong> the<br />
bridge <strong>and</strong> pip<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment <strong>for</strong> chemical <strong>in</strong>stallations eng<strong>in</strong>eers referred to<br />
regulative frameworks to account <strong>for</strong> decisions about safety <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability. These<br />
regulative frameworks give m<strong>in</strong>imal requirements, (parts of) operationalisations,<br />
rules <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong> use <strong>in</strong> normal <strong>design</strong>. Eng<strong>in</strong>eers do not, or only partly<br />
use, the regulative frameworks <strong>in</strong> the radical <strong>design</strong> processes of an ultra light car<br />
<strong>and</strong> a lightweight open truck trailer <strong>in</strong>stead they relied on <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>design</strong> team<br />
norms <strong>for</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g decisions about ethical <strong>issues</strong>. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the descriptive casestudy<br />
research, the author discusses some prelim<strong>in</strong>ary notions <strong>for</strong> conditions<br />
<strong>for</strong> warranted trust <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers mak<strong>in</strong>g normal <strong>and</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g radical <strong>design</strong>s.<br />
‘Wonder en is<br />
gheen wonder’