understanding land investment deals in africa - Oakland Institute

concession agreements concern the manner in whichthey were negotiated. The GoSS Ministry of Agricultureand Forestry reportedly negotiated both agreementswithout the involvement of either the state governmentor the affected communities. 124 When the companycame to the ground in 2008 to begin constructing itsproject facilities, it encountered a great deal of localopposition in the two states. The company was notpermitted to operate until they conducted a series ofstakeholder workshops in the two states to informstate officials and residents in affected communitiesabout what to expect from the investment. In WesternEquatoria, the concession agreement was alsoreviewed by the council of ministers and debated in theparliament before the state government would allowthe company to begin operating. 125The first few years were difficult for both the companyand the government. A state official in Western Equatoriaexpressed a sense of powerlessness in dealing withthe company in those early days: “The company hadfriends on high and when they came down here to usat the local level, no one could say anything to them.” 126In Central Equatoria, a local government officialrecalled his outrage when the GoSS tried to unilaterallyimplement the investment without involving the localcommunities, likening it to the actions of the Britishcolonial government:“Actually, the Loka teak plantation was plantedat the expense of the community, back in thosedays, during the British time. If we are to go torealities, the community in this area will demandcompensation. If you claim to be the ownerof this forest, then you will have to pay thesepeople compensation, because first of all, theywere forcefully evicted from their houses [by thecolonial government]—their homes were actuallyburned. Two, people were conscripted to go andplant the plantations. This is the history when itcomes to teak plantations. It is never anythingthat is done out of communally mobilizingpeople to work. It is done through forced laborand harassment. Despite all this, the communityhas not benefited at all. We only have a singlesecondary school at Loka, but the community andthe local government cannot even take a singleteak to sell it out and improve things.” 127The current situation between the companies, theiremployees and the host communities remains verytense. According to a former state parliamentarian,when Equatoria Teak first came to Western Equatoria,the company promised that it would create 6,000 jobsin the state. When Equatoria Teak began operations,it reportedly hired about 600 people from the localcommunity to work in various capacities on thereserve. 128 According to several former employees,they signed a one-year contract with the company thatwas supposed to be renewed on a yearly basis. Theyclaimed that, aside from a handful of supervisors, theworkers were paid just seven Sudanese pounds per day(a little more than two USD) and that after three yearsof working for the company the contracts were neverreviewed. 129 In fact, according to the employees, theywere not even allowed to take copies of their contractshome with them. 130 When the company encountereddelays in getting the necessary licensing from thegovernment it decided to save money by cutting laborcosts. By the time it stopped project operations inWestern Equatoria in October 2010, Equatoria Teakwas only employing approximately 250 people. 131Perhaps more worrying than the meager employmentbenefits, are the reports of physical abuse by severalcompany supervisors. When several employeesfailed to show up to work, a South African supervisorreportedly gave them an option to either accept to bebeaten with a wooden stick or else be fired. Ratherthan lose their jobs, the employees reportedly chosethe beating. Several former employees interviewedby OI also asserted that managers locked them inlatrines as punishment for various infractions. Whenthe company’s CEO found out about the abuses, hepromptly fired the supervisor in question.As this case study demonstrates, the CDC andFinnfund’s investment in South Sudan has hadmixed results. On the one hand, the concessionagreements include social benefits and attention toenvironmental impacts that are absent from mostland-based investments in South Sudan. However, fordevelopment funds that portray themselves as sociallyresponsible investors, the Equatoria Teak and CentralEquatoria Teak investments fall short on several fronts.The lack of prior consultation and exploitative laborconditions raise serious concerns about the extent toThe Oakland Institute understanding land investment deals in africa: south sudan | 32