CATCHING LIVE SERPENTSAt the end of 1958, Dhirubhai returned to India with his wife Kokilaben and firstchild, a son named Mukesh. <strong>The</strong>y were expecting their second child (another son,Anil, born in June 1959, to be followed by daughters Dipti, born in January 1961, andNina, born in July 1962). From all his years with Besse & Co and all his eveningsstudying the market, he had accumulated savings of just 29000 East Africanshillings-then worth about US$3000 which, as his Besse colleague Susheel Kotharihad reminded him, would be just ‘chutney’s back in his homeland.Dhirubhai was determined to go into business on his own account. At first he lookedat Rajkot, the port city in his native Saurashtra facing the Rann of Kutch.Krishnakant Vakharia, who was then practising law in Rajkot, remembers thatDhirubhai came to visit. ‘He was toying with the idea of a dealership in automobilespare parts there,’ Vakharia said. ‘I had a friend who was doing just that, and whowas not doing very well. So I advised Dhirubhai that he should not go into thisbusiness, and instead of Rajkot he should go to Bombay.’ At request, Vakhariaaccompanied him down to Chorwad and stayed there a few days while Dhirubhaisounded out friends and acquaintances about ideas and help. He found support inthe family of Chambakial Damani, a second cousin (Dhirubhai’s grandfather andDamani’s grandmother were brother and sister) who had been working in Aden forfamily companies at about the same time that Dhirubhai was there. One business,Madhavas Manikchand, had imported textiles and yarns from India, ran a transitbusiness into Ethiopia, and held the agency for Bridgestone Tyres. <strong>The</strong> other,Anderjee Manekchand & Co, had imported textiles from India and Japan. Whennecessary, Dhirubhai had used the names of these firms during his own after-hourstrading.Damani’s father, Madhaylal Manikehand, had closed his businesses in Aden andEthiopia on retiring in 1957, and decided to put Rupees (Rs) 100 000 into a tradingbusiness for his son and Dhirubhai in Bombay. Vakharia saw the agreementconcluded in his presence, and returned to Rajkot. Dhirubhai and Chambaklal calledtheir new business Reliance Commercial Corp. <strong>The</strong> first office was a room of about350 square feet in Narsinathan Street, in the crowded Masjid Bandar district ofBombay. It had a telephone, one table and three chairs. If the two partners and theirinitial two employees were all present, someone had to stand.At first, the business traded spices back to the partners’ contacts in the souk ofAden-betel nut and curry ingredients- and shipped some cotton, nylon and viscosetextiles to Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. But local contacts led them quickly into thefrenetic and potentially profitable business of trading synthetic yarns - one of morethan 60 commodity markets serving all of India that were located in Bombay, nearlyall of them run by Gujaratis. <strong>The</strong> Rajkot lawyer Vakharia had introduced Dhirubhai toa fellow activist in the Socialist Party, a successful yarn trader called Mathura DasMehta. And Dhirubhai’s talented nephew Rasikbhai Meswani (the son of Dhirubhai’solder sister), had begun trading in yarns a couple of years earlier.At the tiny Masjid Bandar office, Dhirubhai began to assemble a team that stayedwith him for decades as Reliance grew. <strong>The</strong>y included Meswani, older brotherRamnikbhai who had also returned from Aden, younger brother Nathwarlal(Nathubhai) on completing his education, and two former schoolmates from
Junagadh named Rathibhai Muchhala and Narottambhai Doshi. Dhirubhai alsoenlisted the services of old acquaintances from Aden, including Liladhar GokaldasSheth, who had been a dealer in textiles, coffee and foreign exchange in Yemen,Burma and Aden (suffering several bankruptcies along the way) before settling backas a foreign exchange dealer in Bombay in the 1950s.Dhirubhai quickly became a familiar figure around the streets of Pydhonie, thesynthetic yarn trading district of Bombay where Gujarati merchants then did theirbusiness sitting on spotless white canvas gaddi floor-coverings, entering trades incompendious ledgers, and consuming endless cups of tea thick with sugar, spicesand hot milk. From late morning until about 4 pm, Pydhonie was busy with tradingas dealers made forward trades, trying to guess the future price of yarn of this orthat micron size.If cotton and silk had been the materials of India’s textile industry right from the oldhandloom days to the industrial looms of the early 20th century, by the 1950s theindustry and its consumers were hungry for the artificial threads created by modernchemical science. Nylon, viscose and polyester were cheap, hardwearing, quickdryingand crease proof, and could imitate both cotton and silk.<strong>The</strong> problem for yarn dealers at Pydhonie was not usually to find buyers but tosecure supplies. <strong>The</strong> tightening of industrial controls and import quotas sinceIndependence had choked supply of these luxuries as the economic Brahmins of NewDelhi channeled national resources towards new complexes making capital goodssuch as power stations and steel mills-what Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru calledthe ‘Temples of modern industry’.India had one viscose factory owned by the Birlas, and one government owned nylonplant. <strong>The</strong> first polyester fibre plant did not open until the 1970s. <strong>The</strong>se domesticfactories supplied only a small fraction of local demand from textile weavers.Smugglers supplied some of the demand, bringing in yarn by either misdeclaringcargoes at regular ports or simply running small ships to the numerous creeks andbeaches of India’s west coast. Made-up textiles were also smuggled as well, viaDubai or Singapore. Indian visitors to Japan’s artificial textile industries, then in theirgreat postwar expansion phase, recall seeing vast production of sari-length material,for which officially there was no open market in the subcontinent at all.