interest in various ways, Dhirubhai’s standard gratuity was a suit or sari length ofmaterial made by his factory Gradually Dhirubhai also learned the channels for largescalepolitical donations in the top echelons.In 1966, Indira Gandhi had become prime minister following the sudden death inTashkent of Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had been India’s leader since the death of herfather Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964. With her only ministerial experience theInformation portfolio under Shastri, but a lifetime of watching her father and her latehusband Firoze Gandhi in politics, Indira was well versed in Congress Partymachinations but had a shallow grasp of policies. Power steadily exacerbated a deeppsychological insecurity and a melancholic nature that led her to place inordinatetrust on unworthy people in her inner circle, as well as on her headstrong sonSanjay, who was extorting funding for his pet scheme of developing an indigenous‘people’s car’s .Among the sweeping economic changes of 1969 was one small legislativeamendment that had the effect of entrenching corruption, though its ostensibleintention had been the opposite. Until then, a section of the Companies Act alloweddirectors to make political contributions to any party. This was repealed in 1969. Ason of the officials who supervised the amendment later admitted, this led to politicalpayments by black money. Companies had to generate black funds by under/overinvoicing, fictitious sales etc. A pattern of wholesale corruption and large-scalecorporate malpractices, through double-accounting, over- invoicing and underinvoicing,came into being, creating massive unaccounted-for and therefore untaxedfunds.” One of the conduits to Indira Gandhi was a private secretary named YashpalKapur, a Hindu the Western Punjab in the 1947 Partition who displayed all thefinancially grasping tendencies this community brought across to Delhi. In all theseYears, her memoir of the Nehru and Indira Gandhi years, the well-connectedmagazine publisher Raj Thapar recalls Kapur thus: “ one glance at him and you feltthe grease all over you. He was smooth and unintelligent, outwardly vacuous andinwardly scheming who then only performed what we called the chai-pani [teamaking]jobs, or so we thought in our innocence.’ By 1971, Thapar noted howKapur’s role had taken on a weird shape. Yashpal Kapur, that oily cupbearer, wasgrowing in stature by the minute and his corruption was becoming legend and hisability to get Indira to sign on the dotted line became the bazaar gossip,’ she wrote.Thapar’s bureaucrat husband Romesh, who early had been a trusted confidant ofIndira, felt duty-bound to tell Indira. ‘e sought an appointment, went to the office,gave her a run-down of what the average person was thinking, of how the PM’s officenow harboured a nest of corrupt people led by the favoured Yashpal. She wasfurious. “You know I would never touch a penny.” “Maybe, but you are seen as thequeen bee. <strong>The</strong> others do the collecting.” Thapar went on:“…in unending string ofstories were current about Yashpal’s power, how he was sought by the high andmighty, how he was well in with Sanjay who was beginning, bit by nibbling bit, totamper with the administration in his favour. Yashpal was of course no longer in thePM’s office. His place had been taken by his nephew, R. K. Dhawan, who was rapidlyto assume much vaster powers than his erstwhile uncle and together they were tomanipulate patronage in this vast country.” Dhirubhai not only cultivated YashpalKapur, says one old acquaintance, ‘e practically purchased him’. In due course, therelationship passed on to R. K. Dhawan, who moved eventually from the primeminister’s office under Indira and then Rajiv Gandhi into parliament and ministerialportfolios himself. Over the years, Dhirubhai developed close ties with politicians inmany parties. <strong>The</strong>se included figures such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, senior leader ofthe Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party who became prime minister of a brief
minority government in 1996, and several on the left such as Chandrashekhar,another short-term prime minister in 1990-91. But his strongest connections werealways with the Gandhi coterie’s within Congress, even though he never likedIndira’s socialistic policy phase in 1969-70, and then later with P V Narasimha Raowho took over the Congress mainstream and prime ministership in 1991.<strong>The</strong> links were not always based on money, however. Dhirubhai is widelyacknowledged to be a masterful exponent of his own business visions, which havegenerally been more farsighted than those of almost anyone else among India’sbusiness leaders. He was quick to grasp that many Indian politicians, officials andbankers could be captivated by intellectual excitement or flattery at being in theinner circle of such an emerging tycoon. Should such individuals’ later show signs ofself-interest or personal financial difficulty, Dhirubhai or one of his lieutenants wouldpick up the signals. A post-retirement job, a business opportunity for a child, indirectfunding or a burst of inspired publicity might then follow for the person concerned.Dhirubhai also played on the perception that he was an outsider and ‘upstart’ whodeserved help to break through the glass ceilings of vested interest and privilege inthe business community. That there was an inner circle in the ‘licence Raj’ theallocation by New Delhi of licences to set up factories and expand productioncapacity-was evidenced in 1967 with a report by a Bombay University economist, R.K. Hazare, to the Planning Commission which revealed that the Birla group ofcompanies had received 20 per cent of the licensed industrial investment approvedby the government between 1957 and 1966. <strong>The</strong> early support given by GhansyamDas Birla to Mahatma Gandhi had certainly paid off in the independent India ruled byCongress. Writing in 1981 on Birla’s 88th birthday, the journalist T N. Ninan notedthat the Birla companies had multiplied from 20 in 1945 to about 150. ‘f anyindustrial house benefited from the licence-permit raj,’ wrote Ninan, ‘It was thehouse that Birla built.’ Birla’s rapid expansion contrasted with the moderate growthof the Tata group, the Parsi-controlled empire that had grown strongly under Britishrule. <strong>The</strong> then head of Tata, J. R. D. Tata, told an interviewer: ‘I think it wrong for abusinessman to run newspapers [the Birlas had set up <strong>The</strong> Hindustan Times, thestrongest paper in New Delhi], wrong for him to play a political role ... But it doesseem that others who do not mind mixing politics with business have done extremelywell for themselves.’ For G. D. Birla, his political connections and the ostentatiousphilanthropy that saw various Birla institutes and garish Hindu temples built aroundIndia were all supportive of his preordained role. As the Bhagavad Gita says, everyman must do his duty, which means if you are a wealthy man, you must do yourduty by your wealth,’ the Birla patriarch reasoned. A businessman’s karma [fate] isto amass wealth and his dharma [duty] is to provide for the general welfare. Ifpolitical action is involved in this, I don’t see why I should feel shy of it.’One of earliest backers, the banker and politician T A. Pay, falls into the category ofintellectual sympathizer. Pai came from an extraordinary upper-caste family based inthe tiny village of Manipal on the Karnataka coast, far south of Bombay. It is still anout-of-the-way place, on a barren hilltop overlooking the sweep of palm trees andexposed beaches fronting the Arabian Sea. In 1925 the Pai family had establishedthe Syndicate Bank there. By the mid-1960s it was the tenth largest Indian bank,with some 190 branches. As well as bankers, the Pai’s were educationists and usedtheir wealth to found a college at Manipal in 1942. It has since grown into one ofIndia’s largest private universities, attracting fee-paying students from Malaysia, theMiddle East and the West Indies.