<strong>The</strong> other source came from the strictly controlled import licences given to registeredexporters of textiles, allowing import of raw materials worth a certain percentage oftheir export earnings. Like many others, Dhirubhai realised that these import orreplenishment licences (known as REPS) were as good as money, even though someof them were officially not transferable and imports had to be made by the actualuser’s of the materials. By paying higher margins than any other traders, Dhirubhaisoon became the main player in the market for REP licences. <strong>The</strong> margins were tinyin the trade itself - but his dominance also put him in the position of being able toturn on and off much of the supply of yarn into the Indian market.Suresh Kothary, whose family business was importing agent for Du Pont productsincluding textile fibres, chemicals and dyes from 1958 to 1993, and also active inyarn trading, remembers first meeting Dhirubhai in 1964 at the Masjid Bandar office.Dhirubhai would often drop by at Kothary’s shopfront at Pydhonie thereafter,lounging on the white cotton mattress and drinking tea or coffee. <strong>The</strong>y were in effectrivals, as Dhirubhai mostly imported his yarns from Asahi Chemicals in Japan or Ital
- Page 2: AcknowledgementsIntroduction: an in
- Page 7 and 8: several years. I sent off some clip
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Financial Express, had carried both
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constant ridicule and demonisation.
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inquiries overseas, the little-trav
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conversion was allowed, the holding
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The company’s shares had already
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In a four-part article published ov
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The case against Reliance had been
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companies, possibly to help strengt
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Nusli Wadia’s children). Pandit b
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carrying a relentless, campaign of
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The committee asked Reliance at lea
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To clinch a prosecution under the F
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operators of the Indian havala trad
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While the law enforcers were closin
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the obligatory disclosures in the p
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On 5 December, the Central Excise a
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LETTING LOOSE A SCORPIONDhirubhai A
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identified himself as an inquiry ag
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But the CBI’s two investigating o
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had been booked into the hotel unde
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dismissing Rajiv and appointing ano
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extended and gruelling interrogatio
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BUSINESS AS USUALDhirubhai Ambani w
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udget for the year starting April 1
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asket from UTI (by value) were Lars
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on the Financial Times of London. A
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1988, two allied activists, journal
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But just as the opposing forces see
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had continued social meetings with
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they recorded Babaria calling Kirti
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arrests on 1 August. When a reporte
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After the initial appearance of Kir
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Though he could not avert the storm
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Dhirubhai’s new newspaper, launch
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and indifferent to the bloodshed in
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temple at Ayodhya, he put off the f
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arriving at Rajiv’s heavily guard
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Securities and Exchange Board of In
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The shouting continued for half an
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The 1991-92 boom helped Dhirubhai q
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Because of this burden, any other n
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the proceeds of the previous Euro-i
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The telephone licences covered near
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HOUSEKEEPING SECRETSOn 29 November
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compliant bank to give in return fo
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According to sources close to the M
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Merrill Lynch. Jain had meanwhile c
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put on its screens. On 29 November,
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1992 into the tax evasion aspects o
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At least one former fund manager, a
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and avoids a prosecution in court.
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Reliance could no longer look eithe
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other hand, the ANZ Grindlays bank