- Page 2: AcknowledgementsIntroduction: an in
- Page 7 and 8: several years. I sent off some clip
- Page 9 and 10: esearch led me into all corners of
- Page 11 and 12: A PERSUASIVE YOUNG BANIAAmong all t
- Page 13 and 14: proportion of these from Kathiawar.
- Page 15 and 16: looked far beyond their immediate p
- Page 17 and 18: which involved boycotting imported
- Page 19 and 20: One of the students was a fellow Mo
- Page 21 and 22: The outpost had been a punishment s
- Page 23 and 24: As he developed more familiarity wi
- Page 25 and 26: water and haven for international t
- Page 27 and 28: Junagadh named Rathibhai Muchhala a
- Page 29 and 30: eing ‘suite luxurious’ compared
- Page 31 and 32: Dhirubhai was again lucky in that,
- Page 33: A FIRST-CLASS FOUNTAINDhirubhai Amb
- Page 37 and 38: Corporation of India. Soon afterwar
- Page 39 and 40: Over two years in the early 1970s,
- Page 41 and 42: captive market. The ‘Eleven Day W
- Page 43 and 44: GURU OF THE EQUITY CULTIndira Gandh
- Page 45 and 46: politicisation of the machinery Fro
- Page 47 and 48: By the end of 1986, Dhirubhai was t
- Page 49 and 50: Reliance made sure that a comment b
- Page 51 and 52: half-hour of panic just before the
- Page 53 and 54: politicians and bureaucrats. ‘It
- Page 55 and 56: Friends in the right PlacesThis was
- Page 57 and 58: act of parliament as far back as 19
- Page 59 and 60: control, and a very long and favour
- Page 61 and 62: in the Telegraph’s leader. Facing
- Page 63 and 64: In December 1983, Dhirubhai had hos
- Page 65 and 66: Pydhonic to sell his polyester and
- Page 67 and 68: give money to political parties. We
- Page 69 and 70: estimated demand of 80 000 tonnes o
- Page 71 and 72: support the big investment in domes
- Page 73 and 74: others. Orkay was accused of pledgi
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- Page 79 and 80: constant ridicule and demonisation.
- Page 81 and 82: inquiries overseas, the little-trav
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The company’s shares had already
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In a four-part article published ov
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The case against Reliance had been
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companies, possibly to help strengt
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Nusli Wadia’s children). Pandit b
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carrying a relentless, campaign of
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The committee asked Reliance at lea
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To clinch a prosecution under the F
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operators of the Indian havala trad
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While the law enforcers were closin
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the obligatory disclosures in the p
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On 5 December, the Central Excise a
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LETTING LOOSE A SCORPIONDhirubhai A
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identified himself as an inquiry ag
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But the CBI’s two investigating o
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had been booked into the hotel unde
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dismissing Rajiv and appointing ano
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extended and gruelling interrogatio
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BUSINESS AS USUALDhirubhai Ambani w
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udget for the year starting April 1
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asket from UTI (by value) were Lars
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on the Financial Times of London. A
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1988, two allied activists, journal
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But just as the opposing forces see
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had continued social meetings with
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they recorded Babaria calling Kirti
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arrests on 1 August. When a reporte
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After the initial appearance of Kir
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Though he could not avert the storm
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Dhirubhai’s new newspaper, launch
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and indifferent to the bloodshed in
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temple at Ayodhya, he put off the f
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arriving at Rajiv’s heavily guard
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Securities and Exchange Board of In
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The shouting continued for half an
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The 1991-92 boom helped Dhirubhai q
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Because of this burden, any other n
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the proceeds of the previous Euro-i
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The telephone licences covered near
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HOUSEKEEPING SECRETSOn 29 November
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compliant bank to give in return fo
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According to sources close to the M
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Merrill Lynch. Jain had meanwhile c
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put on its screens. On 29 November,
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1992 into the tax evasion aspects o
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At least one former fund manager, a
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and avoids a prosecution in court.
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Reliance could no longer look eithe
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other hand, the ANZ Grindlays bank